The role of education in the labour market : an empirical analysis by Matthew O. Haynes (7195505)
I • Lot,Jgh~orough 
• Uruverslty 
Pllklngton Library 
I 
Author/Filing Title ............. l:\~::f.~.1 .. ':d...:.9.: ..................... . 
............................................ _ ..................................................... . 
Accession/Copy No. 
Vol. No ..........••.•••. Class Mark •..••.......•.•........•..•...•.••....••.•...... 
26 JUN 1998 
-~ ,.1 ~. i ', .... ) ~ 'J L.:.:.v ~~..;J 

The Role of Education in the Labour Market: 
An Empirical Analysis 
By 
Matthew Haynes 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy . 
: . -""" ·- ,. ··-·. -. . .. - .. 
' . 
..... 
. : .. : ' . . .·: 
Department of Economics 
Lbughborough University 
; _,- .. ·. 
June 1997 
© by Matthew Haynes 1997 
' !-
Abstract 
It is generally accepted that a more educated workforce can provide more 
economic growth. However, the extent to which personal benefits outweigh the 
social benefits of higher education has become not only an economic issue, but 
also a political issue. Voicing screening sympathies, Chancellor Kenneth Clarke 
asked 'why should bus drivers pay for the education of lawyers?' when cutting 
student grants in 1993 [The Economist 22/4/95]. 
The screening theories of the 1970's posited that, in some circumstances, if 
higher education was only signalling and not improving a person's ability, then 
society may be better off without higher education. A less extreme view is that 
some component of education acts solely as a signal and is socially worthless. 
There has been relatively little attention paid to testing the role of 
education in the labour market of the United Kingdom and Italy. One reason may 
be the shortage of suitable data sets available for such tests. This Thesis utilises 
UK and Italian data sets and aims to redress some of the imbalance in empirical 
work which tends to centre on data from United States. 
It is important to test the educational screening hypothesis in the context 
both of revisions in UK government policy towards the funding of higher 
education and the aim of convergence of labour market conditions within the 
European Union. 
The key objective of this Thesis is to investigate the role of education in 
the determination of wage rates for full-time work in the UK and Italy. The 
empirical analysis generally supports the hypothesis that education has both a 
screening and a productivity augmenting role. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The emergence and expansion of graduate loans in the United Kingdom and the 
simultaneous capping of student grants can be seen as another step in the 
Conservative government's education policy towards individual funding rather 
than central funding for higher education. The relationship_between higher 
-··--------
education and earnings is clear; for example, jnJ 992. male university graduates in 
---·""" ' ' '' .. . 
the UK earned £433 a week on average, compared with £277 for men who had 
<---·--•M•O' -- •• ·~·-~··-·-·--
only A-levels. What is unclear is how higher education should be funded. As 
Kenneth Clarke, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, posited when he cut student 
grants in 1993 'why should bus drivers pay for the education of lawyers?' [The 
Economist April 22nd 1995 p. 20]. 
In 1995 student grants were cut by 8 percent in the UK, with a 
corresponding rise in the size of student loans available in line with estimated 
inflation. In 1996 all three main UK political parties were discussing the 
introduction of a 'graduate tax'. For example, the Labour Party presented 
proposals for higher rates of National Insurance (NI) contributions for graduates 
and an abolition of student grants, in favour of a scheme of larger loans, to the 
Dearing committee of inquiry into university funding in the 21st century. 1 In 
addition, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principles (CVCP) announced 
in September 1996 that they were recommending to the Dearing committee that 
the fundamental principle of free tuition for full time university students be 
abandoned. Under the scheme proposed by the CVCP, students would pay 
approximately £20,000 over three years towards the cost of their university 
education (paying maintenance and approximately a third of tuition fees) via a 
new long-term loan scheme funded by banks. The loans would be paid back to 
the banks via a supplementary NI levy on graduates of approximately 3% of 
I Sir Ron Dearing will present the results of the inquiry after the general election in 1997. 
1.1 
taxable income via a collections agency. To date none of the political parties has 
adopted the idea of repayable tuition fees [see Carve! ( 1996) for more details]. 
The CVCP estimate that legislation enabling universities to charge 
undergraduates for tuition and maintenance costs would save the government 
approximately £6 billion per year [Carve! (1996)]. Such proposals would appear 
to be not only a way in which to conserve government resources but also a move 
towards a 'pay your own way' philosophy as regards higher education. This 
philosophy is mirrored in other nations and is economically justified, regardless of 
the government expenditure reduction, under a screening model of education but 
not a human capital modeJ.2 
The relationship between annual earnings and education can be seen from 
Table 1.1 for full-timers working in the UK and Italy. Generally as education 
increases so too do earnings. For example, a woman working full-time in the UK 
who has a university degree earns approximately 110% more on average per year 
than a woman with no formal qualifications. 
The human capital and screening models have been developed by labour 
economists to explain the relationship between education and earnings which 
generally exists in all economies. While education is partly a consumption good 
for some individuals, in that they derive non-pecuniary utility from having an 
education, it also treated by most individuals as an investment in the future. For 
example, most university students are aware of the direct costs of their education; 
rent, costs of tuition, textbooks, energy bills and other living expenses, and the 
indirect costs in the form of foregone earnings. In both models of education these 
costs are compared to the expected increased earnings derived from having a high 
level of education. Other examples of expected benefits from having a high level 
of education are increased job opportunities and higher social status, which may 
also have a positive effect on earnings levels. 
In both models it is also the case that employers will pay those with more 
education a higher than average wage. Where the models differ is in the 
assumptions about why a high level of education can lead to increased earnings. 
2 This argument becomes more complex when we allow for the fact that the capital market is 
imperfect; students may not be able to borrow at the rate of interest which corresponds to the rate 
of return from the increased education for which they need the loan. 
1.2 
In the human capital model the person who has a higher level of education 
receives higher earnings because the increased level of education has increased 
his or her productive ability on the job. In the so called 'strong screening' model 
the individual who has a higher level of education receives higher earnings 
because the level of education is a signal of that individual's innate ability which 
is unchanged by higher education. 
Table 1.1: Earnings versus Education for UK and Italian Full-timers by Gender 
Country: UK Italv 
Real Earnings Household Earnings 
Education Level Pounds Sterline I OOO's Italian Lira 
Male Female Male Female 
University Graduate 15351 10855 20435 11730 
A-Levels (or equivalent) 9970 6323 16867 11023 
No Qualifications 8181 5138 11632 10632 
.. Notes: Calculated from Bnttsh Soctal Attttudes Survey 1985-1991 and Survey on Consumptton by 
Italian Families (family heads) 1989 data; UK Real Annual Earnings measured 
at 1986 prices Italian Household Annual Earnings measured at 1989 prices. 
The strong screening model suggests that the relationship between higher 
education and individual earnings does not include productivity improvement and 
this may justifY a self-funding policy. Conversely, the human capital model 
suggests that the relationship between higher education and individual earnings 
does include productivity improvement and therefore national productivity 
increases, and so central funding from taxation is justified since higher education 
is benefiting the nation. Finally, in the 'weak screening' hypothesis education 
both enhances and signals productivity, and the funding options are not so clear. 3 
In the 1990's there is reason to appraise these models theoretically and 
empirically because of their domestic and international policy implications. The 
recent proposals in relation to the funding of higher education offer prima facie 
evidence of screening sympathies in the main political parties of the UK. If 
evidence is found in support of the notion of strong screening then the self-
funding policies are justified because there is a divergence between private and 
social marginal benefit of higher education. However, if evidence is found in 
3 Note that this has ignored the possibility of positive externalities from higher education which are 
not related to individual productivity. For example, students in higher education who proceed into 
research opportunities may help develop new technologies and increased levels of knowledge which 
benefit society as a whole. 
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support of the weak screening model then the debate should centre upon which 
certificates are typically acquired as screens (and have little effect on 
productivity) and which certificate courses augment productivity to a greater 
extent. Finally, if there is no evidence of any form of screening then self-funding 
is not justified on the basis of a screening argument. However, even in a no-
screening human capital framework, if education is providing the wrong skills for 
the modern economy, the policy-maker may choose to increase investment in on-
the-job training schemes and contract central funding of higher education. 
In an international context if educational screening occurs to different 
degrees in different member states of the European Union (EU) then this will 
interfere with the aim of labour market convergence outlined in the Treaty on 
European Union (signed at Maastricht, 7th Feb. 1992). Although some 
professional qualifications have become comparable across member states, 
differences in the role of education in the domestic labour markets of member 
states have been largely over-looked. Under the screening hypothesis, an 
educational certificate which signals that a worker is of high ability in one 
member state may not do so in another member state; this may introduce 
inefficiencies into the levels of labour mobility within the EU. 
The aim of this Thesis is to test the conflicting theories of the role of 
education in the labour market of the UK and Italy. I will estimate the effects of 
education on full-time wage rates and, using a number of methodologies, test 
whether these effects are due to the screening and/or human capital role of 
education. Taking the UK and Italy as examples ofEU member states I also aim 
to illustrate the disparities that lie in the returns to and role of education in their 
domestic labour markets. 
Chapter 2 of this Thesis reviews the main theoretical articles developing 
the educational screening hypothesis. An asymmetric information problem is 
presumed to exist in the labour market and this is the basis for the screening 
models. It is hypothesised that education is used by a worker or job-applicant to 
signal their individual ability; a characteristic which the employer cannot observe 
directly until the worker has spent some time in a monitored workplace 
environment. The theoretical models ofSpence (1973), Arrow (1973) and Stiglitz 
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(1975) are outlined. These models developed the idea that education is used as a 
signal of ability by workers, or as a screen for ability by firms, rather than the idea 
that education is solely an investment in human capital. 
Chapter 2 also outlines the game theoretical analysis of signalling theory 
conducted by Riley (1975,1985), Yabushita (1983), Stiglitz & Weiss (1983), and 
Cho & Kreps (1987). The conclusion of Chapter 2 discusses how such models 
can compliment later models of wage determination such as union bargaining 
theory and the efficiency wage hypothesis. 
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical work, spanning over two decades, which 
has been carried out to assess the importance of the educational screening 
hypothesis in the market for labour. The empirical articles are reviewed 
according to the methodology used to test the screening hypothesis. The 
overwhelming indication from the majority of empirical work is that human 
capital rather than the strong screening hypothesis best explains the earnings-
education relationship. However, rejection of the weak screening hypothesis, in 
which education signals and improves ability, cannot be supported when account 
is taken of the biases of individual methodologies and data sets used. The overall 
conclusion is that there is little doubt as to the validity of human capital theory, 
but that the importance of the informational role of education is still open to 
debate. 
In Chapter 4 the performance of the traditional human capital model in 
explaining the earnings-education relationship is tested on data for male and 
female full-time workers from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey 1985-
1991, and the results are compared to previous UK estimations. 
Chapter 4 outlines the human capital theory of Mincer (1974) which has 
traditionally been employed to model the effects of education and experience 
upon earnings. In recent times this model has been challenged by, amongst 
others, Murphy & Welch (1990) and Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) and these 
alternative human capital earnings functions are also outlined. The human capital 
functions are then estimated using the BSA Survey data and comparisons made 
between the three models. The hypothesis that the marginal rate of return to years 
of education is not constant as years of education increase is tested. The effects 
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of certification upon the wage rates of full-timers is analysed and linked to the 
variation in the marginal rate of return to years of education. The overall 
conclusion from this Chapter is that although the traditional Mincerian human 
capital model is a robust model of the effects of education in the determination of 
earnings, it does not allow for variation in the marginal rate of return to education 
and the effects of certification upon wage rates. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 test the less traditional explanation of the 
education-earnings relationship; the educational screening hypothesis. The 
majority of empirical tests of the screening hypothesis reviewed in Chapter 3 used 
US data. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the screening hypothesis is tested using the 
BSA Survey data for the UK, and in Chapter 7 using Bank of Italy Survey of 
Consumption in Italian Families data for 1989. 
In Chapter 5, a methodology similar to that of Wolpin (1977), Riley 
(1979a), Katz & Ziderman (1980), Fredland & Little (1981), Shah (1985), Tucker 
(1985), Cohn et a! (1987), and Grubb (1993) is employed. These economists test 
the educational screening hypothesis by comparing the earnings of self-employed 
workers, who are used to represent unscreened workers, to the earnings of 
employees, who have been used to represent screened workers. 
Details of the samples of self-employed and employees taken from the 
BSA Survey data are presented alongside a discussion of the characteristics of the 
self-employed in the data in relation to the findings of previous UK studies. 
Goodness of fit and model specification test results for the estimation of full-time 
wage rate equations for male and female workers are also shown. The expected 
results under the weak screening hypothesis, where education has a signalling and 
human capital role, are compared to the actual results from estimating the wage 
rate functions for the two worker types, and some conclusions drawn from this 
analysis. 
In Chapter 6 comparisons are made between economic sectors, 
occupations, tenure or education groups which are assumed to be characterised by 
different levels of educational screening. Two of the hypotheses to be tested in 
Chapter 6 relate to the strong version of the screening hypothesis as presented by 
Psacharopoulos ( 1979). The expected results under the screening hypotheses are 
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compared to the actual results of estimating wage rate equations by occupational 
class, sector, tenure group or education group. 
The overall conclusions from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is that there is no 
evidence to support the strong screening hypothesis in relation to the UK labour 
market. There is however evidence to support the weak screening hypothesis and 
human capital theory in relation to the UK. 
Chapter 7 tests the screening hypothesis in Italy using data on full-time 
workers from 1989. This is done by applying methodologies similar to those used 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. As far as I am aware there has been no attempt to test 
the screening hypothesis in relation to Italy to date, and there appears to be a 
general lack of evidence in relation to most of the member states of the European 
Community. The data set is taken from the 1989 wave of the 'Survey on 
Consumption by Italian Families' (SCIF) commissioned by the Bank ofltaly. 
Chapter 7 also investigates the nature of the labour market in Italy. Some 
background to the economic dualism of the North and South ofltaly is given, and 
regional full-time wage rate equations are estimated and discussed. 
The EU has stated that it wishes to open national markets to competition 
among member states. Despite the adoption of the first Social Action Programme 
in 1974 many critics believed that labour market reform in member states of the 
EU was lagging behind the reforms occurring in other EU markets, and the 
laissez-faire approach to the labour market should itself be revised [see Brown et 
a! (1996)]. 
The labour market did not escape the aim of 'convergence' of markets 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, and the subsequent 'Social Charter' which laid 
down principles regarding the labour market with the aim of making working 
conditions, levels of social security and worker protection uniform across the 
labour markets ofEU member states. 
With the aim of free movement of people between member states the EU 
established a number of harmonised national qualifications for specific 
professions; for example the 'right of establishment' was realised for doctors, 
nurses, dentists, midwifes, architects, vets and pharmacists from one member 
state working in another member state. In 1988 the EU also established a system 
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of mutual recognition that could be used to compare higher education 
qualifications, which are legally regulated either by the State or by professional 
bodies, across member states [see Raban (1991) pp. 5-19]. 
Although EU directives may eventually lead to certain uniformities in the 
labour markets of member states, and some qualifications have become 
comparable across member states, differences in the role of and rate of return to 
education between member states has been largely over-looked. Chapter 7 
therefore presents some comparisons between the labour market for full-time 
workers in the UK and in Italy in 1989. 
The overall conclusion from Chapter 7 is that there is no support for the 
strong screening hypothesis, and some evidence to support weak screening 
hypothesis and human capital theory in relation to the Italian labour market. 
Evidence of labour market dualism is found and differences in the effects of 
education in earnings determination between the UK and Italy are illustrated. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents general conclusions relating to the analysis of 
the role of education in determining wage rates in the UK and Italy and highlights 
potential areas for research in the future. 
In summary, this Thesis makes a contribution to labour and education 
economics by presenting an empirical analysis of the role of education in the 
labour markets for full-time workers in the UK and Italy; countries which have 
been neglected in previous empirical literature. Using two data sets this Thesis 
also illustrates the disparities in the formation of wage rates between these two 
EU member states. 
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Chapter 2 
The Theoretical Foundations of the Educational 
Screening Hypothesis 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the concept of education as a screening device and the possibility of 
allocative inefficiency can be traced back as far as Young (1958) or Hull & Peters 
(1969), and the effects of asymmetric information in a market was first elucidated 
by Akerlof (1970), the foundations for the idea that education could be used by 
workers to signal their abilities to potential employers are generally attributed to 
Spence (1973). Spence's (1973) article can be seen as the major catalyst to the 
theoretical debate and empirical study of the role of education in the labour 
market which arose in the 1970's. Over this period many notable economists, 
including Arrow and Stiglitz, debated whether the education-earnings relationship 
was solely a human capital relationship, where the return to education was a 
return to the productivity improvement it created, or whether a large portion of 
education was redundant in the sense that it was only a signal of innate 
productivity. 
In this Chapter I will look at the main theoretical articles developing the 
screening hypothesis, before reviewing the main empirical studies relating. to the 
subject in Chapter 3. Section 2.2 of this Chapter outlines the asymmetric 
information problem which is assumed to exist in the labour market and which is 
the basis for screening models. In Section 2.3 I review Spence's (1973) model 
and his later modifications, and the models of Arrow (1973).and Stiglitz (1975) 
which also developed the idea of education as a screening device. 
Section 2.4 covers the later developments of signalling theory re-
constructed in a game theoretic framework by Riley (1975,1985), Yabushita 
(1983), Stiglitz & Weiss (1983), and Cho & Kreps (1987). Yabushita (1983) and 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) allow for different orderings of 'moves' in the Stiglitz 
(1975) model. Essentially, in Stiglitz (1975) applicants acted first by deciding on 
signalling behaviour, whereas in these later theories the possibility that the firms 
act first is developed. Riley (1975,1985) shows that if we allow for the idea that 
firms may wish to test their beliefs about the relationship between signal and 
productivity, the precise identification of the competitive signalling equilibrium in 
the Spencian model is a very subtle concept and not as simply defined as Spence 
first conceived. Cho & Kreps (1987) offer insights in how to identify a dominant 
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equilibrium from the multitude of possible signalling equilibria, and therefore 
allow us also to comment on the social efficiency of the Spencian model. Section 
2.5 draws some general conclusions from these models. 
2.2 The Asymmetric Information Problem and Screening 
When worker heterogeneity is considered in the labour market economists model 
the way in which workers convey information about themselves to potential 
employers. In such models it is usually assumed that workers' heterogeneity can 
be summed up in one attribute termed 'quality' or 'ability' which is positively 
correlated with productivity. In the screening models the market is assumed to be 
characterised by a large number of small competitive profit maximising firms who 
would like to hire workers who best suit the job in terms of these characteristics.! 
An asymmetry of information is assumed in that workers can directly 
observe their individual abilities, whereas the firm cannot, but can acquire indirect 
information about individual ability. The firm knows the statistical distribution of 
abilities within the population, but given the limited information at its disposal 
cannot differentiate between workers for whom it has the same indirect 
information. 
If the firm makes no attempt to estimate the ability of new workers via 
indirect information and bases the wage paid to them on average expected 
marginal productivity, there will be an adverse selection problem since this wage 
will be below the reservation wage of a proportion of applicants. Assuming a 
positive correlation between a worker's reservation wage and ability, it will be the 
high ability applicants who will not want to work for the average wage. The firm 
will therefore be recruiting only low ability workers, resulting in allocative 
inefficiency since the wage is above the marginal product of labour hired. Low 
quality workers crowd out the high quality workers from the workforce of such a 
firm.2 
If the production technology necessitates the use of both types of worker, 
the firm offering the average wage may be forced to change the wage setting 
behaviour towards a scheme of separate high and low wages simply to stay in 
business. An optimising firm requiring both types of worker in its production 
process would like to find a way of avoiding this adverse selection problem. On 
the other side of the market, workers with higher ability will have an incentive to 
1Note that Spence (1973) flrst uses a model in which there is one employer and two types of 
worker, and then expands the analysis in Spence (1976) to a labour market characterised by a targe 
number of identical competitive employers. 
2This is analogous to the work of Akerlof (1970) concerning the market for used cars where the 
poor quality used cars crowded the good quality used cars from the market. 
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reveal their ability if they can get a higher wage by identifying themselves 
somehow. 
A screening process is a selection procedure which picks out applicants 
who possess a critical amount of a certain observable characteristic which is 
known as a signal of the hidden characteristic. The amount an applicant possesses 
of this signal is correlated with expected ability of the worker so that the firm can 
rank applicants' expected ability on the basis of their endowment of this signal. 
A perfect signal would be some characteristic which is perfectly correlated 
with ability, and ideally has no cost for high ability workers, and a very large cost 
for low ability workers. However, some cost may be incurred by the signaller and 
therefore an assumption is made that this cost is negatively correlated with ability. 
This assumption is made to overcome the moral hazard problem of a low ability 
applicant having the incentive to masquerade as a high ability applicant and 
acquire a high wage. An effective screening process should therefore rely on a 
signal which is accurately correlated with ability in the sense that a low ability 
worker finds it too costly to acquire the critical level of the signal which indicates 
high ability. 
The most obvious and most studied signal of individual ability is 
education, and it is generally accepted to be the case that the cost of acquiring 
education is inversely related to ability. Spence (1973) treats education as a scalar 
amount i.e. years of education, and in Arrow (1973) the education signal is 
college graduation. However, Spence does suggest that educational 'level' can be 
a vector of information and not simply years of education, but also quality of 
education, certificates, field of study, and grades. 
Individuals may invest in education regardless of its signalling role, so the 
signal is available to firms with no prompting and it can be used by most firms as 
an indicator of ability since it is easily observable and verifiable. The firm to 
which a worker applies must trade-off the cost of the screening method it employs 
with the quality of results it obtains, and since observing education levels costs 
the firm very little, this screening method is preferred to more costly alternatives. 
However, the educational screening models assume that educational information 
is the only potential screen of worker ability that can be employed by the firm. 
The firm is therefore assumed to be unable to screen on-the-job and cannot offer 
self-selection contracts contingent upon ability [see Salop & Salop (1976)]. 
The 'strong screening' hypotheses of Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) 
hold that education is used as a signal by workers to inform firms of their ability · 
levels which are not augmented by the acquisition of that education. In contrast, 
the human capital model holds that education does augment productivity by 
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providing individuals with new skills and developing their latent skills [see 
Mincer (1974) and Becker (1975)]. 
Credentialist theories, such as that of Thurow (1975), model the of use 
educational credentials or trade association membership as a misleading signal of 
ability [also see the sociological models of Berg (1971) and Dore (1976)]. 
Thurow reaches a similar conclusion to that of Arrow (1973) in that graduates 
may be over-employed and enjoy higher earnings than if no screening took place. 
However, in the credentialing models firms are assumed to be willing to pay a 
premium to gradutes although they are no more productive than non-graduates 
and in this sense the models deviate from the normal assumption that firms aim to 
profit maximise and the result that the screen is accurate in selecting those 
workers with higher productivities. Any firm paying unwarrented salary 
premiums to graduates would soon realise it was placing itself at a competitive 
disadvantage in comparison to rival firms paying salaries in line with productivity 
[see Rawlins & Ulman (1974) for a review of credentialing theories]. 
In the 'weak screening' models of Spence (1976) and Stiglitz (1975) 
workers invest in education both as a way to signal and augment their abilities. 
Some empiricists tend to develop this model further and allow for the educational 
signal being a vector of information including years of education, highest 
qualification held, field of study and quality of education [Taubman & Wales 
(1973), Rizzuto & Wachter (1979) and Fox (1993) study the effects of schooling 
quality upon earnings]. 
Section 2.3 reviews the work of Spence (1973), Arrow (1973) and Stiglitz 
(1975) which can be seen as the theoretical foundations for screening hypotheses. 
Section 2.4 reviews the later work of Yabushita (1983), Stiglitz & Weiss (1983), 
Riley (1985) and Cho & Kreps (1987) in reappraising the work of Stiglitz and 
Spence. Section 2.5 presents some overall conclusions for this literature survey. 
2.3 Early Models 
2_3.1 Spence's "Passive Response" Model (1973) 
In Spence's (1973) model the typical firm cannot directly observe the ability of the 
workers prior to hiring, and in which workers fall into two groups; Group l have 
low marginal productivity a,., and Group 2 have a higher marginal productivity 
a,_ > a1 • Proportion h of the population are in Group 1 and (1- h) are in Group 2. 
The firm's inability to perceive a worker's ability until he or she has been 
hired and has been monitored on the job for a certain amount of time may cause 
significant adverse selection problems in the functioning of the market. If no 
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signal exists that could be used by workers to show potential employers their 
individual ability then the risk neutral firm will pay a wage based on expected 
average ability; 
(1) w = (1- h)a,. + ha1 
Assuming agreement between the two groups of workers to work at this 
wage then no adverse selection problem will arise. However it is natural for 
Group 2 workers to expect to earn a wage at least equal to their marginal product 
a,., and given that 17t <a,. then w < a2• Group 2 will not offer their services in 
this labour market since their reservation wage has not been met, this leaves a 
supply of Group 1 workers. In the long run it may be that the firm will realise that 
it is only attracting low-productivity workers, and will reduce its wage offer to llt. 
However in the short run we have assumed that productivity is unobservable, and 
this means that an equilibrium exists where only Group 1 workers are employed, 
at a wage higher than their marginal product. This is an example of adverse 
selection due to asymmetric information. 
Spence suggests that workers use a particular level of education to prove 
their ability, in a similar way to that of a used car salesman offering a warranty on 
a car to prove it is of good quality in Akerlof (1970). Suppose workers in Group 
1 obtain a level of education y1 at a cost c1y1, and those in Group 2 a level y2 at 
cost c2y2, where y1 and c1 are the amount of education consumed and the constant 
marginal cost of that level of education to a worker from Group i. These costs are 
not only monetary (such as tuition fees and accommodation costs) but also the 
cost in time and mental effort. The equilibrium that emerges from this model 
depends critically on the assumption that costs of the signal are negatively related 
to productivity, so that c2 < c1 • 
The firm will have a set of probabilistic beliefs on which it bases its wage 
offers. These beliefs are influenced by the firm's observation of the relationship 
between the workers' signals and indices and their productivity. 'Indices' include 
such things as race, height and sex, which are presumed to be unalterable by the 
worker. 
The worker makes a signalling decision based on the offered wage 
schedule and signal costs with the aim of maximising their net income. There is 
thus an 'informational feedback loop' in the labour market, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
There will be an equilibrium if the firm's initial probabilistic beliefs after one loop 
are not disconfirmed by the information input they generate i.e. once any decision 
by worker or firm in the loop is repeated. 
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If the firm believes that there is a level of education y *, such that if y < 
y * then productivity is ~ with a probability of 1, and that if y ~ y * the 
productivity is ~ with probability of I, then it will offer a worker their respective 
expected productivity (this wage offer can also include the returns to education as 
a capital good). 
Figure 2.1: Informational Feedback Loop in the Screening Process 
Firm's conditional probabilistic beliefs .. Offered wage scbedule as a 
r function of educational signals 
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Hiring and observation of the 
.. 
relationship between productivity 
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Applicant Signalling Behaviour 
and educational signals 
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Signalling Costs 
Workers faced with the offered wage schedule have to decide how much 
education to acquire. Note that in this model it is assumed, for simplicity, that 
education is purely a signalling device and has no effect on a workers' 
productivity; it is therefore called a strong screening hypothesis. 
Consider the situation where the high-productivity workers all get a level 
of education y2 = y *, and that low-productivity workers get y1 = 0, and the firm 
pays workers with y, = y * a wage of ~ and workers with y, < y * a wage of a1• 
This will be an equilibrium if no party has an incentive to change their behaviour. 
The firm will be paying each worker a wage equal to their marginal product, it 
will be maximising returns and will have no incentive to change its behaviour. 
The benefit to a worker of obtaining y * education is an increase in wages 
(a2 - a1) given the firm's offered wage schedule. The benefits are less than the 
costs for a Group I worker if 
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condition (2) holds if the workers will choose y1 = 0 because by doing so they 
maximise the difference between offered wages and signalling costs. The net 
benefit is positive for a Group 2 worker if 
condition (3) holds if the workers will choose y * education, since further 
increases in y2 above y * will incur costs with no corresponding benefits. 
The equilibrium situation is depicted in Figure 2.2; the conditional wage 
schedule is w(y) and cost curves are c1 (y) and c2(y) with c2 > c1 in postive 
space. The maximum vertical distance between the wage schedule and costs (i.e. 
maximum net benefit) occurs at Y; = y * for Group 2 workers and at Y; = 0 for 
Group 1 workers. 
Figure 2.2 : Optimal Choice of Education in a Signalling Equilibrium 
£'s 
cl(y) 
a2 
c2(y) 
0" y*" optimal choice for Type-! optimal choice for Type-2 
Combining conditions (2) and (3) gives y * in the interval; 
quantity of 
education 
Given the wage schedule offered and the assumptions that ~ > ~ and 
c1 > c2 there will be an infinite number of possible values of y * within the 
interval in (4), and therefore an infinite number of separating equilibria exist in 
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which the firm is able to make exact point predictions about the productivity of 
the workers. 
The various equilibria are not all equivalent in terms of Pareto's welfare 
criteria.3 Increasing y * will hurt Group 2 by reducing the net benefit of 
signalling, while leaving Group I unaffected. A Group 1 worker earns 
w = (1- h)az +ha,. with no signalling, and a,. with signalling; given that tlz >a,. 
and that 0 < h < 1 the Group 1 worker earns less under signalling than without. 
Spence proves that Group 2 workers are only better off if h > c2 I c1 [see p.365 
Spence (1973) for a proof]. 
Given the signalling equilibrium, the individual may gain from acquiring 
the level of education y *, but it has no effect on productivity and therefore 
private and social returns diverge. However, education as a signal may be 
benefiting society in that it allows firms to allocate jobs correctly; a point which is 
expanded in Section 2.3.5.3 in relation to Stiglitz (1975). 
Spence illustrates a pooled equilibrium, with quite different properties 
from the above equilibrium. Suppose the firms expectations are as follows; if 
Y; < y * the firm expects the worker is from Group 1 with probability h, and from 
Group 2 with probability 1 - h, whereas if Y; <= y * the firm expects the worker is 
from Group 1 with probability I. 
If Y; < y * the profit maximising firm will offer a wage based on the 
average expected productivity of the worker w = (1- h)az + ha1 , and that if 
Y; <= y * the firm offers a wage llz· As before the only levels of Y; that will be 
logically selected are 0 and y *. The payoff from no education is better than that 
for acquiring y * education if 
(5) (1- h)a2 + ha1 > tlz- c2y* >a,. - C1Y * , 
and both groups will rationally set Y; = 0, this implies a lower limit on y * as 
follows; 
(6) y* > h(tlz- a,.) I c2 • 
The firm's beliefs are not being disconfirmed because if no-one is getting 
Y; > y* average productivity is (1-h)tlz +ha1 which is what it is paying each 
worker. There is no information forthcoming to the firm to cause a change in 
beliefs, this is therefore an equilibrium which can be sustained in this simple one 
3Simply stated Pareto's welfare criteria suggests that there is an improvement in social welfare if 
one group or person is made better off without any other group or person in society being made 
worse off. 
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firm - one market model. The stability of such a pooling equilibrium is reassessed 
by Riley (1975,85) in a model where there are a number of hiring firms who 
compete for labour resources, and the equilibrium is found to break down. 
If there is no correlation between signal cost and productivity, education 
could not convey useful information in this market. Spence notes that this 
negative correlation of costs and ability is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for signalling equilibria. Effective signalling also depends on there being 
"sufficient number of signals within the appropriate cost range". In this model if 
y1 is only available in discrete units and they are either too far below y * or too 
far above y * then y1 ceases to be a useful signal. 
This basic model gives an account of the informational functioning of the 
labour market, where there is no competition amongst firms in wage-setting, and 
by using education as the example of a signal adds to the debate over whether 
education is over-supplied by society and whether individuals should pay for their 
education beyond a certain level. 
2.3.2 Spence's "Active Response" Model (1976) 
2.3.2.1 Introduction 
In Spence (1973) the typical firm observes the relationship between signal and 
worker productivity and responds by paying a wage equal to expected 
productivity conditional on the signal. The firm affects employee signalling 
decisions and therefore the observed relationship between education and 
productivity. 
However this behaviour does not take into account the possibility that 
employers could anticipate the effects of their responses on the signalling 
behaviour of workers and therefore on the signal-productivity relationship. 
If firms know what effect their responses to signals will have on the 
informational content of signals they will compete on this level as well as on 
wages, and this may alter the nature of the equilibria and eliminate the 
inefficiency of the 'passive response model' (PRM). Spence (1976) examines the 
properties of market equilibria when firms compete with respect to wages and 
signalling prerequisites, in the 'active response model' (ARM). 
The ARM has two main behavioural assumptions. Firstly, firms know the 
way that the education-productivity relationship may change if and when the 
conditional wage schedule that determines the returns to a signal changes. 
Secondly, firms can accurately predict the education-productivity relationship that 
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will appear in the group hired for any wage schedule given the schedules of rival 
firms. 
We assume that there are a large number of identical firms, two types of 
worker, and a continuous scalar signal y, which now has some effect on 
productivity (as does type as in the PRM), we say j,(y) = productivity of Type i 
person with signal y. This model therefore corresponds to the notion of the weak 
screening hypothesis by allowing for some productivity augmentation from 
education. The signalling costs are c,(y) for Type i and c1 (y) > c2(y) and 
c\(y)>c' 2 (y) 'Vy. 
Each firm makes wage offers, individuals select an employer and the 
appropiate educational signal with the aim of maximising net income and are 
hired. Spence locates equilibria and studies their properties. 
2.3.2.2 The Equilibria 
Suppose a firm with no competitors offered the wage schedule w;' (y) shown in 
Figure 2.3 so that those with y < y1 are not hired, those with y1 s; y < y2 are paid a 
wage w~' (y), and those with y ~ y2 are paid a higher wage w;' (y). The firm 
would make a profit, and workers select y to maximise net income w;' - c,(y) in a 
similar fashion to that explained in Section 2.3.1. Group 1 workers select y1 to 
maximise net income and have productivity f 1(y) > w;', and Group 2 workers 
select y2 to maximise net income and have productivity f 2 (y) > w;' 
However, if we introduce a rival firm then the rival could poach all the 
original firm's workers by raising wages slightly and still make a profit. 
Competition of this kind would raise wage rates until each type was being paid a 
wage equal to their productivity, i.e. wage schedule w(y) in Figure 2.3. 
If two groups signal differently, each will receive its productivity as wages 
in a competitive equilibrium, and more generally any collection of people with the 
same signal will receive its average productivity. 
With such a wage schedule, where at the signal levels y1 and y2 selected 
by the two groups the wage paid equals their marginal product, there is no way a 
rival can outbid on wages alone. 
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Figure 2.3: Signalling Equilibria With and Without Wage Competition 
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However, a rival willing to shift y1 and y2 as well as w1 and w2 may be 
able to poach workers (this was not possible in the PRM). Neither y1 or y2 in 
Figure 2.3 maximises net return to the two groups. Consider Group I; in Figure 
2.4 y1 is moved to a level at which f 1 (y)- c1 (y) is maximised, and w1 is slightly 
below f 1 (y). If a firm offered the schedule as shown it could poach all of Group 
1 away from Figure 2.3 firms, and would make a profit. So the lower productivity 
group will signal at an 'efficient' level (one that maximises output net of signalling 
costs) in an equilibrium provided the two types signal differently. 
Figure 2.4: Competitor's Wage Revision of w1 to Slightly Below f 1 (y) 
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A similar argument can sometimes be made for the higher productivity 
group. Figure 2.5 shows an offer schedule that induces each type to invest in 
efficient levels of y, where net income is maximised and both types are paid a 
wage equal to marginal product. Note that at y2 net return to Type 1 is less than it 
is at y1, so these workers have no incentive to signal y2• 
W e 
Figure 2.5: An Efficient Signalling Equilibrium 
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Spence suggests that 'efficient levels of investment in the signal and 
competitive wages can sometimes be achieved as a signalling equilibrium'. 
However, not all equilibria are efficient. 
In Figure 2.6a the wage schedule has its steps at efficient y;' s but Group 1 
will rationally pick y2 , because of the shape of its cost function c1 (y). A firm that 
makes this offer will therefore lose money since w2 > f 1(y2 ), and the schedule 
will not be an equilibrium. The signal carries no information and this may cause 
further losses since the firm cannot allocate jobs to workers correctly. 
In Figure 2.6b y2 has been shifted to a point where it is no longer rational 
for Type 1 to choose y = y2 , and where wages equal Type 2's productivity. The 
two groups rationally choose different y's and the signal carries information. No 
other wage offer that induces a separating equilibrium will dominate this one 
without causing the exit of at least one group from a firm making the different 
offer. 
So we have put Type 1 at their efficient point and then pushed y2 to a 
point that is inefficient for Type 2 and removes incentive for imitation by Type 1. 
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However, we cannot conversely put Type 2 at an efficient point and reduce y1; if 
y1 is reduced, y2 must be increased even more to compensate the reduction in the 
net return to Type 1 at y1 that may induce imitation. 
Figure 2.6a: Inefficient Signalling Equilibrium where both types choose y2 
Wae 
cl(y) c2(y) 
____ ., 12(y) 
_......,"9-----1-- w(y) 
fl(y) 
Y1 signal 
Figure 2.6b: Inefficient Signalling Equilibrium 
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Spence identifies three types of equilibria involving hiring of both worker 
types which are mutually exclusive and depend on the shape of the productivity 
and cost functions. Firstly, two-wage, full-information schedules that induce 
efficient signal investment (as in Figure 2.5). Secondly, two-wage, full-
information schedules that induce efficient signal investment by Type 1 and over-
investment by Type 2 (as in Figure 2.6b). Thirdly, one-wage, no-information 
schedules, where investment is not efficient for either type [see pp. 61-62 Spence 
(1976)]. 
2.3.3 Comparison Between PRM and ARM 
Provided that wages equal expected marginal productivity given the signalling 
behaviour of workers, there is an equilibrium in the PRM. The wage schedule 
w(y) in Figure 2.3 is an equilibrium schedule in the PRM, however it is not an 
equilibrium in the ARM because neither group is maximising net income, and 
there is some other schedule that improves both groups' net income over the levels 
in Figure 2.3. Thus the effect of the ARM is to eliminate from the set of possible 
equilibria in the PRM any equilibria which are Pareto inferior to some other 
schedule. However, the elimination of these inferior equilibria does not guarantee 
full efficiency in the ARM as can be seen from Figure 2.6b where Group 2 
chooses education y2 above the net income maximising level. 
The equilibria in the ARM are a subset of the equilibria in the PRM which 
are not Pareto dominated by other PRM equilibria. Spence (1976) illustraites that 
more informed and sophisticated competition in signals and wages eliminates 
some of the inefficiency of the PRM, but the tendency for over-investment in 
signals in all PRM equilibria is not eliminated in the ARM. Spence says that to 
escape this over-investment in the signal, wages have to be allowed to deviate 
from marginal products, but this is inconsistent with competitive behaviour. 
2.3.4 Arrow (1973) 
2.3.4.1 Introduction 
Arrow (1973) differs from Spence's model in that the continuous educational 
signal y is replaced by a discrete signal; college graduation. Arrow models higher 
education as a filtering device which provides information in the labour market 
but does not augment productivity. In essence college graduation acts as a 
screening device with which firms can avoid the problems associated with the 
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asymmetry of information in the labour market by sorting workers into different 
ability groups. 
The asymmetry of information is defined by Arrow as follows: the firm 
has a poor idea of applicant ability but can acquire costly indirect information 
about the unobservable characteristic. The firm also knows the statistical 
distribution of productivities, but cannot differentiate between workers for which 
it has the same information [or signal as in Spence (1973)]. 
In theory after the firm has monitored each worker for some time in the 
workplace it may be able to observe their marginal products. The extent to which 
a firm does monitor ability accurately may reduce the value of the education 
screen, and this is discussed with reference to Stiglitz (1975) in Section 2.3.5.5. 
Arrow follows Spence's reasoning in that it becomes a condition for an 
informational equilibria that the probability distribution of productivities to 
educational signals believed by firms generates self-confirming behaviour. 
2.3.4.2 Model Outline 
A worker has three attributes; academic record before college, probability of 
getting through college y conditional on previous academic record, and 
productivity z, having a joint distribution and being positively correlated with y. 
Firms can see whether an applicant has graduated from college or not. College is 
a double filter; once in selection of students for college entry, and once in grading 
them pass or fail. 
Arrow assumes that the admission system aims to maximise the expected 
number of graduates by choosing a cut-off probability. The admission system 
uses pre-college rec.ord as a signal of potential college performance so admission 
is only granted iffy<: y0 and the probability of graduation of a random college 
entrant is; 
(7) Ji. = E(yiy 2: Yo) · 
The expected productivity of a college graduate is 
where; 
Yo = 
= 
critical graduation probability chosen by college admissions board, 
total product of college graduates per unit of total labour force, and 
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= proportion of the population graduating. 
Graduation has some positive informational value if the productivity of a 
randomly chosen graduate exceeds that of a randomly drawn member of the 
population i.e. if z, > E(z). Admission procedures convey information if 
(9) E(zJy ~ y0 ) > E(z) 
and college itself has additional informational content over simply admission if 
and since Arrow shows that 
(11) a,,,,,, E(yJy~ Yo)' 
where CJ,1,,,, is the conditional covariance of y and z given admission, college 
education conveys information about productivity beyond admission if there is a 
positive correlation between productivity and probability of graduation among 
those admitted i.e. (9) and (10) will hold if we assume E(zJy) is an increasing 
function of y. 
2.3.4.3 Social Value of Screening: One Factor Case 
Arrow suggests that although higher education may have an informational role it 
may not be socially worthwhile. In the simplest model of production where all 
individuals are perfect substitutes, information about productivity has no social 
value. The total output of society will be E(z) = z; the high ability workers are 
assumed to produce more whether or not anyone knows who they are. Arrow is 
therefore implicitly assuming, in the one factor case, that high ability workers are 
not crowded out by low ability workers i.e. this analysis is ignoring the idea that 
information in the labour market may well reduce adverse selection problems. 
The private value of college graduation is the difference in wages the 
individual expects between the employer having no information and the employer 
using the filter. If the probability of graduation and the difference between the 
screened wage and the unscreened wage are high enough then it pays a person to 
incur the cost of being filtered; this is analogous to the signalling decision in the 
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Spencian model, although in this case acquisition of a certificate is probabilistic. 
The costs involved are a social waste as worker productivity has been assumed to 
be unchanged by college education. 
Assuming that in equilibrium a proportion of the population attend college 
and a proportion do not, Arrow shows that everyone could be better off by 
prohibiting college. Firms know the expected productivities of both sets of 
workers. Potential college entrants know the probability of graduation of those 
who enter but not their individual probability of graduation conditional on their 
record. Colleges on the other hand know both probabilities. 
There is a critical level y0 such that individuals are admitted to college iff 
y;:: y0 ; the critical level is determined in this case by demand for college 
education rather than capacity limits. The firm then pays graduates z8 = z8 (y0 ) as 
defined earlier. If :z.(y0 ) is the expected productivity of non-graduates, then; 
and N8 as defined previously is a function of y0 too. 
An individual at college graduates with probability )i, and fails with a 
probability (1- )i,). In both states he or she incurs a fixed cost c so that the 
expected return from college is: 
(13) E(Rc)=:Z8 (y,)+Z.(1-y,)-c 
The return from not going to college is R. = :z •. Assuming risk neutral behaviour, 
equilibrium requires that the two returns are equal; since if E(Rc) > R. individuals 
with records slightly less than y0 would find it profitable to attend college. Thus 
in equilibrium; 
(14) E(Rc) = :Z,()i,) H. (1- )i,)- c = :z. 
and we can see that 
(15) )i,(:Z,- :z.) = c 
and therefore :z, > :z. and z > :z. 
The income of the non-graduate is lower than before, and the college 
entrant does not benefit (ex ante) either since E(R.) = R.. Thus abolition of the 
filter may help everyone in this case since there is no efficiency gain from college 
and it creates inequality in ex post incomes. 
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This conclusion depends on the assumption of free entry to college. If 
college entry is rationed then (15) becomes an inequality, and entrants may gain 
on average. The non-entrants still lose out and income inequality is even worse. 
If a stronger informational assumption is made in that the potential entrant 
knows the probability of graduation conditional on his or her record, and y1 is the 
smallest record value to give expected returns from filtering at least equal to z the 
expected return with no filtering; 
(16) Y1 = N, + Yo• 
then Arrow shows that if there are no values of y > y1 then everyone will gain by 
the abolition of the filter. 
The overall conclusion is that abolishing college in this abstract model 
could make everyone better off if incomes under no screening could be 
redistributed correctly. Clearly Arrow has assumed that college studies do not 
augment productivity and has implicitly assumed that the ability to be trained on 
the job is also unaffected i.e. there are no social gains from education in the form 
of increased individual output. Arrow does however analyse the possibilty of 
social returns to college filtering when there are two complementary worker types. 
2.3.4.4 Social Value of Screening: Two Factor Case 
Arrow shows that if there are two complementary worker types then education has 
a positive sorting role. Arrow analyses a model in which everyone is able to 
supply one unit of Type I labour, and different workers are able to supply 
different amounts of Type 2 labour. The supply of Type 2 labour measured in 
efficiency units is denoted z. 
Assume that production requires fixed proportions of the two types of 
labour. By choice of units we can assume that one unit of each type of labour is 
needed to produce one unit of output. Suppose there are two groups of people A 
and B with expected productivities z,. >In, and supplies of Type 2 labour are 
measured in efficiency units. Arrow shows that it can never be optimal to 
simultaneously employ Group A in Type I jobs and Group B in Type 2 jobs. 
Total output can be increased by accurate screening provided that its cost 
is sufficiently low. Arrow shows the gain in output due to zero cost filtering; if 
N _. + N n = I are the population proportions of the two groups, then; 
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If the filter is not employed, a fraction N1 of the labour force is randomly 
assigned to Type I jobs and the remaining workers are assigned to Type 2 jobs. 
The total supply of Type 2 labour in efficiency units is (1- N1)z. Efficiency 
requires that this equals N,, and therefore the output without filtering is 
(18) N1 = Zl (I +Z) 
1f the filter is used so that only Group A are assigned to Type 2 jobs, the supply of 
Type 2 labour is NAzA and that of Type I is NB. If NB < NAzA then some of 
Group A workers will have to be assigned to Type I jobs. That is N1 > N8 and 
efficiency requires (1- N1 )zA = N1. So that 
(19) N1 = zA I (1 + zA) = output with screening and excess group A labour. 
The increase in output is therefore: 
(20) 
If there is a shortage of Group A labour for Type 2 jobs NB > NAzA, the 
optimal allocation requires that all Group A are assigned to Type 2 jobs and 
enough of Group B to make the supplies of the two types of labour equal; 
NAzA+(NB-N,)zB=N,. Sothat 
(21) N, = z I (1 + zB) .•. = ... output with screening and shortage Group A labour. 
The corresponding increase in output is 
(22) ~-...!_= z-zB ...!_ 
1 + ZB 1 + Z 1 + ZB ·1 + Z 
If Group A are graduates and Group B are non-graduates then it has been shown 
that college education has a positive social value if it is free so that people are 
screened by passing or failing. Arrow shows that the socially optimal amount of 
college education will be such that; 
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Note that c does not appear in this condition. Thus, even if education is free, it is 
socially optimal to restrict it so as to improve its screening role. 
2.3.4.5 Competitive Equilibrium in the Two Factor Case 
If the filter is complete, in that every graduate goes into a Type 2 job and every 
non-graduate goes into a Type 1 job, and also socially optimal then it is achieved 
by a competitive market in which college is supplied to everyone willing to pay 
the cost. 
Let w1 and w2 be the price per unit of Group 1 labour and the price per 
efficiency unit of Group 2 labour respectively. Graduates and non-graduates earn 
w2z8 and w1 respectively per man. In equilibrium the expected wage of an 
entrant, net of cost, must equal the wage of a non-graduate, and Arrow shows that 
this gives the condition [see Arrow (1973), pp 211-212]; 
Since one unit of each type of labour combine to produce one unit of output, 
exhaustion of production implies w1+w2=1. Thus from (24) we see that w2z8 > w1 
if c > 0. This implies that no graduate is working at a Type 1 job, since none will 
work for w1 if they can earn w2z8 The total supply of Group 2 labour by all 
graduates therefore does not exceed the number of units of Group 2 labour used in 
equilibrium; which corresponds to condition (23) for optimal allocation. 
If the equality held no non-graduate would want to work in a Type 2 job. 
In this case we must have w1 <: w2z8 • Conversely, if the inequality held, some 
non-graduates are doing Type 2 jobs, so w1 = w2z8 • Thus one of the two 
possibilities must hold in equilibrium, depending on the parameters in the 
problem: 
When (25) holds y0 = y;. Let y; be the corresponding value of y, (probability of 
graduation conditional on admission). If (25) holds we can solve for w1 and w2 : 
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these are the equilibrium wages, and the complete filter is the equilibrium 
allocation provided w1 2: w2z., from the above in terms of cost this condition 
becomes: 
Thus, for c in this range, the complete ftlter is the competitive equilibrium. Arrow 
shows that if c is in this range there may be multiple equilibria for some values of 
c satisfying condition (29), one of which will be the complete filter equilibrium. 
The equilibrium condition for choosing college implies that the ex ante 
expected net income is equal to w1 for all groups. Comparing w1 with the 
expected output in the no-screening case Zl (1 + z) Arrow shows that when 
approaches zero, the competitive equilibrium is better than no screen. When 
c = c2 we can show; 
Therefore there is a cost level between zero and c2 , call it c3 , such that a complete 
filter is better than no filter for c < c3 and worse for c3 < c :5 c2 • Moreover, the 
complete filter although competitive is not an optimal equilibrium for c :2: c3 , and 
the upper limit on the range of costs c1 must be below c3• 
Emphasis should be placed on Arrow's conclusions regarding the two 
factor model since this case is more likely to occur in the modem workplace than 
the one factor case. As we have seen the social value of complete filtering in the 
competitive labour market depends upon the size of the cost of graduating from 
college. Similarly, Arrow shows that for equilibria with incomplete filtering, 
where some non-graduates are in Type 2 jobs, and where (26) holds, the 
equilibrium filter is worse for everyone than the absence of college education. 
2.3.5 Stiglitz (1975) 
2.3.5.1 Introduction 
Stiglitz (1975) presents a simple two-type model of the screening process where 
the high type workers can take a perfectly accurate test again at a fixed cost, in 
comparison to Spence (1973) where high ability workers have a lower marginal 
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cost of signalling. He shows that the idea of too much screening in equilibrium as 
presented by Spence and Arrow (1973) is not necessarily correct. 
Stiglitz develops the central aspects of screening theory in a general model 
and analyses the impact of educational screening on income distribution and 
resource allocation. 
2.3.5.2 Model Outline 
Stiglitz begins with the most basic of examples of a screening process to aid the 
clarity of his analysis. He assumes workers can be described by a single attribute 
(} which is proportional to individual marginal product p; 
(31) p =m(} 
we can choose units so m = I. The fraction of the population that is type (} is 
h( 9). 
Stiglitz assumes an asymmetry of information exists in the labour market 
such that a worker is fully aware of his or her ability but firms are not, and in the 
absence of any information firms, assumed to be risk neutral and competitive, 
treat all workers as if they were the same. The production process is assumed to 
be such that the productivity of any single worker cannot be measured without the 
firm incurring large costs. The output per worker is proportional to the average 
value of (} for those working in the process, since we assume no other inputs. 
A worker receives a wage equal to the average value of marginal product 
of the workforce. If workers with higher (} can be identified they will receive a 
higher wage in the competitive economy and they therefore have an incentive to 
find a way to reveal their (} . 
Assume two groups of workers with 91 and 92 < 91, able and less able. 
Assume a perfect screening device which costs c per individual screened where: 
(33) 9 =average value of(}= h(91}(}1 +[1-h(91)]92 
If the supply of labour is inelastic then the able workers get a discounted wage 
stream 91 and unable workers get 92 • There are two types of equilibria: 
There is a 'No-Screening Equilibrium' if no differentiation is made by 
firms between workers. All workers will be paid 9, the mean productivity of the 
population. This is an equilibrium because it does not pay the more able 
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individual to be screened. With screening the worker would get 9- c net income 
and by (32) this is less than the no-screening income 9. 
There is a 'Full-Screening Equilibrium' if the firm differentiates workers 
by type. Type 91 workers obtain 91- c net income, and Type 92 workers obtain 
92 net income, since they know they are less able and do not invest in any 
screening. In this case it pays the able workers to invest in screening since not to 
do so would mean they get 92 income which by (32) is less than their net income 
from screening. 
Stiglitz indicates four propositions from this example. Firstly, there may 
be multiple equilibria. 4 Secondly, some equilibria are Pareto inferior to others: in 
the full-screening equilibrium both groups have lower net incomes than in the no-
screening equilibrium; 91 - c < 9 from (32) and 92 < 9. Thirdly, the presence of 
less able workers lowers the net income of the more able group in both equilibria; 
with unable workers present, able workers would get 91 (in the full screening 
equilibrium) this is reduced to 91- c, and in the no-screening equilibrium 9. The 
presence of more able workers may increase the net income of the less able group; 
they get 9 instead of 92 in the no-screening equilibrium, or 92 in the screening 
equilibrium. Fourthly, if education is used as a screen, ignoring distributional 
effects, social returns differ from private returns. The gross social return in this 
example is zero, the net returns are negative (since there is a cost). The private 
rate of return to education in the screening equilibrium for the able group is; 
(34) 91-92_1 > 0. 
c 
Many such equilibria result in one group being made better off than in the 
absence of screening and another group being made worse off, but total net 
national output being lower. The equilibria in the example may appear to be 
Pareto sub-optimal, but caution should be taken; if (32) becomes 91 - 9 > c then 
there is no screening equilibrium and a net welfare loss with the losses from 
screening to Group 2 exceeding the gains to Group 1. If we outlawed screening 
and compensated the able group and divided the cost of screening between the 
population, then everyone would be better off, but there are problems then in 
identifying the more able group in need of compensation without screening. 
Thus, even though under screening net national output is lower than in the 
absence of screening, the equilibrium could be more efficient since compensation 
4There are multiple equilibria in a different sense to those indicated by Spence. In this case rather 
than there being multiple screening equilibria, it is possible to have two types of equilibrium under 
assumptions (32) and (33). 
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is possible which could make some group better off without making anyone worse 
off. However since screening may lower net national output and increase income 
inequality it may still be socially undesirable. 
Stiglitz suggests that in a market economy the costs and benefits of 
screening would be borne by the worker as opposed to the firm. In an economy in 
which workers do not signal, the wage paid to all in a competitive equilibrium 
would be equal to the average productivity of all workers. If a firm conducted 
confidential private research into who was more able, it could earn a return to this 
private information, by employing the more able workers, equal to the difference 
between the marginal product of these workers and the average wage. Thus it 
would pay firms to conduct such research if the costs were sufficiently low. 
However, if the information became public knowledge the worker would get the 
benefits; firms bid the wage offered for his or her services up to his or her 
marginal product. 
The worker therefore wishes to have such information become public 
knowledge and the firm wants it kept secret. If information gathered can become 
public knowledge the firms will not invest much into this form of research. 
The gain from screening to able workers may be at least partially costly to 
unable workers, and they may wish to avoid making such information about 
abilities public knowledge. Stiglitz argues that if information is relatively 
costless, in a competitive environment everyone except the least able worker 
would have an economic incentive to publicise relevant information. If there are i 
types of worker, then if the highest ability group Type-i workers can provide 
information on their ability then the market for Type-i workers would clear with a 
wage in excess of the average wage (now lower) paid to the rest of the population. 
Therefore it pays the most able of this remaining sub-population to signal their 
relatively higher ability and so on, until all but the least able are sorted. But if (i 
-1) types have been sorted out, then the least able must also have been identified. 
So, since workers are able to capture the returns to general information 
about their skills they are willing to incur costs; in a competitive economy firms 
that conduct research into general information will be unable to fully capture 
returns. 
There are some conditions under which even the most unable may not 
willingly wish to pay for general information. Firstly, 'under-rated' workers may 
prefer self-employment where they can realise the same earnings as they would 
have done if they had been perfectly screened. Secondly, if self-selection 
contracts are available then an individual who is fully aware of his or her ability 
can take on the risk of hiring and training instead of the firm, and work for a low 
wage until they have proved they are of high ability (assuming ability can be 
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costlessly observed in the workplace). However, many individuals cannot be 
perfectly sure of their abilities and would avoid taking such risk. Thirdly, workers 
who are uncertain of their abilities and are very risk averse, may prefer to be paid 
the average wage rather than risk the chance of being identified as below average 
in the screening process. 
Stiglitz shows that the example used above had several essential 
assumptions which influence the results; 
1. The more able workers are unambiguously more productive than the less 
able. 
2. There are no increases in production from screening workers and labour is 
inelastically supplied. 
3. Workers are fully aware of their own ability. 
4. There is no method of on-the-job screening. 
5. The screening method is perfectly accurate in identifying workers. 
6. The information acquired is general information about ability in all sorts 
of jobs, rather than specific information about the ability to do a firm-
specific task. 
2.3.5.3 The Social Benefits of Screening 
Under Assumption 2 there is no social return to screening, it merely redistributed 
output. However, there are cases in which screening may have a social value. 
In the absence of screening, able workers are paid less than their true 
marginal products. Imperfect information acts as a tax on the more able, and a 
subsidy on the less able. This cross-subsidisation will distort the consumption-
leisure decisions of workers. Provided there are 'appropriate tax instruments', if 
screening costs are low and labour is elastically supplied, everyone can be made 
better off by screening. 
Secondly is the case of matching workers to jobs. It is widely accepted 
that workers differ in the comparative skills with which they can do different jobs 
and learn new skills. For example, if a bricklayer has a comparative advantage in 
carpentry and a carpenter a comparative advantage in bricklaying, there has been 
a mis-match of people to the jobs and this is inefficient. This is also applicable to 
firm-specific training where it is more economical to teach higher ability workers 
new skills than low ability workers. Stiglitz models the situation where there may 
be too little screening because social returns can be derived from job-matching i.e. 
by screening for comparative advantage where there are two types of jobs and two 
types of workers [see Stiglitz (1975), p. 289] 
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Thirdly, matching abilities of groups of workers in the workplace is 
important. For example, in an assembly line production process the wage paid to 
the assembly team will equal average observed marginal product of the workers, 
this will be below the potential marginal product since low ability workers will 
hold up the work of the high ability workers. Thus total output could be increased 
if there were two assembly lines, one for low and one for high ability workers 
where they work at their own pace and are paid accordingly. This implies some 
return to homogeneity. 
Stiglitz models the situation where there may be too little screening 
because there are returns to homogeneity which could give social returns. In this 
case, Stiglitz assumes that output per worker on an assembly line is 9- f3a2 
where f3 > 0 and a2 is the variance of abilities of the fixed large number of 
workers on the line. Thus homogeneity will reduce a2 and improve output per 
worker. 
- 2 • The equilibrium involves no screening, and everyone is paid 9 - f3a8 , If 
we assume the following; 
(35) 
where a; is the expected variance on the assembly line drawn from an 
unscreened population. 
If a single worker purchases screening, his or her income would be 
91 - f3a; - c which is less than 9- f3a;. With full screening every worker is 
better off; the low ability group is paid 92 > 9- f3a; and the high ability group is 
paid 91 - c > 9- f3CJ';,. However, the Pareto-optimal full screening equilibrium is 
degenerate in a competitive economy since the net income of the high ability 
workers is less than that of the low ability workers: 91 - c > 92 • 
If c < f3a; it could pay the firms to screen workers if they do not screen 
themselves, to get output 9 rather than 9- f3a; . However, it is unlikely that the 
information could be kept secret in this situation, since assembly line separation 
would be obvious, so firms could not profit since able workers would be bid away 
by competitors. 
2.3.5.4 Risk A version and Incomplete Knowledge 
If we relax Assumption 3 and introduce risk aversion to the model, then another 
reason why there may be too little screening is that workers are unaware of their 
abilities and are very risk averse. The reason for possible 'market failure' here is 
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that contracts are unavailable that insure for ability [an idea modelled in 'implicit 
contract' theory; see the survey by Azariades and Stiglitz (1983) for more details]. 
In such a situation of uncertainty and risk-aversion it is also unlikely that 
self-selection contracts contingent on ability would help to avoid adverse 
selection problems. In this situation firms could capture the difference between a 
workers true marginal product and their self-perceived marginal product or 
reservation wage, if they could keep their research results secret. However, if 
other firms use job allocation as a signal of ability [a theory presented in 
Waldman (1984)] then they may be able to bid away these underpaid workers, 
and there is no incentive for research. Also, if two firms discover that a worker's 
productivity is less than the wage paid, the firms will compete against each other 
and bid up the worker's wage to equal their marginal product, and the returns to 
research are again equal to zero. 
2.3.5.5 On-the-Job Screening 
Now consider relaxing Assumption 4 that there was no on-the-job screening. This 
is likely to screen for slightly different attributes than educational screening, and 
the return to educational screening is likely to depend on the amount of on the job 
screening and vice versa. In the absence of on-the-job screening the equilibrium 
may well be Pareto inefficient 
Assuming workers have two attributes () and 1/J and that productivity is 
represented by the function: f(9,1/J), that () is screened for by the educational 
system and 1/J is screened for on-the-job, and that costs are assumed to be such 
that it always pays to screen for one and only one attribute. Stiglitz shows that 
there may be two equilibria, one in which () is used as a screen and another where 
1/J is used as a screen [see Stiglitz (1975), pp. 290-292]. When 1/J is the screen it 
does not pay to use () and vice versa. Stiglitz shows that an attempt to eliminate 
educational screening may just shift the emphasis of screening and make everyone 
worse off. 
This view is shared by Arrow (1973) who also discussed the relation 
between what he termed 'on-the-job filtering' and 'college filtering'. The value of 
the college filter is reduced by the extent to which accurate on-the-job screening 
occurs. The possibility that on-the-job screening exists means that if it is 
perfectly accurate and Assumption 3 holds then there will be a full-screening 
equilibrium without expenditure on educational screening. Since accurate on-the-
job screening and a self-selection fine system would replace educational 
screening. 
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This analysis can be compared to that of Salop & Salop (1976) in which 
ability-contingent self-selection contracts can negate the moral hazard problem of 
a worker over-stating their ability on application and no actual screening may 
need to take place. In Stiglitz's model the no-screening equilibrium comes from 
the assumptions that the workers know that the firm can precisely screen for 
ability on the job, that they are fully aware of their abilities, and there is a 
sufficiently high fine to workers who lie about their ability e.g. the 'fine' could be 
working for an initial wage lower than that available elsewhere and then being 
sacked. 
In addition to the case where educational signals may be replaced by other 
signals, the assumption of more sophisticated behaviour on the part of workers 
when on-the-job screening occurs may give the result of no equilibrium in the 
model. Stiglitz suggests that if workers are aware of the effect of their signalling 
behaviour upon other agents then taking the action of others into account may 
lead to the no equilibrium result [See Stiglitz (1975), pp 290-292 and Rothschild 
& Stiglitz (1976) on this subject]. 
2.3.5.6 Educational Screening Mechanisms 
The fact that there are other basis on which to screen workers e.g. on-the-job, or 
via employment history does not detract from the importance of education as a 
screening device since it is usually the primary determinant of a person's initial 
job opportunity and hence subsequent screening. 
Educational institutions provide information about a person's ability for a 
number of reasons. The efficient allocation of educational resources requires the 
identification of individual abilities, since there are returns from finding out who 
are the faster learners. Part of the social marginal product of educational 
institutions is finding each students comparative and absolute advantages in 
different subjects. Additionally, a tutor's reference may be valuable in the eyes of 
an employer in addition to academic achievements. 
There are several mechanisms by which knowledge about individuals 
collected by institutions is publicised. Firstly, if educational institutions sort for 
their own purposes, the groups into which a student was sorted may be a signal of 
individual ability. However, Greenwald (1986) shows that mis-identification 
problems can stem from estimating individual ability by observing group ability. 
Secondly, failing a course in college or not making a grade in secondary 
school conveys a great deal of information which can badly affect future wage 
offers the individual receives; grades attained can also convey useful information. 
Thirdly, information is conveyed by educational self-selection; if wages 
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are a function of grades completed, and the length of time to complete a grade is a 
function of ability, then low ability individuals will quit at a lower grade level 
than higher ability individuals, and completed grades act as a self selected signal 
of ability. 
Alternatively, assume we have a hierarchy of schools where some are for 
high ability individuals only and others just for low ability individuals. Assuming 
the schools use a binary grade system and that attending a school for the most able 
costs a great deal more than attending a school for the less able, then if individuals 
have full knowledge about ability they would apply to a school in which they are 
certain they would pass and therefore are self-selected. 
The school system will determine the accuracy and efficiency of 
educational screening. Stiglitz assumes that the more institutions within the 
system perform their main functions of providing knowledge and skills, the more 
screening is produced as a joint product. The more accurately a system can 
determine comparative advantage the more accurately it will indirectly screen for 
absolute abilities. 
However, some individuals are more likely to have high income parents 
who can afford the range of educational choices available to their children. Even 
if such income inequality is dealt with by government intervention there would 
still be important distributional effects from different educational systems 
resulting from their effectiveness as screening devices for individual ability. 
Stiglitz shows that a comprehensive schooling system, where individuals 
of different abilites can all receive the same levels of education, may allocate too 
much (too little) resources to screening, relative to the amount that would 
maximise net national output, depending on whether individuals are informed 
(uninformed) about their abilities. However, if more able students are able to 
learn faster than less able students, then it is more efficient to spend more 
resources on the more able if the aim is to maximise net national output. This is a 
characteristic of a non-comprehensive education system. 
2.3.6 Conclusion 
Spence's (1973) 'passive response' model was a two type one firm model of a 
signalling process which did not allow for competition in wage setting from other 
firms, a continuum of types or productivity improvement from the education used 
a signal. The latter characteristic means that it is an example of the strong 
screening hypothesis were social and private benefits from education diverge. 
Although simple this model was a powerful in its effects upon economic thinking 
and stimulated further theoretical and empirical work. 
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Spence's (1976) 'active response' model differed from Spence's previous 
signalling model in that it allowed for more than one firm and for productivity 
improvement from education. Again the type of 'education' used as a signal was 
not specified although it is assumed in later theoretical and empirical work to 
mean higher education, or in some cases post-compulsory education. Allowing 
for more sophisticated behaviour on the part of firms eliminates some of the 
inefficiency of the 'passive response' model, but the tendency for over-investment 
in education remains. 
Arrow (1973) specifically models higher education as a screening device 
in the labour market which does not improve productivity. His main conclusion 
from a screening model where there are two types of worker, but only one type of 
job, is that if higher education was abolished there could be a Pareto improvement 
in social welfare. However, when education is used to match two types of worker 
to two types of job the conclusion is not one of abolishment, but restriction, to 
improve social welfare. 
In contrast, Stiglitz (1975) emphasises that whether there is too little or too 
much screening depends crucially on the assumptions made about the screening 
process, the knowledge that workers have about their abilities, the production 
process, and whether screening is ]ob-matching' or hierarchical. Also, attempts to 
curtail educational screening may just shift the focus of screening with the 
possibility of increased equity but also inefficiency. 
In Stiglitz (1975) there are multiple equilibria in the sense that for certain 
values of the fixed cost of being screened [in the interval given in condition (32)] 
an equilibrium where no screening takes place (i.e. a pooling equilibrium) and an 
equilibrium where screening does take place. In the first stages of analyses by 
Stiglitz, Arrow and Spence, the screening equilibrium is shown to be Pareto-
inferior to the pooling equilibrium. In the Spencian model there are multiple 
equilibria in the sense that numerous separating equilibria can exist for certain 
levels of education in the interval given in condition (4), and the efficiency of 
these equilibria depends both upon the cost of signalling and the ability of firms to 
compete in their wage setting behaviour. In the latter stages of the analyses of 
Arrow and Stiglitz it was shown that sorting workers into low and high ability 
types can have social returns if the technology of production is such that workers 
have different aptitudes at different jobs; i.e. if screening is job-matching. 
The next Section of this chapter explains how these early models were 
developed in the context of game theory. By changing the order in which firms 
and workers act in the labour market, or by developing the concept of competition 
amongst firms in wage setting inherent in Spence' s ARM, this later work enabled 
economists to clarify the question of efficiency of signalling equilibria. 
2.30 
2.4 Game Theoretical Approaches to Educational Signalling 
2.4.1 Introduction 
In a signalling game Player A, has private information on the basis of which he 
sends a signal message to Player B, and Player B then responds to this new 
information. In Spence (1973) Player A is the worker and Player B is two or 
more competitive firms. We have seen that there is typically a multitude of 
equilibria resulting from such games, in which neither player has any reason to 
change their strategy from the strategy they have chosen given the strategy of the 
other. The equilibria therefore display the conditions necessary for them to be 
called Nash equilibria. 
Generally in signalling models it is the uninformed players (firms) who 
commit themselves to offers after the fully informed players (workers) have acted; 
workers are assumed to have full knowledge of their individual productivity 
whereas the firm is not prior to hiring and has to rely on a signal. However, some 
theorists have modelled job market signalling when it is the uninformed that are 
the active players and move first, and these are known as screening models. 
Whilst signalling models often have multiple equilibria, screening models in 
contrast tend to have non-existant equilibria if out of equilibrium moves are 
ignored. Dynamic models which involve simultaneous actions by workers and 
firms have not been well studied [see Weiss (1995) for details on why these 
'sorting' models have little acceptance amongst economists]. 
In a signalling model the issue is whether a multitude of equilibria can 
exist, whereas in a screening model it is whether any equilibrium can exist, given 
experimentation by the firm in its wage setting behaviour. However, in both cases 
the question that needs to be answered is whether there is one equilibrium that 
becomes a dominant outcome and if it is a Pareto efficient outcome i.e. can 
signalling behaviour lead to an efficient outcome. 
In many games introducing the multitude of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that 
can be assumed gives rise to a multitude of equilibria i.e. what makes up an 
equilibrium is affected strongly by the interpretations that Player B applies to the 
signal that A might have sent, but in equilibrium does not send. For instance, the 
screening model of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), in which the firm moves first, 
suggests there may be no equilibrium at all, but this result has been criticised by 
Riley (1979b) and Wilson (1977) because the equilibrium concept Rothschild & 
Stiglitz use does not allow for reactions to contracts off the equilibrium path. 
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Thus work on equilibrium selection in such games turns towards the study of 
'justifiable beliefs' for positions off the equilibrium path. 
The main papers on the game theory interpretation of educational 
signalling in the labour market are discussed in this section. Yabushita (1983) 
and Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) analyse the Stiglitz (1975) screening model; 
Yabushita (1983) is not strictly a game-theoretical analysis but is included in this 
section since Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) assess Yabushita's critique using game-
theoretical terminology. Both Riley (1985) and Cho & Kreps (1987) analyse the 
Spence (1973) signalling model using game-theoretical terminology. 
2.4.2 Stiglitz (1975) Reconsidered 
In the Stiglitz (1975) model the wage strategies chosen by the employer in 
equilibrium make zero expected profits since free entry and competition are 
assumed. In the case of no social return to screening it has already been shown 
that the condition for multiple equilibria (no-screening and full-screening are 
possible) is that c lies in the interval shown in (36); the notation corresponds to 
that of Section 2.3.5:. 
Stiglitz (1975) assumed that wages are equal to the respective 
productivities of workers if they are known, and equal to average productivity 
shown in (37) if they are not known by the firm, and the firm dislikes any other 
wage policies even if they may be profitable. Under these assumptions if 
ol- 02 ~ c ~ ol-e there may be both the no-screening and full-screening 
equilibria. 
However, Yabushita (1983) claims that this result would not be tme if we 
assume the firm can adopt other more profitable wage policies. In the full-
screening equilibrium assuming (36) holds the more able worker receives a net 
income of 01 - c and the less able receive 02• The employer could make a profit, 
without any information about the ability of employees from paying a wage w 
where, e > w > ol- c > 02. 
Under thiS wage strategy both the more able and the less able workers can 
be paid more than in the full-screening equilibrium, but the total wage bill does 
not exceed total output. Since the firm and workers prefer this wage scheme the 
full-screening equilibrium does not exist as long as 01- e > 0. 
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The firm could alternatively choose wages for the more able and the less 
able workers w1 and w2 such that: 
a zero profit condition, and w1 - c > w2 the net income of the higher ability 
workers is more than that of the low ability workers. This type of policy implies 
that one group subsidises the other. 
However, such an equilibrium cannot exist. Consider the following wage 
sets; 
A: w1 = e + 0 > 91 and w2 = e- 0 < 92. 
B: w1 =B+to>91 and w2 =B-to<92 , 
where o > 0. If the employer offers wage pair B the less able prefer B to A, but 
the more able prefer A to B. The wage policy B is profitable for sizes of o such 
that w2 < 92 but the employer loses money with A because less able workers 
move to firms offering B, so that the full-screening equilibrium at A is not viable. 
For similar reasons, the equilibrium with subsidies from the more to less able 
cannot exist. 
The existence of the full-screening equilibrium results from the behaviour 
of the firm assumed by Stiglitz. However, the no-screening equilibrium exists 
under (36), and with a screen with fixed cost c there is a unique equilibrium 
except when 91 - e = c, where both types of equilibria may exist. As long as 
there are multiple equilibria Stiglitz's conclusion about Pareto inferiority of full-
screening still holds; the more able earn 91 - c = e in both types of equilibria, and 
the less able get e in the no-screening equilibrium and 92 under full screening. 
The non-existence of equilibria is also alluded to by Riley ( 197 5) in 
reference to Spence's model with a different screening process. Again the 
existence of equilibria depends on behavioural assumptions about the firm in the 
screening process rather than the actual process involved. 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) reply to Yabushita's critique of Stiglitz (1975). 
Stiglitz & Weiss re-formulate Stiglitz's model in game theoretic terms, so that the 
strategy of the firm is the conditional wage offer based on whether the individuals 
signal. The strategy of the individual is the decision of whether or not to acquire 
the education that acts as a signal. 
An individual accepts the highest wage offered. The payoff to the 
individual is this maximum wage less the cost of screening they may have 
undertaken. The payoff to the firm is zero if they do not employ the individual, 
and if the individual is employed the payoff is the difference between the 
marginal product of the worker and the wage paid. 
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One way of viewing the difference between the Y abushita and Stiglitz 
models is in their assumptions of which of the two players moves first. In the 
Stiglitz model the informed individual moves first in choosing education level 
prior to the uninformed firm's wage offer. The individual chooses his or her 
strategy in the first period, and in the second period the firm offers a wage which 
is the profit-maximising response to the individual's strategy and given other 
firms' wage offers. 
Thus if no workers screen themselves they all receive a wage equal to 
expected productivity 8, and if Type 1 screen they will be paid 81, and the 
unscreened workers will get 82, corresponding to expected productivities. In each 
case higher wages would incur losses, and a lower wage could not be an 
equilibrium since other firms would bid away workers up to a point where the 
wage paid equals marginal product. 
If no-one is screening, a high ability worker would only raise their income 
if their productivity net of screening costs exceeds the productivity of a random 
draw from the population. Thus if the converse is true i.e. 8 > 81 - c , there exists 
a no-screening (pooling) equilibrium. Conversely, a screening equilibrium could 
exist if the productivity of the most able net of screening costs exceeds the 
productivity of the least able. Thus, in this model multiple equilibria are a 
possibility. 
This analysis assumes that there are a large number of workers, firms and 
different worker types such that the strategy of one individual will not affect the 
wage offers of firms. Workers know that for every signal choice firms will 
respond in a profit maximising fashion on the basis of other firms action and those 
signals. 
Conversely, Yabushita assumes that the uninformed employers make their 
wage offers prior to informed workers choosing signals, and the strategies of 
workers are passive reactions to these wage offers. In this model multiple 
equilibria cannot exist. 
If 8 > 81 - c then any supposed full-screening equilibrium would be 
broken by a firm offering a wage (under no-screening) of 8- d where 
d < 8- 81 +c. The reason why there is no multiple equilibria result is that firms 
move first and the wage offer determines whether workers screen themselves. 
Thus there is only a pooling equilibrium; this depends on there being a fixed cost 
of screening c, and an absence of alternative screening devices. The Yabushita 
equilibrium is similar to a Nash equilibrium in which workers are not active 
players in the game. 
Thus a second interpretation of the difference between the two models is 
that Stiglitz (1975) has a model with two active players, Yabushita (1983) has a 
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model with one active player. In Yabushita's analysis workers simply choose the 
best wage offered i.e. they act rationally but not strategically, they just react to the 
firms strategy (who takes the reaction of workers as fixed). 
The passive worker assumption is only plausible if the screening is some 
pre-employment test administered by the firm as in Guasch & Weiss (1980). 
However, in Stiglitz (1975) where the screen is an educational course with a 
probability of passing positively correlated to individual ability, it seems 
implausible to him to think that workers passively react to firms' wage offers. It is 
more realistic to assume that individuals strategically choose whether or not to 
screen and the firm makes offers conditional on this decision, and this results in 
multiple equilibria. 
Weiss (1983) shows that the problem of multiple equilibria does not 
disappear with more realistic assumptions such as imprecise knowledge on the 
part of the individual about his or her ability, imprecise tests, and non-discrete 
education levels. However, some of the resulting Nash equilibria are implausible 
and Weiss introduces a more restrictive definition of equilibrium to eliminate 
these [see Weiss (1983), pp 429-435]. 
Yabushita's comment concerning returns to homogeneity on an assembly 
line again assumes that either the firms employ the screening process as in Guasch 
& Weiss (1980), or that workers passively respond to the wage structure offered 
by firms. Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) suggest that in adverse selection models it is 
important to correctly identify who is actively signalling or screening, since only 
then can you correctly define the equilibrium. 
2.4.3 Spence (1973) Reconsidered 
2.4.3.1 Introduction 
Riley (1975) drops Spence's assumption of price-taking agents and shows that 
from the set of seperating equilibria that exist in the Spencian model only the 
Pareto-dominant equilibrium survives experimentation by firms. 
The Spencian signalling equilibrium is self-confirming in the sense that 
the wage paid to workers equals their marginal productivities. Riley suggests that 
the firm may experiment with wage offers by replacing offers rejected by 
applicants and to confirm a priori beliefs. A wage profile which develops from 
such experimentation is termed a 'fully-confirmed' equilibrium and Riley shows 
that only the Pareto-dominant wage profile, in which all workers except the least 
able buy an education with marginal cost exceeding marginal social product, is 
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such an equilibrium. The least able buy education as if finns could costlessly 
predetennine ability. 
Similarly, Wilson's (1977) insurance model suggests that agents anticipate 
the response of others when they consider new contracts. The 'reactive' 
equilibrium which results from this behaviour is an alternative equilibrium 
concept to the Nash Equilibrium. A set of strategies s~ , ... ,s; for n competitors is 
a reactive equilibrium if 
1. For any agent i and any alternative strategy s1 that raises i's payoff there is 
another agentj who can profit by reacting at the expense of i. 
2. There is no further reaction by another agent that can make j's reactions 
unprofitable. 
The equilibrium is reached since agent i will recognise j's incentive to react and 
will choose s; instead of s1• 
Riley (1979b) argues that of the sets of signal-wage contracts that separate 
worker types it is the Pareto-dominant set which is such a reactive equilibrium. 
This equilibrium is unique in that there can be no reactive pooling equilibrium. 
However there can be some criticism levelled at assuming such 
sophistication in the behaviour of finns; for example a thorough knowledge of the 
signalling process on the part of the finn is unlikely given the 'noise' created by 
other sources in the labour market affecting the relationship between productivity 
and education; therefore Riley (1985) provides an alternative analysis of the 
(non)existance of signalling equilibria. 
Instead of modifying the equilibrium concept Riley (1985) modifies the 
model itself. In contrast to the preceeding literature Riley argues that there is a 
family of signalling models which give a strong Nash Equilibrium i.e. all price 
(wage) competition is unprofitable in the absence of reactions by other price-
setters. 
Riley's model is different from preceeding models in that the implicit 
assumption that in a world of perfect infonnation all agents would enter the 
market is dropped. Instead he assumes that a positive proportion of workers 
would choose not to participate since the alternative wage that they could earn in 
another market is not being matched or exceeded in the market in question. This 
modification of the Spencian framework is critical since it means that price 
competition for workers with the lowest signal level is no longer profitable. 
The main aim of Riley (1985) is to define the conditions under which price 
competition is also unprofitable at higher signal levels. Spence's main assumption 
was that for education to be a useful signal it had to be less costly for higher 
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quality individuals. The main result of Riley's analysis is that if the proportional 
rate of decrease of the marginal cost of signalling, with respect to quality, is 
sufficiently high then a Nash Equilibrium exists i.e. price competition is never 
profitable. 
2.4.3.2 Riley (1985) Model Outline 
Each worker can provide one unit of service, and choose signalling level s. 
Differences between workers are solely encapsulated in the variable a1 eA which 
can be seen as ability, thus workers can be described as Type-i. 
A contract (s, w) between a firm and worker is payment w in return for 
signal level s. If a Type-i worker accepts the contract the value of his or her 
output on the job is V(a1,s) so the firms profit per worker is 
(39) n(a1,s, w) = V(a1,s)- w 
Higher a1 's give increased V(a1,s), and assume V(a1,s) is nondecreasing ins. 
Worker preferences are represented by the utility function U(a1,s, w) 
where aU/iJw>O and aujas<O. For each worker there is an alternative 
opportunity outside this market that gives utility U R. 
Assume also that the marginal cost of signalling i.e. 
(40) MC = dwl = aU(a1,s,w)/ as 
' ds u aU(a1,s, w) I iJw 
decreases as a1 increases. This ensures that the choice of signal s(a,), given 
offers, is nondecreasing in a1 • 
A Type-i worker who chooses signal level s has a value to each firm in the 
market of V(a1,s) = a1• Each worker has an opportunity to work elsewhere for a 
wage wR. The cost of the signal is C(a1,s), and the net return to the worker given 
the wage offer (s, w) is 
Condition (40) therefore becomes a requirement that the marginal cost of 
signalling ac I as is lower for the more productive workers. 
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976), in the context of a screening model of 
insurance, showed, for a two type case, that no contract that attracts more than one 
type can be part of a stable Nash equilibrium. 
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More generally Riley takes the proposition that a Nash equilibrium 
contains no pooling of types as given. The emphasis is therefore upon separating 
equilibria contracts. Riley assumes three types of worker A= {a0 ,llt,~} and 
a0 < wR <lit<~- Each worker aims to maximise net return by choice of contract 
(s,w). Riley assumes, as is usual, that if two contracts give the same net return 
then the indifferent worker will choose the one requiring the lowest s. 
As shown in Figure 2.7 {EQ,f;,f;} are a possible set of separating 
contracts. A Type 0 worker has the steepest map of indifference curves 
U0 = U(a0 ,s, w) and chooses E0 • Type 1, with U1 = U(llt,S, w), chooses £,.,and 
Type 2 has the shallowest map of indifference curves U2 =U(~.s.w) and 
chooses f;. 
Only individuals who have productivity exceeding wR will choose to 
signal. Thus the allocation of workers between this and the alternative market is 
efficient. The profit on each contract is zero, and each Type-i worker is 
indifferent between contract E, or contract E,.1 chosen by Type- (i + 1). Thus of 
all possible sets of separating contracts the set {E0,E1,E2 } is Pareto efficient. 
Figure 2.7: Pareto Efficient Separating Contract Set 
u~ 
V(~,s2l=~l-------"t-+ 
a12~--------------+ 
Prefe~cet Directions 
Riley's second proposition is that if the hypotheses of the model are trne 
then from the set of possible separating contracts which are not unprofitable to the 
firm, there is a unique Pare to-efficient set which has three properties. Firstly, the 
contracts are characterised by zero profits. Secondly, the allocation of worker 
types is efficient between those who do and those who do not signal. Thirdly, if 
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the number of types is discrete then if contract E1 is chosen by Type-i the worker 
is indifferent between this contract and contract E1• 1• 
However, {£0,~.~} is not a Nash equilibrium; any offer in both the 
shaded areas is prefered by both Types 1 and 2. If their average productivity ii;2 
is as shown, then any alternative contract in the dense shaded area is strictly 
profitable for the firm to offer. 
We can also see why there will be no pooling Nash equilibrium; suppose 
that Types 1 and 2 choose contract (s0 , w0 ). For this to be not unprofitable 
w0 :o; ii;2 , but there is always a contract T that is preferred only by Type 0 and is 
strictly profitable for the firm. 
Riley looks for conditions under which the area of profitable alternatives 
to {E0 ,E1,E2 } does not exist. Firstly, if the population proportion of Type 0 who 
do not signal is sufficiently large, it will not be profitable to make an offer that 
attracts all types. In this case the whole shaded area is the set of profitable 
alternatives. Since u; bounding this set slopes upwards, the most profitable point 
in this set is D, where there is an intersection between U~ and Vi. Holding Type 
0 preferences fixed point D can be moved by altering the shapes of the 
indifference curves of the other types, and we look for a situation with w0 > ii;2 • 
This will be the case if XD < ~ - ii;2 i.e. if 
(42) 
where h1 is the proportion of Type-i in the population. Since XZ > XY, a 
sufficient condition for w0 > a12 is 
(43) 
Riley shows that this reduces to 
(44) 
Wage competition is unprofitable if (44) holds for all s: 
The sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium (in the seperable case) are 
given in Riley's third proposition; suppose that alternative options are such that a 
majority of low quality workers would, under full information, choose not to enter 
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the market. Then, if the proportional rate of decline with a; of the marginal cost 
of signalling is sufficiently large, the Pareto-efficient set of separating contracts is 
a Nash Equilibrium. 
With more than three types the same argument holds for every potential 
pool between two neighbouring types, and similar results hold for a continuum of 
types. The analysis is extended by Riley to fit the general case where the utility 
function is not separable and the value function depends both on type and signal 
level. 
Riley's fourth proposition allows for a direct productivity enhancing effect 
of the signal and outlines the sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose that alternative options are such that a large number of low quality 
workers would, under full information, choose not to enter the market. Suppose 
also that, the marginal cost of signalling for each of n types is nonincreasing in 
return to signalling, w. Then the Pare to-efficient set of separating contracts is a 
Nash equilibrium whenever the proportional rate of decline in the marginal cost of 
signalling with respect to a; : 
(45) 
is sufficiently large. 
We can also use Figure 2.7 to illustrate the concept of a reactive 
equilibrium in Wilson (1977). A firm may take into account the anticipated 
reactions of others when considering new offers. Consider a new offer D, which 
will give positive profits and a pooling of types, as an alternative to set 
{E0,E1,E2}. There is always a reaction such as T that 'skims the cream'; as a 
result the initial 'defection' D generates losses while reaction T gives profits on 
each worker who accepts it. A firm considering contract D will see reaction T as 
a threat and will therefore not choose to offer D. The Pareto-efficient separating 
set {E0 ,E1,E2 } is then a reactive equilibrium. However, implicit in this concept is 
the assumption that a rival can react quickly to the announced offer D, and offer T 
in competition, before the contract D firm yields profits. Thus this non-Nash 
equilibrium concept is open to criticism on the grounds that assumption of quick 
reactions of competitors may not be plausible in a dynamic labour market 
characterised by trade union wage bargaining and long-term labour contracts. 
Riley also proves that, for a case where there is a continuum of types, 
values of the elasticity of the marginal cost of signalling with respect to a; that 
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give sufficiently large potential gains from signalling also lead to the existence of 
a Nash equilibrium [See Riley (1985), Propositions 5 and 6]. 
Riley (1985) shows that the model displays a unique Nash equilibrium, 
and sufficient conditions for such an equilibrium are satisfied when the returns to 
those signalling are sufficiently large. The model predicts that equilibrium 
problems tend to arise only when potential gains from signalling are small. 
2.4.3.3 Cho & Kreps (1987) and The Intuitive Criterion 
Cho & Kreps (1987) (refered to as C & K henceforth) generalise criteria from 
previous literature for testing the stability and dominance of signalling game 
equilibria and apply them to the Spencian model. 
In a sequential equilibrium Player B makes some hypothesis about what 
private information Player A has and how to respond. Varying the hypotheses 
gives various optimal strategies for Player B, and hence changes the signalling 
incentives of Player A. Many analysts have used intuitive criteria based on the 
inferences that Player B should make about Player A's private information from 
out-of-equilibrium signals [see C & K, p. 181]. If the out-of-equilibrium beliefs 
of Player B can be restricted then many game equilibria can be eliminated. 
Assume that player A's private information is either a or a', and that in 
equilibrium A sends signal s with probability equal to one. Suppose an 
alternative signal s' is possible with the following properties; 
1. If Player A knows a then they would, compared to the equilibrium 
outcome, strictly prefer not to send signal s' , no matter how Player B 
interprets this. 
2. If Player A knows a' then they would, compared to the equilibrium 
outcome, prefer to send signal s' if by sending s' Player A could convince 
Player B that they knew a' . 
Condition 1 implies that Player B should not think that the message s' came from 
a Player A who knows a. Player B should infer from the message s' that Player 
A knows a' ; and therefore if Player A knows a' they should send message s' thus 
upsetting the original 'equilibrium'. 
In the words of C & K it is as if a Player A that knows a' , is by sending s' 
implicitly saying; 
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"I am sending the signal s' which ought to convince you that I know 
a' . For I would never wish to send s' if I know a, while if I know a' 
and if sending this signal so convinces you, then, as you can see, it is 
in my interests to send it." 
C & K refer to the criterion that follows from this as the Intuitive Criterion (IC). 
An equilibrium is meant to be a candidate for self-enforcing behaviour that 
is common knowledge amongst players, so in testing an equilibrium outcome C & 
K assume that it is common knowledge amongst players and look for 
contradictions. The IC therefore relies heavily on the common knowledge of the 
candidate equilibrium outcome, and defections from this 'equilibrium' are seen as 
a conscious effort to break it. 
If there are only two types of worker, C & K show that the Riley outcome 
is the only equilibrium outcome that survives the IC [see C & K, pp 208-212]. 
Banks & Sobel (1987) propose 'divinity' tests of signalling equilibria [Also 
see C & K, pp. 205-206]. These divinity tests subsume equilibrium domination 
and stability tests and correspond to iterative applications of the two divinty 
criterion presented by C & K and the dropping of type-message pairs. C & K 
show that all pooling equilibria fail the Banks-Sobel universal divinity criterion 
and suggest that of all possible separating equilibria tested with the divinity 
criterion only the Riley outcome survives. 
Although Cho & Kreps show that the IC is not sufficient to give the Riley 
outcome when there are more than two ability levels, they suggest that the 
criterion would suffice in the many type case if it was assumed that workers move 
first in showing firms what education levels they have achieved. In this game 
there are sequential equilibria in which the equilibrium wage paid to workers is 
less than their expected value to the firm, and the worker cannot ask for more as 
this will alter beliefs. When the IC is applied a unique Riley equilibrium is the 
only one that survives no matter how many worker types exist. However, C & K 
state that they should not be viewed as justifying the restriction of the Spence 
model to the Riley outcome. Indeed Hellwig (1985) shows that under different 
assumptions only Wilson's Reactive Equilibrium survives stability tests. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
We have seen that the results of the game theoretic models of the job market 
signalling depend upon the order of moves in the game and the existance of out of 
equilibrium beliefs. In Riley (1985) it is the uninformed firms who move first in 
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offering contracts to workers. Stiglitz & Weiss (1983) show that the problem in a 
re-ordered model, in which the uninformed firms respond to the actions of 
informed workers, is not the existence of a Nash equilibrium but a multitude of 
such equilibria. However, Cho & Kreps (1987) argue that the only 'stable' Nash 
equilibrium is the Pareto-dominant separating wage profile (set of contracts) 
presented in Riley ( 1985). 
In essence, Riley (1985) shows that, with sufficiently high potential gains 
from signalling, the stable equilibrium which resulted from experimentation off 
the equilibrium path by firms was the Pareto-dominant equilibrium outcome. 
Thus we have a situation where the first best solution, that of full information 
which common knowledge, cannot be achieved and we have instead a second best 
solution, the Riley outcome, which although less efficient than the theoretical first 
best is more efficient than the third best solution; incomplete information with no 
signalling. 
2.5 Concluding Comments 
2.5.1 Cost Assumptions and On-the-job Screening 
It is the absolute size of the cost of the educational signal which is the critical 
factor in determining the social value of screening in Arrow's model, and in 
Section 2.3.5 we have seen that Stiglitz (1975) follows Arrow's cost assumption in 
deriving a screening equilibrium condition which depends upon the size of a fixed 
screening cost. This contrasts with Spence (1973) in which it was the relative size 
of signalling costs between the high and low ability workers which was the 
critical factor in determining the existence of a screening equilibrium, and in 
Section 2.4.3.2 Riley (1985) takes Spence's critical cost assumption further in that 
he assumes that the marginal cost of signalling decreases as worker ability 
increases. 
In terms of the dis-utility associated with increased study to maintain 
academic performance on the part of low ability individuals, the assumptions of 
Riley (1985) and Spence (1973) are acceptable. However, if on-the-job screening 
(or any other alternative screening method) is used by employers in the labour 
market models then in terms of foregone income Riley and Spence's cost 
assumptions must be re-considered. Another alternative is a screening process 
based on previous work experience as indicated on a curriculum vitae. The 
ability-cost relationship may be changed, regardless of the presence of on-the-job 
screening, since such screening may enable the firm pay seperate wages to high 
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and low ability workers on the point of hiring, thus driving a wedge between the 
foregone wage costs of high and low ability workers from day one of their studies. 
Without on-the-job screening, wages foregone by both low and high 
ability workers are the same and equated with average marginal productivity of 
the pooled group [see Equation (1) in Section 2.3.1]. However, if on-the-job 
screening occurs then the high- and low-ability workers will, after some 
monitoring period, be paid seperate wages in line with individual rather than 
group productivity. High ability workers will earn a wage higher than the average 
wage and low ability workers will earn a wage lower than the average wage. 
Thus the value of the discounted wage-stream foregone by high ability workers is 
larger than the value of the discounted wage-stream foregone by low ability 
workers during their studies. On the basis of wages forgone the cost of 
educational signalling given the existence of on-the-job may therefore increase as 
ability increases. 
This result depends on the time it takes the employer to accumulate 
information and reformulate wages, and the time taken to acquire the appropiate 
educational signal. However, note that it takes approximately three years to 
complete a degree course, and a starting salary contract between em player and 
employee may only be written for one year. In terms of a scalar educational 
signal (years of education) we have seen that it is rational for a worker intending 
to signal that they have high ability to acquire only the exact minimum level of 
education they need to secure the higher wage, and therefore both worker types 
will spend the same amount of years in education if they are both trying to signal 
the same level of ability. In terms of university graduation as a signal of ability, it 
is rarely the case that high ability individuals acquire the signal in a shorter period 
of time than low ability individuals simply because of the way the courses 
associated with such qualifications are time-tabled at such educational 
institutions. 
The extent to which the cost of signalling in terms of wages foregone 
outweighs the disutilities assoicated with studying will then determine the 
direction and size of relative screening costs between the two worker types in 
Spence (1973), and whether the marginal cost of signalling decreases as ability 
increases in Riley (1985). The presence of an alternative form of screening may 
remove possible educational screening equilibria from the labour market models 
of Spence (1973) and Riley (1985) and it is therefore implicitly assumed that no 
other forms of worker screening exist in these models. 
A simplification in Riley (1985) was that the opportunity cost of signalling 
was the same across all types; from the above, it seems more plausible that 
workers with higher ability will have higher opportunity cost. However, Riley 
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states that introducing a reservation utility that varies across types leads to similar 
conclusions as his original analysis. 
2.5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Later Models of Wage 
Determination 
In the screening models outlined in this Chapter, and the human capital theories of 
Mincer (1974) and Becker (1975), the wage rates of employees are set by firms to 
equate with the marginal product of the firms' labour force, which is observed 
either directly or indirectly, with the aim of maximising profits. 
In comparison to the screening hypothesis human capital theory assumes 
that no informational asymmetry problems occur and that productivity is 
costlessly observed and wage rates are based upon observed productivity which is 
augmented by education and work experience. In the screening model the 
informational problems which occur are alleviated by the observation of signals 
which are correlated with expected productivity and wage rates are based upon 
observed educational signals. The aggregate outcome for all firms in the 
economy in both models is that wage rates are equal to marginal product of labour 
in each labour market and that all the labour markets clear. The result of market 
clearance stemming from these models implies that there is no involuntary 
unemployment in the labour market 
However over the 1980's there was a steady rise in the level of involuntary 
unemployment in the UK. Several theories have evolved to explain this 
phenomenon and the apparent downwards wage rigidity in the labour market. 
The main theories are union wage bargaining theory, efficiency wage theory and 
search theory. 
In the case of union bargaining theory, wage rates may be set above the 
market clearing level because of the union pressure upon employers to maintain 
the living standards of working members in the face of expected future price 
inflation (also increasing in the 1980's) and the threat of interrupted production. 
However, since existing unionised workers have little concern over the level of 
employment in their firm, being more concerned about their own job security and 
rate of pay, employment is seldom bargained over. Thus, although a non-market 
clearing wage rate can be determined in the bargaining process, employment 
levels are still chosen by the employer. Assuming the employer is a profit 
maximiser and given the wage rate that has been agreed upon in the bargaining 
process the employment level will be chosen such that the marginal product of the 
last worker employed equals that wage rate. Thus we reach a similar conclusion 
to the human capital and screening models for the motivation of the firm to 
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measure and equate the marginal product of workers to the wage paid so it may 
profit maximise, although the union-bargaining model does not result in labour 
market clearance. 
An exception to the union bargaining model where employment is set 
solely by the employer is the McDonald-Solow model where unions do include 
employment levels as an issue in the bargaining process. However Layard et al 
( 1991) show that this type of bargaining will not be chosen by unions on the 
grounds of its gross inefficiency and although bargains in the UK have in the 
early 1980's concerned manning ratios this does not determine employment since 
the quantity of capital is not normally bargained over and can be changed, as can 
the number of shifts on each machine [see Layard et al (1991), pp. 94-118]. 
In the efficiency wage models, such as Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), the 
productivity of workers depends upon the wage rate they recieve, and therefore 
the firm choses a wage rate to minimise shirking and this does not necessarily 
coincide with the market clearance wage rate. Thus involuntary unemployment 
can occur and in this model acts as a worker discipline device. However the need 
to know marginal product occurs again if the employer is a profit maximiser, and 
given the non-shirking wage rate that has been set, the employment level is 
chosen such that the marginal product of the last worker employed equals that 
wage rate. 
Similarly, in job search models, such as those reviewed by Mortensen 
(1986), an employer will aim to maximise average profit per worker by setting a 
wage which varies in relation to an individual worker's reservation wage. 
Assuming that the firm needs to observe a signal of this reservation wage, and that 
education levels and reservation wages are positively correlated, then screening 
theory is still relevant in the context of search theory. 
The union bargaining and efficiency wage models give the result that there 
is a relationship between unemployment levels and wage rates within regional or 
national labour markets. Recent work on the 'wage curve' has shown a negative 
relationship between real wage rates and regional unemployment rates for the UK 
1973-1990 after controlling for workers individual characteristics and regional 
effects [see Blanchflower & Oswald (1994)]. Blanchflower & Oswald's (1994) 
evidence suggests that the traditional neoclassical demand-supply process of wage 
determination found in human capital theory is fundamentally incorrect, and give 
support to the efficiency wage hypothesis of Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). 
The variables included in the wage rate equations used in Chapters 4-7 are 
the possible signals and indices that would be observable by an employer who is 
trying to determine the productivity of the worker and make a hiring or wage 
setting decision. A decision will be made not only about the wage rate paid but 
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also about the weekly hours a person is contracted to work. These decisions will 
affect the recorded wage rate of the employee. In a screening or human capital 
model these decisions will be based upon observable worker characterstics. In the 
human capital model productivity is directly observable and directly linked to 
years of schooling and work experience, and in a screening model productivity is 
indirectly estimated from educational signals (e.g. qualifications), employment 
signals (e.g. previous employment), and indices (e.g. gender). In addition to the 
signals and indices; sex, marital status, years in the labour force, ethnic origin, 
recent unemployment incidence, years of education, qualifications and quality of 
education; there are control variables for occupation, union membership, region 
and year of response in the wage rate equations used in Chapters 4-7. 
The inclusion of a dummy variable representing recent unemployment in 
the estimated wage rate equations for the UK is made to control for signalling and 
search-cost effects. Recent unemployment may act as a signal of ability in the 
labour market and may affect the costs of search in that it reduces expected 
lifetime earnings and may reduce personal wealth. 
The inclusion of a union membership dummy variable in the estimated 
wage rate equations for the UK is made to control for union-bargaining effects. 
Occupational rank variables are included to control for the characteristics of 
contracts and hiring practices within jobs which may vary by skill level; for 
instance the employer's ability to detect shirking may be different in the case of 
office managers in comparison to manual workers working on a factory line. 
Regional dummy variables are included to control for differences in the 
cost of living, industrial structure, the demand and supply of labour, and the local 
wage curve relationship in each region. The inclusion of year dummy variables in 
Chapters 4-6 corrects the nominal dependant variable for inflation, shifts in the 
national unemployment level in the 1985-1991 period and the national wage curve 
relationship. 
2.5.3 Motivation for Empirical Studies 
The strong Screening hypothesis posits that productivity is not improved by higher 
education, but that individual incomes are. Arrow (1973) suggests that in some 
cases society could be better off if higher education was abolished. Conversely, 
the human capital model posits that individual productivity and therefore national 
income are improved by higher education. Thus we have two different policy 
implications based on the two conflicting schools of thought. 
If higher education is found to be solely a screening device for individual 
productivities then policies advocating self-funding of higher education are 
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justified, smce there is no improvement of national income from higher 
education. If there is no evidence of strong screening then self-funding is not 
justified on the basis of a screening argument; this would support human capital 
theory and the central government intervention in the funding of higher education. 
If evidence is found in support of the weak screening model, where 
education generally signals and improves productivity, then the labour market 
outcome is equivalent to the human capital model, if every qualification improves 
and signals productivity to the same extent. 
However, in the context of weak screening there may be courses or 
qualifications that have different strengths as signals and productivity enhancers. 
For example, General Studies A-Level is generally viewed as not having a great 
effect upon student ability but acting as a signal of a priori ability, indeed older 
universities began to reject this qualification in their admission 'points' scheme in 
the late 1980's, negating even its screening role. In contrast we could say that A-
Level vocational and business orientated courses have strong signalling and 
productivity enhancing roles. Similarly, degrees in the arts are anecdotally 
viewed as less producitivity enhancing than science degrees, but may be used by 
employers to the same extent as screening devices. 
In this case the debate should centre upon which certificates or courses 
have a major role as screening devices and which certifcates or courses have a 
main role of improving productivity; a mixed system of funding would then be 
appropriate. Chapter 3 surveys the work of empirical economists over the period 
1968-1996 in testing the role of education in the market for labour; and we will 
see that there is little support for the strong screening hypothesis from a majority 
of these studies. 
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Chapter 3 
A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Educational 
Screening Hypothesis 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter reviews the empirical work which has been carried out to assess the 
importance of the informational function of education in the market for labour. It 
is shown that support for the screening hypothesis has come from three studies 
using US data, Shah (1985) and Dolton (1985) using UK data, Miller & Volker 
(1984) using Australian data, Sakamoto & Chen (1992) using Japanese data, and 
Liu & Wong (1982) using data from Singapore. Contrary results have been found 
by seven studies using US data, Psacharopoulos (1979) using UK data, Lee (1980) 
using Malaysian data, Oosterbeek (1992) using Dutch data, Arabsheibani (1989) 
using Egyptian data and Albrecht (1981) using Swedish data. The overwhelming 
indication from the latter studies, that human capital theory rather than the 
screening hypothesis best explains the correlation between earnings and 
education, is dampened however when account is taken of the biases of 
methodologies and data sets used. The overall conclusion is that there is little 
doubt as to the human capital role of education, but the importance of the 
informational role is still open to debate. 
The empirical studies of the screening hypothesis are discussed in five 
sections according to the methodology used. Section 3.2 refers to early studies 
which aimed to estimate the returns to educational variables using earnings 
regressions with a control variable for ability and were conducted alongside, or 
prior to, the publication of the main theoretical foundations of the screening 
hypothesis. 1 Section 3.3 refers to tests using comparisons by screening level; this 
is done either by making assumptions about the level of screening inherent in 
different economic sectors or by worker type (employees and the self-employed). 
Section 3.4 refers to comparative tests based upon groups separated by levels of 
1 For a more detailed review of the early studies by Taubman & Wales (1973), Layard & 
Psacharopoulos (1974), and Haspel (1978), I refer the reader to Whitehead (1981). 
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same value as found by Mincer (1974). However, the monozygotic earnings-
difference results, now controlling for genetics and environment, suggest that 
years of education have a significantly smaller effect on earnings; the coefficient 
being 0.027. Thus, the bias in the reported returns to years of education from not 
controlling for common environment and genetics is estimated as approximately 
65%. 
Furthermore, Taubman finds that non-common environment for 
monozygotic twins accounts for approximately 45% of the total variance in log 
earnings at the age of 50, and approximately 25% of the total variance in years of 
education. Taubman suggests that genetics account for up to about 41-50% of 
total variance in earnings and that common environment accounts for up to about 
15-18% of the total variance.4 For total variance in years of education the 
corresponding estimates are about 40% and 30% respectively, confirming that the 
more educated are likely to be more able, regardless of education. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this twin-pair comparison 
methodology is that the influence of genetics on earnings may far outweigh the 
influence of education. Thus, irrespective of one's school of thought as regards 
the reasons for the earnings-education relationship, it would appear that innate 
ability rather than education, plays the dominant role in determining earnings. 
Taubman estimates that not controlling for genetics and environment in earnings 
regressions may bias the estimated effects of years of education or qualifications 
on earnings upwards by about two thirds. However, Taubman suggests that these 
results are only strictly applicable to the population that the twins represent, 
which is white males born between 1917 and 1927 with military service. 5 
3.2.2 The Use of Ability Measures 
Although Ashenfelter & Mooney (1968) are concerned with testing human capital 
theory and do not explicitly investigate the screening hypothesis, which was not 
4 The estimated effects differ between Taubman (1976a) and Taubman (1976b). 
5 Twins studies continue where data can be found; for example, Ashenfelter & Krueger (1994) use 
a sample taken from interviews at the Twinsburg Festival, Ohio in 1991, one of the world's largest 
gatherings of twins, and estimate the average rate of return to years of education to be 
approximately 12-16% using a similar methodology to Taubman (1976a,b ). 
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theoretically formalised at that time, their study does provide some support for the 
hypothesis. Their sample is a group of male 1958-60 Woodrow Wilson Fellows.6 
1966 annual salary is regressed on a set of dummies for years in graduate 
schooling, highest degree level held by respondent, occupation, market 
experience, field of study, and an ability proxy MAPT.7 
Ashenfelter and Mooney show that there are significant returns to years of 
education, but that years of education are highly correlated with degree, 
profession and market experience variables. Field of study and degree level are 
found to be significant in determining earnings. Of the four ability proxies 
available to the authors, only MAPT has any significant impact on income levels; 
the MAPT coefficient was significant and represented $2.1 for each point in the 
test score. They suggest that the reason why only MAPT was a good proxy out of 
the four possibilities is that there is some interaction between MAPT and Field of 
Study, but show that neglecting such an interaction is unlikely to give spurious 
results in this model. They suggest that omitting an ability variable for this sample 
of highly educated people has little effect on rate of return results, i.e. mis-
specification errors are small. However, later discussion illustrates that in general 
there are large potential biases connected with omitted ability in education-
earnings functions. 
Occupation, degree type, and field of study explain more of the variance in 
earnings, than do years of study; this suggests that employers use degree and field 
of study as a screening device for ability. Thus, the authors make the conclusion 
which, along with the publication of theoretical models of educational screening, 
may have added impetus to moving the focus of empirical analysis in this field 
away from human capital theory towards the explicit investigation of the 
screening hypothesis; 
" ... the application of traditional 'rate of return' analysis to the area of 
graduate education, in which years of graduate education would be 
6 The Fellowships were awarded to first year graduate students nation-wide in America according 
to qualifications in arts and science and an interest in college teaching as a future career. Since the 
sample is homogenous in sex, and generally so in age and market entry time, explicit control of 
these variables was not necessary. 
7 MAPT relates to a mathematics aptitude score on a scale of 200 to 800 from a Scholastic 
Aptitude Test of an Educational Testing Service in New Jersey which is deemed a good measure of 
intellectual ability. 
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used as the sole education-related variable, would be highly 
misleading." [Ashenfelter & Mooney (1968) p. 86] 
Alongside the publication of the theoretical foundations of the screening 
hypothesis, Taubman & Wales (1973) published their estimates of the rates of 
return to education and also explicitly tested the screening hypothesis using the 
National Bureau of Economic Research Thorndike Hagan (NBER-TH) sample. 
The subjects in this sample were US Army Air Force volunteers surveyed directly 
in 1955 and 1969 who were given a number of tests measuring various types of 
ability. 
The net earnmgs differentials due to education at the two dates are 
calculated from regressions within occupational categories with independent 
variables including schooling, age, an ability proxy and socio-economic 
background variables. In 1955, the yearly earnings of those who had attended 
college are 10-15% above those who had only attended high school. The 
differential is 70% for M.D.'s, and 2% for PhD's. In 1969 those who had some 
college education earn about 17% more than high school graduates of the same 
ability, those with a degree, some graduate work or a Masters degree earn 25-30% 
more. From 1955 to 1969 the differentials, independent of ability level, increase 
at all education levels; the highest increase being for the highest educated. 
As found by Ashenfelter & Mooney, of the many ability variables 
measured in the sample, only mathematical ability has a significant effect on 
earnings. Over time, the income of workers in the top fifth on the ability scale in 
this sample had risen at a faster rate than that of workers in the bottom fifth of the 
scale, and the earnings of workers in the middle of the scale are similar to the 
average high school graduate. Since the sample is drawn from the top half of the 
ability distribution, Taubman & Wales suggest that for high school graduates and 
beyond, ability is a more important determinant of the range of income 
distribution than is education. They suggest that ability initially has little effect 
on wages, but that over time the effect grows, and at a faster rate for those with 
high ability. 
Taubman & Wales find that the differences in eammgs at a g1ven 
education level due to college quality effects are very large. For example a 
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college drop-out from a college ranked in the top fifth of the ranking order 
according to the academic rating proposed by Gourman (1967) earns more than 
anyone not in the top fifth except for those with a three year degree. Similarly a 
degree holder from a low quality university earns 53% more than the average high 
school leaver, whereas someone with a degree from a quality university earns 
98%more. 
One explanation of these findings is that high quality educational 
establishments may impart different or additional earning skills on their students 
compared to low quality establishments. Indeed, Spence (1973) suggests that 
quality as well as the quantity of education may be used as a screen. Moreover, 
Akerlof(1970) suggests that some branding of institutions occurs. For example a 
firm may expect that an 'Oxbridge' graduate is of higher quality (more reliable, 
trustworthy, less likely to shirk and so on) than a graduate from other universities. 
Another example is that a firm of accountants may feel that an applicant with 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants (CIPFA) approved training is of 
higher quality than an applicant with equivalent experience or qualifications who 
has not been trained under the mantle of CIPF A. The extent to which these 
quality effects influence the hiring decision of firms may lead to the claim that 
such hiring criteria are barriers to entry into some occupations rather than 
screening devices. 
The percentage rates of return from education reported by Taubman & 
Wales show a general decrease in the rate of return as education level increased 
from the some college category (15% rate of return) to the PhD (4% rate of 
return) category. However, the striking result is that the rate of return to a college 
dropout exceeds that of a graduate. Taubman and Wales suggest that since the 
college dropouts in their sample were in their mid-20's in 1946, many probably 
had a family to support and could not afford a college degree in the short run; they 
may have been pulled from college by their commitments (we will return to this 
result later). However they did not present data to support this idea. Another 
possible explanation is that dropouts are pulled from college by attractive offers 
from firms and that such dropouts are characterised by high levels of ability and 
are therefore paid high wages. 
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Compared to an alternative rate of return from common stocks of 
approximately 10%, the some college and BA certificate (11% rate of return) 
categories of education are judged worthwhile, suggesting that dropping out is a 
more economically rational choice than completing the course at college. 
Although their analysis ignores education's role as a consumption good, this result 
is interpreted by Layard & Psacharopoulos (1974) as discrediting the screening 
hypothesis. 
To test the educational screening hypothesis, Taubman & Wales compare 
the actual occupational distribution with the expected one with free entry at 
various education levels. Taubman & Wales show that B.A holders, but not high 
school graduates, achieve almost the same occupational distribution as would 
occur with no screening (entering occupations which provide the highest income). 
The authors conclude that this is due to educational screening with some workers 
characterised by relatively low levels of education being prevented from entering 
highly paid jobs. They suggest that up to 50% of the earnings differentials are due 
to screening and it is thus a very important function of education. 
Both Layard & Psacharopoulos (1974) and Riley (1979a) find it difficult 
to accept that the proxies of ability used by Taubman & Wales capture all the 
crucial facets of ability, especially when the proposed model is one where firms 
cannot test accurately for ability and that of the many ability variables measured 
in the sample, only mathematical ability had a significant effect on earnings. 
Arrow (1973) and Wolpin (1977) suggest it is unlikely that we could 
expect to find a direct measure for ability, especially since to do so would attack 
one of the foundations of the screening models. If it is assumed that firms cannot 
measure ability directly and have to rely on signals, then empirical economists 
cannot suggest that they can do any better. Thus researchers rely on proxy 
variables for productive ability, and this may lead to 'omitted-ability biases'. 
However, economically rational firms may choose to rely on educational 
signals ifthe direct ability measures they could obtain are relatively more costly 
than the educational signaL Indeed, in the previous models outlined in Chapter 2 
the educational screening process costs the profit maximising firm nothing, and it 
follows that, even if direct ability measures were available, if the educational 
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screen is accurate direct ability measures would not be used. The screening 
hypothesis does not therefore strictly rely on the non-existence of direct ability 
measures if we can make the assumption that such measures are more expensive 
than educational screening. 
Layard & Psacharopoulos suggest that the non-graduates who are hired for 
high paying jobs are known by firms to be different, in terms of non-educational 
ability variables, like motivation, as those with the same ability (as recorded by 
Taubman & Wales) who are not hired. Layard & Psacharopoulos (1979) go on to 
challenge the importance of the screening hypothesis and defend human capital 
theory by comparing three predictions of the screening hypothesis to the previous 
empirical evidence. 
The first prediction that Layard & Psacharopoulos make is that private 
returns are to certificates rather than years of education. The basis of this so 
called 'sheepskin' version of the screening hypothesis is that certification from a 
course conveys more information to a firm about an applicant's ability than just 
attendance on the course for a number of years, and that wages will increase faster 
with years of education if the year also has a certificate at the end of it. 
To test this idea Layard & Psacharopoulos compare drop-out rates of 
return to those of course completion from a number of studies; see Table 3.1. 
Unless Taubman & Wales were hypothesising that firms use years of education 
rather than certificates as a screen, then their own results would seem to be 
damaging to the screening hypothesis. 
Table 3.1: Rates of Return to Education for US Males: Drop Out vs. Completion 
Drop-out Rate of Completion Rate of 
Course Return(%) Return(%) Source of Results 
B.A. IS 11 Taubman & Wales 
B.A.+M.A. 8 8 (!973) 
Hi!!h School 7 6 Rogers 
B.A. 12 8 (!969) 
Hi!!h School 16.3 16.1 Hanoch 
B.A. 7.1 9.6 (!967) 
Hi!!h School 12.3 14.5 Hansen 
B.A. 5.1 10.1 (1963) 
B.A. 9.5 14.5 Becker (1975) 
Source: Layard & Psacharopoulos (1974) p. 991. 
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In addition Layard & Psacharopoulos point to the negative effect of a 
Master's on earnings in the article by Ashenfelter & Mooney (1968) which they 
claim does not support the screening hypothesis in any way. However, the effect 
is insignificant and should be viewed with caution because firstly the Masters 
involved are for arts and sciences only (e.g. does not include Business Masters) 
and the time period for which this study applies is short; the certificate may have 
had an influence in the long run on earnings. In addition it could be the case that 
firms believe that a Masters certificate is a poor indicator of ability; firms may 
feel that an applicant who has acquired this non-business Masters is delaying 
entering the labour market because they have little motivation, whereas the 
acquisition of a PhD shows commitment to a career path, the extent to which the 
Masters is an ambiguous signal of ability may be the reason why the coefficient 
on this certificate dummy is insignificant, whereas that on a PhD is significant in 
the Ashenfelter & Mooney study. 
Layard & Psacharopoulos also consider the claims of Hansen et a/ (1970) 
casting doubt on high school education as a screen. Hansen et a/ regress the 
earnings of 1963 draft rejectees on years of schooling, Armed Forces Test 
Qualification results, and age. Holding the latter two variables constant, they 
showed that high school graduation did not significantly affect earnings, and they 
rejected the 'sheepskin' hypothesis at this education level. However there were 
technical problems in this model and the results must be viewed with caution. 
In the light of this evidence, and that cited in Table 3.1, La yard & 
Psacharopoulos conclude that a screening hypothesis based on educational 
certificates is not supported by the evidence. 
Layard & Psacharopoulos suggest that a second prediction of the screening 
hypothesis is that the effect of education on earnings, with ability held constant, 
will fall as worker's experience rises, and firms come to have better information 
about the worker's true productivity. Ignoring on-the-job training, the authors 
reject the prediction of falling returns from Taubman & Wales's own results 
which show that the education effects on earnings rise both proportionately and 
absolutely with age. 
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The third observation is that education will not be demanded if cheaper 
screening methods exist. The authors suggest that the screening hypothesis 
implies that firms will take on graduates and pay them a high wage because they 
believe this to be more profitable than employing non-graduates at a lower wage. 
This is because the firm believes that on average graduates are more able than 
non-graduates, and the education gained just acts as a signal. This hypothesis 
implies that the cost of finding able non-graduates is at least as great as the wage 
differential between the able non-graduates and able graduates. 
· Layard & Psacharopoulos argue that a private enterprise would have set up 
an institution for the testing of non-graduates, and since no such institution has 
evolved they refute the screening hypothesis. However, Stiglitz (1975) contends 
that no single firm would be willing to embark on such a project given that other 
firms will poach high ability non-graduates from that company, thus the 
institution would have to be independent from any production process apart from 
the production of information at a cost below the pay differential between 
graduates and non-graduates Wiles (1974) contends that although aptitude tests 
could be cheap for firms to use, educational screening occurs because the 
education system is subsidised, and it is therefore relatively cheaper for the firm 
to use education as a screening device. 
On the basis of the evidence cited, Layard & Psacharopoulos conclude that 
' ... the theory of human capital is not after all in ruins' and that the screening 
hypothesis is an insignificant part of the explanation of how education affects 
wages. 
However, Riley (1979a) argues that Layard & Psacharopoulos's 
observations are inconclusive for a number of reasons. Firstly, screening theorists 
have never suggested that firms look exclusively at certificates as a signal of 
ability, but rather a vector of informational variables about workers, such as 
quality of schooling, grades obtained, and field of study. Given the absence of 
these variables in some of the empirical work cited by La yard & Psacharopoulos, 
there is no reason why the rate of return should be lower for drop-outs. Moreover, 
no distinction is made between those who were pushed from the education system 
and those who were pulled out by 'superior alternatives' which tend to increase 
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the average rate of return from dropping out; if a student was offered a lifetime 
wage prior to graduating which was in excess of the lifetime wage he or she 
expected to earn after graduating then it is economically rational for the student to 
drop out. 
Secondly, in any signalling game it is a necessary condition of a signalling 
equilibrium that a firm's probabilistic beliefs are realised. This being the case one 
would not expect the returns to education to fall with work experience. Indeed 
screening is presumably used to select able workers for jobs that require a lot of 
on-the-job-training, and since productivity, and wages, rise sharply in these jobs 
over time, the observed rise in return to education is, Riley suggests, not 
surprising. 
Thirdly, Riley suggests that Layard & Psacharopoulos's critique is extreme 
in that they view education under the strong version of the screening hypothesis 
where education has only one role (as a screen) they do not test the weak version 
of the screening hypothesis where education also has a productivity enhancing 
role. Since there was no analysis of the trade-off between screening cost and 
productivity enhancement by Layard & Psacharopoulos their critique says nothing 
useful about the costs of screening via education if it also had a role as a human 
capital investment. 
3.3 Comparisons by Level of Screening 
3.3.1 Occupational Screening Levels 
The main implication of the screening hypothesis is that more education is gained 
by workers than in a situation where firms could perfectly observe ability without 
reference to signals. So for a given ability level, screened workers would acquire 
more education than non-screened workers if the screening hypothesis is correct. 
Wolpin ( 1977) attempts to isolate the signalling component of the rate of 
return to education by using self-employed people as representing the unscreened 
group. Wolpin uses the NBER-TH sample and utilises the composite ability 
measure which is based on seventeen ability tests for the US Army Air Force. He 
finds that the mean ability levels and education levels (measured as years of 
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education) of the self-employed and employees do not differ significantly [see 
Wolpin (1977) p. 956 for a table of results]. If, as the ability measure suggests, 
the two groups are of similar innate ability, and if these groups do proxy for 
screened and unscreened workers, then Wolpin concludes that this result indicates 
'only a minor screening function' for education. 
However, the result of similar mean education levels between the two 
groups is not particularly surprising because decisions about education come 
before the employment decision, and the choice of education in reality does not 
rest entirely on employment aims. Wolpin's work does not control for other 
entries in the utility function of individuals when considering education; for 
example workers of any ability level may place great emphasis on trying to 
achieve a social norm education level for his or her perceived class in society, 
they may follow a family norm, or they may invest in education with the aim of 
helping others with monetary returns being a secondary consideration, e.g. 
teachers and nurses. 
From a purely monetary perspective there are two reasons why further 
education will be acquired even if an individual aims to be self-employed when 
leaving compulsory education. Firstly, because he or she cannot be sure that their 
plans will come to fruition and they may need to signal their ability in the labour 
market in the future or to work for an employer prior to self-employment. Wolpin 
crudely corrects for hedging by using only a sub-sample from the NBER-TH 
sample of individuals whose first and last reported occupations over a 20 year 
period was self-employment in a non-professional occupation, and compared 
them to a similar sub-sample of stable salaried employees. Secondly, Lazear 
( 1977) suggests that certain professionals may acquire additional qualifications in 
order to signal to their potential client base the quality of their services, thus 
raising the overall level of education in the self-employed group. If the self-
employed group is dominated by these highly paid occupations having higher 
quality of schooling than employees, then doctors, lawyers and other professionals 
may receive a larger return per year of education because of service-quality 
signalling differences. However, a parallel argument can be made in that 
employees in similar professions may also wish to signal quality of service to 
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potential clientele of the firm that employs them. Indeed, Tucker ( 1987) fails to 
find support for Lazear's hypothesised 'consumer screening' role for education 
amongst professional groups. However, it is common practice to omit 
professional occupations to avoid possible biases due to consumer screening, 
when testing the screening hypothesis. 
Another explanation of high education amongst the self-employed is that 
they are screened by government agencies or banks, so that not all those who wish 
to become self-employed can and those that do may be educationally screened to 
a certain extent by these institutions. 
A reason why we may observe low levels of education for the self-
employed may be because of self-selection; individuals who have invested 
incorrectly in the educational signal act rationally in becoming self-employed to 
enhance income in a sector where education level is unimportant in determining 
earnings. Grubb (1993) suggests that this may occur even when there is a higher 
risk involved in self-employment, because the highly educated may be more risk 
averse and choose salaried positions despite the higher returns in self-
employment. 
Wolpin's results also suggest that education has a larger impact on the 
earnings of the self-employed. This is because the two groups acquire a similar 
amount of education even though the self-employed in the NBER-TH sample 
appear to be more able. However, earnings from self-employment will include 
some element of non-labour returns (such as profit or returns to capital), so the 
earnings differential between the self-employed and employees is biased upwards 
and this may invalidate this result.8 Riley (1979a) suggests that this result may in 
fact be consistent with his version of the educational screening model. 
Riley (1979a) presents a theoretical model of the screening process on the 
basis of which he then tests for the expected observable differences between 
screened and unscreened workers using data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) 1971-1975. 
8 Rees & Shah ( 1986) find that there is little difference between the earnings of employees and the 
self-employed in their data; the self-employed are found to have 'inferior' human capital but earn 
more from it in comparison to employees, and there is evidence to suggest that the earnings 
differential can be attributed to a return on self-employed capital. 
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In Riley's (1979a) model individuals either accumulate education for some 
unscreened job or continue in college and later accept a screened job. The main 
finding from his model is that the discounted lifetime earnings functions of 
workers choosing screened jobs, for any given education level below Y c' are 
below those for unscreened workers, as depicted in Figure 3.1. The cross-over 
level of education, Ye, is determined by the difference in size between the private 
rate of return to education for screened and unscreened workers; it is a theoretical 
requirement that the individual return to education must be at least as high in the 
screened sector in comparison to the unscreened sector [see Shah (1985) pp. 122-
123]. The cross-over point is assumed to lie outside the sample range in both 
Riley's (1979a) and Shah's (1985) empirical analysis. 
Figure 3.1: Predicted Discounted Lifetime Earnings Functions from Riley (1979a) 
Discounted Lifetime Earnings 
Screened Profile 
Ye Years of Education 
Instead of using intuition to divide occupations into screened and 
unscreened categories Riley lets the data 'speak'. Logarithmic earnings functions 
with education measured in years and control made for experience and socio-
economic factors are estimated for different occupations. The CPS data was then 
split into sub-samples I, 11, Ill and IV as shown in Table 3.2, with equal numbers 
of occupations in each, according to mean education and the size of the estimated 
vertical intercept in the estimated discounted lifetime-earnings function. Riley 
assumes that a higher intercept term implies a higher earnings function. 
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Table 3.2: Riley's Occupational Groupings 
Occupational Intercept 
Mean Education Low High 
Low m !I 
High IV I 
Individuals choosing screened jobs could work in unscreened jobs with 
higher discounted lifetime earnings functions and lower education. A comparison 
of groups II and IV is therefore made, with sub-sample II representing the 
unscreened group and sub-sample IV representing the screened group. Riley 
suggests that the occupations appearing in the sub-samples give moderate support 
for the screening hypothesis [see Riley (1979a) Tables 2 and 3 for details]. 
Riley also tests four predictions from his model. Firstly, education must 
be effective to be used as a screening device; it must be a good predictor of actual 
productivity or earnings, if not firms will soon use other screens. Accordingly the 
earnings function for the screened group is expected to fit the data better than that 
for the unscreened group. Secondly, the model predicts that individuals choose 
between an unscreened job with less education (higher lifetime earnings function) 
and a screened job requiring more education; Riley therefore expects a negative 
correlation between estimated intercept and mean level of education across 
occupations. Thirdly, Riley's model predicts that for occupations characterised by 
the same mean levels of education the earnings of the self-employed will be 
higher than those of employees. Fourthly, since the screening device in this 
particular model is assumed only to yield a prediction of productivity which is 
correct on average, as other information on productivity accrues wages are 
expected to change in line with measured productivity so there should be a 
tendency for the difference between actual and predicted earnings to increase with 
tenure. 
Generally Riley's expected results are confirmed and support his screening 
hypothesis. He suggests that the weak screening hypothesis, where education 
signals and improves productivity, offers a more complete explanation of wage 
determination than human capital theory. 
Shah (1985) employs Riley's methodology on data from the 1973 UK 
General Household Survey. With the self-employed representing the unscreened 
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sector, it is found that they have an estimated lifetime earnings function above 
that for private employees representing the screened sector; this is what is 
expected from Riley's screening model. However, rejection of the screening 
hypothesis may not follow since non-labour income effects have not been 
controlled for in Shah's regressions. 
Shah also splits occupations into screened and unscreened groups I to IV; 
as with Riley ( 1979a) the occupations found to fall into the group 11 were 
occupations that one would expect to be unscreened, and those that fell into group 
IV were occupations one would expect to be screened [see Shah ( 1985) p. 121 for 
details]. The correlation between estimated occupational intercept and mean 
level of education by occupation was found to be significantly positive, which 
refutes the Riley's screening hypothesis. However, the correlation was reversed in 
the upper tail of the education distribution, and so Riley's screening hypothesis is 
not rejected by Shah for occupations with mean education levels in excess of 
about 10.5 years. This would suggest that educational screening is based upon 
high school and university education. 
Separate earnings function regressions for the screened and unscreened 
sub-samples show the coefficient on education in the screened group is larger than 
that in the unscreened group, and the earnings profile of the latter group is above 
that of the former group over the sample range of education levels. Both these 
results are consistent with educational screening, and thus Shah indicates tentative 
support for the screening hypothesis. 
Shah (1985) and Riley (1979a) compared occupations with high earnings 
and low education (presumed to be unscreened) with occupations with low 
earnings and high education (presumed to be screened). However, a large 
proportion of the occupations assumed to be characterised by high screening 
levels were teachers and other underpaid professional and semi-professionals, 
suggesting that non-monetary returns and consumer-screening may have 
interfered with the construction of sub-sample IV. 
Katz & Ziderman (1980) present a comparative test of the average 
education levels of screened and unscreened groups within similar occupations, 
using data from the Israeli Labour Force Study 1973-77. They follow Wolpin's 
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analysis in that they use the self-employed as representing unscreened workers, 
however their model allows for a human capital as well as a screening function 
for education and includes an occupational dimension largely ignored by Wolpin. 
The hypotheses that Katz & Ziderman test are that for higher level 
occupations, needing large human capital investment, education levels are higher 
for employees than for the self-employed, and that the converse is true for low 
level occupations. Obviously certain intermediate occupations may exhibit 
education levels for both groups that are approximately equal. 
Katz & Ziderman's results generally match the results expected from their 
specific model. Occupations where average skill level required is high (scientific, 
academic, technical and professional workers for example) show employees 
having a significantly higher mean level of education than the self-employed. 
Occupations where average skill level required is low (labourers, drivers, and 
unskilled manual workers for example) show employees having a significantly 
lower mean level of education than the self-employed [see Katz & Ziderman 
(1980) Table 1 p. 85 for details of their occupational ranking system]. Again, an 
argument can be made that individuals do not know ex ante whether they will 
succeed in being self-employed. However, Katz & Ziderman claim that their 
results 'are sufficiently robust to withstand the effect of hedging' (although no 
explicit proof is given), and this may also explain why the differences m 
education levels between the two groups are significant but minimal. 
Fredland & Little (1981) use data from the US National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) in a test of the screening hypothesis in which the returns to 
education and training for the self-employed are compared to those of employees. 
They choose total family income as the dependant variable because it is a variable 
common to both groups of workers, education is measured in years of formal 
education, and other variables include control for demographic and family 
background effects. The returns to education between the self-employed and 
employees are found to differ significantly, with those for the self-employed 
group being approximately 80% larger. Screening theory generally predicts that 
the self-employed will invest in less education than employees of the same ability, 
or that at a given education level the self-employed group will have higher 
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earnings. However, Fredland & Little find that the self-employed have both 
higher education and higher earnings. When professionals are omitted from the 
regressions the difference in returns to education disappears rather than is 
reversed, so we cannot claim that this difference in the returns to education was 
due to consumer screening of the self-employed group. The result of higher 
returns to education for the self-employed is inconsistent with the screening 
hypothesis. 
However, as with Riley (1979a), Fredland & Little find that the fit of the 
earnings regression is significantly weaker for the self-employed. If the human 
capital effect of education made up a significant portion of the effect of education 
on earnings we would expect little difference between the fit of the equations for 
the two groups. This result is therefore supportive of the screening hypothesis. 
The overall results of Fredland & Little are therefore mixed and may be 
adversely affected by the omission of an ability control due to data limitations. 
Moreover, Tucker (1985) suggests that the total family income measure of 
earnings is too noisy a measure of a worker's own labour income since it includes 
other family member's income, returns to family assets and other non-labour 
family earnings. The lack of control for a situation where these additional 
components represent different proportions of the total family income of the self-
employed and employees may bias Fredland & Little's results. 
Cohn et al (1987) aim to test the pure screening hypothesis with a 
methodology based on Katz & Ziderman (1980) and using the 1978 US Panel 
Study oflncome Dynamics (PSID). 
The authors follow Katz & Ziderman's suggestion that differential 
educational investments by occupation and worker type (i.e. self-employed or 
employees) indicates screening. The null hypothesis is that there are no significant 
differences in educational investments between self-employed and private 
employee subsets. The alternative hypothesis is that there are positive differences 
between educational investments of employees compared to the self-employed for 
high level occupations (e.g. professionals), and negative differences between 
educational investments of employees compared to the self-employed for low 
level occupations (e.g. unskilled manual workers). Their results reject such 
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hypotheses, based on a comparison of the mean education levels of employees 
versus self-employed workers [see Cohn et a! (1987) Table 1 p. 291 for full 
details of their occupational ranking system]. 
The only significant difference between the two groups is for professional 
occupations, in which the self-employed have a significantly higher mean level of 
education contrary to the null hypothesis. 
This comparison of mean years of schooling between the self-employed 
and employees as a test of the existence of screening is open to similar criticism 
as that levelled at Wolpin in that non-monetary returns to education may outweigh 
monetary returns in the signalling decisions of workers, qualifications rather than 
years of study may be the screen used by firms, service-quality signalling may be 
an interference in the professional occupations, and hedging may occur. Their 
results should therefore not be seen as solid evidence refuting a screening model 
based upon the use of qualifications as a signal of ability in the labour market. 
Grubb (1993) also uses self-employed individuals as representing the 
unscreened workers. He tests whether credentials and grades are market signals 
and have higher returns in screened than in unscreened occupations, and uses 
Heckman's (1979) correction to control for self-selection bias. 
Grubb uses the 1972-1986 NLS containing information on education, 
socio-economic status, on-the-job training, ethnic origin, and several measures of 
ability including a composite test score TEST, allowing him to omit some of the 
biases inherent in previous comparative tests which ignore social factors that may 
influence education or ability, and overwhelm the signalling role of education.9 
Grubb distinguishes between experience in current job which would affect 
the signalling value of education, and experience from other jobs. Grubb also 
includes a measure of 'credits' earned by drop outs from post-secondary courses 
accumulated prior to leaving, since simply being allowed entrance to an 
institution may be used as a screen by employers. 
Grubb shows that a number of post-secondary qualifications operate as 
screens by gaining individuals access to jobs where they accumulate labour 
9 Results estimating the value of education as a signal may be biased upwards if no control is 
included for on-the-job training in regressions; workers with high ability may be selected for on-the-
job training. 
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market experience and on-the-job training. For instance, the extra $3305 p.a. in 
1985 total earnings a salaried worker earns compared to high school leavers from 
having a vocational associate degree vanishes once Grubb controls for labour 
market experience and on-the-job training. In comparison vocational college 
degrees have an insignificant effect on self-employed earnings. It may be that 
firms select applicants with vocational college degrees into jobs requiring on-the-
job training because they have lower training costs, compared to high school 
leavers. 
Sub-Baccalaureate certificates (indicating a level of education below 
university standard) and academic associate degrees have no significant effect on 
the earnings of either group [see Grubb (1993) p. 132 for a definition of these 
certificates]. In contrast the returns to Baccalaureate (university) degree's are 
substantially higher in the unscreened positions than in salaried employment 
contrary to the screening hypothesis. This finding is compounded by the results 
for course credits for drop outs. Grubb concludes that university degrees and 
vocational credits earned within 4 year colleges are valuable not only as signals, 
but are 'intrinsically' productive. Such evidence supports a weak version of the 
screening hypothesis in which university and 4 year college education signals and 
augments a worker's productivity. 
High school grades appear to be used as screens of ability with significant 
positive returns for salaried workers which persist when labour market experience 
and on-the-job training are controlled for. This relationship is not present for the 
self-employed and suggests that high school performance is used as a screen but is 
not intrinsically valuable. Such evidence supports a strong version of the 
screening hypothesis in which high school education signals, but does not 
augment a worker's productivity. 
Grubb shows that allowing for the possibility of self-selection into self-
employment, using Heckman's (1979) correction for incidental sample truncation, 
makes no significant differences to any of the results discussed. However, 
throughout the analysis TEST appears to be an inaccurate ability proxy since it is 
consistently insignificant, and we would therefore expect some omitted-ability 
bias to be present in these results. 
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Tucker (1985) decomposes the gross earnings differential between a 
sample of self-employed and private employees from the 1981 PSID and 
calculates the percentage of the earnings differential due to different sources. 10 
Tucker's dependant variable is the natural log of 1980 own-labour income; this 
omits bias from the self-employed group typically receiving returns from capital 
assets. n In the estimated earnings functions the estimated coefficients on 
education, an intelligence index, race, sex and a socio-economic status dummies 
are higher for the self-employed, and the estimated coefficients on on-the-job 
training, experience, hours of work, years in current job and marital status are 
higher for employees [see Tucker (1985) p. 323 for a description of each variable 
and table of results]. The earnings equation differential between the two groups is 
significant, and a higher R2 for the employee sub-sample is consistent with the 
screening view that this group are generally more screened than the self-
employed. Tucker estimates that the average employee in the sample earns 
1.256% more in 1980 than the self-employed worker. 
Tucker shows that the self-employed advantage from formal education, 
intelligence, race, sex and socio-economic variables in the contributions to the 
earnings differential between the two groups, is more than offset by the 
employees' advantage from on-the-job training, experience, hours of work, tenure 
and marital status. 
Tucker assumes that under screening the coefficient on years of education 
in the estimated earnings function will be greater in size and more significant for 
the screened group. However he finds that the coefficient is slightly higher for the 
unscreened group, and coefficients for both groups are significant, the self-
employed have an advantage in terms of rate of return from years of education 
and employees are not gaining relatively more from their stock of education; 
Tucker therefore rejects the screening hypothesis. 
Tucker bases his tests of the screening hypothesis solely on years of 
education completed; as argued previously this basis is open to criticism, and 
10 Profes.sionals are again omitted from the sub-samples of private employees and self-employed 
workers. 
11 The use of logarithmic terms is common practice in human capital literature, but whether it is 
appropriate to screening analysis is open to debate [Grubb (1993) pp. 131-132]. 
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although Tucker suggests that his results are a stronger rejection of the hypothesis 
than Wolpin (1977) or Fredland & Little (1981). To discredit a screening 
hypothesis based upon the use of qualifications, Tucker would have to make the 
strong assumption that each year of education completed is accompanied by 
grading or certification which is common knowledge in the labour market. 
3.3.2 Sectoral Screening Levels 
The theoretical distinction between the 'weak' and the 'strong' version of the 
screening hypothesis is generally taken to mean that in the strong version of the 
screening hypothesis education has only a screening function, whereas in the 
weak version it also has a productivity augmenting role. 
Psacharopoulos (1979) interprets the strong screening model as predicting 
that the wages of university graduates will be in excess of their actual 
productivity, and will remain at this level even as tenure increases. In contrast, in 
the weak model he suggests that wages of university graduates will be revised 
downwards towards their actual productivity. Whether firms pay irrational wages 
initially on hiring (the weak version where education is both a signal and a human 
capital investment) or continuously after hiring (the strong version where 
education is only a signal) is tested by Psacharopoulos using 1975 UK General 
Household Survey data on approximately 5000 employed males. 
Psacharopoulos's methodology is to compare the rate of return to 
education between competitive and non-competitive economic sectors, which are 
assumed to be characterised by different levels of screening; in later literature this 
type of sectoral methodology is referred to as a 'P-test'. Distributive trades are 
assumed to be the competitive sector and public administration to be the non-
competitive sector. Psacharopoulos assumes that screening is more likely to occur 
in non-competitive economic sectors, where wage scales are bureaucratic and 
linked to education and where wages can deviate from marginal product, which is 
difficult to measure, persistently over time. He expects the wages in the 
competitive sector on the other hand are largely determined by traditional market 
forces. 
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Psacharopoulos shows that, regardless of economic sector, the mid-to-
early earnings ratios become higher as education increases. 12 This differential in 
earnings growth is more pronounced in the competitive rather than the non-
competitive sector. Thus age-earnings profiles by level of education in a sector 
where productivity is important seem to contradict the strong screening 
hypothesis. 
Psacharopoulos admits that no allowance is made for other factors that 
influence earnings, and that no ability measure is available in the data he uses. By 
not controlling for ability a potential source of bias is introduced since higher 
returns to higher levels of education may simply be reflecting efficient screening 
in that those with higher ability have acquired higher levels of education 
compared to those with lower abilities. 
Psacharopoulos's human capital earnings functions explain nearly double 
the earnings determination in the competitive sector compared to the non-
competitive sector. Also, the returns to years of education are higher in the 
competitive sector compared to the non-competitive sector; this refutes the strong 
hypothesis. Psacharopoulos concludes that education must have an inherent 
productive value since it is valued more in the competitive sector. 
Lee ( 1980) follows the methodology of Psacharopoulos (1979) to test the 
strong version of the screening hypothesis in that he compares the rates of return 
to education in competitive and non-competitive sectors of the Malaysian 
economy. However, Lee uses examination grades at the end of primary education 
to proxy for ability. 13 Education level is measured in terms of the highest 
educational certificate held by the worker. 
Lee finds that, in comparison to the public sector, the coefficients on the 
educational certificate dummies are generally significantly higher in the private 
sector, the private sector shows a significantly higher return to ability, and that 
even after on-the-job screening is accounted for as tenure increases, that the 
private sector continues to place a higher value on education. These results are 
consistent with those of Psacharopoulos (1979) in that they refute the strong 
12 
'Mid' career corresponds to ages 36-45 and 'early' to less than or equal to 25. 
13 The limitations of this specific proxy are discussed in Lee & Psacharopoulos (1980). 
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version of the screening hypothesis and show that education has an inherent 
productive value, and can be seen as stronger evidence than Psacharopoulos 
( 1979) since some potential omitted ability bias has been removed. 
Cohn et a! (1987) use PSID data and follow Psacharopoulos's 
methodology for testing the 'strong' screening hypothesis. Cohn et a! test whether 
mid-to-early career earnings ratios fall as years of education increase, and if mid-
to-early career earnings ratios are higher for the non-competitive sector. 
Returns to education are found to be generally higher in the government 
sector, but a number of other sectors show rates of return as high or higher, and 
there is no discernible pattern of decreasing rates of return as competitiveness 
increases. Mid-to-early occupation earnings ratios generally rise, rather than fall, 
with the exception of the government sector, and there is no evidence that the 
mid-to-early occupation earnings ratios are consistently higher in the less 
competitive sectors from their results. Thus the authors find no evidence in 
support of the strong screening hypothesis. 
Ziderman (1992) applies a P-test to two Israeli data sets; the 198~ Census 
of Population and Housing (CPH) and the 1977 Labour Mobility Survey (LMS). 
The government sector is taken as the non-competitive sector and the trade sector 
as the competitive sector. Mincerian earnings functions are estimated for each 
sector and analysed with inconclusive results. However, the author suggests that a 
prima facie case can be made in support of the weak screening model in relation 
to Israel from this work and Katz & Ziderman (1980). Similarly, Lambropoulos 
(1992) applies a P-test to Greek data for 1977, 1981 and 1985, and given the 
constraints of the data set employed, finds no support for the strong screening 
hypothesis. 
All the P-test literature cited above assumes that the choice the sector of 
employment is exogenous; they do not control for the fact that by splitting their . 
data sets into sectoral sub-samples they are incidentally truncating the pooled 
sample. However, Arabsheibani & Rees (1996) estimate a two-stage Heckit 
model, using General Household Survey 1985 data for the UK, to correct for the 
self-selection bias in the estimated returns to education which may be present in 
previous literature. They find no evidence in support of the strong screening 
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hypothesis, since the estimated rate of return to schooling in the private sector is 
actually significantly higher than that estimated for the public sector. Haynes & 
Sessions (1996) replicate the Heckit analysis of Arabsheibani & Rees (1996) on 
data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 1985-1991, and arrive at the similar 
conclusion of rejecting the strong screening hypothesis. 
Ziderman (1990) does register some doubts regarding the rationale behind 
the P-test methodology of analysing mid-to-early-career earnings ratios. The 
assumption is that screening implies irrational behaviour on the part of employers 
in paying wage rates to educated employees in excess of their productivity. But 
the screening models, as outlined in Chapter 2, generally involve profit 
maximising firms who pay wage rates equal to productivity. Therefore, the ratio 
test may be unable to shed any light on whether the higher educated workers 
higher wage rates are due to productivity augmentation by education or higher 
innate productivities. 
3.4 Comparisons by Education or Tenure Levels 
3.4.1 Efficient versus Inefficient Years of Education 
Oosterbeek (1992) bases his test of the screening hypothesis on the information 
signalled by a divergence of actual years of education from 'efficient' years of 
education. For a given university course, 'efficient' years of study is the number of 
years nominally needed to obtain a degree. Oosterbeek posits that this divergence 
influences earnings, with the direction of the influence dependant on the school of 
thought. 
Human capital theorists, for example, would suggest that the more time 
spent obtaining a degree should increase earnings since education augments 
productivity and the extra study time will lead to more thorough understanding of 
the course. Rushing through the degree, on the other hand, would result in less 
understanding and have a negative influence on earnings. In contrast, Oosterbeek 
suggests, the screening school predicts that obtaining degrees in less (longer) than 
the nominal time would signal above-average (below-average) productivity and 
positively (negatively) influence earnings. 
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Oosterbeek uses a sample of 1377 Dutch economists in 1987, and uses 
average test score in secondary education as an ability proxy. He finds that for a 
student of any ability a longer period of study increases earnings. The estimated 
coefficient represents a rate of return to one extra year of study of economics of 
approximately 8%. This supports the human capital prediction that a student of 
any ability will find it profitable to spend longer than the nominal required time 
studying for their degree, and it therefore refutes the screening hypothesis that 
short study duration will enhance earnings. 
This result appears to contradict the result of Layard & Psacharopoulos 
(1979) indicating that drop-outs have a higher rate of return to their education 
than those who complete courses; both Oosterbeek and Layard & Psacharopoulos 
claim to discredit the screening hypothesis but with contrary results. However, 
the claim that a contradiction exists should be made with caution as we have seen 
that Oosterbeek was testing his own specific screening hypothesis based on 
efficient versus actual years of education rather than the more conventional 
'sheepskin' hypothesis. 14 
Oosterbeek & Groot (1994) develop this methodology further by 
decomposition of actual years of schooling into effective years, repeated years, 
skipped years, inefficient routing years and dropout years. Inefficient routing 
years refers to years spent on an educational path within the Dutch educational 
system which could have been avoided by correct routing, repeated years are 
years spent repeating classes, skipped years are years spent skipping classes, and 
dropout years are years spent in education without graduation from a course. This 
division of the 'schooling' variable is used to provide further evidence in the 
human capital versus screening debate. 
The authors suggest that repeated years will have a negative effect on 
earnings in the screening model, since it is a 'bad' signal to employers, and a non-
negative effect in the human capital model. If the repeated year leads to increased 
understanding of a subject then there may be a small positive effect on earnings in 
the human capital framework. 
14 Indeed, the two countries and samples in question are also different. The non-zero returns to 
dropping out in the US may be to some extent a result of the credit system which operates in the 
US educational system. 
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Conversely, skipped years will have a positive effect in the screemng 
model and a non-positive effect in the human capital model. Inefficient routing 
years will have no effect on earnings in the screening model since they convey no 
useful information to employers, and in the human capital model they may have a 
positive effect if human capital is heterogeneous. The sheepskin argument of the 
screening models predicts that years of education without graduation from a 
course will have no effect on earnings, whereas the human capital model predicts 
a positive effect. 
Oosterbeek & Groot use a detailed panel data set from surveys in 1952 and 
1983 of Dutch workers. The authors find that skipped years have a significant 
negative effect on earnings, failing courses has a neutral effect; and dropout years 
have a significant positive effect on earnings. This result is analogous to that for 
drop-outs in Layard & Psacharopoulos (1974). These results provide strong 
support for the human capital model and refute the screening hypothesis. 
3.4.2 Ranking in the Distribution of Education by Age Cohort 
Sakamoto & Chen (1992) give evidence supporting a credentialist theory with 
reference to Japan. Sakamoto & Chen estimate logarithmic income functions for 
Japanese males, which allow for both human capital and screening effects of 
education on income, using cross-sectional data from 1955, 1965 and 1975 Social 
Stratification and Mobility Surveys. 
The number of years of education completed is interpreted as the human 
capital effect of education. The percentile ranking in the distribution of years of 
education for the respondents age-cohort is interpreted as the screening or 
credentialist effect of schooling. 
The human capital effect of years of schooling on log-income is found to 
be reduced by approximately a third when the screening function of education is 
included in the regressions. They also find that over the sample period there 
seems to have been an increase in the role of education as a screen and a 
reduction in the value of education as a human capital investment; the net effect 
on log-income of years of schooling fell from 4.04% to 3.02% while the net effect 
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of percentile grading according to years of education and prestige of the university 
attended rose from 0.31% to 0.41%. Japanese universities prestige can be 
measured by the entrance-exam score needed for admission, and has been found 
to be used by Japanese firms as a screening device by Miyahara (1988). 
They suggest that the human capital model of education without allowing 
for screening effects is unable to explain fully the relationship between education 
and income in Japan, and they find support for Thurow's (1975) credentialist job-
competition' theory. 
Kroch & Sjoblom (1994) also posit that if education is a signal, then the 
typical firm could base its wage setting or hiring decisions upon the position of 
the individual in the distribution of education in their age cohort. In a similar way 
to Sakamoto & Chen (1992), Kroch & Sjoblom estimate logarithmic earnings 
functions with the percentile ranking of the worker in the distribution of years of 
education, within their race-gender category's age cohort, representing the 
screening element of education, and years of education representing the human 
capital element of education. The authors use eight different samples from CPS 
1973 and PSID 1967-80 data, separated on the basis of gender and racial origin. 
From analysing the samples from the panel data under a range of earnings 
function specifications Kroch & Sjoblom find that years of education has a 
consistent significant positive effect on earnings, but that the percentile ranking 
measure does not. Although the evidence is ambiguous, since in some cases the 
rank is significant in determining earnings, it gives more support to the human 
capital theory than the signalling theory of education. The estimated earnings 
functions for white females and non-white males from the PSID data do give 
some support to the weak screening hypothesis, but Kroch & Sjoblom conclude 
that overall the signalling role of education is small in comparison to its human 
capital role. 
3.4.3 Comparisons by Level of Tenure 
Tucker (1986) tests both the strong and weak versions of the screening hypothesis 
using US data from the 1980 PSID. Following the example of Lee (1980) Tucker 
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controls for ability using the proxies available in the PSID data. Tucker finds a 
significant positive coefficient for tenure in his earnings function regressions for 
school leavers and university graduates, and in line with rejection of the strong 
screening hypothesis the coefficient is greater for university graduates. The 
tenure squared coefficients are approximately equal and significant which is 
consistent with education being productivity enhancing. Workers with larger 
stocks of formal education earn higher relative wages even after employers have 
had time to observe performance on the job, thus discrediting pure screening 
theories of education and lending support to human capital theories. 
Tucker (1986) re-examines Psacharopoulos's claim that few would dispute 
the existence of weak screening in the labour market, using earnings regressions 
for four tenure groupings. 15 Under weak screening Tucker expects both the size 
and precision of the coefficient on years of education to decline as firms gather 
more and superior information about the true productivity of workers through 
observation. However, he shows that in this sample the rate of return to education 
remains relatively stable as tenure increases, and declines slightly only after 
tenure exceeds twenty years. On the basis of this finding Tucker rejects both the 
strong and the weak versions of the screening hypothesis. 
Tucker justifies his assumption that individual hiring-wage decisions are 
based only on years of formal education completed by saying that the US 
education system does not use standardised certification of students (on which 
starting salaries can be based). However, previous theoretical and empirical 
literature suggests that the hiring or wage setting decision is based on a vector of 
educational information including certificates or grades which acts as a signal of 
productivity and not merely the single years of education measure. 
Grubb (1993) also tests the Psacharopoulos's (1979) strong and weak 
versions of the screening hypothesis. For high school grades, the only obvious 
screen from Grubb's results, the interaction terms between experience (as a proxy 
for tenure) and the screen are insignificant, implying that grades are used in both 
the strong and weak senses in screening for ability. However, note that human 
15 Less than one year with current employer, 1-5 years, 5-20 years and over 20 years. 
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capital theory suggests that education increases the 'ability to learn' on the job so 
there may be positive interaction; this indicates a potential ambiguity in results. 
Liu & Wong (1982) argue that the relevant test of educational screening 
effects in the determination of wage rates should be in reference to educational 
certificates rather than years of education. The authors assume that the 
information about individual ability conveyed by the years of education of an 
applicant is not sufficiently accurate for the purposes of making the dual hiring 
and wage offer decision rather than just a hiring decision. Years of schooling may 
only act as a predictor of the probability of being employed in a particular 
occupation and the associated average wage rate. If this is the case then it is not 
surprising that previous empirical tests based on years of education as a screening 
device predicting individual wage rates have been inconclusive. 
Since workers may be screened more than once and work in more than 
one job in their lifetimes information about individual productivity will accrue as 
general labour market experience increases. Liu & Wong follow 
Psacharopoulos's (1979) reasoning that, if this information is freely available to 
all firms and the skill requirement for each firm is non-specific, then certification 
as a screening device may be replaced by this alternative information. However, 
Liu & Wong suggest that, for firms where the skill requirements are firm-specific, 
wage screening by certification will be used even for individuals who have had 
previous work experience. 
Liu & Wong use data from a Singapore labour force survey in 1974 
sponsored by the Spencer Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the International 
Labour Organisation. The authors estimate logarithmic wage rate functions for 
male Chinese employees in the sample divided into tenure groupings according to 
years of experience with a specific firm and then years of general labour market 
experience. The authors find returns to certificates fall as both types of tenure 
increases, and that the effect of high level certificates on wage rates persists 
longer as tenure increases than the effects of lower level certificates. These 
results provide evidence supporting Psacharopoulos's weak screening hypothesis 
via certificates among manufacturing employees in Singapore. 
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3.5 Comparisons by Education Utilisation Groups 
Wiles (1974) proposed that the wages or salaries of workers in occupations 
related to their educational qualifications should be compared to the wages or 
salaries of other workers with the same qualifications, but who are working in 
areas not directly related to their education. If a premium is paid to the group 
who are utilising their education (working in areas directly related to their 
qualifications) then the strong screening hypothesis is rejected. However, if the 
qualification gets a premium irrespective of its relevance to the jobs people are 
employed in, then the strong screening hypothesis carmot be rejected. Given the 
detailed data-sets necessary to apply the Wiles test it is unsurprising to find that 
there appears to be only three articles which apply this methodology to data on 
university graduates. 
Miller & Volker (1984) use the Wiles (1974) methodology to test the 
screening hypothesis. Miller & Volker (1984) follow the suggestion made by 
Blaug (1976) that the Wiles test best applies to starting salaries and apply the test 
to the starting salaries of a sample of Australian university graduates in the fields 
of economics and sciences. Miller & Volker's estimates provide support for the 
screening hypothesis since a premium is paid to graduates regardless of the 
relevance of their qualification to their job. Miller & Volker conclude that on the 
basis of comparisons made for economics and science graduates screening was 
'alive and well in Australia' [Miller & Volker (1984) p. 125]. 
Dolton (1985) applies the Wiles test to a sample taken in 1977 recording 
data on approximately 4000 first-degree graduates of universities and 
polytechnics in the UK based on pass lists for 1970, and finds evidence in support 
of weak screening. Earnings equations were estimated for two sub-samples 
determined by the response to a question relating to the vocational relevance of 
the respondent's degree subject in their first job. Following Miller & Volker, 
Dolton expects under the human capital model to find that graduates with relevant 
degrees had a higher estimated rate of return to education, whereas under the 
strong screening hypothesis he expects no significant difference. 
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Dolton finds that there is generally no significant difference between the 
estimated earnings functions of the two sub-samples, however, he rejects the 
strong screening hypothesis as it appears that certificates do have a productivity 
enhancing role. Dolton suggests that; 
" ... there are reasonable grounds to support a compromise 
interpretation of the education-income association which gives 
credence to both human capital and screening theory but supports an 
extreme version of neither." [Dolton (1985), p. 32] 
Arabsheibani (1989) uses a random sample of Egyptian university 
graduates from 1978 to investigate the Wiles (1974) methodology, and, following 
Miller & Volker, applies it to the starting salaries of graduates separated by field 
of study. Arabsheibani finds that a premium is paid to graduates working in jobs 
where their education is relevant. This supports the human capital model of 
education and rejects the strong version screening hypothesis for Egyptian 
graduates. 
3.6 Comparisons by Level of Alternative Information 
The article by Albrecht (1981) appears to be unique in that it analyses the hiring 
process of the employer to test the screening hypothesis. Albrecht analyses a 
probit model in which applicants are characterised by their education and the 
amount of information the hiring firm has about them. The firm is assumed to be 
unable to employ self-selection contracts and uses education as a screening 
device. In the model the firm has to depend more heavily on education as a signal 
when screening applicants about which it has little a priori information. 
The firm is expected to give a positive weight to education in the hiring 
procedure and if part of this weight is due to an informational role then the weight 
should be expected to fall if alternative information is available. Albrecht 
therefore expects interaction between education categories and a priori 
information categories, and a test of the hypothesis that a firm does not use 
education as a screen can be expressed as a test for zero interactive effects. 
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Albrecht uses a data set based on applicants for blue collar jobs at a Volvo 
factory in June 1978. The critical split level between high and low education is 
assumed to be Gymnasium graduation. 16 There are three possible recruitment 
sources; recommendation by a Volvo employee, Swedish Labour Market Board 
referral, or application from newspaper advertisements. The first source is 
assumed to be the high informational category, the others the low informational 
category. 
Albrecht's results show that completion of the gymnasium, Swedish or 
Finnish nationality and being male significantly increase the probability of being 
hired. 17 Having a Volvo employee's reference, age and residence are insignificant 
determinants. The education-infonnation interaction effects are insignificant; 
Albrecht concludes that Volvo's hiring decisions give no support for the 
hypothesis that education is used for informational purposes in the hiring process. 
From his results it is equally apparent that the company does not appear to give 
any significant weight to information category, as defined by Albrecht, in the 
hiring process. 
However, in using the hiring decision of the company as the dependant 
variable in his model Albrecht has introduced a potential source of bias in his 
results. The decision to hire depends not only on the variables listed above, but 
also upon the interview performance of an applicant, a factor which has not been 
controlled for. It is probably the case that the number interviewed i.e. passing 
through the educational filtering process, does not correspond to the number hired 
i.e. passing through the second screening process. The omission of an interview 
performance variable may have biased results away from the role of education as 
an information source since undoubtedly there is much alternative information to 
be gathered from an interview. 
16 The Gymnasium is attended for three years (ages 16 to 19) in Sweden. 
17 However, it should be noted that only approximately 11% of the sample are female. 
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3. 7 Conclusion 
In conclusion we can see that there is a mass of empirical work which seems to 
discredit the educational screening models, and support the human capital theory 
of education as augmenting ability. However, we would be wrong to conclude on 
the basis of the results discussed that education has no informational role in the 
labour market beyond it's role as a productive investment. There are three main 
reasons for scepticism. 
Firstly, many of the articles refute only the fact that the role of education is 
not solely informational. As noted earlier the founding theoretical articles of 
Spence, Arrow and Stiglitz viewed education as having only an informational role 
for clarity of analysis. Indeed the later articles of Spence allow for a human 
capital role alongside its informational role, and Arrow explicitly states that he is 
merely applying Okun's Razor. In this light it could be said that some of the 
empirical investigators of the screening hypothesis are testing too strong an 
hypothesis and in putting their tests into the context of a human capital versus 
screening debate have ignored the middle ground. Investigation of the screening 
hypothesis should allow for the productivity enhancing role of education 
alongside its informational role, i.e. empiricists should test the weak version of 
the screening model. 
Secondly, it should be noted that by pitching the two schools of thought 
against each other some empirical research has tended to test only the 
informational role of years of formal education. However, such tests say little 
about the role of the educational credentials as a signal of ability, and it is more 
likely that in reality a personnel officer within a company will not be counting 
years but certificates acquired by an applicant. Thus, couching tests of the 
screening hypothesis in terms of earnings or wage-rate functions with years of 
education as the main independent variable can also result in misleading 
evidence. 
Moreover, when credentials are used to measure education level in some 
cases there is a misinterpretation of the screening hypothesis in that the screening 
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model is mistaken for a model of credentialism, in which wage rate differentials 
are not related to productivity differentials. 
Thirdly, attention can be drawn to the inaccuracy or the lack of ability 
proxy variables used in the studies of the screening hypothesis. Notable in the 
discussion of the problems associated with ability proxies are Taubman ( 1976a,b) 
and Griliches (1977). Taubman found that not controlling for genetics and family 
background in earnings-education regressions may cause a over-estimation of 
coefficients of up to two thirds, since a significant proportion of the variance in 
earnings can be attributed to these factors. Using NLS data, Griliches (1977) 
showed that the assumed positive omitted-ability bias in estimation of earnings 
coefficients in earnings regressions may actually be insignificant or even reversed. 
Thus the authors suggest that we should be wary of studies that attempt to 
measure the rate of return to education but do not control fully for socio-economic 
or family background effects, since the reported coefficients may be biased, and 
furthermore this bias may be indeterminate. 
However, Weiss (1995) contends that in sorting models (screening or 
signalling models) firms cannot directly observe the attributes that affect worker 
productivity that are omitted from the standard wage equation. Firms use 
education as an indirect estimator of the unobserved attributes. The estimated 
coefficient on education is fully capturing the effects of this estimation process 
and would not be affected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that 
the firm cannot directly observe, but that the researcher can. Weiss suggests that 
even the use of instrumental variables does not reduce the effects of unobserved 
characteristics on estimates of the returns to education, since those characteristics 
are not observed by firms. This argument equally applies to other worker 
characteristics such as house ownership status, housing tenure, number of 
dependant children, drug use, alcohol and cigarette consumption patterns, which 
the typical firm would be unable to directly observable. Indeed, a majority of the 
P-test literature reviewed in this Chapter use simple Mincerian earnings functions 
to estimate the effect of education on earnings and have no control for 
demographic or regional characteristics of an individual. 
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In addition, results oftesting the screening hypothesis seem to suggest that 
the screening hypothesis may apply to some countries rather better than other 
countries. For instance evidence of screening was found to exist for the Israel, 
Japan, Singapore and Australia, but not for the Greece, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Egypt. Mixed results were found for the UK and the USA. The 
extent to which education is used as screen must surely depend both on the nature 
of the educational systems and the labour markets in these countries. For 
example, some countries may have a policy of employing only university 
graduates as civil servants, some countries may have a system of 'closed shops' 
operating amongst professionals requiring certain job-related qualifications, and 
some countries may place more emphasis on alternatives to education as a screen 
in their labour markets. One cannot generalise the result of no evidence for 
screening in Country A to Country B if the two countries have dissimilar 
education systems or labour markets. In addition we can see that there seems to 
be a lack of evidence in relation to Western European countries such as France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
Given these overall criticisms and the problems associated with individual 
studies one must suggest that the evidence as to whether an informational 
component of education exists is not conclusive one way or the other. However, 
what we can say from the results of using the methodologies presented here is that 
there is little evidence in support of the idea that education has no human capital 
role i.e. there is little support for the strong version of the screening hypothesis. 
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Chapter 4 
Application Of Human Capital Models To British Social 
Attitudes Survey 1985-1991 Data 
4.1 Introduction 
In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith observed: 
" ... When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to 
be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will 
replace capital/aid out by it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man 
educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of these 
employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be 
compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he 
learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual 
wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his 
education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable 
capital" [reprinted in Smith (1976), pp. 113-114]. 
Smith's insight, developed nearly two centuries later in the 1950's by economists 
such as Becker and Mincer, was that a number of activities that human beings 
undertake can be analysed in a similar fashion to physical capital in a framework 
of investment theory. Human capital investment in education and training has 
since received much theoretical and empirical attention from labour economists. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to estimate human capital earnings 
equations for male and female full-time workers who responded to the British 
Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey in the period 1985-1991. Before testing the 
educational screening theories discussed in Chapter 2 we can initially study how 
well the traditional human capital model fits this UK data set, and compare the 
results to previous studies conducted in the UK. 
4.1 
Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) relax implicit assumptions in Mincer's 
work regarding independence of earnings function parameters from educational 
level. Psacharopoulos & Layard's analysis differs from Mincer's in that they 
assume that three underlying parameters of the Mincerian model; the rate of 
return to experience, the fraction of earnings forgone by increased education, and 
the rate of change of investment ratio; are functions of education level. 
Murphy & Welch (1990) accept the independence of the three parameters 
from education level and develop the Mincerian model in a different direction. 
Concerned with how well the traditional quadratic function performs empirically, 
Murphy & Welch develop an earnings function which is a quartic function of 
experience. The authors find that this function fits Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data more accurately than the Mincer's (1974) quadratic earnings function. 
4.2.2 Mincer (1974) Schooling Model 
Mincer begins his analysis with the assumption that additional years of education 
accumulated by an individual requires postponement of labour market entry and 
therefore reduces the earnings span of the worker. The present value of the 
worker's lifetime earnings at the start of schooling is given by the formula: 
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where e is the base of natural logarithms. 
Similarly, the present value oflifetime earnings of a worker with s-d years 
of education, where d is non-negative is given by: 
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The ratio of annual earnings after s years of education to annual earnings 
after s-dyears of education, k.,_d, is found by letting V,= V,_d: 
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We can see that k •.• -d is 
1. Greater than unity- people with more education earn more, 
2. A positive function of r- the differential in earnings due to the extra years of 
schooling is larger the higher the rate of return to schooling, 
3. A negative function of n - the differential is greater the smaller the lifetime 
of the individual. 
If we hold working life span constant then k,_,_d is found to be constant. 
If n is the fixed life span then: 
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and from equalisation of present values we get: 
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If k,,o = Y, I fo = k, then k, = e" is the earnings ratio between a worker with s 
years of education and a worker with no years of education. Taking natural 
logarithms gives; 
(8) lnY, = lnY0 + rs (MS) 
this function shows that percentage additions to earnings are proportional to 
absolute differences in schooling; the logarithm of earnings is a strict linear 
function of the time spent in education. Thus a worker with no schooling is 
assumed to earn fo every year of his or her life and if the worker has one year of 
education this raises earnings by a proportion r. 
4.2.3 Mincer (1974) Human Capital Earnings Function 
The interpretation of experience (or age) profiles of earnings as a result of 
investment behaviour enabled Mincer (1974) to expand the schooling model, 
outlined in Section 4.2.2 above, to allow for post-education investments in human 
capital. Mincer (1974) shows empirically that earnings nearly double after 20-30 
years of experience within each schooling group. Mincer states that since age 
interacts with education in determining earnings a linear additive formulation 
with no interaction between these two variables is inadequate. Within his data 
there is far less of an interaction between experience and education than between 
age and education; the experience profiles of log-earnings are nearly parallel 
between schooling groups. 
A log-earnings function with years of work included is presented by 
Mincer as follows, and allows for the concave relationship between experience 
and earnings: 
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(9) !nE,= lnE, + {J1x- {J2x 2 
where; 
X the workers years of experience in the labour market 
the worker's earnings after s years of schooling 
Using the schooling model: !nE, = lnE0 + rs this function becomes: 
Human capital theory shares a common assumption with screening theory in that 
the worker will equate the marginal cost with the marginal revenue from 
increased investments in education (or other forms of human capital), in order to 
optimise utility. Optimisation theory would suggest that investment in human 
capital declines over the lifetime of the worker beyond an early point, since 
marginal costs would rise in excess of marginal revenue [see Mincer (1974), pp. 
11-16] However, there is no guide to the specific functional form of this 
behaviour. Mincer considers the following specification for the relationship 
between experience and dollar investments (ex) and 'time equivalent' investment 
ratios (kx); 
(11) 
(12) 
where: 
= 
T = 
net dollar investment by the worker during the initial period of 
experience x = 0, 
investment ratio during the initial period of experience x = 0, 
total period of positive investment. 
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The investment ratio k1 is the ratio of investment expenditure C1 to gross 
earnings E1 in period j. This can be measured as a 'time equivalent' as the 
fraction of time the worker devotes to the improvement of earning power; for 
example the time equivalent (in years) of investment between the tenth and 
fifteenth year of experience is k10_ 15 = (ln}'; 5 -In}';0 ) I r [see Mincer (1974), 
pp.72-74 for more details]. Treating investment and earnings as continuous 
functions of time gives the following function: 
(13) 
where: 
E I 
E s 
j 
r, 
E, = E, +r,f~ C1.dj r=O 
= 
= 
Gross earnings at time t, 
Earnings from s years of schooling only, 
length of working life, 
the rate of return to non-school investment.2 
Equation (13) shows that gross earnings at time t are equal to earnings from s 
years of schooling plus the return from non-school investments which, from 
Equation (11), is assumed to decline as x increases. The logarithmic version is as 
follows: 
(14) In£, =lnE,+r,J' k1dj }=0 
Substituting (11) into (13) and (12) into (14) transforms (13) and (14) into 
functions of years of experience. If the investment ratio is assumed to fall linearly 
over time, as in Equation (12), then the gross log-earnings function becomes: 
2The rate of return to non-school investment is assumed by Mincer to be constant over all levels of 
xands. 
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(15) 
If we define net earnmgs as Y, = E, - C, and the logarithm as 
In Y, = In E, -ln(1- k,) then the net earnings function becomes: 
(16) 
The logarithmic function is preferred to other functional forms, from an 
econometric viewpoint, as it minimises the need for interactive terms. Using 
Equation (12), and substituting for In E, using the schooling model, the earnings 
function for the population can be specified as; 
where: 
(18) b=5.. 
T 
In this Chapter we will use data on pre-tax earnings per annum and hours 
worked per week for each worker. We must, therefore, transform the log-
earnings function (17) into a gross log-wage rate function for full-timers, by 
assuming they are paid for 52 weeks of the year, as follows: 
(19) lnW, = tn(l) =In Y, -ln52h 
52h 
Substituting for Equation (17) gives; 
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(20) Inw; = ln£0 -ln52h + r,s + rxk0x- !rxbx 2 + ln(1- k, + bt) 
where h is the number of hours worked per week. This is estimated by: 
(21) 
where: 
a ln£0 -ln52h +In( I- k0 + bt) 
/3, 
/32 = 
/33 -lr b 2 X 
4.2.4 Murphy & Welch (1990) Quartic Human Capital Function 
An alternative estimation model is developed by Murphy & Welch (1990) from 
the traditional Mincer (1974) quadratic earnings function. The general model 
developed by Murphy & Welch (1990) (referred to as M&W below) is a quartic 
function of accumulated human capital as follows: 
where; 
(23) z = a'+/3 'x+f3 'x2 sxt 1 2 
and; 
s = Education group 
x = Years of experience 
t Year of observation 
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The parameters in Equation (22) are allowed to change over time and across the 
schooling groups, whilst those in Equation (23) are constants. On simplification 
M&W have the following model for estimation: 
where ljJ = 1/60 in M&W. This value is a constraint chosen by M&W to give a 
peak in the earnings function at 30 years of experience, which is consistent with 
the average profiles from the CPS data set. This constraint will not be included in 
the generalisation of this formula applied to non-grouped BSA Survey data. 
M&W use 1964-87 CPS data and find that the standard quadratic 
empirical model underestimates early-career earnings growth by 30-50% and 
overstates mid-career growth by 20-50%. Their quartic formulation performs 
more accurately in fitting the data. The quartic model is consistent with the 
human capital theory prediction of a declining rate of earnings growth, but rejects 
the assumptions of constant rates of return and linearly declining investment 
(M&W p. 227). M & W conclude that the quartic provides a better estimate of 
the true earnings function than does the traditional quadratic, a claim that will be 
tested later in this chapter. 
4.2.5 Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) Interactive Human Capital Function 
Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) (referred to asP & L below) develop a model 
which drops the assumption made by Mincer that the parameters k0 , b and rx are 
independent from s; the education level: 
where; 
(26) 
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and individual differences in the parameters k0 , b and rx are accounted for in the 
error term Uif [seeP & L, p. 46]. 
Although independence of the parameters from schooling may be inferred 
from the apparent parallel nature of log-earnings profiles for schooling groups in 
the data-set employed in Mincer's early work, P & L suggest that we should be 
more rigorous with the model specification. They make the following simple 
assumptions and substitute them into the function above: Firstly, P & L assume 
that the rate of return to experience is increases as years of education increases; 
where r1 and r2 are constants and r"' is the rate of return to experience (x) and s, 
is the number of years of education, of individual i. Under this assumption an 
individual with more education will gain a higher monetary return from learning 
on-the-job or from a job related training scheme. 
Secondly, P & L assume that the fraction of potential earnings foregone at 
the start of labour force participation increases as years of education increases; 
where k1 and k2 are constants, and k0 is the investment ratio during the initial 
period of experience x = 0 for individual i. 
Thirdly, P & L assume that the rate of change of the fraction of potential 
earnings foregone at the start of labour force participation increases as years of 
education increases; 
where b1 and b2 are constants, and b, is the rate of change of the investment ratio 
of individual i. Little intuition is supplied by P & L regarding these assumptions, 
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but they suggest that there is no reason why Mincer should assume that the three 
parameters k 0 , b and r, do not vary in relation to years of education. 
Substituting (27), (28) and (29) into the Mincerian function gives the 
following model: 
In Y,, = ln£0 - k1 + (r,- k2 )s, + (k1r1 + b1 + !r1b1 )x, - !r1b1x? 
(30) +(k1r2 +r1k2 +b2 +!r1b2 +!r2b1)s1x1 +(k2r2 +!b2r2 )s?x1 
- !(r1b2 + r2b1 )s,x,2 - !r2b2s12 x? + u211 
Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) use this estimating equation and present 
results, based on 1972 UK General Household Survey data, which do not support 
the hypothesis implicitly made by Mincer (1974) that the parameters k0 , band r, 
are independent of schooling [seeP & L, p. 493, Table Ill]. A wage rate function 
similar to Equation (30) will be tested using a different UK data set and the results 
compared to those ofP & L. 
4.2.6 Models to be Estimated 
We initially have three candidate models; a traditional Mincerian quadratic 
function (M), an adaptation of the M & W quartic function (MW) to include 
education as an explanatory variable, and an adaptation of the P & L function 
(PL).l The models estimated for the BSA sub-samples of male and female full-
time workers are: 
(M) 
(32)lnW =a 2 + f34YOED + f35Y/LF + f36YILF 2 + f31YILF 3 + f38YILF 4 + & 2 (MW) 
3 For brevity this Chapter only considers these three functional forms. Other functional forms can 
be chosen to give the required curvature in age-earnings profiles; for example, Mincer estimates a 
Gompertz function, see Mincer (1974) pp. 90-96 for more details. 
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(33) 
where: 
w = 
= 
fJJ 
YOED = 
YILF 
hourly wage rate derived from real (or nominal) annual gross 
earnings divided by hours worked in a week and 52 weeks 
for full-timers, 
a constant term, 
a constant coefficient, 
years of full-time education, 
years in the labour force, 
is an error term, assumed to be nonnally distributed with an 
expected value of zero. 4 
However, given the amount of additional information we have at our 
disposal in the BSA Survey data we can also estimate more detailed versions of 
the log-wage rate functions above: 
lnW = a 6 + /l24 YOED+ /l25YILF + /l26YILF 2 + /l21YILF.YOED+ 
(36) {J28Y0io"D 2 • YILF + {J29YOED. YILF 2 + {J30 YOED2 . YILF 2 + 
B3d +&6 
where: 
d set of control variables, 
(M') 
(MW) 
(PL') 
4Jfnominal gross earnings data is used in constructing the dependant variable then dummy variables 
will be included to control for the response year. 
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vector of parameters. 
The control variables contained within d are dummy variables for marital 
status, union or staff association membership, ethnic origin, unemployment in the 
past five years, the UK. region in which the respondent is resident, and a control 
for occupational skill level. In these equations the proxy for accumulated post-
education human capital x is years in the labour force, YILF, and the proxy for s 
schooling is years of full-time education, YOED. 
Separate wage rate equations are estimated for male and female full-time 
workers. Separation of workers into male and female sub-samples is justified at 
each stage by a Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test to show that wage 
determination occurs in separate markets for men and women; details of the tests 
are shown in Appendix 4.2. 
4.3 The Sample from the BSA Survey 1985-1991 
The sample used to estimate earnings functions is a pooled data set taken from the 
BSA Survey 1985-1991. The BSA Survey is an annual survey initiated in 1983 by 
the Social and Community Planning Research and funded by the Monument 
Trust. Additional contributions are also made by the Countryside Commission, 
Department of the Environment, ESRC, Marks and Spencer Plc, the Nuffield 
Foundation and Shell UK. Ltd. The data is derived from a cross-sectional sample 
of individuals, aged 18 and over, living in private households whose addresses 
were on the electoral registrar. 114 Parliamentary constituencies were selected 
from among all those in Great Britain on the basis of the Registrar General's 
Standard Regions. 
From each constituency a polling district was randomly selected. 
Addresses were chosen from these districts by treating the listed electors as 
circular with a fixed interval and marking the name of the individual on which the 
sampling interval landed. This methodology ensured a probability proportionate 
to the number of listed electors. Where possible these electors were chosen for the 
survey. Where there was a difference between the register record and the current 
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household members, the interviewer selected one respondent randomly. The BSA 
Survey has two sections. The main section is a interviewer-administered 
questionnaire; the second section is a self-completion section [Brown et al 
(1994)]. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Full-time Workers by Gender 
Sample: Males Females 
(N=5418) (N=2781) 
Standard Standard 
Variable Name Mean Deviation Mean Deviation T-Statistic 
Age 39.327 12.330 36.444 12.106 10.145* 
Years of education 16.734 2.021 17.038 2.027 -6.436* 
Nom. Gross Earnings 12209 6924.7 8114.9 4724.1 31.516* 
Real Gross Earnin2s 10453 5599.3 6843.1 3640.3 35.142* 
Hours worked per week 45.626 10.770 38.865 6.824 34.613* 
Years in Labour Force 22.593 12.914 19.406 12.602 10.750* 
Married 0.749 0.006 0.601 0.009 13.449* 
Divorced/widowed 0.048 0.003 0.124 0.006 -11.023* 
Hi2h Level Occupation 0.353 0.006 0.314 0.009 3.523* 
Mid Level Occupation 0.301 0.006 0.502 0.009 -17.827* 
Low Level Occupation 0.346 0.006 0.185 0.007 15.155* 
Self-employed 0.176 0.005 0.066 0.005 15.700* 
Union Membership 0.422 0.007 0.448 0.009 -2.247* 
Recent Unemployment 0.197 0.005 0.187 0.007 1.093 
African 0.011 0.001 0.017 0.002 -2.142* 
Asian Chinese 0.018 0.002 0.019 0.003 -0.319 
White European 0.163 0.005 0.153 0.007 1.181 
Unclassified race ori2in 0.808 0.005 0.812 0.007 -0.437 
East Anglia 0.038 0.003 0.035 0.003 0.689 
East Midlands 0.063 0.003 0.060 0.005 0.538 
London 0.094 0.004 0.111 0.006 -2.371* 
North East 0.045 0.003 0.047 0.004 -0.406 
Northern Ireland 0.119 0.004 0.129 0.006 -1.291 
North West 0.090 0.004 0.107 0.006 -2.418* 
Scotland 0.075 0.004 0.081 0.005 -0.955 
South East 0.190 0.005 0.166 0.007 2.715* 
South West 0.080 0.004 0.067 0.005 2.166* 
Wales 0.040 0.003 0.040 0.004 0.000 
West Midlands 0.080 0.004 0.090 0.005 -1.522 
Yorkshire/Humberside 0.085 0.004 0.067 0.005 2.973* 
Notes: * Difference between means 1s Sigrnficant at the 5% level or better. 
No satisfactory educational certification variables are available prior to 
1985, and no survey took place in 1988, therefore the data is for 6 rather than 7 
years. The BSA Survey over the years 1985-1991 covered approximately 15000 
individuals; of these 9998 were working, of which 8199 were in full-time 
employment, and had usable records. Following Blanchflower (1991) the 
nominal yearly gross-earnings data was converted from the original open-ended 
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groupings into band midpoints using UK General Household Survey statistics as a 
guide, and then adjusted for inflation using 1986 as the base year for a measure of 
real gross-earnings; we therefore have two possible dependant variables for the 
estimation of wage functions; real gross hourly wage-rates and nominal gross 
hourly wage-rates. Summary statistics for full-time male and female workers in 
the BSA Survey data are shown in Table 4.4.1; Appendix 4.1 contains a 
description of the variables used. 
Some interesting significant sample mean or sample proportion 
differences are shown in Table 4.1. We can see that on average male full-timers 
are significantly older, have less years in education, earn more per annum and 
work more hours per week than their female counterparts. A significantly higher 
proportion of male full-timers are married, and a significantly lower proportion 
are divorced/widowed in comparison to female full-timers. A significantly higher 
proportion of female full-timers work in the middle level occupations, and 
significantly lower proportions in high and low level occupations in comparison 
to male full-timers (see Appendix 3.1 for details of the occupational groupings). 
A significantly higher proportion of male full-timers are self-employed, and a 
significantly lower proportion are union members in comparison to female full-
timers. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 The Mincerian Wage Rate Functions 
The results of estimating the Mincerian schooling function (MS) for full-time 
male workers are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.2; the logarithms of 
nominal wage rates are regressed on years of education and dummy variables 
indicating the response year. The dummy variables for year control for price 
effects which will affect the real value of nominal wages in each year and also 
control for trends in labour supply and demand which may influence wage 
bargaining and employment in the UK. The explanatory power of this equation is 
very low as indicated by an R-squared adjusted of 0.168. 
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Table 4.2: Mincerian Equation Estimates for Male Full-timers (N=5418) 
Variable Equation (MS) Equation (MR) Equation (MN) 
Name Est. Coef. T-Ratio Est. Coef. T-Ratio Est. Coef. T-Ratio 
YOED 0.089 24.999* 0.105 29.067* 0.105 28.803* 
YILF -- -- 0.045 21.850* 0.044 21.768* 
YILF2 -- -- -0.00074 -17.706* -0.00074 -17.608* 
Dl985 -0.445 -15.544* -- -- -0.423 -14.528* 
Dl986 -0.336 -13.755* -- -- -0.329 -14.121* 
Dl987 -0.307 -12.268* -- -- -0.302 -12.544* 
Dl989 -0.155 -6.6138* 
-- --
-0.143 -6.411* 
Dl990 -0.049 -2.032* -- -- -0.042 -1.779* 
Constant 0.210 3.317* -0.897 -13.256* -0.560 -7.769* 
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.195 0.252 
Variance of 0.280 0.253 0.252 
Estimate 
Notes: • Stgruficant at the 5% level or better, Mean of dependant vanable = 1.511 (nommal), 1.368 
(real), All regressions have standard errors corrected according to White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix except Equation (MS). 
The results of estimating the Mincerian human capital equation (MR) for 
real wage rates of full-time male workers are shown in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 
4.2. Using nominal wages and dummy variables to represent the year in which 
the data was collected gives the (improved) results for equation (MN) shown in 
Columns 6 and 7. The addition of years in the labour force and its square as 
explanatory variables in the Mincerian human capital function estimates raises 
both the R-squared figure and the size of the coefficient on the years of education 
variable in comparison to the schooling model. The magnitude of the coefficient 
was reduced in estimation of equation (MS) by the omission of years in the labour 
force with which years of education is negatively correlated. 
The estimated rate of return to years of education in equation (MN) is 
approximately I 0.5% which accords with the P & L result of a I 0% rate of return 
to years of education in the UK. P & L find that maximum earnings occur when 
experience reaches around 30 years, in formulation (MN) maximum wages also 
occur at approximately 30 years of experience (P & L, p. 493).5 However, 
Harmon & White (1995) estimate the average rate of return to years of education 
for male workers in the UK to be approximately 16% using instrumental variables 
estimation technique on Family Expenditure Survey data for the period 1978-
5Maximising the function W = c + 0.044x- 0.00074x 2 , wherex is experience and c is the sum 
of all other effects, implies an optimal value ofx = 29.7. 
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1986. Harmon & White (1995) suggest that ordinary least squares estimation of 
earnings functions give estimated rates of return to education which are biased 
downwards. 
The nominal wage equation (MN) estimate shows a higher adjusted R-
squared and a lower estimate variance than the real wage equation (MR); we 
reject this formulation, and concentrate on nominal wages as the correct 
dependant variable. 
The results of estimating the Mincerian schooling equation (MS) for full-
time female workers are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.3. The 
explanatory power of this equation is low as indicated by an adjusted R-squared 
figure of 0.246, however females appear to fit this model better than their male 
counterparts as indicated by the higher adjusted R-squared. 
Table 4.3: Mincerian Equation Estimates for Female Full-timers (N=2781) 
Variable Equation (MS) Equation (MR) Equation (MN) 
Name Est. Coef. T-Ratio Est. Coef. T-Ratio Est. Coef. T-Ratio 
YOEO 0.098 21.681* 0.107 22.815* 0.105 22.414* 
YILF -- -- 0.029 11.296* 0.028 11.068* 
YILF2 -- -- -0.0005 -9.448* -0.0005 -9.290* 
01985 -0.483 -13.176* -- -- -0.446 -12.416* 
01986 -0.441 -14.153* 
-- --
-0.422 -13.885* 
01987 -0.379 -12.161* 
-- --
-0.371 -12.191* 
01989 -0.212 -7.172* 
-- --
-0.200 -6.950* 
01990 -0.077 -2.624* -- -- -0.071 -2.502* 
Constant -0.183 -2.265* -0.989 -11.483* -0.578 -6.459* 
Adjusted R2 0.246 0.191 0.282 
Variance of 0.233 0.223 0.221 
Estimate 
Notes: * stgruficant at 5% level or better, •• stgruficant at the I 0% level, 
Mean of dependant variable= 1.254 (nominal), 1.103 (real). 
The results of estimating the Mincerian human capital equation (MR) for 
real wage rates of full-time female workers are shown in Columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 4.3. Using nominal wage rates gives the (improved) results for equation 
(MN) shown in Columns 6 and 7. We can see that on average females earn a 
lower wage rate per hour than males ceteris paribus; the average (log) real wage 
rate for men is 1.368 compared to 1.103 for women. Again we can see that the 
addition of years in the labour force and its square as explanatory variables in the 
estimated equation (MN) raises both the adjusted R-squared figure and the size of 
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the coefficient on the years of education variable in comparison to the schooling 
model. 
The estimated rate of return to years of education in equation (MN) for 
females is approximately 10.5% the same as that for males. However, we can see 
that the returns to experience differ by gender, and in formulation (MN) 
maximum wage rates for females occur at approximately 56 years of experience.6 
It is interesting to note that females appear to fit these simple wage rate equations 
better than males as indicated by higher adjusted R-squared figures in Table 4.3 
compared to Table 4.2. 
Table 4.4 shows the results from the estimation of the more detailed wage 
equation (M') for male and female full-time workers. Control is made for marital 
status by the inclusion of the dummy variables indicating whether the respondent 
is married (or living as married) or divorced/widowed; the reference state is that 
of a single person. Marital status is included as an explanatory variable for two 
reasons; firstly marital status will affect the labour supply decision of a worker 
since the individual is involved in earning household income in conjunction with 
their spouse; for example, this may affect the worker's willingness to work 
overtime. Secondly, it has been suggested in the absence literature that married 
workers may be considered more reliable and conscientious than there single 
counterparts, and this may positively influence their earnings; however, there is 
empirical evidence to suggest that female workers with dependant children are 
more likely to be absent [see Brown & Sessions (1996), p. 36-37]. 
6Maximising the function W = c + 0.028x- 0.0005x 2 , where xis experience and c is the sum 
of all other effects, implies an optimal value of x = 56. 
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Table 4.4: Mincerian Equation (M') Estimate for Full-timers by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
(N=5418) (N=2781) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.164 8.804* 0.0001 0.005 
Divorced/widowed 0.123 3.624* 0.055 1.825** 
Recent Unemployment -0.143 -8.897* -0.111 -5.449* 
East Anl!lia -0.102 -3.404* -0.0004 -0.009 
East Midlands -0.130 -4.700* -0.160 -3.806* 
London 0.088 3.553* 0.166 5.576* 
North East -0.107 -3.492* -0.141 -3.322* 
Northern Ireland -0.276 -9.088* -0.162 -4.832* 
North West -0.167 -6.688* -0.101 -3.198* 
Scotland -0.105 -4.104* -0.144 -4.178* 
South West -0.160 -6.087* -0.168 -4.043* 
Wales -0.207 -5.758* -0.214 -4.938* 
West Midlands -0.104 -4.006* -0.074 -2.290* 
Yorkshire/Humberside -0.142 -5.633* -0.134 -3.844* 
Union Membership 0.097 7.585* 0.115 6.978* 
Self-employed -0.200 -8.091* -0.371 -6.701* 
High Occupation Class 0.243 12.718* 0.242 11.698* 
Low Occupation Class -0.156 -9.298* -0.233 -10.637* 
African -0.109 -1.674** -0.027 -0.434 
Asian I Chinese -0.252 -3.942* 0.079 0.972 
Unclassified Race 0.032 0.790 0.082 1.708** 
Years of Education 0.051 12.288* 0.056 11.326* 
Years in Labour Force 0.027 12.534* 0.022 8.091* 
YILF2 -0.00051 -12.178* -0.00044 -7.118* 
1985 dummy -0.520 -19.305* -0.478 -14.822* 
1986 dummv -0.398 -18.469* -0.454 -15.324* 
1987 dummy -0.361 -16.402* -0.374 -12.623* 
1989 dummy -0.151 -3.972* -0.121 -2.794* 
1990dummy -0.063 -2.957* -0.063 -2.343* 
Constant 0.555 6.263* 0.277 2.671* 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.438 
Variance ofEstimate 0.204 0.173 
Mean Log-wage 1.5 !I 1.254 
Notes: * S1gruficant at 5% level or better, ** S1gruficant at I 0% level, 
White's (1980) standard error correction is used. 
The dummy variable for recent unemployment indicates whether the BSA 
respondent has been unemployed within the previous five years. Greenwald 
(1986) presents an asymmetric information adverse selection model of the labour 
market in which applicants who have previously been unemployed are expected 
by prospective employers to be low skill from their association with the 
unemployment pool. The wage such workers receive from their employers who 
rely on paying an average productivity wage after employing this possibly 
inaccurate screening device will be lower than that received by those with no 
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unemployment history. Taubman & Watcher (1986) also suggest that an actual 
'scarring' effect occurs with unemployment where skills are lost and therefore 
future earnings impaired i.e. unemployment amounts to a negative human capital 
investment. Whichever of the two theories is correct in reality is not the subject 
of this Chapter, suffice to say that a record of unemployment may have a negative 
effect on wages and therefore we should control for such an effect in our human 
capital equation estimations. 
The dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent is self-
employed is included since there is much evidence to suggest that the self-
employed exhibit a different investment behaviour to that of employees in relation 
to education duration [for example see Wolpin (1977), Katz & Ziderman (1980)]. 
The self-employed are traditionally viewed as being less risk averse than 
employees, [for empirical evidence testing this point see Blanchflower et a! 
(1988a)], and we may therefore expect that they may invest in education 
differently than other workers.? 
Union membership is controlled for in the regressions by the inclusion of a 
dummy variable which indicates if the BSA Survey respondent was, at the time of 
the study, a member of a trade union or staff association. Trade unions can act to 
increase wages while leaving productivity unchanged and therefore restrict 
output, or they may influence work practices so that output is actually increased. 
Metcalf(l988) suggests that unions may reduce labour productivity if they 
are allowed to operate restrictive work practices (closed shops), are involved in 
adverse industrial action (strikes), if unionised firms invest less than their non-
unionised counterparts, or there is a lack of co-operation between workers and 
management. Productivity may be increased by unionisation if firms faced with a 
high labour factor price substitute more productive capital for labour, if unions 
reduce X-inefficiency by monitoring work practices and if they reduce worker 
exploitation and interact fruitfully with management rather than antagonistically. 
The overall net effect however has been found to be a reduction in labour 
1for further details on the differences between the self-employed and employees in this sample see 
Chapter 5. 
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productivity in unionised firms in the UK [see Metcalf(1988) for a brief survey of 
UK studies]. 
In contrast the effect of unionisation on wages is positive with union 
members having higher average wages than similar non-union workers. 
Blanchflower & Oswald (1988) survey a number of recent studies and find that 
union members' wages are approximately 10% higher than those of non-unionised 
workers ceteris paribus. Metcalf (1988) suggests that it is the closed shop that is 
the source of this differential, but that increased legislation in the 1980's have 
undermined the practice. Blanchflower & Oswald (1988) show that union 
members are also more likely to receive occupational pensions, sick pay, meal 
vouchers, and longer holidays in comparison to non-unionised workers. 
Trade union membership peaked in the UK in 1980 at approximately 56% 
of employees [see Elliot (1991), p.198, Table 7.2], and has been in decline since 
then due to trade union legislation, economic recession and the changing 
industrial structure of the UK (such as increased service sector activity, increased 
use of physical capital and increased participation by female part-timers); trade 
union membership in the UK in 1990 was approximately 39% of employees [see 
Adnett (1996), p.27, Table 1.7]. The percentage of male and female full time 
workers (self-employed and employees) who were members of staff associations 
or trade unions over the sample period for this BSA Survey data set was on 
average approximately 43%. The average non-union wage over the period for 
these workers was approximately £4.01 per hour, and the union wage 
approximately £4.37 per hour, representing a premium of approximately 9% from 
union membership. The effect of union membership ceteris paribus upon wage 
rates can be estimated from the coefficient on the union membership dummy 
variable in the wage rate equation estimates. 
Wage rates depend to a large extent upon the beliefs and behaviour of the 
employer and we therefore include the ethnic origin dummy variables 
representing Asian or Chinese, African, and unclassified race to control for 
possible racial biases in the hiring and pay structures of UK firms (the reference 
category is White or European). These variables will also help to control for any 
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asymmetries of information regarding job vacanc1es and differences in the 
mobility of labour within different ethnic communities. 
Regional dummies are included in the regressions to take account of 
spatial differences in living costs, labour mobility, and in the supply and demand 
positions of regional labour markets. 
Occupational effects are accounted for in the regressions by the inclusion 
of two occupational classification dummy variables showing whether the worker 
is in high or low level jobs (the reference category is middle level occupations). 
These dummy variables are constructed on the basis of the workers' reported 
Goldthorpe-Heath social classification; as the rank number increases the 
classification moves from high-skill labour, involved in professional and 
management jobs, to low-skill agricultural jobs (see Appendix for details of the 
occupational ranking involved). Including the two dummies will help to control 
for the differing pay structures in operation within these different occupations to 
reduce possible bias in the estimated effect of post-school investment on earnings; 
employers in low-skill industries may have a different view about an applicant's 
or employee's market experience than their high-skill counterparts and may also 
be more or less able to measure productivity directly. 
From Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.4 we can see that being married (or 
living as married) has a significant positive effect on the wage rates of male full-
time workers, as does having been married, as indicated by the dummy 
representing divorced or widowed. The difference between the coefficients on 
these two variables is not statistically different from zero, i.e. both these states are 
equivalent in their positive impact on wages in comparison to a single male 
worker. In comparison if we look at Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.4 we can see 
that being married is insignificant in the determination of wage rates for female 
full-time workers, whereas being divorced has a positive effect on their wage 
rates. 
Having been unemployed in the previous five years has a significant 
negative effect on wage rates; reducing the wage rate by approximately 14% for 
men, and 11% for women. In general all regions of residence in comparison to 
the South East have a negative impact upon wage rates with the exception of 
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residence in London. Union or Staff Association membership enhances wage 
rates by approximately 10% and 12% above non-union members for men and 
women respectively. 
Being self-employed actually reduces a worker's wage rate by 
approximately 21% for men, and 37% for females. Although the self-employed 
on average earn relatively more than employees they work more hours per week; 
from Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 we can see that the self-employed work 
approximately 10 hours more per week than employees. 
The positive and significant coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing high occupational class for both sexes reflects the higher wage rate 
which is generally paid to professional and management occupations in the UK; 
the impact is approximately 24% higher wage rates for both women and men, in 
comparison to middle level jobs. The negative and significant coefficient on the 
dummy variable representing low occupational class for both sexes reflects the 
lower wage rate which is generally paid to the lower skilled occupations in the 
UK; the impact is 23% compared to 16% lower wage rates for women as 
compared to men. 
Being of Asian or Chinese ethnic origin in comparison to White or 
European origin has a significant negative impact upon wage rates of male full-
timers; reducing wage rate by approximately 25%. There is a similar negative 
effect on wage rates for men with African ethnic origin of approximately 11%. 
The negative impact of Asian or Chinese ethnic origin upon wage rates may be a 
result of the lack of information about opportunities available to minority 
communities or racism on the part of employers in the hiring of workers. Neither 
of these ethnic origin dummy variables are significant in determining the wage 
rates of female full-time workers. 
Years of education have a positive impact upon wage rates; the estimated 
percentage increase in wage rate for each year of education is approximately 5% 
for men and 6% for women. This estimate is significantly lower than the estimate 
from equation (M) which was 11%, the reduction being due in part to the 
inclusion of additional explanatory variables. We can compare this education-
effect to the effect of years in the labour force (i.e. potential post-education 
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human capital investment) which is estimated at approximately 3% for men, and 
2% for women. The coefficients on the variables representing years of education 
and years in the labour force are significantly different from each other, indicating 
that each year of education has a larger positive impact on wages than does each 
year of labour market experience. 
4.4.2 The Murphy & Welch Wage Rate Functions 
The results from the estimation of the quartic wage function (MW) for male and 
female full-time workers are shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, where the 
dependant variable is the natural logarithm of real gross wage rates in Columns 2 
and 3 and the dependant variable is the natural logarithm of nominal wage rates in 
Columns four and five of each table. 
Table 4.5: Quartic Wage Rate Equation (MW) Estimates For Males (N=5418) 
Real Nominal 
Wa!!e Rate Eouation Wa!!e Rate Eouation 
Variable Name Estimated Estimated 
Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
YOED 0.105 29.212* 0.105 28.939* 
YILF 0.107 14.116* 0.106 14.061* 
YILF2 -0.0048 -9.778* -0.0048 -9.719* 
YILF3 0.952E-4 7.979* 0.942E-4 7.911* 
YILF4 -0.718E-6 -7.519* -0.709E-6 -7.437* 
1985 
-- --
-0.423 -14.573* 
1986 -- -- -0.329 -14.230* 
1987 
-- --
-0.302 -12.617* 
1989 
-- --
-0.145 -6.495* 
1990 -- -- -0.043 -1.817* 
Constant -1.137 -15.622* -0.798 -10.364* 
Adiusted R2 0.204 . 0.260 
Variance of 0.250 0.249 
Estimate 
Meanlnw 1.368 1.511 
Notes:* Significant at 5% level or better, White's (1980) standard error correction IS used. 
As with the·Mincerian function we can see that-the higher adjusted R-
squared figures of 0.260 for men and 0.304 for women indicate that the simple 
nominal log-wage quartic function fits the data better than the real log-wage 
function. We can also see that the simple nominal log-wage quartic function fits 
the data better than the Mincerian formulation (MN) with an adjusted R-squared 
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of0.252 for men and 0.282 for women, and just as well as the Mincerian function 
with the schooling year dummies (MD) with an adjusted R-squared of 0.260 for 
men and 0.292 for women. Moreover, the coefficients on YILF3 and YILF4 are 
statistically significant, which supports the view that the quartic function may fit 
earnings data better than the Mincerian quadratic function. 
Table 4.6: Quartic Wage Rate Equation (MW) Estimates For Females (N=2781) 
Real Nominal 
Wage Rate Equation Wage Rate Equation 
Variable Name Estimated Estimated 
Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
YOED 0.107 23.164* 0.105 23.598* 
YILF 0.129 11. 727* 0.127 12.634* 
YILF2 -0.0083 -9.634* -0.0082 -10.308* 
YILF3 0.211E-3 8.435* 0.211E-3 8.989* 
YILF' -0.186E-5 -7.696* -0.188E-5 -8.194* 
1985 -- -- -0.436 -12.415* 
1986 
-- --
-0.409 -13.429* 
1987 -- -- -0.363 -11.653* 
1989 -- -- -0.192 -6.247* 
1990 
-- --
-0.062 -2.093* 
Constant -1.304 -14.296* -0.899 -9.745* 
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.304 
Variance of 0.217 0.216 
Estimate 
Meanlnw 1.103 1.254 
Notes: * S1gruficant at 5% level or better. 
Estimating the more detailed nominal wage rate function (MW'), using a 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix for both sexes gives the results 
shown in Table 4.7, which are an improvement in comparison to the Equation 
(MW) estimates. From Table 4.7 we can see that the effect of including YILF3 
and YILF4 as explanatory variables in the log-wage rate function is now only 
marginal; R-squared is 0.398 for males and 0.451 for women for the quartic 
equation (MW), and the variance of the estimate is only slightly reduced in the 
quartic relative to the results for the Mincerian equation (M'), which was 
characterised by an adjusted R-squared of 0.393 for men and 0.438 for women 
(see Table 4.4). The inclusion of additional explanatory variables has reduced the 
superiority of the quartic function over the Mincerian function in explaining 
wages. 
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Table 4.7: Quartic Wage Rate Equation (MW') Estimate for Full-timers by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
(N=5418) (N=2781) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.132 6.741* -0.027 -1.307 
Divorced/widowed 0.094 2.716* 0.027 0.905 
Recent Unemployment -0.142 -8.862* -0.102 -5.051* 
East Anelia -0.104 -3.512* -0.005 -0.117 
East Midlands -0.127 -4.648* -0.163 -3.918* 
London 0.081 3.288* 0.152 5.094* 
North East -0.111 -3.620* -0.147 -3.507* 
Northern Ireland -0.282 -9.342* -0.179 -5.326* 
North West -0.169 -6.819* -0.109 -3.514* 
Scotland -0.108 -4.225* -0.138 -4.043* 
South West -0.160 -6.080* -0.171 -4.158* 
Wales -0.207 -5.821* -0.218 -5.128* 
West Midlands -0.103 -3.976* -0.082 -2.557* 
Yorkshire/Humberside -0.146 -5.802* -0.134 -3.870* 
Union membership 0.092 7.208* 0.110 6.729* 
Self-employed -0.206 -8.267* -0.369 -6.687* 
High Level Occupation 0.241 12.633* 0.233 11.274* 
Low Level Occupation -0.157 -9.380* -0.230 -10.730* 
African -0.106 -1.647* -0.044 -0.755 
Asian/Chinese -0.254 -4.000* 0.071 0.861 
Unclassified Race 0.033 0.814 0.075 1.583 
Years of education 0.052 12.426* 0.058 11.758* 
YILF 0.078 10.141* 0.102 10.736* 
YILF2 -0.374E-2 -7.978* -0.654E-2 -9.050* 
YILF3 0.759E-4 6.861* 0.168E-3 8.001 * 
YILF4 -0.582E-6 -6.681* -0.149E-5 -7.402* 
1985 -0.519 -19.274* -0.474 -14.808* 
1986 -0.399 -18.601* -0.446 -15.184* 
1987 -0.362 -16.543* -0.371 -12.639* 
1989 -0.152 -3.995* -0.120 -2.815* 
1990 -0.063 -2.995* -0.056 -2.1 06* 
Constant 0.366 3.956* 0.106 0.098 
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.451 
Variance of Estimate 0.203 0.169 
Meanlnw 1.511 1.254 
Notes: * Stgmficant at 5% level or better, ** Stgmficant at 10% level, Whtte's (1980) standard 
error correction is used. 
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4.4.3 Psacharopoulos & Layard Wage Rate Functions 
Table 4.8 shows the results of estimating Equation (PL) corresponding to P&L's 
model specification. All the coefficients on the interactive terms which are 
omitted from the traditional Mincerian formulation are significant for both sexes, 
they display the same magnitude and sign pattern as in P&L's results and therefore 
support P&L's contention that the implicit assumptions behind the traditional 
Mincerian log-earnings function should not go unchallenged. 
Table 4.8 : P & L Equation Estimates (PL) for Full-timers by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
YOED 0.123 11.471* 0.101 8.183* 
YILF -0.394 -4.874* -0.252 -1.985* 
YILF2 0.009 4.206* 0.006 1.670** 
YILF•YOED 0.051 5.411* 0.030 2.086* 
YOEo2•yJLF -0.001 -5.319* -0.788E-3 -1.915** 
YOED*YILF2 -0.001 -4.412* -0.676E-3 -1.660** 
YOED2•YILF2 0.314E-4 4.229* 0.171E-4 1.460 
1985 -0.411 -14.015* -0.435 -12.381* 
1986 -0.324 -13.968* -0.415 -13.406* 
1987 -0.297 -12.359* -0.370 -11.787* 
1989 -0.134 -6.006* -0.194 -6.268* 
1990 -0.033 -1.411 -0.071 -2.374* 
Constant -0.920 -4.850* -0.548 -2.436* 
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.285 
Variance of Estimate 0.250 0.222 
Notes: * Stgmficant at 5% level, * Stgmficant at 10% level, Mean In w- 1.511 
(males), 1.254 (females), males use White's (1980) standard error correction. 
The estimated wage rate equation (PL'), set out in Table 11, represents a 
more detailed formulation of P&L's model allowing for additional influences 
upon wages such as marital status, union status and region of residence; the 
additional variables correspond to those added to the traditional Mincerian 
function in Section 4.4.1 of this Chapter. The main result of significant 
interactive terms between years in the labour force and-years of education still 
remams. 
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Table 4.9: Detailed P & L (PL') Wage Rate Equation Estimates for Full-timers by 
Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.162 8.540* -0.001 -0.062 
Divorced/widowed 0.118 3.427* 0.054 1.772** 
Recent Unemployment -0.143 -8.882* -0.108 -5.255* 
East Anglia -0.099 -3.287* 0.001 0.024 
East Midlands -0.129 -4.690* -0.158 -3.737* 
London 0.090 3.640* 0.165 5.563* 
North East -0.105 -3.436* -0.139 -3.277* 
Northern Ireland -0.275 -9.061* -0.167 -4.947* 
North West -0.163 -6.551* -0.099 -3.154* 
Scotland -0.104 -4.061* -0.139 -4.026* 
South West -0.160 -6.070* -0.169 -4.059* 
Wales -0.205 -5. 717* -0.217 -4.998* 
West Midlands -0.101 -3.886* -0.072 -2.235* 
Yorkshire/Humberside -0.139 -5.520* -0.131 -3.753* 
Union membership 0.098 7.645* 0.115 6.996* 
Self-employed -0.200 -8.069* -0.371 -6.679* 
High Level Occupation 0.241 12.661* 0.243 11.672* 
Low Level Occupation -0.150 -8.854* -0.228 -10.241* 
African -0.120 -1.819** -0.033 -0.550 
Asian/Chinese -0.265 -4.108* 0.069 0.846 
Unclassified R. 0. 0.029 0.724 0.080 1.662** 
Years of Education 0.048 4.621* 0.046 3.893* 
Years in Labour Force -0.230 -3.202* -0.131 -1.188 
YILF2 0.511E-2 2.673* 0.242E-2 0.774 
YILF*YOED 0.029 3.464* 0.016 1.228 
YOED2*YILF -0.802E-3 -3.314* -0.378E-3 -1.040 
YOED*YILF2 -0.640E-3 -2.823* -0.277E-3 -0.758 
YOED2•YILF2 0.179E-4 2.697* 0.614E-5 0.583 
1985 -0.511 -18.764* -0.473 -14.723* 
1986 -0.396 -18.350* -0.451 -15.165* 
1987 -0.358 -16.287* -0.375 -12.665* 
1989 -0.147 -3.859* -0.118 -2.710* 
1990 -0.056 -2.629* -0.062 -2.312* 
Constant 0.593 3.156* 0.441 2.012* 
Adjusted R2 0.395 0.439 
Variance ofEstimate 0.204 0.173 
Notes:* S1gruficant at 5% level,** Sigmficant at 10% level, Both use White's (1980) correction. 
From the coefficients reported in Table 4.12 it is possible to calculate 
estimates of the parameters r~, r2, k~, k2, b1 and b2, which summarise the 
assumptions made by P & L; 
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Using six equations [constructed by comparing the compound parameters 
in Equation (36) to the estimated coefficients in Table 4.9] to find six unknowns 
(r~, r2, k~, k2, b1 and b2) and employing the computer package Mathematica we 
can estimate the underlying parameters. In each case there are two sets of 
solutions and only the more realistic set of solutions is reported in Table 4.10.8 
Results are not reported for female full-time workers as none of the estimated 
coefficients used to calculate the underlying parameters in the wage function are 
statistically significant. 
Table 4.10 : Parameter Estimates for the P & L Equation for Male Full-timers 
Estimate from Estimate from 
Parameter P & L (1979) (PL') 
'I -0.313 -1.757 
'2 0.0491 0.146 
kl 0.767 0.131 
k2 -0.033 -0.00537 
bl 0.0337 0.00582 
b2 -0.00145 -0.000245 
Source (Column 2): P & L, p. 493. 
From Table 4.10 we can see that for someone with 10 years of education 
the rate of return to each year of experience is approximately; 
-1.757 + 1.46 = -3% (18%) 
and for someone with 16 years of education the rate of return to experience is 
approximately; 
-1.757 + 2.336 =58% (50%). 
8The less 'realistic' solution of the set of simultaneous equations gives negative (positive) figures 
where we would intuitively expect postive (negative) figures. 
4.30 
The figures in brackets are the equivalent rates of return estimated by 
Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) using 1972 General Household Survey data. If 
we assume that the BSA Survey and OHS data are both representative of the UK 
population as a whole, these results suggest that there has been a spread in the 
returns to experience over education categories over the 1980's; those with ten 
years education experiencing negative returns and those with sixteen years of 
education experiencing average returns of approximately 58% rather than 50% to 
each year of experience. Those with lower levels of education appear to have 
negative or near zero returns to experience, whereas those with higher levels of 
education appear to have higher positive returns to experience. Dynamic factors 
such as modernisation of production processes and increased sophistication of the 
nature of wage schemes may be the cause of such changes. For example, it is 
increasingly the case that workers in management jobs, who on average tend to 
have higher levels of education, are offered company share options at certain 
stages of tenure, the profits from which will add to the individual income variable 
used to construct the hourly wage rate. The negative rate of return to experience 
for those workers with less than approximately 12 years of education in the BSA 
Survey sample implies that a minimum education is required before experience 
can be expected to positively influence wage rates. 
The investment ratio, the level of expenditure on training (in the form of 
foregone earnings) over the level of gross earnings, in the first year of work for a 
worker with 10 years of education is approximately; 
0.131-0.0537 = 8% (44%), 
and the investment ratio in the first year of work for a worker with 16 years of 
education is approximately; 
0.131 - 0.0859 = 5% (24%). 
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This shows that levels of expenditure on training in the form of foregone earnings 
have changed significantly since the 1970's, and, as in P & L, that those with 
higher education invest less, as a percentage of gross earnings, in non-schooling 
human capital. 
The investment ratio falls each year for a worker with I 0 years of 
education by approximately; 
0.00582- 0.00245 = 0.3% (1.9%), 
and the investment ratio falls each year for a worker with 16 years of education by 
approximately; 
0.0582- 0.000245(16) = 0.2% (1%), 
again these are lower figures than those estimated by P & L, and indicate that the 
rate of change of the investment ratio does not appear to differ significantly 
between education groups in the BSA Survey sample. 
4.5 Tests for Variation in the Marginal Rate of Return to Years 
of Education and the effects of Certification 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The possibility that the marginal rate of return to years of education is not 
constant is allowed for by introducing dummy variables for the various years of 
schooling into the estimated wage rate equations. The continuous variable for 
years of education is now omitted from the equations. The dummy variable for 9 
years of education, S9, is the minimum level of education and the omitted 
reference category, and the dummy for 15 years of education is constant (no-one 
in the sample left full-time education at the age of twenty). The pattern of 
cumulative returns is now shown by the coefficients on the dummy variables S 10 
to S17. 
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4.5.2 Estimated Wage Rate Equations and Test Results 
The traditional Mincerian human capital model assumes that the marginal rate of 
return to years of education (MRE) is constant, and so in the estimated wage rate 
functions (MS), (MR) and (MN) any variation in the marginal rate of return will 
be absorbed by the constant term. We can control for variations in the marginal 
rate of return to years of schooling by substituting dummy variables representing 
the number of years of education completed in the place of the continuous 
variable for years of education. 
Table 4.11 and Table 4.13 below show the results for male and female 
full-time workers of estimating the Mincerian wage rate function with schooling 
dummies (MD), the Mincerian wage rate function with schooling dummies plus 
variables representing marital status, union status, ethnic origin, occupation and 
regional effects (MD'). 
From Table 4.11 we can see that the average return to years in the labour 
market for male and female full-time workers is approximately 5% and 3% 
respectively for each year of experience. 
The estimated coefficients on SI 0 to S 17 show the cumulative returns to 
10 to 17 years of education completed. We can see that for males the return to the 
1Oth year of education in insignificant and then that each year adds to the positive 
impact that schooling has upon wage rates with the exception of the 17th year of 
education. By the 16th year the return is approximately 68%, but then falls to 
approximately 53%. For females SIO has a negative impact on wage rates and 
then as years of education increases up to 13 years the return becomes positive 
and significant, and increases to approximately 50% by the 16th year. The return 
appears to then falls to approximately 40% in the 17th year, however this is not 
significantly different from the return in the 16th year in this subsample. If we 
test the significance of differences between coefficients on the years of education 
dummies we get the results shown in Table 4.12, where slO to s17 correspond to 
the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables SlO to S17. 
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Table 4.11: Estimated Mincer-type Equation (MD) for Full-timers by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
Variable Estimated Estimated 
Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
YILF 0.049 21.551* 0.033 I 1.818* 
YILF2 -0.00082 -16.850* -0.0006 -9.982* 
SIO -0.061 -1.336 -0.212 -2.831* 
Sll 0.141 3.023* -0.023 -0.306 
Sl2 0.278 5.397* 0.123 1.560 
Sl3 0.367 7.039* 0.172 2.160* 
Sl4 0.374 6.078* 0.139 1.546 
Sl6 0.675 13.240* 0.501 6.323* 
S17 0.527 8.494* 0.404 3.224* 
1985 -0.413 -14.115* -0.439 -12.214* 
1986 -0.327 -14.136* -0.424 -13.978* 
1987 -0.300 -12.499* -0.371 -12.271* 
1989 -0.131 -5.849* -0.185 -6.408* 
1990 -0.027 -1.144* -0.062 -2.196* 
Constant 0.944 18.668* 1.102 14.169* 
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.292 
Variance of 0.249 0.218 
Estimate 
Notes: * Sigruficant at 5% level or better, regresSion for males uses 
White's (1980) standard error correction. 
Table 4.12: T- Statistics for Hypotheses Regarding Cumulative Returns to Years of 
Schooling in Equation (MD) 
Null Hypothesis 
Males Females 
sll-si0-0 10.076* 6.463* 
s12-sii~O 5.251* 5.225* 
s13-si2-0 2.551* 1.395 
s14-sl3~0 0.139 -0.539 
s16-si4~0 6.475* 6.073* 
sl7-si6-0 -3.175* -1.275 
Notes: • Sigmficant at the 5% level or better, sI 0-17 correspond 
to coefficients on the dummy variables SI0-17. 
The explanatory power of function (MD) for both sexes is low as indicated 
by the adjusted R-squared figures of 0.260 (males) and 0.292 (females). It is 
interesting to note that female full-time workers appear to fit this simple 
Mincerian wage rate function better than their male counterparts as indicated by 
the higher adjusted R-squared figure. 
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Table 4.13: Estimated Wage Rate Equation (MD') with Schooling Dummies 
Gender: Males (N-5418) Females N-2781) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years in Labour Force 0.031 12.420* 0.025 8.364* 
YILF2 -0.563E-3 -11.333* -0.504E-3 -7.106* 
SlO -0.042 -1.012 -0.111 -1.573 
Sll 0.088 2.064* 0.013 0.183 
Sl2 0.141 2.976* 0.106 1.420 
S13 0.178 3.664* 0.092 1.206 
S14 0.206 3.648* 0.130 1.490 
S16 0.344 6.979* 0.292 3.799* 
Sl7 0.253 4.290* 0.229 2.296* 
Married 0.159 8.461* -0.412E-2 -0.202 
Divorced/widowed 0.116 3.414* 0.050 1.667** 
Recent Unemployment -0.145 -9.055* -0.109 -5.294 
East Anglia -0.099 -3.318* 0.149E-2 0.033 
East Midlands -0.128 -4.656* -0.162 -3.827* 
London 0.088 3.590* 0.163 5.464* 
North East -0.109 -3.566* -0.141 -3.3635 
Northern Ireland -0.276 -9.096* -0.171 -5.095* 
North West -0.164 -6.563* -0.097 -3.095* 
Scotland -0.107 -4.190* -0.145 -4.174* 
South West -0.159 -6.070* -0.169 -4.082* 
Wales -0.204 -5.706* -0.222 -5.129* 
West Midlands -0.100 -3.847* -0.073 -2.280* 
Y orkshireffi urn berside -0.141 -5.590* -0.136 -3.902* 
Union me m her 0.096 7.503* 0.115 7.009* 
Self-employed -0.200 -8.101* -0.369 -6.657* 
High Level Occupation 0.236 12.308* 0.238 11.286* 
Low Level Occupation -0.151 -8.889* -0.223 -I 0.036* 
African -0.123 -1.885** -0.039 -0.633 
Asian I Chinese -0.257 -4.006* 0.072 0.891 
Unclassified R. 0. 0.030 0.742 0.076 1.587 
1985 -0.511 -18.760* -0.473 -14.919* 
1986 -0.397 -18.425* -0.455 -15.370* 
1987 -0.358 -16.320* -0.375 -12.687* 
1989 -0.143 -3.729* -0.114 -2.651* 
1990 -0.052 -2.423* -0.056 -2.097* 
Constant 1.268 20.064* 1.157 13.195* 
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.441 
Variance of Estimate 0.203 0.172 
Mean In w 1.511 1.254 
Notes: * Sigruficant at the 5% level or better, •• s1gruficant at I 0% level, 
White's (1980) standard error correction is used. 
Table 4. 13-·!ffiows the results of estimating a more detailed Mincerian 
wage rate function for the same male and female BSA sub-samples. From Table 
4.13 we can see that the earnings function (MD') is superior to (MD) in explaining 
the determination of full time wage rates of male and female workers as indicated 
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by higher R-squared and lower variance of estimate values than in the estimation 
of function (MD). 
The estimated coefficients for the schooling dummy variables S 10 to S 17 
show the effect upon the worker's wage, ceteris paribus, of having between 1 0 
and 17 years of education. We can see that the schooling dummies generally have 
a more significant effect in the wage rate determination of male full-time workers 
compared to female full-time workers. 
When testing for variations in the marginal percentage effect of years of 
education on wage rates we can test the following null hypotheses; 
Ho's: sll-s10=s12-sll (HI) 
s12- sll = s13- sl2 (H2) 
s13- s12 = s14- sl3 (H3) 
s14- s13 = s16- s14 (H4) 
s16- s14 = s17- sl6 (H5) 
where slO to s17 are the coefficients on the dummy variables SIO to S17. 
Thus the null hypothesis in each case is that the size of the differential in 
coefficients between yearly schooling dummy variables remains constant as years 
of schooling increases i.e. that the MRE is constant.9 
The results of testing the hypotheses for the Mincer-type functions 
containing schooling dummy variables are shown in Table 4.14. The simple 
model (MD) shows a number of years in which the appropriate null hypothesis 
should be rejected, as indicated by significant t-statistics, i.e. there is evidence to 
suggest that the marginal rate of return to years of education is not constant. For 
example, we can see that for the Mincerian function (MD) for male full-timers 
there appears to be a significant difference between the marginal rate of return to 
schooling between the 11th and 12th year, the 14th and 15+16th year, and the 
9 Note that in the more detailed wage rate equations the coefficient on education is strictly 
interpreted not as 'the rate of return to education' but as the percentage increase in wage rates for 
each year of education; in this section the terminology 'MRE' is used in a broad sense. 
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15+ 16th and 17th year. to There appears to be three changes in the marginal rate 
of return to education for males as years of schooling increases. 
Once control variables are introduced into the wage rate function the Null 
Hypotheses (H4) that the marginal rate of return to years education is constant 
between the 14th and 15th year cannot be rejected for either gender. However, 
the previous significant t-statistics leading to rejection ofH1 and H5 for male full-
timers, and H2 and H5 for female full-timers are still apparent. 
Table 4.14: T-Statistics for Mincer-type Equations with Schooling Dummies by 
Gender 
Model Sample Null Hypothesis T- Statistic 
HI 1.806** 
H2 0.880 
Males H3 1.173 
H4 -3.267* 
(MD) H5 6.287* 
HI 0.954 
H2 1.731** 
Females H3 1.034 
H4 -3.412* 
H5 4.495* 
HI 2.401* 
H2 0.347 
Males H3 0.121 
H4 -1.348 
(MD') H5 3.444* 
HI 0.795 
H2 2.113* 
Females H3 -0.754 
H4 -1.182 
H5 2.335* 
Notes: • s1gmficant at the 5% level or better, •• at I 0% level. 
The results of testing for the variation in MRE presented in this Section 
are duplicated when similar wage rate equations are estimated using the Murphy 
& Welch and Psacharopoulos & Layard formulations with schooling dummies 
included. The significant t-statistics shown in Table 4.14 match the occurrence of 
significant variation in MRE in the other two model specifications. 11 
IOJ5+ 16th year here represents the two years of schooling between ctommy variables sl4 and sl6. 
11 A similar methodology can be found in Hungerford & Solon ( 1987) and Belman & Heywood 
(1991); the authors use a spline model with schooling dummies and find significant variations in the 
marginal rate of return to schooling in years associated with certification; supporting the 'sheepskin' 
screening hypothesis. 
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The significant variation in the MRE revealed in all three human capital 
models by these hypothesis tests may be due to the fact that no control is being 
made for certification effects upon wage rates. For example the significant change 
in MRE in the 12th year of education in functions (MD) for males may be due to 
the fact that no control is made for 0-level or GCSE acquisition which occurs at 
this time. Following authors such as Ashenfelter & Mooney (1968) and Liu & 
Wong (1982), Section 4.5.3 aims to clarify the situation by replacing the 
schooling dummies with dummies representing the highest educational 
qualification held by the BSA Survey respondent. 
4.5.3 The Effects of Certification Upon Wage Rates 
We have seen from Sections 4.5.2 to 4.5.4 that the marginal rate of return to years 
of education appears to be non-constant as years of education increases. The aim 
of this Section is to illustrate the effects of certification upon wage rates, since 
this may be the main cause of these shifts in the MRE as years of education 
increases. The detailed wage-rate functions are re-estimated where the schooling 
dummy variables are replaced by dummy variables representing the highest 
formal educational certificate held by the worker. We will see that certification 
has a significant impact upon wage rates, and by estimating the previous 
schooling dummy regressions for workers with no formal qualifications we may 
test the hypothesis that it is certification which is causing the MRE shifts. 
4.5.3.1 Unqualified Workers and the Returns to Years of Schooling 
From Table 4.15 we can see that the dummy variables representing 10 to 14 years 
of schooling are no longer significant determinants of the wage rates of either 
gender; this is in marked contrast to the results shown in Table 4.13 for 
unqualified plus unqualified workers by gender, where the dummy variables were 
significant in the determination of wage rates for male full-timers but not for 
female full-timers. 
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Conducting the same hypothesis tests on the differences in MRE as years 
of education increase gives the results shown in Table 4.16. We cannot reject the 
null hypotheses in any of the tests and so we cannot reject the overall hypothesis 
that MRE is constant for unqualified workers. 
Table 4.15: Estimated Mincer-type Equations (MD') for Full-timers with No Formal 
Qualifications by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
(N = 1524) (N = 640) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
YILF 0.026 4.976* 0.020 2.355* 
YILF2 -0.520£-3 -5.506* -0.368£-3 -2.477* 
SIO -0.053 -0.977 -0.029 -0.328 
Sit -0.047 -0.766 0.027 0.277 
Sl2 -0.096 -1.091 0.063 0.387 
St3 -0.!28 -1.203 0.103 0.229 
Sl4 0.274 1.288 -- --
Married 0.198 5.075* 0.035 0.627 
Divorced/widowed 0.153 2.391* 0.082 1.213 
Recent Unemnlovment -0.147 -4.724* -0.096 -2.000* 
East Anlllia -0.161 -3.086* -0.029 -0.270 
East Midlands -0.135 -3.089* -0.019 -0.240 
London 0.150 3.151* 0.215 3.009* 
North East -0.033 -0.560* -0.218 -2.392* 
Northern Ireland -0.351 -6.086* -0.179 -2.284* 
North West -0.107 -2.173* -0.017 -0.248 
Scotland -0.158 -3.180* -0.046 -0.598 
South West -0.218 -4.438* -0.113 -1.342 
Wales -0.248 -3.866* -0.131 -1.373 
West Midlands -0.082 -1.782** -0.020 -0.293 
Yorkshirelllumberside -0.085 -1.857** -0.095 -1.220 
Union 0.121 4.891* 0.101 2.632* 
Self-employed -0.202 -4.403* -0.337 -4.536* 
Hieh Level Occupation 0.160 3.306* 0.242 4.181* 
Low Level Occupation -0.136 -4.531* -0.169 -4.290* 
African 0.019 0.191 0.021 0.126 
Asian I Chinese -0.169 -1.575 0.141 0.834 
Unclassified R. 0. 0.182 2.529* 0.216 1.884** 
1985 -0.456 -8.943* -0.523 -7.194* 
1986 -0.303 -6.968* -0.425 -6.938* 
1987 -0.216 -4.809* -0.368 -5.784* 
1989 -0.122£-2 -0.018 -0.051 -0.477 
1990 -0.028 -0.619 -0.174 -2.909* 
Constant 1.087 9.311 * 0.890 4.715* 
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.218 
Variance ofEstimate 0.202 0.186 
Meanlnw 1.267 0.986 
Notes: * stgruficant at the 5% level or better, stgruficant at the I 0% level, male regressiOn uses 
White's (1980) correction. 
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The results shown in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 lend support to the 
hypothesis that it is certification effects that are causing the MRE shifts that have 
been found to occur at particular levels of education, in Section 4.5.2. The second 
part of this Section involves the estimation of wage rate functions by gender with 
the inclusion of highest certification dummy variables in the place of the 
schooling year dummy variables. 
Table 4.16: T-Statistics for Estimated Mincer-type Equations for Full-timers with 
No Formal Qualifications by Gender 
Model Sample Null Hypothesis T- Statistic 
HI 0.645 
H2 -0.097 
Males HJ -1.521 
H4 --
(MD') H5 --
HI 0.133 
H2 -0.007 
Females HJ --
H4 
--
H5 --
Notes: '--'denotes where a hypothesis could not be tested. 
4.5.3.2 The Effects of Certification upon Full-time Wage Rates 
From Table 4.17 we can see the results of estimating wage rate functions which 
include certification effects rather than years of study effects for male and female 
full-timers. The dummy variables representing the highest formal educational 
qualification held by the respondent are all significant in the estimated wage 
equation for both males and females. For example, possessing a degree level 
certificate as the highest held increases the wage rate of male and female workers, 
ceteris paribus, by approximately 44% and 47% respectively above those with no 
formal qualifications. In contrast, possessing CSE certification as the highest held 
increases the wage rate of male and female workers, ceteris paribus, by 
approximately 12% and 8% respectively above those with no formal 
qualifications. 
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Table 4.17: Estimated Wage Rate Equations including Highest Qualification 
Dummies by Gender 
Gender: Males Females 
(N = 5418) (N = 2781) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
YILF 0.027 12.608* 0.022 7.927* 
YILF2 -0.512E-3 -12.395* -0.434E-3 -7.030* 
Degree 0.435 15.333* 0.470 12.823* 
Nursing 0.172 2.388* 0.289 7.987* 
Teaching 0.232 3.699* 0.388 8.248* 
Academic I vocational 0.170 2.953* 0.299 4.477* 
HND 0.321 11.194* 0.349 4.383* 
Trade I business 0.304 11.112* 0.202 4.117* 
Apprenticeship 0.193 10.065* 0.166 6.073* 
A- levels 0.202 8.250* 0.151 4.051* 
0 -levels 0.142 6.743* 0.123 4.210* 
CSE's 0.121 3.700* 0.076 1.879** 
Married 0.163 8.936* -0.379E-2 -0.187 
Divorced I widowed 0.123 3.652* 0.045 1.497 
Recent Unemployment -0.143 -8.967* -0.109 -5.382* 
East Anglia -0.104 -3.521* -0.521E-2 -0.117 
East Midlands -0.128 -4.676* -0.165 -3.926* 
London 0.102 4.148* 0.163 5.556* 
North East -0.120 -3.924* -0.150 -3.625* 
Northern Ireland -0.249 -8.349* -0.156 -4.768* 
North West -0.167 -6.771* -0.109 -3.500* 
Scotland -0.106 -4.157* -0.152 -4.463* 
South West -0.164 -6.296* -0.179 -4.330* 
Wales -0.199 -5.625* -0.204 -4.701* 
West Midlands -0.097 -3.777* -0.081 -2.565* 
Yorkshire I Humberside -0.149 -5.935* -0.137 -3.941* 
Union membership 0.096 7.544* 0.104 6.287* 
Self-employed -0.189 -7.668* -0.379 -6.832* 
High Level Occupation 0.209 10.741* 0.210 9.634* 
Low Level Occupation -0.132 -7.730* -0.191 -7.963* 
African -0.073 -1.162 -0.037 -0.615 
Asian I Chinese -0.236 -3.734* 0.084 1.067 
Unclassified R. 0. 0.025 0.626 0.074 1.582 
1985 -0.532 -20.344* -0.487 -15.367* 
1986 -0.388 -18.294* -0.448 -15.378* 
1987 -0.349 -16.001* -0.376 -12.846* 
1989 -0.159 -4.256* -0.127 -3.001* 
1990 -0.080 -3.877* -0.067 -2.542* 
Constant 1.245 24.057* 1.090 17.822* 
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.451 
Variance of Estimate 0.199 0.169 
Meanlnw 1.511 1.254 
Notes:* Slgmficant at the 5% level,** at the 10% level, Whtte's (1980) correctton ts used. 
If we compare the results shown in Table 4.17 to those shown in Table 4.4 
and Table 4.13, for previous equations, we can see that this estimated equation 
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which includes certification has higher R-squared and lower variance indicating 
that it explains the variation in wage rates more accurately. What this model 
allows for is not only the effect of years of education upon wage rates but also the 
effects of certificates upon wage rates. The subject of the next two Chapters is to 
test the mechanism by which certification and years of education increase 
workers' wage rates. 
Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 present the order in which the highest 
educational certificates held fall in relation to their estimated positive effects 
upon the wage rates of male and female full-time workers respectively. We can 
test the significance of the differences in the returns to the highest qualifications 
held shown in Table 4.18 and Table 4.19. 
Testing the differences apparent from Table 4.18 we find that for male 
full-timers, the holding of a degree has a significantly higher positive effect on 
wage rates than the holding of any other certificates in comparison to being 
unqualified. Holding an HND has a significantly higher positive effect on wage 
rates than holding any of the lower certificates in comparison to being 
unqualified, and similarly for the trade/business qualifications. Teaching 
qualifications give higher returns than 0-levels or CSE's but are equivalent in 
their effect upon wage-rates of male full-timers in comparison to holding 
qualifications within the group running from A-levels to academic/vocational 
qualifications. The positive effect on wage rates of male full-timers is not 
significantly different for 0-levels and CSE's in comparison to being unqualified. 
Table 4.18: Ranking of Certificates in Descending Order of the size of the 
estimated rate of return for Male Full-timers 
Estimated 
Certificate Return 
Degree 0.435 
HND 0.321 
Trade I business 0.304 
Teachine 0.232 
A -levels 0.202 
Anorenticeshio 0.193 
Nursing 0.172 
Academic I vocational 0.170 
0 -levels 0.142 
CSE's 0.121 
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Table 4.19: Ranking of Certificates in Descending Order of the size of the 
estimated rate ofretnm for Female Full-timers 
Estimated 
Certificate Return 
Degree 0.470 
Teaching 0.388 
HND 0.349 
Academic I vocational 0.299 
Nursing 0.289 
Trade I business 0.202 
Apprenticeship 0.166 
A -levels 0.151 
0 -levels 0.123 
CSE's 0.076 
Testing the differences shown in Table 4.19 we find that for female full-
timers holding a degree has a significantly higher positive effect on wage rates 
than holding any of the other certificates in comparison to being unqualified. 
Holding an HND has an equivalent positive effect on wage rates in comparison to 
holding a certificate from the group running from academic/vocational to trade 
business certificates. Teaching qualifications give higher returns than nursing 
qualifications but are equivalent in their effect upon wage-rates of female full-
timers in comparison to holding an HND or academic/vocational qualifications. 
Holding a nursing qualification has a significantly higher positive effect on wage 
rates than holding any of the certificates ranked below it in Table 4.19. The 
positive effect on wage rates of female full-timers is not significantly different for 
apprenticeship certificates and A-levels in comparison to being unqualified. 
Again the positive effect on wage rates is not significantly different for 0-levels 
and CSE's in comparison to being unqualified for female full-timers. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Mincerian wage rate functions were estimated for male and female full-timers 
who responded to the BSA Survey 1985-1991. The estimated average increase in 
wage rates for each year of education was estimated as approximately 5% for men 
and 6% for women with the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. This 
figure is significantly lower than the estimate from the simple Mincerian function 
which was approximately 11%, and the rates of return estimated for the UK in 
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previous studies approximately equal to 10% [Psacharopoulos & La yard (1979)] 
and 16% [Harmon & Walker (1995)]. 
It was found that the inclusion of additional explanatory variables reduced 
the superiority of the quartic Murphy & Welch (1990) function over the 
Mincerian function in explaining the variation in full-time workers' wage rates. 
Estimation of the Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) function gave results showing 
significant interaction between years in the labour force and years of education, 
but different results from those of P&L in the estimation of the underlying 
parameters of the model. 
Significant shifts in the marginal rate of return to years of education were 
found in all of the human capital models. The shifts in the marginal rate of return 
to years of education were found to occur in years which would normally be 
characterised by the obtainment of educational certificates such as 0-levels and 
A-levels. It was proposed that controlling for certification effects in the human 
capital functions could allow for the variation in the marginal rate of return to 
education. 
We found that an estimated wage rate equation that included dummy 
variables representing the highest certificate held by the BSA Survey respondent 
instead of years of education as a measure of education level explained the 
variation in wage rates for full time workers more accurately. This model allows 
for not only the effect of years of education upon wage rates but also the effects of 
certificates upon wage rates. The subject of the Chapter's 5 and 6 is to test the 
possible screening role that certification and years of education may have in 
increasing full time wage rates in the UK. 
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Appendix 4.1: Variable List and Descriptions 
Table 4.20: BSA Sample Variables; Description and Derivation 
Derived from the BSA 
Variable Description variables 
Hours Hours worked per week by respondent EJBHOURS, EJBHRCAT, 
SJBHOURS, SJBHRCAT 
Self-employed I - Respondent is self-employed RECONPOS, 
0 ~ Respondent is an employee RECONACT, 
REMPLOYE 
Highest Qualificatiou Held Dummy variables 
IIQD'S; 
Degree I - highest formal educational qualification held EDQUALI-16 
is a University I CNAA degree or diploma. 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
Nursing I ~ HQ is a Nursing qualification. EDQUALI-16 
0 ~ lower Qualification is HQ 
Teaching I - HQ is a Teacher Training qualification. EDQUALI-16 
0 ~ lower Qualification is HQ 
Academic/ I -HQ is any other academic or vocational EDQUALI-16 
vocational qualification. 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
IIND I - HQ is a BEC higher, HNC or HND EDQUALI-16 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
Trade/ I ~ HQ is any other technical or business EDQUALI-16 
business qualification. 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
Apprenticeship I - HQ is a Trade Apprenticeship, Royal Society EDQUALI-16 
of Arts or similar clerical qualification. 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
A-Levels I - HQ is an A-Level, overseas school leaving EDQUALI-16 
cert. C&G Advanced I Full Technical level, BEC 
Ordinary, ONC or OND qualification. 
0 ~ lower Qualification is HQ 
0-Levels I -HQ is a CSE Grade I, 0-level, C&G craft EDQUALI-16 
etc. qualification. 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
CSE's I - HQ is a CSE Grade 2-5 qualification. EDQUALI-16 
0 ~ lower qualification is HQ 
No Quals I - no formal qualifications are held. EDQUALI-16, 
0 ~ a formal qualification is held NOEDQUAL 
(Reference category for HQD's) 
Other Characteristics; 
Recent I -Worker has experienced a spell of EUNEMP, SUNEMP 
Unemployment unemployment within the last 5 years 
0 ~Not been unemploved in the last 5 years 
Months Total number of months that respondent has EUNEMPT, SUNEMPT 
Unemployed spent in unemployment in the last 5 years. 
Years in Labour Years in the labour force experienced by the -·-- RAGE, YOED 
Force worker 
Years of Years of education experienced by the worker EDQUALI-16, TEA, 
education RAGE 
Private I - Individual attended private primary or RPRIVED 
education secondary school 
0 ~ Individual did not attend private school 
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Gender I -Male O=Female RSEX 
Divorced I 1- Separated, divorced or widowed MARITAL,MARRDNOW, 
widowed 0 =other marital status MARRIED, MARSTAT 
Married I= Married or living as married MARITAL,MARRDNOW, 
0 = other marital status MARRIED,MARSTAT 
Union Member I -Worker is a TU/Staff Association member UNIONS A 
0 =Not a TU/SA member 
Asian I I - Worker has Asian I Pakistani I Indian I RACEORIG, ETHNICAT, 
Chinese Chinese I Oriental ethnic origin ETHNICGP 
0 = other ethnic origin 
African I -Worker has Black I African I West-Indian I RACEORIG, ETHNICAT, 
Caribbean ethnic origin ETHNICGP 
0 = other ethnic origin 
White/ I -Worker has White I European ethnic origin RACEORIG, ETHNICAT, 
European 0 = other ethnic origin ETHNICGP 
(Reference category for ethnic origin) 
Unclassified I - Respondent is of unclassified racial origin RACEORIG, ETHNICAT, 
racial Origin 0 =Respondent has a definite ethnic origin ETHNICGP 
High Worker's Goldthorpe-Heath social classification RGHCLASS 
Occupational is high or low skill Professional & Management 
Class occupation 
Middle Worker's G-H social classification is; Routine 
Occupational Office, Sales & personal, Small public business, 
Class Farmers, Manual foreman and similar jobs 
(reference category for occupational class) 
Low Worker's G-H social classification is; Skilled 
Occupational manual, Semi/unskilled manual, or Agricultural 
Class emplovees 
Re1!ional Dummv Variables; 
East Anglia I - worker lives in East Anglia PANO 
0 = lives elsewhere 
East Midlands I - worker lives in the East Midlands 
0 = lives elsewhere 
London I = worker lives in London 
0 = lives elsewhere 
North East I - worker lives in the North East 
0 = lives elsewhere 
North West I -worker lives in the North West 
0 = lives elsewhere 
Northern I =worker lives in Northern Ireland 
Ireland 0 = lives elsewhere 
Scotland I - worker lives in Scotland 
0 = lives elsewhere 
South East I --worker lives in the South East (not London) 
0 = fives elsewhere 
(Reference category for region) 
South West I - worker lives in the South West 
0 = lives elsewhere 
Wales I =worker lives in Wales 
0 = lives elsewhere 
West Midlands I - worker lives in the West Midlands 
0 = lives elsewhere 
Yorkshire/ I - worker lives in Yorkshire I Humberside 
Humberside 0 = lives elsewhere 
Notes: All vanables were available 1985-1991 wtth the exception of SUNEMPT which was only 
recorded for the period 1985-87. 
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Appendix 4.2: 
Dummy Variable Tests for Separation of Wage Rate Equations by 
Gender 
This Appendix outlines the tests undertaken to prove that male and female full-
timers wage rates are determined separately i.e. that market segmentation by 
gender occurs. The fact that the separate male and female regressions presented in 
this Chapter are generally heteroscedastic means that we cannot employ the 
simple Chow test based on the sum of squared errors of the two regressions. 12 
Gujarati (1970) presents an alternative to the Chow test which is employed here to 
show differences by gender. 
The dummy variable approach presented by Gujarati (1970) in this 
application involves pooling the data and running a single regression including a 
dummy variable showing whether the BSA respondent is a man and including 
interactive variables between gender and all the explanatory variables used in the 
two separate male and female regressions. The number of observations equals 
8199 throughout and all regressions employ a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix since they fail heteroscedasticity tests. 
A parsimonious approach is adopted for the more detailed wage rate 
equations in that we move from general to specific modelling by dropping 
interactive variables which are not significant from the regression and then re-
estimating the pooled wage rate function. The results are robust in the sense that 
the estimated coefficients which are significant in the initial run remain 
significant and hold very similar value in the second run. 
Significant !-statistics on the gender dummy or interactive dummies show 
where there are differences between the wage rate determination of male and 
female full-timers. A significant F-statistic indicates a rejection of the hypothesis 
that all the coefficients in the regression are zero. 
12Where Chow tests were employed the F-statistics were highly significant and indicative or market 
segmentation by gender, but these results are viewed as unreliable because Chow's assumption of 
homoscedastic variance of error terms does not hold. 
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From Table 4.21 we can see that being male significantly effects the rate 
of return to years of experience and its square, but there is no significant gender 
effect for the effect of years of schooling on wage rates. From Table 4.22 we can 
see that the gender dummy is significant, and there are significant interactions 
between gender and marital status, residence in East Anglia, London and Northern 
Ireland, being self-employed, being in a low level occupation and being Chinese 
or Asian. 
Table 4.21: Estimated Mincerian Schooling and Human Capital Models with 
Gender Effects 
Equation: (MS) (MN) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.393 3.882* 0.018 0.159 
Years of Education 0.098 22.420* 0.105 23.214* 
Years in Labour Force -- -- 0.028 10.268* 
YILF2 -- -- -0.528E-3 -8.242* 
1985 -0.483 -13.269* -0.446 -12.616* 
1986 -0.441 -13.992* -0.422 -13.710* 
1987 -0.379 -11.951* -0.371 -11.815* 
1989 -0.212 -6.682* -0.200 -6.471* 
1990 -0.767 -2.506* -0.071 -2.398* 
Male*YOED -0.869E-2 -1.559 -0.313E-3 -0.054 
Male*YILF -- -- 0.016 4.786* 
Male*YJLF2 -- -- -0.213E-3 -2.780* 
Male*1985 0.038 0.801 0.023 0.501 
Male*1986 0.105 2.625* 0.094 2.423* 
Male*1987 0.072 1.783** 0.069 I. 734** 
Male*1989 0.056 1.426 0.057 1.498 
Male*1990 0.028 0.708 0.029 0.771 
CONSTANT -0.183 -2.297* -0.578 -6.611* 
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.293 
Variance of Estimate 0.264 0.242 
F - Statistic 187.368* 201.235* 
Notes: * s1gmficant at 5% level,** Sigmficant at 10% level, Mean In w = 1.424. 
From Table 4.23 and Table 4.24, we can see that these gender effects are 
occurring with each model of wage determination. Being male as opposed to 
female has a positive effect on wage rates of full-timers of 17-19% higher wage 
rates, as does being a self-employed man as opposed to a self-employed woman. 
Being a married man rather than a married woman leads to 14-18% higher wage 
rates, males living in one of the three regions showing significant gender effects 
have 7-13% lower wage rates than women in these areas, and being an Asian or 
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Chinese man rather than woman results in approximately 30% lower wage rates. 
Note that all these effects assume all other things are equal. 
Table 4.22: Estimated Mincerian Wage Rate Equation (M') with Gender Effects 
Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.191 9.529* 
Years of Education 0.053 16.490* 
Years in Labour Force 0.025 14.801* 
YILF2 -0.468E-3 -13.943* 
Married -0.738E-2 -0.405 
Divorced I widowed 0.081 3.586* 
Recent Unemployment -0.133 -10.418* 
East An1!lia -0.231E-2 -0.054 
East Midlands -0.140 -6.046* 
London 0.166 6.348* 
North East -0.120 -4.823* 
Northern Ireland -0.152 -5.567* 
North West -0.143 -7.293* 
Scotland -0.120 -5.845* 
South West -0.162 -7.282* 
Wales -0.212 -7.552* 
West Midlands -0.095 -4.645* 
Yorks./ Humberside -0.139 -6.739* 
Union member 0.106 10.474* 
Self-employed -0.384 -6.999* 
High Occupation 0.243 17.210* 
Low Occupation -0.239 -11.341* 
African -0.077 -1.698** 
Asian I Chinese 0.054 0.730 
Unclassified R. 0. 0.051 1.637 
1985 -0.506 -24.032* 
1986 -0.417 -23.854* 
1987 -0.366 -20.687* 
1989 -0.138 -4. 787* 
1990 -0.063 -3.776* 
Male• married 0.180 8.407* 
Male• East An11:lia -0.097 -1.964* 
Male• London -0.078 -2.475* 
Male•Northern Ireland -0.132 -4.251* 
Male• Self-employed 0.191 3.226* 
Male•Jow occupation 0.083 3.486* 
Male• Asian/Chinese -0.295 -3.293* 
Constant 0.339 4.962* 
Adjusted R2 0.432 
Variance of Estimate 0.194 
F - Statistic 169.772* 
Notes: • s1gmficant at the 5% level,** 10% level, Mean In w -1.424. 
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Table 4.23: Estimated M & W Wage Rate Equations with Gender Effects 
Equation: (MW) .(MW') 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.100 0.835 0.17209 3.698* 
Years of Education 0.105 23.598* 0.054 16.895* 
Years in Labour Force 0.127 12.634* 0.100 10.667* 
YILF' -0.821E-2 -10.308* -0.649E-2 -9.055* 
YILF' 0.211E-3 8.989* 0.167E-3 8.042* 
YILF' -0.188E-5 -8.194* -0.149E-5 -7.464* 
Married -- -- -0.015 -0.777 
Divorced I widowed 
-- -- 0.062 2.679* 
Recent Unemployment 
-- --
-0.129 -10.154* 
East Anglia -- -- -0.751E-2 -0.178 
East Midlands -- -- -0.138 -6.026* 
London -- -- 0.152 5.835* 
North East -- -- -0.125 -5.030* 
Northern Ireland -- -- -0.168 -6.130* 
North West -- -- -0.147 -7.541* 
Scotland 
-- --
-0.120 -5.854* 
South West -- -- -0.163 -7.348* 
Wales -- -- -0.211 -7.630* 
West Midlands 
-- --
-0.096 -4.759* 
Yorkshire I Humberside 
-- --
-0.141 -6.908* 
Union member -- -- 0.099 9.836* 
Self-emploved -- -- -0.371 -6.796* 
llil!;h Occupation 
-- --
0.239 16.954* 
Low Occupation 
-- --
-0.230 -11.082* 
African 
-- --
-0.082 -1.850** 
Asian I Chinese 
-- --
0.047 0.620 
Unclassified R. 0. 
-- --
0.047 1.536 
1985 -0.436 -12.415* -0.504 -24.016* 
1986 -0.409 -13.429* -0.415 -23.879* 
1987 -0.363 -11.653* -0.365 -20.788* 
1989 -0.192 -6.247* -0.140 -4.863* 
1990 -0.062 -2.093* -0.061 -3.652* 
Male•YOED -0.659E-3 -0.115 -- --
Male"YILF -0.021 -1.664** -0.021 -1.746** 
Male• YILF' 0.344E-2 3.672* 0.270E-2 3.174* 
Male• YILF' -0.117E-3 -4.441* -0.902E-4 -3.846* 
Male• YILF' 0.117E-5 4.708* 0.907E-6 4.161* 
Male• married 
-- --
0.138 5.689* 
Male•East Anl!;lia 
-- --
-0.095 -1.942** 
Male• London -- -- -0.072 -2.291* 
Mate•Northern Ireland -- -- -0.122 -3.900* 
.... 
Male• self-employed 
-- --
0.168 2.849* 
.. 
Male"low occupation -- -- 0.074 3.128* 
. ·- ~ 
Male• Asian/Chinese -- -- -0.292 -3.213* 
Male"1986 0.080 2.083 .. ·---- -- --
Constant -0.899 -9.745"' ---- 0.125 1.696** 
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.440 
Variance of Estimate 0.237 . -- 0.191 
F - Statistic 172.408* 150. 736* 
Notes:* s1gruficant at the 5% level, •• 10% level, Mean In w = 1.424. 
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Table 4.24: Estimated P&L-type Wage Rate Equations with Gender Effects 
Equation: (PL) (PL') 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male -0.372 -1.2648 0.185 9.313* 
Years of Education 0.101 8.183* 0.049 6.315* 
Years in Labour Force -0.252 -1.985* -0.201 -3.356* 
YILF' 0.588E-2 1.670** 0.430E-2 2.660* 
YOED*YILF 0.030 2.086* 0.025 3.609* 
YOED'*YILF -0.788E-3 -1.915** -0.684E-3 -3.410* 
YILF'*YOED -0.676E-3 -1.660** -0.533E-3 -2.783* 
YILY*YILF' 0.170E-4 1.460 0.146E-4 2.603* 
Married -- -- -0.836E-2 -0.455 
Divorced I widowed -- -- 0.077 3.391* 
Recent Unemployment -- -- -0.132 -10.313* 
East Anglia -- -- -0.066 -2.620* 
East Midlands -- -- -0.140 -6.023* 
London -- -- 0.163 6.265* 
North East -- -- -0.118 -4.782* 
Northern Ireland -- -- -0.160 -5.883* 
North West -- -- -0.141 -7.165* 
Scotland -- -- -0.118 -5.753* 
South West -- -- -0.162 -7.287* 
Wales -- -- -0.211 -7.543* 
West Midlands -- -- -0.092 -4.530* 
Yorkshire I Humberside -- -- -0.136 -6.615* 
Union member -- -- 0.107 10.553* 
Self-emoloved -- -- -0.385 -7.006* 
Hillh Occupation -- -- 0.244 17.260* 
Low Occuoation -- -- -0.231 -10.931* 
African -- -- -0.087 -1.905** 
Asian I Chinese -- -- 0.039 0.522 
Unclassified R. 0. -- -- 0.049 1.579 
1985 -0.435 -12.381* -0.498 -23.547* 
1986 -0.415 -13.406* -0.414 -23.624* 
1987 -0.370 -11.787* -0.364 -20.588* 
1989 -0.194 -6.268* -0.134 -4.630* 
1990 -0.071 -2.374* -0.058 -3.477* 
Male*l986 0.091 2.364* -- --
Male*l987 0.073 1.849** -- --
Male* married -- -- 0.179 8.378* 
Male*London -- -- -0.073 -2.324* 
Male*Northern Ireland -- -- -0.121 -3.922* 
Male* self-employed - -- 0.194 3.265* 
Male*low occupation -- -- 0.082 3.441* 
Male* Asian I Chinese -- - -0.289 -3.214* 
Constant -0.548 -2.436* 0.384 2.679* 
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.434 
Variance of Estimate 0.240 0.194 
F - Statistic 140.065* 157.816* 
Notes: • sigruficant at 5% level •• s1gmficant at I 0% level, Mean In w- 1.424. 
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Table 4.25: Estimated Mincer-type Equation with Certificate and Gender Effects 
Variable Est. CoetT. T- Ratio 
Male 0.141 6.538* 
Years in Labour Force 0.025 14.966* 
YILF' -0.473E-3 -14.256* 
Degree 0.447 19.843* 
Nursine 0.279 9.425* 
Teachin2 0.383 9.169* 
Academic I Vocational 0.228 5.182* 
HND 0.325 12.364* 
Trade I Business 0.208 4.522* 
Apprenticeship 0.183 11.788* 
A- Levels 0.191 9.213* 
0- Levels 0.135 7.940* 
CSE's 0.105 4.157* 
Married -0.026 -1.374 
Divorced I widowed 0.022 0.777 
Recent Unemolovment -0.131 -10.372* 
East Anglia -0.918E-2 -0.217* 
East Midlands -0.140 -6.111* 
London 0.124 6.539* 
North East -0.131 -5.342* 
Northern Ireland -0.147 -5.518* 
North West -0.146 -7.553* 
Scotland -0.125 -6.103* 
South West -0.169 -7.631* 
Wales -0.205 -7.424* 
West Midlands -0.093 -4.623* 
Yorkshire I Humberside -0.146 -7.137* 
Union member 0.102 9.992* 
Self-emploved -0.385 -7.000* 
Hieh Occuoation 0.212 14.571* 
Low Occuoation -0.196 -8.987* 
African -0.061 -1.374 
Asian I Chinese 0.063 0.870 
Unclassified Race Ori2in 0.044 1.459 
1985 -0.518 -25.242* 
1986 -0.408 -23.735* 
1987 -0.358 -20.464* 
1989 -0.145 -5.114* 
1990 -0.075 -4.612* 
Male•Teachine -0.151 -2.099* 
Male"Trade!Business 0.097 1.916** 
Male* married 0.206 9.011* 
Male"divorcedlwidowed 0.116 2.810* 
Male•East Midlands -0.091 -1.861** 
Male"Northern Ireland -0.111 -3.696* 
Male" self-employed 0.205 3.446* 
Male"low occuoation 0.070 2.871* 
Male•AsianiChinese -0.296 -3.396* 
Constant 1.097 27.267* 
Ad"ustedlU -0.447 Variance ofEstimatc 0.189 
F- Statistic- 93.099* Mean lnw 1.424 
Notes: * stgmficant at the 5% level, •• I 0% level. 
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Estimating a similar model for the Mincer-type wage rate function 
including the highest certificate held dummy variables gives the results shown in 
Table 4.25. The interactive effects discussed above are again significant in this 
model, with the exception of being male as opposed to female and resident in 
London. Indeed three more significant interactions can be noted. Firstly being 
male, as opposed to female, and holding teaching qualifications as the highest 
held reduces the wage rate earned by approximately 15%. Secondly, being male, 
as opposed to female, and holding trade or business qualifications as the highest 
held raises the wage rate earned by approximately 10%. Thirdly, being a male, as 
opposed to female, divorcee or widower/widow raises the wage rate by earned 
approximately 12%. 
It is widely accepted that men and women operate in separate labour 
markets and these results support this view. The significant !-statistics on the 
gender dummy and a number of interactive dummies, and the significant F-
statistics for each of the detailed models illustrates the segmentation of the labour 
market by gender. Of particular note is the premium paid to male workers in 
comparison to female workers in low-level occupations, and the gender-region 
interactions. 
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Appendix 4.3: 
Year Dummy Variables; Real versus Nominal Wage Rate 
Equations 
This Appendix outlines the intuition behind the inclusion of the dummy variables 
representing year of response to the BSA Survey questionnaire for each worker 
and the use of nominal rather than real wage rate formulation. 
The results of estimating real wage rate Mincerian functions (MR) and 
nominal wage·rate Mincerian functions (MN) for male and female workers in the 
BSA Survey sample are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. It was shown that the 
nominal wage rate functions were superior in explaining the variation in full-time 
wage rates for both gender groups in comparison to the real wage rate 
formulation. The results of estimating Mincerian real wage rate equations with 
year dummies by gender are shown in Table 4.26. By comparing these results 
with those in Table 4.2 and 4.3 for Equation (MN), we can see that the use of 
nominal rather than real wage rates has no significant effect on the size or 
significance of the estimated coefficients on years of education or years in the 
labour force and its square, i.e. the Mincerian equation is robust. The decision to 
use the logarithm of nominal rather than real wage rates as the dependant variable 
was made due to the superiority of the goodness of fit of regressions based upon 
the former variable. 
The decision to include the dummy variables representing year of response 
in the simple and detailed wage rate equations was to control for possible yearly 
effects of omitted variables both on the dependant and independant variables 
included in the regressions. In the context of variation in the average size of the 
dependant variable these yearly external effects include price or wage inflation, 
shifts in the national unemployment level and in the national wage curve 
relationship. 
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Table 4.26: Mincerian Real Wage Rate Equations with Year Dummies by Gender 
Males (N-5418) Females N-278ll 
Variable Estimated Estimated 
Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
YOED 0.105 28.802* 0.105 23.238* 
YILF 0.045 21.772* 0.028 10.273* 
YILF' -0.742E-3 -17.615* -0.528E-3 -8.241* 
Dl985 -0.063 -2.144* -0.083 -2.324* 
Dl986 -0.015 -0.646 -0.106 -3.412* 
Dl987 -0.029 -1.194 -0.095 -2.997* 
D1989 -0.580E-2 -0.259 -0.060 -1.930** 
Dl990 -0.647E-3 -0.027 -0.027 -0.905 
Constant -0.876 -12.129* -0.900 -10.265* 
AdjustedR" 0.196 0.195 
Variance of 0.253 0.222 
Estimate 
Mean In w 1.368 1.103 
Notes:* Stgruficant at 5% level,** at 10% level, both regresswns use White's (1980) correctton. 
In the context of variation in the average size of the explanatory variables 
these external effects could, for example, include: yearly variation in the hiring 
behaviour of employers due to changes in the business environment; which would 
show itself in variation in the effect of age, education and other labour market 
information upon employees earnings. Secondly; yearly variation in the internal 
payment schemes of companies due to changes in the business environment, 
which would have an effect upon the influence occupational category and years in 
the labour force had on earnings over the sample period. Thirdly; yearly 
fluctuations in the influence of union membership in the wage-bargaining system. 
One would intuitively expect that the influence of unions upon earnings would 
decline as union membership and coverage declined in the UK over the sample 
period. Fourthly; yearly fluctuations in the regional market effects of demand and 
supply for labour. 
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Chapter 5 
Self-employed Versus Employees; A Comparative Test Of 
The Screening Hypothesis Using UK Data 
5.1 Introduction 
In previous tests of the educational screening hypothesis self-employed workers 
have been used to represent unscreened workers whilst employees have been used 
to represent the screened workers; Wolpin (1977), Riley (1979a), Katz & 
Ziderman (1980), Fredland & Little (1981), Shah (1985), Tucker (1985), Cohn et 
a/ (1987), and Grubb (1993) share the common methodology of comparing 
screened to unscreened worker types. 
The educational screening hypothesis has been largely tested using this 
methodology on US data. In this Chapter I aim to test a weak educational 
screening model using the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey data and a 
similar methodology to that ofWolpin (1977), Katz & Ziderman (1980), Fredland 
& Little (1981) and Cohn et a/ (1987). The weak screening hypothesis allows for 
both human capital and informational effects of education in the determination of 
wages. 
Section 5.2 outlines the theoretical reasomng underpinning the 
methodology employed to test the weak screening hypothesis. Section 5.3 
presents some details of the samples of self-employed and employees taken from 
the main BSA Survey sample used in previous Chapters and a discussion of the 
characteristics of the self-employed in the BSA Survey data in relation to previous 
UK studies. Section 5.4 describes the possible model specifications to be 
employed and then shows goodness of fit and model selection and specification 
test results for male and female full-time workers. Section 5.5 outlines the 
hypotheses to be tested and details the results expected under the weak screening 
hypothesis. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 detail the actual results from estimating the wage 
rate functions and testing the hypotheses in Section 5.5. Concluding comments 
are collected in Section 5.8. 
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5.2 Theoretical Reasoning 
Both worker types, that is employees and the self-employed, are assumed to be 
fully aware of their own abilities; this is the private information an employee 
would wish to signal to employers. In a weak screening model, such as that 
presented by Riley (1979a), both worker types are assumed to invest in education 
for human capital investment to the same degree, but only employees use 
education as a signal of productive ability to employers. Self-employed workers 
have no need to signal their ability to prospective employers, and we would 
therefore expect that self-employed wages are less closely linked to education 
relative to private employees. 
Wolpin (1977) showed that self-employed workers obtained a similar level 
of education as non-self-employed workers of the same ability in similar 
occupations, and this was taken as evidence against the importance of education 
as a screening device. However, the choice of education does not rest entirely on 
employment aims; Wolpin's model does not allow for other entries into the utility 
function of individuals when considering education; for example workers of any 
ability level may place greater emphasis on trying to achieve a social norm 
education level for his or her perceived class in society, following a family norm, 
or they may invest in education with the aim of helping others regardless of 
monetary returns (for example this may be the case for some prospective doctors, 
nurses, aid-workers and teachers). 
Additionally, from a purely monetary perspective, education will be 
acquired even if a person aims to be self-employed when leaving education, since 
he or she cannot be sure that their plans will come to fruition and they may need 
to signal their ability in the labour market in the future. Due to a lack of 
appropriate data we cannot directly control for such hedging behaviour in this 
sample, although an attempt is made to control for self-selection using the 
technique ofHeckman (1979) which is detailed in Section 5.4.1. 
This empirical work adopts a similar approach for UK. data, in that we will 
look at the possible differences in education acquired by the two worker types, 
and also at the returns to educational variables given that education has been 
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acquired for whatever reason. A self-employed person gams nothing from 
education as a signal since we assume that he or she has full knowledge of the 
private information that education signals in the labour market, and thus any 
return attached to the certificate is in the form of a return to human capital. 
Conversely an employee will need to signal his or her ability in the labour market 
and thus will gain a return from the signalling function of the certificate as well as 
a human capital return. 
One caveat is that self-employed workers may be educationally screened 
by the financial institutions who provide them with credit. Thus if we find a 
significant difference between the effects of educational variables upon wage 
rates between the two sub-samples we might consider this to be an under-estimate 
of the differential, since if education is used in the screening process of banks we 
would expect the differences in returns to education between employees and the 
self-employed to be smaller than if such lender-screening did not exist. 
5.3 The BSA Survey Sample and Characterisation of the Self-
employed 
The sample used is a pooled data set taken from the BSA Survey 1985-1991 (with 
1988 excluded, since there was no survey in this year) covering 1140 full-time 
self-employed workers, and 7059 full-time employees. The number of employees 
used in the analysis in this Chapter is reduced as we have omitted workers in the 
armed forces. Summary statistics for these two sub-samples are shown in Table 
5.1 (see Appendix 1 of Chapter 4 for variable list). 
From Table 5.1 we can see that the average length of full-time education 
differs significantly between the self-employed and employees in this BSA Survey 
sample. Additionally we can see that approximately 31% (from the mean value of 
the dummy variable representing no formal qualifications) of the self-employed 
subsample have no formal certification compared to 26% of employees, again 
significantly different figures. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Full-time Employees and Self-employed in BSA 
Survey Sample 1985-1991 
Employees Self-employed 
(N = 7059) (N = 1140) 
Variable Standard Standard Test 
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Statistic 
Real Gross Earnings 9071 5031 10202 6673 -6.697* 
Nom. Gross Earnings 10609 6216 12127 8256 -7.274* 
Weekly Hours 41.787 8.102 52.907 15.026 -37.161* 
Age 37.791 12.325 41.806 11.792 -10.266* 
Years in Labour Force 20.922 12.897 25.169 12.285 -10.384* 
Years of Education 16.870 2.033 16.637 1.9841 5.131* 
Recent Unemployment 0.194 0.005 0.191 0.012 0.192 
Male 0.6321 0.006 0.839 0.011 -13.665* 
Union membership 0.487 0.006 0.085 0.008 25.428* 
African 0.013 0.001 8.77E-3 0.003 1.272 
Asian Chinese 0.017 0.002 0.025 0.005 -1.701** 
White European 0.161 0.004 0.153 0.011 0.686 
U nclassilied Race 0.809 0.005 0.814 0.012 -0.422 
Degree 0.114 0.004 0.099 0.009 1.469 
Nursing 0.033 0.002 0.016 0.004 3.072* 
Teaching 0.023 0.002 9.65E-3 0.003 2.967* 
Academic/vocational 0.014 0.001 7.89E-3 0.003 1.684** 
HND 0.040 0.002 0.028 0.005 2.370* 
Trade I business 0.061 0.003 0.071 0.008 -1.373 
Apprenticeship 0.158 0.004 0.166 0.011 -0.696 
A- Levels 0.103 0.004 0.124 0.010 -2.107* 
0- Levels 0.158 0.004 0.145 0.010 1.176 
CSE's 0.037 0.002 0.025 0.005 1.936** 
No Qualifications 0.257 0.005 0.309 0.014 -3.702* 
Private Education 0.109 0.004 0.148 0.01 I -3.885* 
Professional 0.060 0.003 0.097 0.009 -4.776* 
High Level Occupation 0.361 0.006 0.204 0.012 10.369* 
Mid Level Occupation 0.302 0.005 0.783 0.012 -31.216* 
Low Level Occupation 0.336 0.006 0.012 0.003 22.350* 
Married 0.683 0.006 0.797 0.012 -7.822* 
Divorced I widowed 0.077 0.003 0.057 0.007 2.334* 
Single 0.241 0.005 0.146 0.010 7.106* 
East Anglia 0.038 0.002 0.033 0.005 0.890 
East Midlands 0.061 0.003 0.068 0.007 -1.014 
London 0.102 0.004 0.086 0.008 1.704** 
North East 0.049 0.003 0.029 0.005 2.959* 
Northern Ireland 0.116 0.004 0.164 0.011 -4.585* 
North West 0.100 0.004 0.068 0.007 3.501* 
Scotland 0.078 0.003 0.070 0.008 0.942 
. -· .. 
South East 0.180 0.005 0.195 0.012 -1.204 
-.-
South West 0.072 0.003 0.097 0.009 -3.012* 
.. 
Wales 0.039 0.002 0.048 0.006 -1.555 
West Midlands - -··. 0.086 0.003 0.068 0.007 1.989* 
Yorkshire/Humberside- 0.080 0.003 0.074 0.008 0.674 
... Notes: * Dtfference between means ts stgmficant at the 5% level or better, ** dtfference between 
means is significant at the I 0% level. 
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Looking at the highest qualification held dummy variables (HQD's) 
nursing and teaching certification seem to be more frequently obtained by 
employees than the self-employed. Since we would expect far fewer self-
employed nurses and teachers compared to employees the significance of the test-
statistic associated with this differential is not surprising. 
Six of the highest qualification dummy variables have significantly 
different mean values between the two groups at the 5% level; the exceptions 
being Degree, Trade/business, apprenticeships, and 0-levels. For example, 
relatively fewer full-time employees than full-time self-employed workers possess 
A-levels as their highest certificates. In a screening framework this may be 
because these certificates are seen by employers as a 'middle ground' qualification 
and they cannot decide whether the applicant is of high or low ability in 
comparison to applicants with either a degree or 0-levels as their highest 
certificate, and this uncertainty is reflected in the behaviour of employees. 1 If we 
calculate the cumulative proportion of employees and self-employed workers who 
hold HQD's above A-Level standard, we find that the cumulative proportion for 
employees significantly exceeds that of the self-employed ( 45% compared to 
40%), this may be because employees are more interested in acquiring post-
school certification than the self-employed. The significantly higher proportion of 
employees compared to self-employed holding CSE's as the highest qualification 
is possibly due to the significant age differential between groups. 
It is important to remember that worker-type is identified in each year's 
BSA Survey questionnaire by the following question read out to all workers by the 
interviewer; 
'In your (main} job are you; (a) an employee, or 
(b) self-employed?' 
1 This may simply reflect the nature of the British educational system in that A-Levels are seen as a 
step towards acquiring a degree. The lower proportion of employees holding A-Levels as their 
highest educational qualification may be due to the desire of employees to achieve the next 'step', 
acquiring a degree, due to traditional social pressures to achieve within the educational system. 
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Thus the definition of self-employment rests upon what the BSA Survey 
respondent perceives as self-employment. 
The classification of respondents by the interviewer as self-employed 
would be difficult in many cases perhaps depending more on legal rather than 
economic definitions. The Thirteenth International Conference on Labour 
Statistics (1982) defined the self-employed as employers, own-account workers, 
members of producers' co-operatives and unpaid family workers. However, the 
legal definition of self-employment is usually connected to owners of 
unincorporated businesses i.e. not employees of the owners of an incorporated 
business. 
Relying on the respondent may mean that some people may regard 
themselves as self-employed when by the strict economic definition they are not. 
However, in testing the screening hypothesis in this comparative methodology we 
are testing the behaviour towards signalling of the two worker types, and if under 
the hypothesis a self-employed person need not signal ability via educational 
variables it is important that the person regards themselves as self-employed 
regardless of the strict definition, legal or economic, of their activity. Self-
definition of worker type by respondents goes some way in accounting for beliefs 
in the labour market. 
A comparison of the summary statistics for the self-employed in Table 5.1 
with previous estimates may relieve some anxiety that surrounds the identification 
of the self-employed in the BSA Survey data. Blanchflower et al (1988a) use 
National Child Development Survey (NCDS) data from 1981 (NCDS sweep 4) 
and BSA Survey 1985 data and identify a number of characteristics of the self-
employed. The self-employed are predominantly male and resident in the South 
East and Midlands, they typically do not have above average levels of 
qualifications, and they experience similar levels of unemployment as employees. 
From Table 5.1 we can see that these results are matched for this data set. 
Blanchflower et al (1988b) use NCDS sweeps 1 to 4 to identify more 
characteristics for self-employed individuals of 23 years of age. Most interesting 
are their findings on ability differentials between employees and the self-
employed. The BSA Survey data does not contain any current- or childhood-
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ability proxy variables and since omission of an ability control may cause bias in 
the estimates of returns to schooling we would hope to see that on average 
productive-ability (ability that effects productivity and therefore earnings) does 
not vary significantly between worker types in the UK to ensure that our later 
estimates are not inaccurate. In speech and reading tests the self-employed were 
found to perform less well than employees, however bias is apparent as the speech 
test results have been found to be influenced heavily by gender and the self-
employed are predominantly male. In mathematical ability tests the scores of the 
full-time self-employed are not significantly lower than for employees. 
Intelligence quotients calculated at the age of 11 show the self-employed to have 
lower verbal scores but similar non-verbal scores in comparison to employees. 
Since previous studies [notably Ashenfelter & Mooney (1968) and 
Taubman & Wales (1973)] have found that only mathematical ability effects 
earnings significantly we may conclude as far as this NCDS evidence shows that 
the self-employed and employees in the UK do not differ significantly in 
productive-ability. Indeed, Weiss (1995) contends that it is not necessary to 
include ability variables in modelling the screening process since the firm is 
unable to directly observe ability. Including variables which the firm cannot 
directly observe in a model of wage determination will have no significant effects 
on the estimated coefficients on the variables that the firm can observe and uses 
as signals of ability. 
Blanchflower et a! (1988b) have further observations relevant to this 
study. The self-employed group includes a range of occupations from highly paid 
professionals such as doctors and lawyers, to low paid shopkeepers and farmers. 
However, average gross weekly earnings are found to be significantly higher than 
for employees, and that the self-employed work longer hours and at more anti-
social times. From Table 5.1 the significant gross earnings and hours worked 
differential is confirmed from the BSA Survey data; the self-employed workers 
earn roughly £1100 more in real terms each year than employees, however we can 
see that the self-employed on average have a significantly longer working week 
which may explain some of the earnings differential. Blanchflower et al (1988b) 
also found that 6% of full-time self employed were union members in comparison 
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to 46% of employees; this is similar to the BSA Survey data shown in Table 5.1 
showing 9% of all self-employed are union or staff association members in 
comparison to approximately 49% of employees; the test-statistic associated with 
this differential is significant at the 5% level. 
Blanchflower et a! (1988b) find that those who were self-employed at 23 
years of age were twice as likely as employees to have predicted at age 11 their 
worker type 12 years in the future and that such 'childish predictions' were not 
random. This is an important result in the context of the screening hypothesis 
since it is assumed in most screening models that individuals decide upon future 
employment, and therefore what educational investments to make, on the basis of 
an offered wage schedule set by potential employers. If the decision to be self-
employed is made at an early age prior to acquisition of certification then under 
the screening hypothesis we would expect such individuals to acquire less 
certification for signalling purposes in comparison to would-be employees or 
those who have ambiguous aims. However, exogenous shocks must not be 
ignored; Blanchflower & Oswald ( 1990) study a young cohort of self-employed 
workers in the UK (from NCDS data), and find that an overriding influence upon 
the worker type choice decision is whether the individual ever received an 
inheritance or gift. For example, ceteris paribus, individuals coming into money 
in the region of £5000 were approximately twice as likely to chose to be self-
employed. 
Rees & Shah ( 1986) apply a simultaneous equation model of worker type 
and earnings to examine the detenninants of self-employment using GHS 1978 
data. They find that the probability of self-employment depends positively on the 
earnings differential between worker types and that age and education are also 
significant determinants in the choice decision. The effects of education in this 
study are 'interesting' in that education is found not only to have a greater impact 
upon the earnings of employees, but also (contrary to the screening hypothesis) to 
raise the probability of self-employment. 
Patterns in the raw data such as those presented in Table 5.1 can g1ve 
misleading inferences about the effects of education upon wages, since we are not 
controlling for other factors when comparing mean values. The means are 
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included more for completeness than as evidence for or against screening. To 
gain a more precise understanding of the differences in educational achievement 
between worker types and to test whether this can be explained by the weak 
model we must analyse the individual relationships between educational variables 
and earnings formally using regression analysis. 
5.4 Model Selection 
5.4.1 The Heckit Procedure and Candidate Models 
Since we are primarily concerned with the estimated rates of return to education 
for the self-employed and employees in the form of certification or years of 
education the models estimated for the two subsets in this Chapter are Mincerian 
wage rate functions. The alternative human capital formulations of Murphy & 
Welch (1990) and Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979) were found to marginally 
improve goodness of fit in comparison to the Mincer-type formulations, but the 
effects on most coefficients are also marginal, only the return to years in the 
labour force and powers of years in the labour force showed marked differences 
between the Mincerian and two other formulations. The Mincer-type functions 
estimated in this Chapter will take the form shown in equations (1) and (2) 
or, 
where: 
w 
s 
= wage rate derived from nominal annual gross earnings divided by 
hours worked in a week and 52 weeks for full-timers, 
years of full-time education, 
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X 
Bi,a, 
c 
d 
B,,A, 
&, 
= 
years in the labour force, 
are constant coefficients, 
vector of highest qualification held dummy variables (HQD's), 
set of control variables, 
are vectors of parameters, 
error terms; E( &1 ) = 0. 
Equation (1) is a simple Mincerian formulation regressing estimated wage 
rates upon years of education, years in the labour force, years in the labour force 
squared, and d contains dummy variables representing year of response (since the 
dependant variable is nominal wage) and a control for sample selection bias. 2 
The alternative specification, Equation (2), uses highest qualification held 
to measure educational achievement and the variables contained within d are 
'indices' such as gender, marital status, union or staff association membership, and 
ethnic origin; dummy variables to represent possible signalling or human capital 
effects of unemployment in the previous five years, private schooling at either 
secondary or primary level; UK Region dummy variables; a control for 
occupational class, a control for year of response, and a control for self-selection 
bias. 
Following Grubb (1993), sample selection bias is controlled for using the 
procedure known as the 'Heckit model' suggested by Heckman (1979). The 
Heckit model corrects the separate wage rate equations estimated for the self-
employed and employees for incidental truncation of the sample. There are 
workers in each type of employment who on the basis of socio-economic 
characteristics could earn more in the other type of employment. The Heckit 
model corrects for this fact by calculating inverse Mills ratios, which can be 
interpreted as the probability a person would choose to work in the opposite type 
of job if they could, and inserting these ratios into the estimated wage rate 
equations for each worker type. 
2 As in Chapter 4 real wage rate functions were estimated and found to fit the data less accurately 
than the nominal formulation with year dummies. 
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The Heckit model is a two-stage model and is estimated as follows.J 
Stage one is to make a probit estimation of the following model for sector 
selection: 
(3) I* =pZ +V 
( 4) I= I if/* :'> 0 (worker is self-employed) or 
I= 0 if I*> 0 (worker is an employee) 
Where I* is the critical value of the selection criterion which is based on the 
socio-economic variables in vector Z. Endogenising sector selection implies that 
expected values of the error terms in the wage-rate functions of the self-employed 
and employees are no longer equal to zero when an individual is observed to be 
working in one type of employment, but on the basis of the selection criterion 
would prefer to be employed in the other type of employment [see Heckman 
(1979)].4 
Stage two of the Heckit model involves including inverse Mills ratios, 
derived from the probit estimation of Equation (3), as explanatory variables in the 
estimation of the Mincerian wage-rate functions (1) or (2) to estimate the returns 
to education with worker type selection endogenous. For example using Equation 
(I), we would estimate the following functions; 
(5) 
(6) 
where: 
3 The Heckit model was estimated on the SHAZAM software package using an adaptation of a 
program written by D. Jaeger (1992); see pp. 258-261 SHAZAM User's Reference Manual. 
4 Also see Lee (1978) who uses a two-stage simultaneous equation model with limited dependent 
and qualitative endogenous variables to investigate the interactions between union membership and 
wage rates. 
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W; 
s 
X 
D 
= 
= 
= 
the nominal hourly wage-rate of the individual working in job i, 
years of education, 
years in the labour force, 
matrix of year of response dummy variables, 
error terms; E( v1 ) = 0, 
and the inverse Mills ratios are defined formally as follows; 
(6) 
(7) 
A, - -f(pZ) 
I- F(pZ) 
A, = f(pZ) 
2 1-F(pZ) 
for the employee wage rate equation, 
for the self-employed wage-rate equation. 
Where.fi:.) is the density function of the standard normal variables and F(.) is the 
distribution function. 
5.4.2 Goodness of Fit Results 
Earnings functions were estimated for the two sub-samples (self-employed and 
employees) using the SHAZAM software package at Manchester Computer 
Centre. For each regression two goodness of fit measures were used; Adjusted 
R2 and variance ofthe estimate. For the model to fit the data well we would want 
a high R2 and F-statistic, and a low estimate variance. Log-linear wage rate 
functions were estimated for male and female, employee and self-employed, sub-
samples with goodness of fit results as shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Summary of Model Comparisons for Full-time Workers 
Estimated Adjusted Variance of 
Gender Worker Type Function a2 Estimate F- statistic 
Male Self-employ_ed (I) 0.14 0.47 14.46 
Male Employees (I) 0.34 0.19 245.26 
Female Self-employed (I) 0.14 0.60 4.20 
Female Employees (I) 0.34 0.18 150.01 
Male Self-employed (2) 0.23 0.41 8.68 
Male Employees (2) 0.48 0.15 111.57 
Female Self-employed (2) 0.21 0.55 2.39 
Female Emplovees (2) 0.48 0.14 65.94 
It was decided that female workers would be omitted from this Chapter 
because the wage-rate functions were inadequate in explaining wage 
determination for female self-employed workers; this conclusion is reached from 
looking at the variance of the estimates and F-statistics, and an overall lack of 
significance in the t-ratios of the variables in the regression results. This also 
means that this Thesis is consistent with previous work on testing the screening 
hypothesis which concentrates on male full-timers to avoid any gender effects 
from pooling a sample of male and females. 
5.5 Hypotheses and Expected Results 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The hypotheses that follow are mostly derived from the theoretical and empirical 
articles that have been reviewed in the preceding chapters. They are constructed 
to test for differences in the role of education, unemployment, and market 
experience between worker types. The overall theme of the hypotheses is to test 
whether there are significant differences between the screened and unscreened 
workers in the returns to potential screening devices. 
Hypotheses 1,2 and 4 are concerned with the weak educational screening 
hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 is concerned with a screening hypothesis in relation to 
unemployment incidence following the work of Greenwald (1986), Taubman & 
Watcher (1986), McCormick (1990) and Ma & Weiss (1993), in which recent 
unemployment is used as a signal by prospective employers. Hypothesis 5 is 
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similar in that it is concerned with a screening hypothesis in relation to years of 
experience as a signal of ability. Hypothesis 6 tests the claims of Lazear (1977) 
that the returns to certification may be biased by inclusion of professional workers 
in the samples. 
5.5.2 Hypothesis 1 
This hypothesis follows that of Riley (1979a); for education to be effective as a 
screening device it must be a good predictor of productivity (and therefore wage 
rates), if not firms will use other more accurate screening devices. The estimated 
wage rate function for the screened group (employees) is therefore expected to fit 
the data better than that for the unscreened group (self-employed workers). 
Rejection of the following null hypothesis supports the screening model: 
Ho: The screened group does not fit the model any better than the unscreened 
group. 
H 1: · The screened group fits the model better than the unscreened group. 
5.5.3 Hypothesis 2 
Both the screening hypothesis and human capital theory infer that we should 
expect positive and significant coefficients on the highest qualification dummies, 
schooling quality proxy, and years of education variable. Under the screening 
hypothesis we would expect higher returns from educational variables for 
employees. For example, the coefficient on the public school variable may be 
insignificant in the regression for self-employed wages, in comparison to a 
positive and significant effect for employees. The dummy for public school may 
give some indication of quality of education as perceived by employers. This may 
support the finding in Taubman & Wales (1973) that schooling quality effects 
were significant in the determination of wages in the private sector, and support 
the idea that employers look at a vector of educational information as a signal of 
ability. Rejection of the following null hypothesis supports the screening model: 
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Ho: Returns to the vector of educational information are not significantly 
different between worker types. 
H 1: Returns to the vector of educational information are significantly different 
between the worker types. 
5.5.4 Hypothesis 3 
In a human capital framework the impact on unemployment in the previous five 
years is expected to have a negative effect on earnings, through its de-skilling 
effects and impact upon search behaviour. However, differentials may exist 
between worker-types because of an informational function of unemployment; in 
a screening model it may be the case that an employee may be 'marked down', 
through association with the unemployment pool, by a new employer, whereas a 
self-employed person will not mark themselves down [see Greenwald (1986)]. 
Conversely unemployment could be actually be a positive signal to some potential 
employers [see McCormick (1990), Ma & Weiss (1993), and Taubman & 
Watcher (1986)]. We assume that the potential negative motivation and de-
skilling effects are the same for both worker types, and so any differential in 
coefficients can be attributed to unemployment as a signal in the market for 
employees.5 If employees are found to have a less (more) negative coefficient on 
the recent unemployment variable compared to the self-employed, this may be 
evidence of a positive (negative) signalling role for recent unemployment in the 
market for full-time employees. The null and alternative hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Ho: The impact of recent unemployment is not significantly different across 
worker-types. 
5 Note that we do not know what worker type the respondent was before his or her period of 
unemployment, or whether, in fact, prior to the reported total unemployment in the previous five 
years the respondent was already unemployed. This implies that any result indicating a differential 
between worker types may be due to unobserved differences between the two sub-samples in 
unemployment duration and previous worker type. 
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H 1: The impact of recent unemployment 1s significantly different across 
worker-types. 
5.5.5 Hypothesis 4 
In a human capital framework, years of study will have positive effects on wages 
regardless of whether any qualifications have been obtained, however in the 
screening models we would expect that the longer a person spends in study 
without certification the more this is seen as a bad signal; this is explicitly tested 
by Oosterbeek (1985). We may also test this by constructing a sample of 
employees with no formal qualifications. We would then expect that the return to 
years of education for employees with no formal qualifications would be 
significantly different in comparison to the returns to employees who possess 
some formal qualification. In a weak screening model we would expect the return 
to years of education for employees with no formal qualification in comparison to 
the return to years of education for employees with formal qualifications to be 
smaller if years of education enhances productivity but gives a negative signal 
when coupled with the absence of certificates. However we would expect the 
return to be larger if years of education enhances productivity and is increasingly 
relied by employers upon as a basis on which decide pay in the absence of other 
signals. The coefficient on years of education could turn out to be negative for 
those with no formal qualifications if years of education coupled with no 
certificates is such a bad signal that it over-rides any productivity enhancing 
effects years of education may have. Rejection of the following null hypothesis 
supports the screening model: 
HQ: The return to years of education does not differ between those with some 
formal qualification( s) and those with none. 
H 1: The return to years of education does differ between those with some 
formal qualification(s) and those with none. 
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5.5.6 Hypothesis 5 
In additional to explaining the education-earnings relationship human capital and 
screening models (based on the use of tenure or general labour market 
experience) have sought to explain the experience-earnings relationship. For 
example, Gibbons & Katz (1991) posit that those workers with high levels of 
tenure who are displaced due to plant closure, or for other reasons beyond their 
control, will receive higher subsequent wages than those laid-off (i.e. having 
shorter tenure) since they are seen by other firms to have successfully passed 
through the first firm's on-the-job screening process. Gibbons & Katz find that 
this is indeed the case; the differential impact of plant closure and lay-offs is 
difficult to explain in the context of human capital theory, where tenure represents 
specific human capital accumulation. 
Potential labour market experience, as measured by years in the labour 
force, is also expected to have some effect on wages in both a human capital and 
a screening model. 
In a human capital model experience proxies for general human capital 
acquisition, and since we are controlling for unemployment effects, the years in 
the labour force variable represents positive general human capital acquisition 
which will enhance productivity and therefore wages.6 
In a screening framework experience may be used as a signal of ability by 
employers when deciding upon wage rates. As general labour market experience 
increases the worker can build up a curriculum vitae recording previous 
experience in addition to educational achievements. As experience increases the 
level of information available to the firm which it can use in its hiring and wage 
determination decisions increases. For example, first time job-seekers may be at 
somewhat of a disadvantage in comparison to more experienced workers with the 
same education, because they cannot show a previous employer's reference which 
gives a previous estimate of ability that the potential employer can observe. 
6 However we do not fully control for all unemployment over the workers lifetime (only in the five 
years preceding the date of the survey), and the frequency or duration of unemployment is not fully 
controlled for in the dummy variable representing recent unemployment. The rate of return to years 
in the labour force may therefore be underestimated due to lack of control for the negative effects 
of less recent unemployment upon wages. 
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Thus a difference in the estimated coefficients on the years in the labour 
force variable between employees and the self-employed may indicate some 
positive signal effect for employees. Experience may be used as a screen by 
employers in such a way that although two applicants may have the same ability 
the one with more labour market experience will be accepted for the job and years 
in the labour force may therefore influence wage rates through its influence upon 
job allocation. The null and alternative hypotheses are therefore as follows: 
Ho: The positive effect of years in the labour force on log-wages does not 
differ across worker type. 
H 1: The positive effect of years in the labour force does differ across worker 
type. 
5.5. 7 Hypothesis 6 
The exclusion of professional workers such as doctors and lawyers from data sets 
when estimating the returns to educational variables and return differentials 
between worker types has become common practice. Lazear ( 1977) suggests that 
self-employed professionals may acquire qualifications in order to signal to their 
potential client base quality of service, thus raising the average level of education 
of the self-employed, and biasing the results of comparative studies. We can test 
such claims by running estimations of wage functions with and without 
professionals included. If the coefficients of educational variables change 
significantly with the exclusion of professionals from the data set we cannot reject 
the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: Inclusion of professionals biases the returns to education upwards. 
H 1: Inclusion of professionals does not bias the returns to education. 
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5.6 Actual Results using the Heckit Model with the Simple 
Mincerian Wage Rate Function (1) 
5.6.1 The Pro bit Sample Selection Model 
The probit equation used in the first stage of the Heckit model to estimate the 
inverse Mills ratios used in estimating Equations (1) and (2) is shown in Table 
5.3. The number of observations for this regression is N = 5391 i.e. the whole 
sample of non-army male full-timers is used. 
The reported Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) statistic is highly significant 
and indicates that we cannot accept the null hypothesis that the explanatory 
variables have no influence on choice probabilities in the probit model i.e. that 
{32 = {33 = ... = f3 K = 0 where the betas are the estimated coefficients on the 
variables included in the probit model. The reported LRT-statistic is found by 
calculating the following equation; 
(8) LRT- statistic= -2[lnC(D.)- lnC(w)] 
and has a Chi-squared distribution of (K-1) degrees of freedom, where; 
K the number of explanatory variables, 
e(n) = the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the maximum 
likelihood estimates, 
C(w) the maximum value of the likelihood function evaluated under the 
hypothesis that /32 = /33 = ... = f3 K = 0 
In addition, the reported Cragg-Uhler R 2 value appears to show that the 
probit model performs well in explaining the self-employment selection process. 
The Cragg-Uhler R2 is defined formally as follows: 
2 {[' ](jl,) [' ](jl,)}/{ [' ](jl,)} (9) Cragg-Uhler R = €(D.) - €(w) 1- €(w) 
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and a Cragg-Uhler R2 value in the region of0.3 is generally taken to indicate that 
the model has a good fit to the data [see Cragg & Uhler ( 1973) for more details]. 
Table 5.3: Estimated Pro bit Model of Self-employment Selection 
Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio 
Degree -0.306 -2.220* 
Nursing -1.421 -2.681* 
Teaching -0.655 -2.388* 
Academic/vocational -0.581 -2.244* 
HND -0.682 -4.814* 
Trade I business -0.330 -3.188* 
Apprenticeship -0.032 -0.386 
A-Levels -0.230 -2.529* 
0-Levels -0.270 -3.188* 
CSE's 0.254 1.488 
Years in labour Force 0.035 4.167* 
YILF' -0.508E-3 -3.308* 
Years of education 0.061 2.879* 
Dl985 -0.196 -1.961** 
Dl986 -0.254 -3.035* 
Dl987 -0.131 -1.558 
Dl989 -0.139 -1.807** 
Dl990 -0.040 -0.513 
Sinele -0.010 -0.130 
Low Occupation -2.464 -22.569* 
High Occupation -1.198 -20.092* 
Wales/Scotland/N. Ire. 0.085 1.426 
North -0.132 -2.041* 
Constant -1.266 -3.402* 
Likelihood Ratio Test 1552.13* 
Cragg-Uhler R2 0.412 
Notes: • s1gmficant at 5% level, •• at I 0% level. 
The inverse Mills ratios are calculated from this probit model and used as 
explanatory variables in the estimated wage rate equations for male full-time 
employees and self-employed workers. 
5.6.2 Estimated Wage Rate Functions and Results 
The estimated Mincerian wage rate functions for male full-time employees and 
self-employed are shown in Table 5.4. In both estimated wage rate equations the 
inverse Mills ratios (lambda's) are significant in the determination of wage rates 
i.e. in this case incidental truncation of the sample of male full-timers would have 
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biased results if simple one-stage OLS estimation was employed for the simple 
Mincerian model. 
Table 5.4: Estimated Mincerian Equations for Male Full-timers by Worker Type 
Employees Self- Employed 
(N=4435) (N = 956) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years of Education 0.105 29.726* 0.062 4.748* 
Years in Labour Force 0.047 24.304* 0.033 4.964* 
YILF' -0.770E-03 -19.474* -0.601E-3 ·5.034* 
Dl985 -0.431 -16.478* -0.545 -5.906* 
Dl986 ·0.369 -16.420* -0.234 ·3.075* 
Dl987 ·0.311 -13.471* -0.337 ·4.522* 
Dl989 ·0.164 -7.510* 0.164 ·2.365* 
Dl990 -0.047 -2.090* -0.052 ·0.766 
Lambda ·0.152 ·6.119* 0.314 5.589* 
Constant -0.579 -8.519* -0.174 ·0.749 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.140 
Variance of Estimate 0.192 0.459 
Meanlnw 1.543 1.357 
Notes: • stgmficant at 5% level, • • stgmficant at the I 0% level. 
From Table 5.4 we can see that the estimated wage rate function for male 
full-time employees fits the data more accurately than that for the male full-time 
self-employed; adjusted R-squared is higher and the variance of the estimate is 
lower for employees in comparison to the self-employed. We therefore cannot 
accept the null Hypothesis 1 that the screened group does not fit the model any 
better than the unscreened group. We must also reject the strong screening 
hypothesis that education has only a signalling role, since if this was the case then 
the estimated wage rate equation for the self-employed would display no 
significant returns to years of education. 
Although years of education is significant in both of the estimated wage 
rate equations shown in Table 5.4 there is a marked difference between the 
average rate of return to years of schooling by worker type. The average rate of 
return to years of schooling is approximately 11% per year for employees and 
approximately 6% for the self-employed. We therefore cannot accept the null 
Hypothesis 2 that the returns to education are not significantly different between 
worker types. Indeed, a Chow test to show that the two estimated wage rate 
equations shown in Table 5.4 are significantly different produces an F-statistic 
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approximately equal to 27.45 which is highly significant indicating that wage 
rates are determined separately by worker type for full-time male workers. 
In relation to Hypothesis 5 we again cannot accept the null hypothesis. 
The average rate of return to years in the labour force differs by worker type; full-
time male employees receive approximately 5% higher wages per year of 
experience, compared to approximately 3% higher wages per year of experience 
for full-time self-employed males. The rate of decrease in the marginal rate of 
return to years in the labour force as years in the labour increases also differs by 
worker type; the coefficient on years in the labour force squared is approximately 
-0.77E-3 for employees and approximately -0.60E-3 for the self-employed. 
It is important that we employ all the relevant variables at our disposal that 
could be observed by the firm when modelling the process of wage rate 
determination, and to this end the more detailed wage rate Equation (2) is 
estimated in Section 5.7. Estimation of Equation (1) has given us an indication 
that there are indeed significant differences by worker type in the estimated rates 
of return to education. In Section 5.7, following Liu & Wong (1982), and the 
evidence in Chapter 4, we move on to re-formalise the wage determination 
process in terms of highest formal qualifications held, to allow for variation in the 
marginal rate of return to years of education and certification effects.? 
5.7 Actual Results using Detailed Wage Rate Function (2) 
5.7.1 General Results 
Estimating more detailed wage rate functions for the self-employed and 
employees using the two stage Heckit model results in the inverse Mills ratios 
becoming insignificant in determining wage rates for either worker type. Since 
sample selection bias is found to be insignificant in the more detailed model the 
lambda terms are dropped from the equation and we use simple one stage 
7 Liu & Wong (1982) argue that wage rate determination is far more likely to be based upon 
highest certifcate held rather than years of education. 
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ordinary least squares.8 The results of estimating the wage rate functions are 
shown in Table 5.5. 
From Table 5.5 we can see that most of the variables are significant in 
determining wage rates for employees. The coefficients in the log-linear 
regression can be interpreted as rates of return to a variable. Where the variables 
are significant in determining wage rates there are marked differences in the 
magnitude of returns between worker types. 
Being married, or being a divorcee or widower, rather than being single 
has a positive significant effect on wage rates for both worker types. The regional 
dummy variables all have a negative impact upon wage rates where significant, 
with the exception of Greater London residence which has a positive effect. The 
South East dummy is omitted as the reference category and so this pattern of signs 
is unsurprising and reflects the higher cost of living, higher labour demand and 
resultant higher wages in London. 
Union or Staff Association membership has a positive significant 
influence on wage rates of employees; increasing wage rates by approximately 
I 0% above the wage rate of a non-union member. There is no such significant 
effect on the wages of the self-employed. Membership to a union or staff 
association gives the employee benefits in the wage negotiation process which a 
non-members would not enjoy. However, Layard et a/ (1991) show that some 
non-members do gain because their wages are covered by union agreements; since 
coverage is not indicated by the union membership dummy variable, the 
coefficient on this variable will be an underestimate of the actual effect of unions 
upon wage rates. 
Occupational classification indicated by the dummy variables for 
professional and management and skilled/semi-skilled/farm manual jobs, as we 
would expect, has a significant effect on the wage rates for employees. 
Professional and management jobs in relation to middle skill clerical jobs increase 
wage rates of the self-employed by approximately 44% and the wage rates of 
8 It may be argued that the simple Mincerian is a mis-specification of the wage rate formula in 
comparison to the detailed model including certification dummies, and that the lambda terms are 
only significant because the omitted certification and regional effects are entering the formulation in 
a non-linear form. 
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employees by approximately 16%. Skilled/semi-skilled/farm manual jobs in 
comparison to middle skill jobs decrease wages by approximately 16% for 
employees, whereas the effect is insignificant in the determination of self-
employed wages. 
If ethnic origin is significant in determining wage rates of employees then 
we would expect significant coefficients on the racial origin dummy variables 
included in the regressions. Moreover, we would expect under the assumption of 
race-bias occurring in UK employment that the two 'non-white' dummies to have a 
negative effect on earnings in comparison to the White/European reference 
category. In contrast all races may operate in the same 'market' if self-employed, 
in that their wages are not affected by employer biases and we expect no 
significance in the coefficients of the race dummies for this worker type. 
However it may be the case that 'non-whites' are affected by race-bias within the 
banking system from which they receive loans and from potential customers. 
Both African and Asian/Chinese racial origin are significant m 
determining wage rates for male full-time employees. The negative impact upon 
log-wages in this case may stem from employer-bias for employees, but in 
addition motivation and information levels may be lower for this minority group. 
A possible source of bias for the self-employed could result from the behaviour of 
the providers of finance towards such individuals. However, we must note that 
the response rate in the BSA Survey to questions concerning racial origin was 
poor, and so there may be bias in the estimation of coefficients for these variables 
due to the responses not matching population proportions. 
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Table 5.5: Estimated Wage Rate Functions for Male Full-timers by Worker Type 
Self Employed 
(N=956) 
Employees 
(N~435) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.216 3.142* 0.144 7.869* 
Divorced I widowed 0.292 2.553* 0.072 2.250* 
Private Education 0.009 0.135 0.040 2.024* 
Recent Unemployment -0.175 -3.188* -0.135 -8.810* 
East Anglia -0.041 -0.330 -0.113 -3.468* 
East Midlands -0.199 -2.110* -0.101 -3.709* 
London 0.087 0.978 0.102 4.320* 
North East -0.309 -2.265* -0.090 -2.994* 
N. Ireland -0.392 -4.719* -0.188 -7.009* 
North West -0.139 -1.472 -0.161 -6.881* 
Scotland -0.231 -2.448* -0.077 -3.063* 
South West -0.221 -2.692* -0.158 -6.245* 
Wales -0.379 -3.463* -0.159 -4.858* 
West Midlands -0.003 0.095 -0.108 -4.443* 
Yorks/Humberside -0.296 -3.251* -0.108 -4.490* 
Union membership -0.060 -0.786 0.103 8.403* 
Prof. + Management 0.436 6.737* 0.160 9.088* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm -0.146 -0.763 -0.155 -9.273* 
Manual 
African -0.034 -0.146 -0.118 -1.825** 
Asian/Chinese -0.240 -1.290 -0.255 -4.536* 
Unclassified R.O. 0.171 1.385 -0.034 -0.864 
Degree 0.291 2.976* 0.450 17.735* 
Nursing 0.414 0.635 0.152 1.749** 
Teaching -0.129 -0.437 0.273 4.843* 
Other Ac.Nocational -0.364 -1.349 0.222 4.123* 
HND 0.207 1.631 0.335 11.567* 
Other Trade/Business 0.246 2.647* 0.302 11.728* 
Apprenticeship 0.229 3.528* 0.176 8.706* 
A-Levels 0.089 1.255 0.228 10.223* 
0-Levels 0.168 2.374* 0.137 6.869* 
CSE's 0.215 1.541 0.111 3.178* 
Years in Labour Force 0.013 I. 753** 0.030 14.326* 
YILF2 -0.00032 -2.620* -0.00054 -13.707* 
1985 -0.589 -6.458* -0.522 -22.028* 
1986 -0.259 -3.430* -0.412 -20.042* 
1987 -0.323 -4.313* -0.350 -16.572* 
1989 0.025 0.229 -0.224 -6.177* 
1990 -0.053 -0.811 -0.089 -4.492* 
Constant 1.106 6.856* 1.286 25.955* 
R2 Adjusted 0.229 0.480 
Variance of Estimate 0.412 0.150 
Mean In w 1.357 1.543 
Notes. • s1gruficant at 5% level, •• s•grnficant at I 0% level. 
The year dummy variables are all significant in the determination of wage 
rates of employees and those representing 1985-87 are significant in the 
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determination of wage rates for the self-employed. The reference variable in this 
case is the dummy variable for 1991 representing whether the observations of the 
other variables were made in the 1991 survey. Since the dependant variable is 
based upon nominal earnings in each year we would therefore expect a strong 
correlation between the size of the estimated coefficients on these dummy 
variables and the actual national inflation rate in the corresponding year. This is 
in fact the case, with the correlation coefficient between national inflation (with 
base 1991=100) and the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables 
representing 1985-90 for employees calculated as 0.986, implying that the wage 
rate becomes higher as inflation becomes higher in relation to the inflation rate in 
1991. Similar correlations can be found between the size of the estimated 
coefficients on the year dummy variables and national and male unemployment 
rates, the correlation coefficients being -0.933 and -0.922 respectively. This 
implies that as unemployment decreases the coefficients on the dummy variables 
representing 1985-90 become less negative and so wage rates increase towards the 
1991 level. These three correlations are significant at the 5% significance level or 
better in a one-tail t-test. 
A Chow test to see if the coefficients in the two regressiOns are 
significantly different gives a calculated F-statistic of 6.27 which is significant at 
the 1% significance level. We can reject the hypothesis that the two estimated 
functions do not differ significantly; the employee and self-employed sub-samples 
have significantly different wage functions. 
5.7.2 Hypothesis 1 and Actual Results 
From the adjusted R-squared measure we can see that the self-employed group 
(unscreened workers) do not fit the model as well as the employees (screened) 
group (also see Model Comparison summary results Table 5.2). The result of a 
weaker fit of the estimated earnings function to the self-employed is consistent 
with the findings ofRiley (1979a), Fredland & Little (1981), and Tucker (1985), 
and the idea that the self-employed are generally less screened than employees. 
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5.7.3 Hypothesis 2 and Actual Results 
All of the highest certification dummy variables are significant in determining 
male full-time employees' wage rates. If we rearrange the order of highest 
certification dummy variables into order of magnitude of return rather than 
educational stage obtained, we get the ranking of importance for male full time 
employees shown in Table 5.6. For example the addition to a male full-time 
employee's wage rate made by holding a degree or equivalent certificate as the 
highest qualification held in comparison to having no formal qualifications is an 
increase of approximately 45%. 
Table 5.6 : Ranking of Returns from Certificates to Male Full-time Employees 
Employees 
Certificate Estimated 
Return 
Degree 0.450 
HND 0.335 
Other Trade/Business 0.302 
Teachine 0.273 
A-Levels 0.228 
Other Ac.Nocational 0.222 
Apprenticeship 0.176 
Nursing 0.152 
0-Levels 0.137 
CSE's 0.111 
Moreover, we can test the significance of differences in returns to each 
highest certificate. The return to degree level certification as the highest held was 
found to be significantly higher than any of the other HQD's in comparison to 
having no qualifications. HND qualification was found to be insignificantly 
different in its effect upon wage rates in comparison to teaching and 
trade/business qualifications, but significantly higher than the lower ranked 
qualifications in Table 5.6. The return to teaching qualifications was found to be 
significantly higher than that estimated for apprenticeship qualifications and those 
ranked below. Nursing,· 0-levels, and CSE's were found to be insignificantly 
different in their positive effects upon wage rates of full-time male employees. 
Table 5.7 presents similar ranking of HQD's for the self-employed. 
Looking at the coefficients on the qualification dummy variables in the estimated 
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earnings function for self-employed males, we see that only the degree, 
trade/business, apprenticeship and 0-levels dummy variables had a significant 
influence on the wages of the self-employed, compared to all the certificate 
dummy variables significantly affecting employee wage rates. From tests for 
significant differences in returns to the four HQD's that influence self-employed 
workers' wages it was found that they are all equivalent in their positive effect 
upon the wage rates of the full-time male self-employed in the sample. 
The significantly higher returns from all the highest certification dummies 
to employees except for 0-levels and apprenticeships may be attributed to the 
signalling role that these certificates have in the market for employees. The 
insignificant difference in returns to 0-levels may be due to the lender-screening 
caveat previously mentioned in Section 5.2. It is possible that banks require a 
minimum level of education (certification) from self-employed workers applying 
for finance for their business plans, and this could be 0-level standard 
certification. 
Table 5. 7 : Ranking of Returns from Certificates to Male Full-time Self-employed 
Self-employed 
Certificate Estimated 
Return 
De~ree 0.291 
Other Trade/Business 0.246 
Apprenticeship 0.229 
0-Levels 0.168 
Nursing insignificant 
Teaching insignificant 
Other Ac.Nocational insignificant 
HND insignificant 
A-Levels insignificant 
CSE's insignificant 
However, conversations with a number of local retail bank branches who 
are lenders to new businesses suggest that this caveat is weak. Business bankers 
confirmed that although previous experience, account records and a detailed 
business plan are used to screen applicants for start-up loans, there is no explicit 
minimum educational requirement that applicants had to meet. 9 There may be 
9 Barclays Bank, Midland Bank, National Westminster, Lloyds Bank, and TSB Business Centre 
Loughborough. 
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some correlation between the drawing-up of a sound business plan that will pass 
lender-screening and certain qualifications, and so there may be hidden 
educational screening occurring. Indeed the returns to the more vocational 
certificates; trade/business and apprenticeship qualifications may well be due to 
this correlation as well as returns to human capital. 
A further explanation stems from the relaxation of the assumption that 
both worker types benefit, in terms of human capital, equally from courses. It is 
reasonable to think that some courses will be more useful than others to the self-
employed in terms of skills that will be needed to run ones own business. It may 
be that apprenticeships and 0-levels impart such specific self-employment skills 
whereas other courses do not impart any additional useful skills. However, 
neither explanation explains why there are insignificant returns to some post- 0-
level certificates. 
The return to private schooling is insignificant for the self-employed but 
equal to approximately 4% for employees; so in terms of quality of education we 
can reject the null hypothesis. Educational quality as proxied by the private 
education dummy does appear to have significantly different effects on wage rates 
by worker type, and so there appears to be a difference in the returns to schooling 
quality between worker type. Although self-employed workers appear to gain 
nothing in terms of increased income from attending private schools, the 
proportion of self-employed BSA Survey respondents attending private school 
differs significantly from that of employees (15% of the self-employed compared 
to 11% of employees). 
We must however note that the private schooling dummy derived from the 
BSA Survey questionnaire (showing private schooling at junior or secondary 
education levels) may not be a good proxy of education quality. With the 
introduction ofleague tables for schools with detailed statistics relating to quality, 
future researchers may have better resources from which to construct an accurate 
schooling-quality variable. 
In general these results can be taken as evidence in support of the weak 
screening hypothesis, both in terms of educational certification and quality, and 
we can therefore reject the null of Hypothesis 2. 
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5. 7.4 Hypothesis 3 and Actual Results 
There are a number of reasons why unemployment incidence may have an effect 
on wage rates in both a screening or human capital framework. The first factor 
which stems from human capital theory is that some de-skilling occurs in that 
individuals forget useful skills and ability may be eroded, secondly from a 
psychological perspective an individual may lack motivation as unemployment 
time increases. 
Thirdly in an infonnational model unemployment history may effect 
wages in a similar way to the effects of educational achievement. Ma & Weiss 
(1993) for example develop a signalling theory of unemployment in which 
employment at an unskilled job serves as a 'bad' signal to finns hiring skilled 
labour, thus unemployment may in fact be have a positive signalling effect in the 
detennination of wage rates through its job-allocation effects in the market for 
skilled labour. Alternatively, Greenwald (1986) develops an adverse selection 
model in which potential employers expect that applicants from the 
unemployment pool are of lower ability than those who are wishing to change the 
job they are currently doing. In this model we would expect unemployment to 
have a negative effect on wage rates since those with an unemployment record 
may find they cannot attain a highly paid high skill job as they have been 'marked 
down' by employers. 
From Table 5.5 we can see that having been unemployed in the previous 
five years has a significant negative impact on the wage rates of both worker 
types. However, the difference in the impact of the dummy variable, representing 
unemployment in the past five years, between worker types is contrary to 
expectations. Assuming unemployment has a 'marking' effect we would expect a 
larger negative coefficient for the male employee group; however, from Table 5.5, 
we can see that the male full-time self-employed have a coefficient on the dummy 
variable of approximately -0.175, and employees have a coefficient of -0.135. 
A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test involving estimating a wage rate 
function for a pooled sample of full-time male workers, with a dummy variable 
5.30 
representing that the BSA Survey respondent is self-employed and a dummy 
variable representing the respondent is self-employed with recent unemployment, 
indicated that there was no significant interaction between worker type and recent 
unemployment. On this basis we cannot reject the null in Hypothesis 3, that the 
impact of recent unemployment is not significantly different across worker-types. 
It appears that the assumption that the potential negative motivation and de-
skilling effects are the same for both worker types and that a differential would 
occur due to employers' screening by unemployment history is incorrect. 
We can look at the impact of unemployment upon wages more closely by 
the use of an alternative measure of unemployment. In the regression results 
shown in Table 5.8 the recent unemployment dummy variable has been replaced 
by a continuous variable which measures the total months of unemployment 
experienced by the worker in the previous five years before the survey year in 
which they were questioned. Previous inclusion of this continuous variable for 
recent unemployment was not conducted because of the reduced coverage of the 
self-employed sample from 1985-91 with the dummy variable to I 985-87 with the 
continuous variable. The months of recent unemployment variable is denoted as 
MRU in Table 5.8. 
From Table 5.8 we can see, from the estimated coefficient on the MRU 
variable, that the negative impact of each month of total unemployment in the 
previous five years for the male full-time self-employed worker is similar to that 
for the male full-time employee; approximately 3% lower wage rates compared to 
2% lower wage rates. Thus it is not only the event of unemployment in the last 
five years that has a negative impact upon wages, it is also the duration of that 
unemployment. For example, a self-employed man who has been unemployed for 
a total of ten months in the previous five years would have an approximately 30% 
lower wage rate than if he had experienced no unemployment in the previous five 
years. 
The months of recent unemployment variable does not show consecutive 
months of recent unemployment, rather it is the sum of all episodes of 
unemployment over the past five years; unfortunately this means that the 
inclusion of a square of this variable in the regression to observe the marginal rate 
5.31 
of decline of wage rates would be misleading. A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable 
test showed that there was no significant difference between worker types in the 
average rate of decline of wages due to months of recent unemployment. 
Table 5.8: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-timers including Months 
of Recent Unemployment 1985-87 by Worker Type 
Self-employed Employees 
(N =355) (N=I987) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years in Labour Force 0.025 2.160* 0.032 9.766* 
YJLF2 -0.451E-3 -2.361* -0.557E-3 -9.162* 
Degree 0.449E-2 0.026 0.321 8.319* 
Nursinl! -- -- -0.030 -0.259 
Teaching 0.229 0.473 0.163 1.697** 
Other Ac.Nocational -0.456 -1.137 0.051 0.642 
HND 0.020 0.097 0.248 5.495* 
Other Trade/Business 0.250 1.674** 0.242 6.051* 
Apprenticeship 0.134 1.191 0.144 4.454* 
A-Levels -0.033 -0.263 0.122 3.501* 
0-Levels 0.091 0.763 0.095 3.113* 
CSE's 0.466 2.098* 0.106 2.016* 
Married 0.230 1.825** 0.123 4.193* 
Divorced I widowed 0.373 I. 758** 0.104 1.985* 
Private Education 0.054 0.517 0.034 1.138 
MRU -0.030 -2.156* -0.018 -4.856* 
East Anglia -0.134 0.484 -0.090 -1.983* 
East Midlands -0.204 0.144 -0.103 -2.646* 
London 0.117 0.393 0.086 2.548* 
North East -0.200 0.365 -0.120 -2.605* 
North West -0.135 0.321 -0.125 -3.637* 
Scotland -0.307 -2.039* -0.064 -1.748** 
South West -0.211 -1.498 -0.159 -4.293* 
Wales -0.312 -1.919** -0.170 -3.572* 
West Midlands 0.100 0.627 -0.102 -2.890* 
Yorks./Humbenide -0.354 -2.396* -0.111 -3.070* 
Union membership 0.048 0.391 0.137 7.192* 
Prof. + Manaj!ement 0.363 3.326* 0.192 6.912* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm 0.219 0.449 -0.179 -6.803* 
Manual 
1985 -0.211 -2.133* -0.176 -7.269* 
1986 0.081 0.967 -0.071 -3.408* 
Constant 0.768 4.383* 0.902 18.322* 
R2 Adjusted 0.144 0.397 
Variance of Estimate 0.439 0.161 
Mean In w 1.204 1.379 
Notes: • s1gruficant at the 5% level or better, ** s1gmficant at the I 0% level, 
'--' denotes where a variable was not available for that sub-sample. 
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5.7.5 Hypothesis 4 and Actual Results 
Following the reasoning of Oosterbeek (1992) it is hypothesised that the return to 
years of education differs between those with some formal qualifications and 
those with no formal qualifications. In a human capital framework, years of study 
will have positive effects on wages regardless the qualifications obtained, 
however under Oosterbeek's screening model we would expect that the longer a 
person spends in study without gaining any qualifications the more this is seen as 
a signal oflow ability. 
If we focus on the workers detailed in the BSA Survey sample who are 
reported to have no formal qualifications we can produce distribution tables for 
education by region and by occupational class. From Table 5.9 we can see that 
Northern Ireland and Wales have the highest levels of unqualified workers, 
whereas Scotland and the South East (excluding London) have a more qualified 
workforce; this may be due in part to migration of qualified workers from 
Northern Ireland and Wales in search of work and the different educational 
systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
From Table 5.8 we can see a general pattern to the occupation-
qualification distribution; the higher the skill level associated with an occupation 
the less likely it is that an unqualified individual will be working in that particular 
occupation. This can be interpreted as support for either the human capital theory 
of education and/or the screening theory of education. In the human capital 
model the qualifications are a result of a course which has imparted the necessary 
skills onto the individual in the high level occupation, skills that are not needed 
for work in lower level occupations. In the screening model the qualifications are 
needed to signal to employers that the individual possesses the skills needed for 
work in the higher level job, skills which have (have not) been augmented by the 
course in the weak (strong) hypothesis, and only individuals with those 
qualifications will be accepted for the higher level occupations. 
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Table 5.9: Regional Distribution of Unqualified Male Full-time Workers 
Total Number Percentage of Total 
Region Number Unqualified Unqualified 
East Anglia 207 64 31 
East Midlands 346 110 32 
London 510 144 28 
North East 245 65 27 
Northern Ireland 646 223 35 
North West 488 125 26 
Scotland 408 94 23 
South East 1030 253 25 
South West 433 Ill 26 
Wales 217 71 33 
West Midlands 434 135 31 
Yorks. & Humberside 460 129 28 
National Total 5418 1524 28 
Notes: Calculated from BSA Survey sample. 
Table 5.10: Occupational Distribution of Unqualified Male Full-time Workers 
Goldthorpe- Heath Occupational Total Number Percentage of Total 
Classification Number Unqualified Unqualified 
High Level Prof. & Management 971 52 5 
Low Level Prof. & Management 939 101 11 
Routine Office 326 51 16 
Sales I personal 44 11 25 
Small p-b with employees 259 80 31 
Small P:b without employees 394 !50 38 
Farmers 100 64 64 
Manual foreman etc. 430 !51 35 
Skilled manual 860 269 31 
Semi-skilled I unskilled manual 979 549 56 
Agricultural employees 36 24 67 
Total 5418 1524 28 
Notes: Calculated from BSA Survey sample. 
Following Oosterbeek (1992), under Hypothesis 4, we would expect that 
the return to years of education for employees with no formal qualifications 
would be significantly different in comparison to the returns to qualified 
employees, due to the signalling effects of years of education coupled with no 
qualifications. We test this hypothesis by constructing a sample of employees 
who have no formal qualifications, estimating their wage function and comparing 
it to the estimated wage function of qualified employees. The estimated wage 
functions for unqualified and qualified full-time male employees are shown in 
Table 5.11. 
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We can see from Table 5.11 that the return to years of education for male 
full-time employees with no qualifications is insignificant. Furthermore, the 
estimated wage equation has a significantly lower R-squared than the estimated 
equation for qualified employees, indicating that this wage function is inaccurate 
in explaining the a large proportion of the variation of wage rates calculated for 
male employees with no formal qualifications in the BSA Survey subsample. We 
can also see from Table 5.11 that unqualified workers earn a lower average wage 
than qualified workers, and that in comparison to Table 5.5, most other 
coefficients are similar between the qualified employees subsample and the larger 
sample for all employees.IO 
In the weak screening hypothesis we would expect the return to years of 
education for employees without qualifications in comparison to the return for 
those with qualifications, to be smaller, negative or insignificant, if years of 
education enhances productivity but gives a negative signal when coupled with 
the absence of certificates, and larger if years of education enhance productivity 
and are increasingly relied by employers upon as a basis on which decide pay in 
the absence of other signals. From the results in Table 5.9 it appears that years of 
education may have a negative signalling effect which cancels out positive 
productivity effects leading to an insignificant total effect upon the wages of 
employees with no formal qualifications. 
A Chow test to test that the two sets of estimated coefficients in the 
regressions shown in Table 5.11 are significantly different gives a calculated F-
statistic of 5. 87 which is significant at the 1% level. This implies that wage rates 
of the qualified and unqualified employees are determined by significantly 
different functions and the groups may therefore operate in different labour 
markets. 
IO This result is also consistent with dual labour market theory. 
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Table 5.11: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Full-time Male Employees by 
Education 
Unqualified Employees 
IN= l214) 
Qualified Employees 
IN= 324in 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years in Labour Force 0.025 5.755* 0.034 13.717* 
YILF2 -0.454E-3 -6.181* -0.623E-3 -12.184* 
Years in Education -0.019 -0.894 0.045 11.169* 
Married 0.169 4.550* 0.133 6.254* 
Divorced I widowed 0.097 1.715** 0.065 1.655** 
Private Education 0.895E-2 0.165 0.048 2.249* 
Recent Unemployment -0.154 -5.076* -0.129 -7.207* 
East Anglia -0.157 -2.641* -0.083 -2.137* 
East Midlands -0.054 -1.115 -0.116 -3.540* 
London 0.148 3.223* 0.077 2.795* 
North East 0.023 0.396 -0.123 -3.533* 
N. Ireland -0.258 -4.963* -0.160 -5.099* 
North West -0.108 -2.269* -0.175 -6.491* 
Scotland -0.086 -1.680** -0.072 -2.518* 
South West -0.142 -2.800* -0.161 -5.558* 
Wales -0.202 -3.445* -0.137 -3.454* 
West Midlands -0.063 -1.393 -0.127 -4.375* 
Yorks.lllumberside -0.025 -0.551 -0.131 -4.606* 
Union membership 0.128 5.353* 0.082 5.726* 
Prof + Management 0.141 3.409* 0.177 9.127* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm -0.151 -5.208* -0.169 -8.414* 
Manual 
African 0.179E-2 0.017 -0.196 -2.281* 
Asian/Chinese -0.116 -1.051 -0.320 -4.866* 
Unclassified R.O. 0.105 1.446 -0.099 -2. I 22* 
1985 -0.457 -9.833* -0.514 -18.439* 
1986 -0.339 -8.335* -0.432 -18.037* 
1987 -0.232 -5.441* -0.391 -16.059* 
1989 -0.094 -1.388 -0.260 -6.013* 
1990 -0.021 -0.507 -0.079 -3.463* 
Constant 1.387 3.938* 0.784 8.695* 
R2 Adjusted 0.271 0.479 
Variance ofEstimate 0.146 0.152 
Mean In w 1.305 1.634 
Notes: • Signtficant at 5% level, •• at 10% level, observatiOns mclude Armed Forces employees. 
5.7.6 Hypothesis 5 and Actual Results 
Years in the labour force, which may be interpreted as a proxy for potential 
experience and therefore 'general' human capital, has a positive effect on the wage 
rates for both worker types. II The years in the labour force squared term indicates 
ll Years in the labour force must be regarded as 'potential' labour market experience since 
unemployment may have occured which is not controlled for by the dummy variable representing 
unemployment in the last five years. 
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that as the return to experience increases at a decreasing rate as expenence 
increases. From Table 5.5 we can see that the curvature of the Mincerian age-
earnings profile is more pronounced for employees; coefficient is -0.54E-3 m 
comparison to -0.32E-3 for the self-employed. 
We can reject the null hypothesis 5. The return to years in the labour force 
is higher for male full-time employees in comparison to the self-employed male 
full-time workers in the Mincerian model; 3% per year compared to 1% per year. 
This may reflect the structure of employees wage contracts in reference to age or 
tenure within UK companies which is not apparent for the self-employed. It may 
also be partly due to some form of signalling return (i.e. a return to the 
information carried by age) with the differential between worker types reflecting 
the lack of such informational return to the self-employed. However, since we 
have not controlled for tenure in the earnings function estimate, and no such 
variable is available in the BSA Survey data, we cannot separate these two effects. 
Thus as far as the informational aspect of experience is concerned the evidence is 
inconclusive. As far as the human capital aspect of experience is concerned, 
since we have significant positive returns to both worker types, we can conclude 
that experience does enhance productivity and therefore earnings. 
5.7.7 Hypothesis 6 and Actual Results 
From Table 5.5 we can see that being a professional worker has a significant 
positive influence on the log-wages of the self-employed and employees. There 
has been much debate over the possibility that professional workers, especially 
self-employed professionals, may bias the returns to educational variables 
upwards and therefore invalidate the results of comparative studies of the 
screening hypothesis. 
Lazear (1977) presented a caveat to be applied to comparative studies of 
the screening hypothesis, that professional self-employed workers may invest in 
education (certification) beyond human capital needs because they may deal with 
customers who use certification as a signal of service quality. It is equally 
possible that professional employees may invest beyond human capital and 
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employer-screening needs because of such consumer screening. We can test for 
the impact of such consumer-screening by estimating wage rate functions with 
and without the inclusion of professionals included and comparing the results. If 
the coefficients of educational variables change significantly with the exclusion of 
professionals from the data set we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
From Tables 5.12 and 5.13 we can see that the returns to years of 
educational certificates for both worker types does not appear to alter significantly 
when professionals are omitted from the regressions. Returns to certification are 
not significantly different between non-professional employees and all employees. 
From Table 5.11 we can see that the return to a degree level qualification as the 
highest qualification held by a non-professional self-employed worker is 
insignificant whereas it is significant in the regression for all self-employed. 
There may be some interaction between professionalism and degree level 
certification. 
Thus there is no firm evidence here to suggest that professionalism does 
effect the returns to education because of consumer-screening. Indeed Tucker 
(1987) presents an explicit test of Lazear's hypothesis and rejects the notion of 
consumer-screening. A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test involving estimating 
a wage rate for both types of workers including dummy variable interactive terms 
for interaction between professionalism and qualification level gave the result that 
only the returns to teaching qualifications were increased by professionalism for 
both worker types, and that the returns to 0-levels were decreased significantly 
for self-employed professionals. 
These results do not contradict the conclusions already derived in this 
Chapter. Although the return to teaching qualifications is inflated by the inclusion 
of professionals it remains insignificant in the determination of self-employed 
wage rates, and although the returns to 0-levels are decreased by the inclusion of 
professionals they remain significant for the self-employed. 
5.38 
Table 5.12 : Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-time Employees 
Non- professionals All Employees 
(N = 4071) (N=443Sl 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.142 7.429* 0.144 7.869* 
Divorced I widowed 0.074 2.245* 0.072 2.250* 
Private Education 0.037 1.768** 0.040 2.024* 
Recent Unemployment -0.133 -8.425* -0.135 -8.810* 
East Anglia -0.105 -3.109* -0.113 -3.468* 
East Midlands -0.090 -3.212* -0.101 -3.709* 
London 0.111 4.481* 0.102 4.320* 
North East -0.086 -2.791* -0.090 -2.994* 
N. Ireland -0.204 -7.308* -0.188 -7.009* 
North West -0.157 -6.456* -0.161 -6.881* 
Scotland -0.079 -2.931* -0.077 -3.063* 
South West -0.156 -5.942* -0.158 -6.245* 
Wales -0.156 -4.612* -0.159 -4.858* 
West Midlands -0.107 -4.200* -0.108 -4.443* 
Yorks.lllumberside -0.102 -3.995* -0.108 -4.490* 
Union membership 0.109 8.536* 0.103 8.403* 
Prof. + Management 0.159 8.769* 0.160 9.088* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm -0.156 -9.319* -0.155 -9.273* 
Manual 
African -0.107 -1.630* -0.118 -1.825** 
Asian/Chinese -0.261 -4.386* -0.255 -4.536* 
Unclassified R.O. -0.012 -0.292 -0.034 -0.864 
De2ree 0.432 15.252* 0.450 17.735* 
Nursinl( 0.151 1.743* 0.152 1.749** 
Teaching 0.266 4.667* 0.273 4.843* 
Other Ac.Nocational 0.199 3.559* 0.222 4.123* 
HND 0.335 10.518* 0.335 11.567* 
Other Trade/Business 0.293 10.973* 0.302 11.728* 
Apprenticeship 0.175 8.599* 0.176 8.706* 
A-Levels 0.234 10.280* 0.228 10.223* 
0-Levels 0.134 6.652* 0.137 6.869* 
CSE's 0.107 3.067* 0.111 3.178* 
Years in Labour Force 0.030 13.616* 0.030 14.326* 
YILF2 -0.538E-3 -13.137* -0.544E-3 -13.707* 
1985 -0.524 -21.250* -0.522 -22.028* 
1986 -0.405 -18.890* -0.412 -20.042* 
1987 -0.347 -15.718* -0.350 -16.572* 
1989 -0.202 -5.429* -0.224 -6.177* 
1990 -0.085 -4.121* -0.089 -4.492* 
Constant 1.262 24.740* 1.286 25.955* 
R2 Adjusted 0.465 0.480 
Variance of Estimate 0.150 0.150 
Mean In w 1.508 1.543 
Notes: • S1gmficant at 5% level, •• S1gmficant at I 0% level. 
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Table 5.13: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Full-time Self-employed Males 
Non-professionals All Self-employed 
(N= 854) (N=95(i) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.208 2.907* 0.216 3.142* 
Divorced I widowed 0.338 2.780* 0.292 2.553* 
Private Education 0.030 0.412 0.009 0.135 
Recent Unemployment -0.167 -2.993* -0.175 -3.188* 
East Anglia -0.030 -0.240 -0.041 -0.330 
East Midlands -0.181 -1.885** -0.199 -2.110* 
London 0.124 1.316 0.087 0.978 
North East -0.255 -1.804** -0.309 -2.265* 
N. Ireland -0.388 -4.480* -0.392 -4.719* 
North West -0.096 -0.981 -0.139 -1.472 
Scotland -0.233 -2.275* -0.231 -2.448* 
South West -0.231 -2.649** -0.221 -2.692* 
Wales -0.391 -3.378* -0.379 -3.463* 
West Midlands 0.024 0.246 -0.003 0.095 
Yorks./Humberside -0.257 -2.668* -0.296 -3.251* 
Union membership -0.154 -1.829** -0.060 -0.786 
Prof. + Manaeement 0.366 4.672* 0.436 6.737* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm -0.165 -0.869 -0.146 -0.763 
Manual 
African 0.146 0.584 -0.034 -0.146 
Asian/Chinese -0.321 -1.596 -0.240 -1.290 
Unclassified R.O. 0.188 1.456 0.171 1.385 
Deeree -0.085 -0.660 0.291 2.976* 
Nursine 0.489 0.754 0.414 0.635 
Teaching -0.343 -1.054 -0.129 -0.437 
Other Ac.Nocational -0.327 -1.215 -0.364 -1.349 
HND 0.231 1.642 0.207 1.631 
Other Trade/Business 0.231 2.268* 0.246 2.647* 
Apprenticeship 0.235 3.601* 0.229 3.528* 
A-Levels 0.124 1.703** 0.089 1.255 
0-Levels 0.185 2.591* 0.168 2.374* 
CSE's 0.214 1.542 0.215 1.541 
Years in Labour Force 0.014 1.920** 0.013 1.753** 
YILF2 -0.353E-3 -2.803* -0.32E-3 -2.620* 
1985 -0.575 -5.887* -0.589 -6.458* 
1986 -0.221 -2.726* -0.259 -3.430* 
1987 -0.307 -3.909* -0.323 -4.313* 
1989 0.051 0.448 0.025 0.229 
1990 -0.035 -0.518 -0.053 -0.811 
Constant 1.053 6.275* 1.106 6.856* 
R2 Adjusted 0.172 0.229 
Variance of Estimate 0.403 0.412 
Meanlnw 1.282 1.357 
Notes. • S1gmficant at 5% level, ** S1gmficant at I 0% level. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
Following the methodology of Wolpin (1977), Katz & Zidennan (1980), and 
Cohn et a/ (1987) wage rate functions were estimated for self-employed and 
employees in the BSA Survey sample. Significant differences were found in the 
effects of years of education, years of experience, private education and highest 
certification levels upon wage rates by worker type. 
Both the simple OLS and the two-stage Heckit results are taken as support 
for the weak screening hypothesis. The result of a weaker fit of the estimated 
function to the self-employed sample is consistent with the findings of Riley 
(1979a), Fredland & Little (1981) and Tucker (1985) and supports the hypothesis 
that education is used as signal of ability by employees. The effect of years of 
schooling was positive and significant for both worker types, but the estimated 
return was higher for employees in comparison to the self-employed. All the 
certificate dummy variables were found to significantly increase wage rates of 
employees, whereas only degree level, trade and business, apprenticeships and 0-
level certification were found to significantly effect the wage rates earned by the 
self-employed. The effect of private schooling was positive and significant for 
employees but not for the self-employed. These results were taken as evidence in 
support of the weak but not the strong screening hypothesis, since under the 
strong screening hypothesis we would expect no significant education effects for 
the unscreened group (the self-employed). 
Years of education was found to have no significant influence on the wage 
rates of unqualified male employees. Unqualified and qualified employees were 
found to have significantly different estimated wage rate functions. In light of 
this, two tentative conclusions are as follows: Firstly it may be that it is 
certificates rather than years of education that act as a screen in the labour market 
and that years of education has no productivity augmenting role; or secondly, that 
increased years of education have such a strong negative signalling effect upon 
the wage rates of unqualified employees that it outweighs their positive 
productivity augmentation effects. 
The effect of recent unemployment was found not to differ significantly 
between worker types, and so the hypothesis that unemployment incidence had a 
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role as a screen was rejected. The effect of years in the labour force was found to 
differ significantly between work types; this may be due to the wage-tenure 
structure inherent in employee pay schemes, but may also be because experience 
plays a role as a signal of ability in the labour market. It was also found that 
omitting professionals does not contradict the conclusions already derived in this 
Chapter, supporting Tucker (1987) who finds no evidence of the consumer-
screening of professionals. 
Overall, from this methodology, we have found strong evidence that weak 
screening occurs in the UK labour market for male full-timers. There is little 
evidence in favour of the strong screening hypothesis since education is found to 
have significant effects on the wage rates of the self-employed. 
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Appendix 5.1: Additional Results 
Table 5.14 shows the results of estimating detailed Mincerian wage rate functions 
for the BSA Survey male full-time employee and self-employed samples. The 
results of Section 5.7 are generally confirmed by these estimated equations; the 
estimated wage rate function for the self-employed appears to fit the data less 
accurately than that for employees, and the returns to education and years of 
experience differ significantly between worker types. 
Table 5.14: Estimated Mincerian Equations for Male Full-timers by Worker Type 
Self-employed Employees 
(N~956) (N ~ 4435) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Married 0.234 3.402* 0.142 7.647* 
Divorced I widowed 0.332 2.903* 0.066 2.016* 
Private Education 0.013 0.202 0.044 2.181* 
Recent Unemployment -0.178 -3.263* -0.134 -8.590* 
East Anglia 0.009 0.069 -0.121 -3.640* 
East Midlands -0.170 -1.795** -0.112 -4.016* 
London 0.095 1.066 0.084 3.492* 
North East -0.280 -2.059* -0.081 -2.662* 
N. Ireland -0.419 -5.051* -0.211 -7.741* 
North West -0.129 -1.365 -0.163 -6.865* 
Scotland -0.204 -2.164* -0.082 -3.211* 
South West -0.185 -2.258* -0.157 -6.116* 
Wales -0.358 -3.268* -0.171 -5.119* 
West Mids. 0.010 0.104 -0.118 -4.749* 
Yorks./Humberside -0.275 -3.027* -0.106 -4.305* 
Union -0.047 -0.607 0.105 8.442* 
Prof. + Management 0.457 7.282* 0.196 11.127* 
Skilled/Semi-skilled /Farm -0.136 -0.708 -0.183 -11.026* 
Manual 
African -0.028 -0.122 -0.155 -2.344* 
Asian/Chinese -0.270 -1.444 -0.260 -4.543* 
Unclassified R.O. 0.195 1.570 -0.027 -0.689 
Years of education 0.027 1.919** 0.052 13.796* 
Years in Labour Force 0.011 1.607 0.030 14.205* 
YILF2 -0.00032 -2.583* -0.00053 -13.423* 
1985 -0.609 -6.691* -0.508 -20.969* 
1986 -0.273 -3.604* -0.420 -20.064* 
1987 -0.343 -4.582* -0.360 -16.753* 
1989 0.029 0.267 -0.216 -5.858* 
1990 -O.D41 -0.626 -0.072 -3.544* 
Constant 0.771 2.773* 0.583 7.116* 
R2 Adjusted 0.219 0.461 
Variance of Estimate 0.417 0.156 
Mean In w 1.357 1.543 
Notes: * Slgruficant at 5% level, ** stgruficant at I 0% level. 
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In terms of years of education the self-employed have wage rates increased 
by approximately 3% compared to approximately 5% for employees for each year 
of education. Private education at secondary or primary level significantly 
increases the wage rates of employees, by approximately 4%, but has no 
significant effect on the wage-rates of the self-employed. These results can be 
taken as evidence in support of the weak screening hypothesis. 
A Chow test to see if the coefficients in the two regresstons are 
significantly different gives a calculated F-statistic of 2.17 which is significant at 
the 1% significance level. We can reject the hypothesis that the two estimated 
functions do not differ significantly; the employee and self-employed sub-samples 
have significantly different wage functions. 
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Chapter 6 
Further Comparative Tests of the Screening Hypothesis 
Using UK Data 
6.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter I continue to test the educational screening hypothesis in relation 
to the UK labour market using BSA Survey 1985-1991 data. The tests detailed in 
this Chapter follow the methodologies of Psacharopoulos (1979), Lee (1980) and 
Cohn et a! (1987) in which the data is split into sub-samples according to the 
economic sector in which the respondent works, Katz & Ziderman (1980) in 
which the data is split into occupational sub-samples, and Tucker (1986) in which 
the data is split into level of education or tenure sub-samples. In each case 
comparisons are made between the selected sub-samples which are assumed to be 
characterised by different levels of educational screening, in a similar fashion to 
the employee and self-employed analysis of Chapter 5. 
Section 6.2 presents the six hypotheses to be tested. Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 
and 5 relate to testing the weak version of the screening hypothesis, Hypotheses 4 
and 6 relate to testing the strong version [as interpreted by Psacharopoulos (1979)] 
as opposed to the weak version of the screening hypothesis. 
The strong version of the screening hypothesis is generally regarded as the 
opposite extreme to the human capital model outlined in Chapter 4 in its approach 
to the role of education in the labour market. In the human capital model 
education has no informational role and is purely a productivity augmenting 
process. In the weak version of the screening hypothesis the informational role 
was added, whilst in the strong version of the screening hypothesis the 
productivity augmenting role is removed and education is acquired by workers 
purely for its signalling content. 
The strong version of the screening hypothesis, sometimes also referred to 
as the 'pure' screening model, is that hypothesis presented both by Spence (1973) 
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and Stiglitz (1975) whereby education is solely informational in nature and acts as 
a signal of innate ability to potential employers. Under the strong version of the 
screening hypothesis any differences in wage rates by years of education 
categories, ceteris paribus, must be attributed to this screening process. The 
analysis ofPsacharopoulos (1979) differs from previous screening theories in that 
he assumes in the strong version of the screening hypothesis that firms make an 
initial wage setting error which is maintained even as tenure increases. 
According to Psacharopoulos (1979) in the weak version of the screening 
hypothesis educational variables, namely years of education and credentials, are 
used by employers to determine initial wage rates for workers i.e. in the language 
of Spence (1973) the initial wage rates make up the offered wage-education 
schedule on which workers base their signalling decision. However, in contrast to 
the strong version of the screening hypothesis as outlined by Psacharopoulos 
( 1979), in his interpretation of weak screening, as tenure increases wage revisions 
linked to on-the-job monitoring will bring the wage more in line with actual 
productivity of the worker. Worker productivity is assumed to be augmented by 
three forms of human capital investment; education, general labour market 
experience and specific on-the-job experience. 
Indeed, this thesis has already shown a link between years of education 
and years in the labour force (a proxy for tenure) in wage rate determination; 
Table 4.8 in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4, shows a positive and significant 
coefficient on the YILF*YOED variable in the estimated wage rate functions for 
male and female workers. This implies that, as years in the labour force increases 
the effect of education upon wage rates also increases; this can be taken as 
evidence against Psacharopoulos' s strong screening hypothesis. This Chapter 
extends the analysis by applying a number of further tests of the screening 
function of education. 
Section 6.3 gives details of the results of testing Hypotheses 1 which uses 
education level data, and separate estimated wage rate functions by occupational 
group. Section 6.4 gives details of the results of testing Hypotheses 2 and 4 which 
use mid- to early-career earnings ratios. Section 6.5 presents the results of testing 
Hypotheses 3 which uses regression analysis to estimate sectoral Mincerian wage 
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rate functions. Section 6.6 presents the results of estimating wage rate functions 
for employees in different labour market experience groups which can be used to 
test Hypotheses 5. Section 6.7 presents the results of estimating wage rate 
functions for employees in different education groups which can be used to test 
Hypotheses 6. Section 6.8 draws some overall conclusions from the results of 
these tests. 
6.2 Hypotheses and Expected Results 
6.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
From Table 5.5 in Chapter 5 we can see that occupational effects, as represented 
by the occupational class variables, are generally significant in determining the 
wage rates of male full-time workers. The effect of occupational class as well as 
the effect of worker type upon the returns to education is the subject of the mean-
based hypothesis ofKatz & Ziderman (1980) (referred to asK & Z hereafter). 
K & Z suggest that screening would be characterised by differentials in 
years of education attained by occupational category and worker type (self-
employed or employees), since some workers are more likely to be screened than 
others. K & Z expect employees to invest more in education than the self-
employed for higher level occupations, and that the opposite situation occurs for 
low-level occupations. Low level occupations are defined as occupations 
requiring a low level of job-related skills, for example unskilled manual labour, 
and high level occupations as occupations requiring a high level of job-related 
skills, for example the professions. In the BSA Survey sub-sample occupations 
are classified as high- and low-level using the Goldthorpe-Heath classification 
(see details of this classification in Appendix 1 of Chapter 4). 
In a pure human capital model K & Z expect the self-employed to acquire 
more education on average than employees in similar occupations because the 
self-employed need to invest in additional'self-employment skills'. For low level 
occupations, where skill requirements are low, the self-employed are expected on 
average to invest in more education than employees for self-employment skills. 
However, for high level occupations education is assumed to be a joint input into 
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job- and self-employment skills, and education level may not differ by worker 
type in these occupations. 
Alternatively, a pure educational screening model predicts no differential 
in education for the lowest level occupations between the self-employed and 
employees, since it follows from such a model that the lowest ability employees 
choose not to screen, because they find it too costly. As skill requirements 
increase employees' education will outweigh the education of the self-employed 
due to screening effects. 
Combining both models gtves the weak screenmg hypothesis where 
education acts as a signal and enhances ability. In such a model K & Z expect 
that for high level occupations the education of the self-employed is less than that 
of employees, for low levels the education of the self-employed is higher than that 
of employees, and that there exists some intermediate level of occupation where 
education levels are equal between worker types [for more details see K & Z, pp. 
81-84]. Thus the null and alternative hypotheses would be as follows: 
Ho: There are no significant positive (negative) differences in education 
between 
employees and the self-employed for high (low) level occupations. 
Hr There are positive (negative) differences between the education of 
employees and the self-employed for high (low) level occupations. 
6.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
Wage rates in the competitive sectors of the economy are expected to be 
determined by economic variables such as factor supply and demand conditions, 
unionisation, and regional wage pressures. Since it is more important to measure 
productivity in the competitive sector to ensure profit maximisation it also more 
likely that non-educational screening devices such as up-or-out contracts 
contingent on ability are used [see Salop & Salop (1976) for a theoretical 
exposition of this screening device]. We would therefore expect that screening by 
education is not as apparent in the competitive sectors of the economy as it is in 
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the public sectors where wage rates are determined more bureaucratically, and 
where wage rates can deviate from worker productivity even as tenure increases, 
since it is difficult to measure individual productivity in this sector. I 
In his analysis of the screening hypothesis Psacharopoulos (1979) assumes 
the distributive trades sector [Standard Industrial Classification number 6 (SIC 6)] 
to be characterised by competitive wage determination, and the public 
administration (public non-service) sector to be characterised by uncompetitive 
wage determination based more upon educational screening. An alternative 
choice of employment sector in such a comparison of earnings ratios would be the 
self-employed and employees, where employees are assumed to be screened and 
the self-employed unscreened. 
It does not automatically follow that the sectors used in Psacharopoulos 
(1979) are characterised by high or low competition in the UK in 1985-1991. 
Thus, another choice of sector for comparison of earnings ratios and returns to 
education can be made from calculating, rather than assuming, the level of 
competition present in certain sectors from data in the Census of Production and 
comparing the sector with the highest level of concentration to the sector with the 
lowest level of concentration. Cohn et a/ ( 1987) conducted such a test using USA 
sectoral data. 
Thus the null and alternative hypotheses would be as follows: 
Ho: Mid- to Early-career earnings ratios do not differ between competitive and 
non-competitive sectors in the economy, 
H 1: Mid- to Early-career earnings ratios are higher for the non-competitive 
sectors. 
1 Note that Blaug (1985) presents an alternative explanation as to why mid-to-early earnings ratios 
may converge as tenure increases, based upon abour market segmentation theory and the 
hypothesis that internal markets and statistical discrimination exists in the two sectors to different 
degrees. 
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6.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 is a continuation of Hypothesis 2, but in this case relates to the 
estimated coefficients of educational variables in sectoral wage rate regressions, 
rather than the earnings ratio. Testing this hypothesis using regressions allows us 
to control for other influences upon wage rates in addition to education. Since 
screening may be more apparent in non-competitive sectors we might expect, 
under the weak screening hypothesis, to find higher returns to years of education 
and the highest qualification held in these sectors compared to competitive 
sectors. 
Ifo: Returns to educational variables do not vary with degree of 
competitiveness in the sector, 
H 1: Returns to educational variables decrease as degree of competitiveness 
increases. 
6.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
The basis for Hypothesis 4 is demonstrated using in Figure 6.1. Under the strong 
version of the screening hypothesis, education is solely a signal of ability and has 
no human capital effects. Therefore a university leaver is signalling that his or 
her productivity is higher than a school-leaver. The initial wage paid to the 
university graduate is therefore higher than that paid to the school-leaver 
assuming they are paid in line with their different expected productivities, and 
according to Psacharopoulos (1979) in the strong version of the hypothesis this 
pay differential is maintained throughout the working life of the individuals 
regardless of whether the productivity estimation is correct. 
6.6 
Figure 6.1: Earnings Profiles in the Strong Screening Hypothesis 
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In the strong hypothesis the earnings profiles are less divergent over time 
than they would be if human capital effects were occurring. Thus, in Figure 6.1 
the thin line represents the wage-tenure profiles for the university graduate and 
the school-leaver under the strong version of the screening hypothesis. 
In Figure 6.1 the thick line represents the wage-tenure profiles for the 
university graduate and the school-leaver if education was not a screening device 
i.e. if educational was instead purely a human capital investment then the 
university graduate is more productive than the school-leaver due to acquired 
skills. According to Psacharopoulos, in the weak version of the model as 
employers learn more about individual ability, as tenure increases, wage rates of 
graduates are increasingly divergent from those of school-leavers as it becomes 
increasingly apparent that they are more skilful than school-leavers. 
In the strong version of the screening hypothesis as outlined by 
Psacharopoulos (1979) university graduates are 'over-valued' in the sense that 
wage rates are maintained at a level in excess of productivity even as tenure 
mcreases. Psacharopoulos (1979) diverges from the signalling equilibrium 
conditions of Spence (1973) and Riley (1985) who state that in a signalling 
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equilibrium wages must be set equal to individual productivity. In this sense 
Psacharopoulos's (1979) strong screening hypothesis should be more accurately 
classified as a credentialist model, rather than a screenist model. 
We can see from Figure 6.1 that under the assumption that 
Psacharopoulos' s version of strong screening is taking place for both education 
types that mid- to early-career earnings ratios would not rise as years of education 
increase; giving rise to Hypothesis 4, as follows; 
Ho: Mid- to Early-career earnings ratios do not rise as years of education 
increase, 
H 1: Mid- to Early-career earnings ratios do rise as years of education increase. 
6.2.5 Hypothesis 5 
Following Liu & Wong (1982), and Tucker (1986), under the hypothesis that 
weak screening exists we would expect that as tenure increases the employer 
would be able to get more (and more precise) information about their employees, 
we should therefore expect that the size and significance of the estimated 
coefficient on educational characteristics, which were used as indicators of 
productivity at the initial hiring point, should decline as tenure increases. Data 
limitations mean that years of experience in the labour market is used as a proxy 
for tenure in the analysis of this chapter. Weiss (1995) states that just as turnover 
declines with tenure as workers acquire more firm-specific human capital, quits 
decline as experience (and general human capital) increases. Given the fact that 
quits decline as experience increases we expect that experience and tenure are 
positively correlated, and one may proxy for the other. Rejection of the following 
null hypothesis would therefore lend support to the weak screening hypothesis; 
Ho: Returns to qualifications do not decrease as years of experience increase, 
H 1: Returns to qualifications decrease as years of experience increase. 
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6.2.6 Hypothesis 6 
Following Tucker (1986), the strong screening hypothesis is supported if the 
tenure-earnings profiles for degree holders and school-leavers do not diverge as 
tenure increases and employers could learn more about their workers. 
Conversely, if the profiles were divergent this suggests that higher educated 
groups are paid relatively higher wages beyond the initial hiring point (i.e. relative 
productivity and therefore wage rates are increasing due to human capital effects) 
and the strong screening hypothesis should be rejected. 
Rejection of the following null hypothesis would therefore lend support to 
the strong screening hypothesis; 
Ho: Returns to years of tenure increase as education level increases, 
H 1: Returns to years of tenure do not increase as education level increases. 
By testing Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5 we are testing the weak educational 
screening hypothesis. In each case, rejection of the null hypothesis would be 
consistent the weak screening hypothesis, and acceptance of the null hypothesis 
would be a rejection of the weak screening hypothesis. Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6 test 
the strong version of the educational screening hypothesis. Rejection of the null in 
Hypothesis 4 is not consistent with the strong version of the screening hypothesis, 
and acceptance of the null hypothesis would be consistent with strong, weak or no 
screening and is therefore inconclusive. Rejection of the null hypothesis in 
Hypothesis 6 lends support to the strong screening hypothesis. 
6.2.7 Ziderman's (1990) Critique of Psacharopoulos's Model 
Ziderman (1990) suggests that the P-test methodology of looking for erosion of 
educational effects with age used by the authors above is based upon a 'faulty 
specification' of the screening model. In Psacharopoulos (1979), used as a 
reference for all the later P-test literature, the model tested is one in which firms 
pay irrationally higher starting salaries to the more educated workers in the 
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absence of alternative information on applicants expected productive ability. The 
distinction drawn between the weak and strong versions of the model is based 
upon whether firms continue to pay wages above a worker's productivity even 
after the worker has been monitored for some time. In the weak version of the 
screening model it is expected that wages are adjusted downwards in line with 
observed productivity. 
This theoretical framework is in conflict with the previous theoretical 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. In the models of Arrow (1973) and Spence 
(1974), and indeed in the analysis which followed with the advent of game theory, 
wages paid to workers do not diverge from productivity. In Chapter 2 it was 
shown that an equilibrium exists in these models only if the expectations of the 
employer in regard to the education-productivity relationship are confirmed, and 
given the utility maximising behaviour which is assumed on the part of firms and 
workers, this only occurs when wages are set equal to productivity. 
Finns will only continue to use education as a screen if it can be used to 
correctly predict the productivity of applicants, and if not, in the context of 
Spence (1974), corrections are assumed to have been already made in the 
'informational feedback loop' so that wages are set equal to productivity in the 
long run. What Psacharopoulos ( 1979) appears to be suggesting by positing that 
firms make an 'initial hiring' mistake (by paying, on average, wages in excess of 
productivity to highly educated applicants) is that the firm is still within the 
feedback loop. In the long run, starting salaries rather than subsequent wages 
would be adjusted downwards as tenure increases once on the job monitoring has 
revealed any such mistakes. 
Zidennan (1990) suggests that the eroswn of returns to educational 
variables with age is an effect of older applicants rather than existing workers 
with higher tenure. He suggests that the observed erosion of returns with age is 
due to the accumulation of alternative information which can be used as a screen 
for productive ability; for example a curriculum vitae of employment history may 
replace the need to apply the education screen to older applicants. 
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6.3 Actual Results and Hypothesis 1 
6.3.1 Mean Levels of Education and Percentages of Certificate Holders 
To test Hypothesis 1 we can present a distribution of mean years of education by 
occupation and worker type, as shown in Table 6.1. In Tables 6.2 to 6.4 the 
notation is such that HIGHQ corresponds to having a degree, nursing 
qualification, teacher training, or another academic or vocational certificate of 
equivalent merit as the highest qualification held, MIDQ corresponds to having A-
levels, HND, an apprenticeship or equivalent trade or business qualification as the 
highest held, LOWQ corresponds to having 0-levels or CSE's as the highest 
qualifications held, and NOQ corresponds to having no formal educational 
certification. 
According to Katz & Ziderman, if screening occurs we can expect 
employees with occupations classified at the top (bottom) of the occupational 
scale to invest in more (less) years of education than the self-employed in 
similarly ranked occupations. From Table 6.1 we can see that the results do not 
appear to support this hypothesis; the self-employed in high level jobs appear to 
invest in significantly more years of education than employees in high level jobs, 
and there is no significant difference by worker type in mean years of education 
for low level occupations. 
Table 6.1: Distribution of Mean Years of Education by Occupation and Worker 
Type 
Employees Self -emplo ed 
Mean Mean 
Occupation n years of Standard n years of Standard T-
Level education Deviation education Deviation Statistic 
High 1714 13.000 2.363 188 13.596 2.270 -3.296* 
Middle 858 11.437 1.626 756 I 1.048 1.479 5.003* 
Low 1863 10.790 1.050 12 I 1.000 1.279 -0.690 
All Levels 4435 I 1.769 2.035 956 I 1.548 1.946 3.069* 
Notes: Calculated from BSA sample; data orruts the Armed Forces, * s1gruficant at the 5% level. 
We can see from Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 that the percentage of both 
worker types holding high and middle level qualifications generally falls as 
occupational class decreases, and that percentage of both worker types holding 
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low level qualifications or no qualifications generally rises as occupational class 
decreases; this pattern is consistent with both human capital and strong screening 
theory. In Katz & Ziderman's weak screening model we would expect that 
employees with occupations classified at the top (bottom) of Table 6.2 to hold a 
higher (lower) percentage of highly ranked qualifications in comparison to the 
self-employed percentages in the same row in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.2: Distribution of Highest Certificate Type by Occupational Classification 
for Employees 
Percentage of Employees with 
NOQ Occupational Class HIGHO MIDQ LOWQ 
Hi2h Level 33 46 13 8 
Middle Level 7 44 22 27 
Low Level 2 29 24 45 
All Levels 15 39 19 27 
Notes: Calculated from BSA Survey sample, data omtts the Armed Forces. 
Table 6.3: Distribution of Highest Certificate by Occupational Classification for the 
Self-employed 
Percentage of Self-employed with 
Occupational Class HIGHQ MIDQ LOWQ NOQ 
High Level 41 44 9 6 
Middle Level 3 40 18 39 
Low Level 0 25 42 33 
All Levels 11 40 17 32 
Notes: Calculated from BSA Survey sample, data omtts the Armed Forces. 
The results presented in Table 6.4, from testing the hypothesis that the 
sample proportions holding each type of certificate at each occupational level are 
equal, also do not appear give support to Katz & Ziderman's hypothesis. 
Table 6.4: Test statistics ofthe difference between worker types in the proportion of 
highest certificate type held by occupational class 
Z- statistics for the difference between employees and self-
employed in the proportion holding 
Occupation Level HI GHQ MIDQ LOWQ NOQ 
Hi2h -4.722* 1.126 3.417* 2.111* 
Middle 4.620* 2.264* 2.740* -7.407* 
Low 4.409* 2.491* -11.345* 6.800* 
All Levels 3.205* -0.575 1.440 -3.127* 
Notes: • Stgruficant at the 5% level m a two-tatled test; mdtcates that we cannot 
accept the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal for both worker types 
in the occupational class indicated. 
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The significant negative test statistic in the high level occupation I high 
level certificate cell of Table 6.4 indicates that a significantly lower proportion of 
employees in this occupational class have high level certification in comparison to 
the self-employed. In addition, the significant positive test statistic in the low 
level occupation I high level certificate cell of Table 6.4 indicates that a 
significantly higher proportion of employees in this occupational class have high 
level certification in comparison to the self-employed. These results are the 
opposite of those expected under Katz & Ziderman's reasoning about the weak 
screening hypothesis implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 1. 
However, patterns in the data such as those presented in Tables 6.1-6.4, 
which are based on sample mean or proportion values, may give misleading 
inferences about the effects of education upon wages, since we are not controlling 
for other factors when employing such hypotheses tests. To gain a more precise 
understanding of the differences in educational achievement between worker 
types and to test whether this can be explained by the weak screening model we 
must analyse the individual relationships between educational variables and wage 
rates more formally using regression analysis. The wage rate equations that are 
estimated use nominal hourly wage rates as the dependant variable, educational 
variables and experience as the main independent variables and controls made for 
regional influences, marital status, union status, ethnic origin, and yearly 
influences (see Chapter 5 for wage rate formulation and Appendix 4.1 of Chapter 
4 for a description of variables). 
6.3.2 Estimated Wage Rate Functions for Occupational Groups 
As a starting point for the regression analysis of wage rate determination in 
occupational groups we estimate separate wage functions for male workers 
(pooling self-employed and employees). Table 6.5 shows the estimated wage rate 
functions for male full-timers where the sample is split into sub-samples 
depending on the workers' occupational classification. 
6.13 
The main variables of interest in these estimated wage rate functions; 
years in the labour force, the highest qualification dummy variables, and the 
variable representing private education; have coefficients which appear to change 
depending upon occupational class. From Table 6.5 we can see that the average 
rate of return to years in the labour force appears to be higher for workers in high 
level occupations in comparison to workers in middle and low level occupations 
i.e. it appears that general labour market experience has a larger effect on 
increasing wages in managerial and professional occupations. 
The highest qualification held dummy variables above HND level show a 
general pattern of decreasing returns as occupational classification moves from 
the professional and managerial to the unskilled occupations, with the exception 
of the teaching qualification variable. HND's show an increase in returns between 
high and low level occupations, whereas trade/business, Apprenticeship, A-level 
and 0-Ievel qualifications show a decrease in returns between high and low level 
occupations. CSE's are insignificant in determining wage rates of male full-timers 
in all but low level occupations. 
From Table 6.1 we can see that the self-employed and employees tend to 
be concentrated in different occupations, and therefore some of the patterns in 
returns to educational variables we see in Table 6.5 may be due to the effects of 
worker type on returns. For instance there are no self-employed routine office, 
sales, personal service or agricultural labourers, and very few private business 
workers or farmers are classed as employees. 
If we could estimate separate wage rate functions for the self-employed 
and employees and by occupational group we would be able to test a hypothesis 
similar to that ofKatz & Zidennan (1980) by looking for occupational variations 
in the returns to high and low level certification. However, given the distribution 
and relatively small size of the self-employed sample in this BSA Survey sample 
this was found to be impractical. 
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Table 6.5: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-timers by Occupation 
Level 
Occupation Level: High Middle Low 
(N = 1910) (N = 1633) . (N = 1875) 
Variable Name Est. T-Ratio Est. T- Ratio Est. T- Ratio 
Coef. Coef. Coef. 
YlLF 0.032 8.074* 0.020 4.860* 0.024 8.014* 
Y1LF2 -0.53E-3 -6.555* -0.44E-3 -5.834* -0.47E-3 -8.334* 
Degree 0.510 10.303* 0.270 3.076* 0.038 0.171 
Nursinl! 0.312 2.865* 0.152 1.573 -0.043 -0.649 
Teachinl! 0.315 4.325* -0.134 -0.685 0.418 1.847** 
Ac. I vocational 0.342 3.853* -0.030 -0.268 0.076 0.826 
HND 0.369 7.362* 0.278 4.355* 0.376 5.509* 
Trade I business 0.401 7.994* 0.217 4.123* 0.142 2.261* 
Apprenticeship 0.184 3.409* 0.208 5.659* 0.176 7.663* 
A- Levels 0.236 4.518* 0.158 3.587* 0.217 6.125* 
0- Levels 0.173 3.265* 0.176 4.478* 0.056 2.035* 
CSE's 0.083 0.772 0.123 1.587 0.076 2.064* 
Married 0.145 4.672* 0.215 5.337* 0.137 5.587* 
Divorced/widowed 0.138 2.381* 0.192 2.794* 0.044 0.952 
Private Education 0.029 0.993 0.076 2.002* -0.008 -0.159 
Self-employed -0.178 -5.852* -0.171 -5.247* -0.092 -4.273* 
Recent Unemp. -0.082 -1.607 -0.265 -9.084* -0.094 -0.430 
East Anglia -0.069 -1.505 -0.079 -1.270 -0.130 -2.910* 
East Midlands -0.165 -4.020* -0.208 -3.429* -0.034 -0.885 
London 0.036 0.875 0.104 2.385* 0.176 4.524* 
North East -0.126 -2.5 12* -0.226 -3.202* -0.055 -1.290 
N. Ireland -0.136 -3.033* -0.325 -5.395* -0.257 -5.929* 
North West -0.198 -4.921* -0.179 -3.423* -0.132 -3.518* 
South -0.063 -1.603 -0.164 -3.149* -0.099 -2.413* 
South West -0.158 -3.685* -0.214 -4.371* -0.120 -2.946* 
Wales -0.224 -3.621* -0.275 -3.625* -0.130 -2.859* 
West Midlands -0.163 -3.724* -0.009 -0.173 -0.090 -2.337* 
Yorks./Humber. -0.218 -4.817* -0.194 -3.618* -0.042 -1.253 
Union Member 0.039 1.932** 0.037 1.253 0.174 9.555* 
African -0.148 -0.979 -0.061 -0.558 -0.086 -1.046 
Asian I Chinese -0.107 -1.134 -0.298 -2.700* -0.323 -2.952* 
Unclassified R.O. -0.050 -0.741 0.108 1.365 0.010 0.204 
1985Dummy -0.564 -12.322* -0.536 -9.699* -0.483 -13.879* 
1986Dummy -0.425 -11.943* -0.309 -7.235* -0.411 -13.084* 
1987Dummy -0.350 -10.082* -0.302 -6.559* -0.361 -11.277* 
1989Dummy -0.235 -3.738* -0.060 -0.789 -0.186 -4.129* 
1990Dummy -0.104 -3.096* -0.05 I -1.207 -0.062 -2.056* 
Constant 1.432 15.956* 1.297 12.869* 1.122 16.804* 
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.253 0.340 
Variance of Estimate 0.192 0.262 0.136 
Meanlnw 1.841 1.398 1.275 
Notes: • s1gmficant at the 5% level, •• sJgruficant at the 10% level, Anned Forces workers are 
included. Standard errors are corrected using White's (1980) correction. 
6.15 
6.4 Actual Results and Hypotheses 2 and 4 
Since Hypotheses 2 and 4 are both tested using mid- to early-career earnings 
ratios it is convenient to look at the results of testing these hypotheses before 
looking at the regression results used in testing Hypothesis 3. We will look at 
each sectoral comparison in the following order; Distribution versus Public Non-
services, Self-employed versus Employees, Competitive versus Less Competitive 
Production Industries, and Private versus Public Sectors. 
6.4.1 Distribution versus Public Non-services 
Table 6.6 : Mid- to Early-career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-timers in the 
Distribution and Public Non-service Sectors by Years of Education 
Years of Education 
Sector 11-12 13-14 15+ 
Distribution (SIC 6) 1.925 2.082 1.869 
Public Non-services 1.775 1.853 1.926 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age groups 36-45 
and 25 or less respectively. 
Table 6.7: Mid- to Early-career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-timers 
in the Distribution and Public Non-service Sectors by Certification* 
Highest Formal Qualification 
Sector None 0-level(s) A-level(s) De2ree 
Distribution (SIC 6) 0.91 I 1.262 0.895 --
Public Non-services 0.928 1.053 1.454 0.901 
Notes: • EqUivalent certtficates m each category are detaded m Chapter 4 Appendtx 4.1. 
Employing Psacharopoulos's choice of economic sector we have the public 
non-service sector representing the screened sector and distributive trades sector 
(SIC group 6) as the competitive unscreened sector. The mid- to early-earnings 
ratios shown in Table 6.6 have no pattern, being lower in the 11-12 and 13-14 
categories and higher in the 15+ category for the public non-service sector in 
comparison to the distributive trades sector.2 We cannot therefore reject the null 
hypothesis and no support for the screening hypothesis comes out of this 
comparison. 
2 The reported Mid- to Early-career earnings ratio is the ratio of the average real earnings of a 3 6-
45 year old divided by the average real earnings of a 25 or less year old in the chosen sector. 
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Table 6.7 uses qualification categories; again we expect the public non-
service sector to have higher mid- to early-earnings ratios than the distributive 
sector under the screening hypothesis. The mid- to early-earnings ratios are 
higher in the 'none' and 'A-levels' categories, but lower in the '0-levels' category, 
for the public non-service sector in comparison to the distributive trades sector, 
and no ratio is available for distributive trade workers in the 'Degree' category. 
We cannot therefore fully reject the null hypothesis and only limited support for 
the screening hypothesis comes from this comparison. 
6.4.2 Self-employed vs. Employees 
The theory behind Hypothesis 2 suggests that mid- to early-earnings ratios should 
be higher in screened occupations as compared to unscreened occupations. 
Following the methodology of Cohn et al (1987) we take the self-employed as 
unscreened and employees as screened occupations, and we expect the employees 
sample to have higher mid- to early-earnings ratios than the self-employed under 
the screening hypothesis. We can see from Table 6.8 that this is indeed the case 
over all the education categories; this can be taken as evidence in support of the 
educational screening hypothesis. 
Table 6.8 : Mid- to Early-career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Self-employed 
and Employees by Years of Education 
Years of Education 
Worker Type 11-12 13-14 15+ 
Self-employed 1.253 1.623 0.888 
All Employees 1.850 2.056 1.721 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age 
groups 36-45 and 25 or less respectively. 
Table 6.9 : Mid- to Early-career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Self-employed 
and Employees by Certification 
Highest Formal Qualification 
Worker Type None 0-level(sl A-level(s) De2ree 
Self-employed 0.825 0.822 1.097 1.038 
All Employees 1.045 1.216 1.165 1.200 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, M1d- to Early-career corresponds to age 
groups 36-45 and 25 or less respectively. 
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Looking at qualifications rather than years of education and using the self-
employed ( unscreened occupations) and employees (screened occupations) 
comparison we expect the employees sample to have higher mid- to early-
earnings ratios than the self-employed under the screening hypothesis. We can 
see from Table 6.9 that this is the case over all the qualification categories, and as 
such can be taken as evidence in support of a screening hypothesis where highest 
qualification held by an applicant is used as a screen for ability by prospective 
employers. 
6.4.3 Competitive vs. Less Competitive UK Production Industries 
We can disaggregate the production sector in the BSA Survey data into the four 
divisions in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Tables I 0 and 11 
show the mid- to early-career earnings ratios corresponding to each of the 4 
industrial sub-divisions at different education levels. 
Table 6.10: Mid to Early Career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Workers in 
Industries SIC 1-4 by Years of Education 
Concentration Years of Education 
Industry Ratio(%) 11-12 13-14 15+ 
Enet"2v & Water SIC 1 57.1 1.792 1.808 1.351 
Extraction & Chemicals SIC 2 54.6 1.680 1.319 2.577 
Other Manufacturinl! SIC 4 39.3 1.193 1.119 1.468 
Metaleoods & Eneineerine SIC 3 39.2 1.618 1.853 1.910 
Notes: Earrungs rallOs calculated from BSA data; Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age groups 
36-45 and 25 or less respectively. 
In Table 6.10 the concentration ratio is an average figure for the 1985-
1991 period showing the percentage of total gross output produced by the 5 
largest employers in each part of the industry at the 3-digit SIC level aggregated to 
the !-digit level as shown; calculated from Table 6.13 Report on the Census of 
Production Summary Volumes (HMSO). The production industries are arranged 
in ascending order of competition in both Tables 6.10 and 6.11, that is to say that 
the Energy & Water industry is less competitive, as shown by a higher 
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concentration ratio, than the Metal goods industry. 3 We can see that the Metal 
goods and Other Manufacturing industries have very similar competition levels, 
as do Energy & Water and Extraction & Chemicals, over the period 1985-1991, 
and we could group them together as the more and less competitive sections of 
UK production industry.4 
Looking at Table 6.10 m reference to Hypothesis 2 we can see that 
initially there appears to be higher ratios for the less competitive industries, 
however moving from the 11-12 to the 13-14 years of education category we see 
that Industry SIC 3 has the highest ratio. Furthermore, in the 15+ years of 
education category Industries 3 and 4 have earnings ratios larger in magnitude 
than that for Industry I. Again these results are contrary to those expected under 
the strong screening hypothesis. 
As regards Hypothesis 4, we expect mid- to early-career earnings ratios to 
fall as years of education increase under the strong screening hypothesis. 
Comparing the 11-12 to the 13-14 years of education category in Table 6.10 we 
can see that the earnings ratios for Industries 1 and 3 increase whereas the 
earnings ratios for Industries 2 and 4 decrease. Comparing the 11-12 to the 15+ 
years of education category we can see that the earnings ratio for Industry 1 has 
fallen, but that the ratios for the other three industries have risen. Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis i.e. there is no support for the strong screening 
hypothesis from this comparative analysis. 
As regards Hypothesis 2, we can see from Table 6.11 that in the 'None' 
category the more competitive industries (SIC 3 and 4) have higher mid- to early-
career earnings ratios than the less competitive industries (SIC 1 and 2). In the '0-
level(s)' category industry 4 has an earnings ratio exceeding that of less 
competitive sectors. In the 'A-level( s )' category Industry 1 has the highest 
earnings ratio but Industry 3 has a higher earnings ratio than Industry 2. In the 
3 There are some problems associated with using concentration ratios to measure the level of 
competition in an industry. For example, concentration ratios take no account of the existance of 
barriers to entry which will determine the level of contestability in the market by limiting potential 
competition [see Pollard (1989) for more details]. However, I take a pragmatic approach in that 
reliable alternatives to concentration ratios to measure competition levels are very difficult to find. 
4 Other Manufacturing SIC 4 covers such industries as food and drink production, textile and 
leather processors, clothing, tobacco, jewellery, musical instruments, toys, photo-labs and wooden 
manufactures. 
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'Degree' educational category results are not available for Industries 1 and 2, so 
the evidence is inconclusive. 5 
Table 6.11 : Mid to Early Career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Workers in 
Industries SIC 1-4 by Certification 
Highest Formal Qualification 
Industry None 0-level(s) A-level(s) Deeree 
Eneri!Y & Water SIC 1 1.030 1.200 1.753 --
Extraction & Chemicals SIC 2 0.924 0.792 1.238 
--
Other Manufacturing SIC 4 1.057 1.369 1.093 1.368 
Metal Goods & Ene. SIC 3 1.153 1.083 1.341 0.985 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, '--' denotes where full observatiOns were not available, 
Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age groups 36-45 and 25 or less respectively. 
Looking at Table 6.11 in reference to Hypothesis 4 we find that a move 
from the 'None' to the '0-level(s)' category results in a decrease in the size of mid-
to early-career earnings ratios in industries 2 and 3, but an increase in size for 
Industries 1 and 4. A movement from 'None' to the 'A-level(s)' category of 
education gives a rise in earnings ratios for all industries, and a move from 'None' 
to the 'Degree' category of education gives a rise in Industry 4 and a fall in 
Industry 3. So again we cannot reject the null hypothesis; there is no support for 
the strong screening hypothesis. 
6.4.4 Private vs. Public Sectors 
As regards Hypothesis 2 we can see from Table 6.12 that the earnings ratios are 
higher for the private sector in comparison to the public sector. This is contrary to 
the expected result under screening that mid- to early-earnings ratios would be 
higher in the less competitive sector. If we disaggregate the public and private 
sectors we find that private non-manufacturing and public non-service sectors 
generally have higher ratios than the private manufacturing and public service 
sectors respectively; this is again contrary to Hypothesis 1. 
5 Note that under an efficiency wage model these results could be influenced by rent-sharing in the 
more concentrated industries. 
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Table 6.12 : Mid to Early Career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Workers in 
Private and Public Sectors by Years of Education 
Years of Education 
Sector 11-12 13-14 15+ 
Private Mannfacturin2 1.730 1.655 1.952 
Private Non-manufacturin2 2.092 2.341 1.809 
Public Services 1.620 2.477 1.314 
Public Non-services 1.775 1.853 1.926 
Private Sector 1.901 2.126 1.849 
Public Sector 1.708 1.873 1.811 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age groups 
36-45 and 25 or less respectively. 
As regards Hypothesis 4 we can see from Table 6.12 that although mid- to 
early-career ratios generally increase as years of education increase from the 11-
12 to the 13-14 years category, there is no discernible pattern when comparing the 
11-12 to the 15+ category ratios. For example the private sector shows a decrease 
(1.90 falling to 1.85), whereas the public sector shows an increase (1.71 falling to 
1.81) in ratios. Private non-manufacturing, public services and private sectors 
show decreasing mid- to early-career earnings ratios from the 11-12 to the 15+ 
category. Given these mixed results we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 6.13 categorises mid- to early-career earnings ratios in terms of 
certification, where 0-level(s), A-level(s) and Degree level certificates are the 
highest qualifications held by the worker in each sector. 
Table 6.13 : Mid to Early Career Earnings Ratios for Male Full-time Workers in 
Private and Public Sectors by Certification 
Ili2hest Formal Qualification 
Sector None 0-level(s) A-level(s) Degree 
Private Manufacturing 1.060 1.252 1.296 1.266 
Private Non-manufacturing 1.091 1.319 0.873 1.355 
Public Services 0.984 1.003 1.232 1.137 
Public Non-services 0.928 1.053 1.454 0.901 
Private Sector 1.069 1.284 1.109 1.315 
Public Sector 0.950 1.016 1.293 1.119 
Notes: Calculated from BSA data, Mid- to Early-career corresponds to age groups 36-45 and 25 or 
less respectively. 
As regards Hypothesis 2 we can see from Table 6.13 that the earnings 
ratios are higher for the private sector relative to the public sector, with the 
exception of those holding A-levels. This is contrary to the expected result under 
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screening that mid- to early-earnings ratios would be higher in the less 
competitive sector. As regards Hypothesis 4 we can see from Table 6.13 that 
mid- to early-career ratios generally increase as qualification held Improves. 
Since most sectors show increasing ratios we reject the null hypothesis. 
These results coincide with the findings of previous authors who use this 
methodology; Psacharopoulos ( 1979) for the UK, Lee ( 1980) for Malaysia, Cohn 
et al (1987) for the US, Lambropoulos (1992) for Greece, and Arabshiebani & 
Rees ( 1996) for the UK, who show that the private sector generally tends to 
display higher earnings ratios at each education level than the public sector. 
6.5 Actual Results and Hypothesis 3 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Although there is little support for the screening hypothesis from the mean based 
comparisons we must remember that the earnings data can be influenced by many 
other factors in addition to education. Figure 6.2 shows a graph of real wages 
versus years in the labour force for male full-time workers by level of highest 
certification. We can see that, rather than the smooth lines of Figure 6.1, in 
reality we have varying wage differentials between education groups as years in 
the labour force increases, and this is largely due to variables which affect the 
wage rates of the BSA Survey respondents which are not accounted for in either 
Tables 6.6 to 6.13, or the Figure 6.1. 
A clearer test of the screening hypothesis would be to conduct regression 
analysis which would account for most of the additional influences upon wage 
rates in the UK using data from the BSA Survey sample on such things as union 
status, residence, and marital status. 
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Figure 6.2 : Real Wage Rate-Experience Profiles for BSA Survey Workers 
0-Levcl(s) 
~--------------------
=------ No Qualifications 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Years in the labour force 
Notes: Average values for all workers calculated from BSA Survey Data 1985-1991 
Accordingly, we test Hypothesis 3 using the results of wage rate 
regressions for specific economic sectors. The wage rate regressions are Mincer-
type earnings functions as used in Section 6.3.2 and with a control made for 
occupational status. Regressions are conducted for full-time male workers in the 
appropriate sectors; the self-employed versus employees analysis is omitted as 
this methodology has been fully covered in Chapter 5. Such comparative sectoral 
tests have, in recent literature, been referred to as 'P-tests' after the original work 
by Psacharopoulos (1979). 
As in Chapter 5, it was found that, once additional explanatory variables 
were included in the estimated sectoral wage rate equations in Heckit models, the 
inverse Mills ratios included to control for sample-selection bias became 
insignificant (see Chapter 5 for details of the Heckit model). Since we want to 
include the additional variables to control for regional, racial, marital and 
occupational effects in wage equations in this Section, the Heckit model is 
dropped in favour of wage rate equations estimated using one stage log-linear 
OLS regressions. For details of a P-test between the private and public sectors in 
this BSA Survey sample which uses the Heckit model with simple Mincerian 
functions and rejects the strong screening hypothesis, see Haynes & Sessions 
(1996). 
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We will look at each sectoral companson m the following order; 
Distribution versus Public Non-services, Private versus Public Sector, and 
Competitive versus Less Competitive Production Industries. 
6.5.2 Distribution vs. Public Non-services 
First, consider the original P-test ofPsacharopoulos (1979), in which we have the 
public non-service sector representing the screened sector and distributive trades 
sector (SIC 6) as the competitive unscreened sector. Table 6.14 presents the 
estimated wage rate equations for male full-time workers in both these sectors. 
There are several points of interest in Table 6.14. Six of the regional 
dummy variables are significant in determining the wage rates of distribution 
workers compared to three in the public non-service sector. This may reflect the 
fact that wage rates in the distribution sector are affected more by regional labour 
market pressures than wage rates in the public non-service sector, which tend to 
be set in relation to more national labour market trends. In the public sector 
London residents are paid significantly more than other South East residents, and 
West counties and Northern Ireland residents significantly less than South East 
residents. 
Union membership increases wage rates by approximately 13% in the 
public non-services sector, but is insignificant in the wage rate equation for 
workers in the distribution sector. There also appears to be differences in the 
effect of occupational classification between sectors; for example high level 
occupations get 28% compared to 19% higher wage rates, ceteris paribus, than 
middle level occupations in the distribution sector and public non-services sector 
respectively. 
Both Asian, Chinese or African racial origin have a significantly negative 
impact upon wage rates in the distribution sector, whereas none of the racial 
background dummy variables has a significant negative effect in the public sector. 
The positive effect of years of experience in the labour force and the 
negative effect of having been unemployed in the previous five years are each 
comparable across sectors. Each additional year of experience gives 
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approximately 3% higher wages and being unemployed in the last five years gives 
approximately I 6-19% lower wages. 
To investigate the hypothesis that the education-wage relationship is 
stronger in the public non-service sector (the screened sector) in comparison to 
the distribution sector (the unscreened sector) we will look at the significance and 
magnitude of the coefficients on the highest qualification dummies in each sector. 
Table 6.14: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-timers in the 
Distribution and Public Non-service Sectors 
Sector: Distribution Public Non-services 
IN=77l) IN=3571 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
Years in labour Force 0.029 4.746* 0.024 3.459* 
YILF2 -0.594E-3 -5.347* -0.480E-3 -3.689* 
High Qualifications 0.228 2.448* 0.382 4.147* 
Middle Qualifications 0.182 3.524* 0.180 3.806* 
Low Qualifications 0.047 0.820 0.033 0.537 
Married 0.131 2.257* 0.075 1.190 
Divorced/widowed 0.056 0.489 -0.032 -0.335 
Private Education 0.118 1.881** 0.102 1.133 
Recently Unemployed -0.155 -3.175* -0.190 -2.852* 
East Anglia -0.101 -0.853 -0.032 -0.265 
East Midlands -0.112 -1.278 -0.018 -0.221 
London 0.203 2.551* 0.214 2.129* 
North East -0.189 -1.816** 0.026 0.318 
N. Ireland -0.105 -1.207 -0.160 -1.581 
North West -0.202 -2.547* -0.110 -1.293 
South -0.114 -1.375 -0.063 -0.743 
South West -0.222 -2.752* -0.186 -1.987* 
Wales -0.323 -2.809* -0.185 -1.792** 
West Midlands -0.125 -1.408 -0.046 -0.556 
Yorkshire & Humb. -0.271 -3.115* -0.066 -0.874 
Union Member 0.074 1.317 0.130 1.977* 
Low Occupation -0.099 -2.001* -0.196 -3.992* 
High Occupation 0.278 5.604* 0.192 3.164* 
African -0.507 -2.409* -0.188 -1.222 
Asian I Chinese -0.707 -4.202* -0.145 -0.656 
Unclassified R.O. -0.103 -0.825 0.028 0.230 
1985 -0.545 -6.600* -0.378 -4.698* 
1986 -0.370 -5.126* -0.328 -4.366* 
1987 -0.298 ·4.243* -0.258 -3.208* 
1989 -0.274 -2.443* -0.100 -0.846 
1990 -0.084 -1.265 -0.813E-2 -0.104 
Constant 1.281 8.193* 1.324 7.873* 
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.460 
Variance of Estimate 0.291 0.112 
Meanlnw 1.308 1.531 
Notes: * S1gmficant at 5% level or better, •• S1gmficant at I 0% level. 
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From Table 6.14 we can see that high and middle level qualifications 
show significant positive returns in the estimated wage rate functions for both the 
sectors, and that low level qualifications are not significant in the wage rate 
functions. The returns to high level qualifications appear to be higher in the 
public non-service sector, and the returns to middle level qualifications appear to 
be equal to approximately 18% in both sectors. The positive returns to education 
in both sectors leads to a rejection of the strong screening hypothesis unless we 
look on distribution as being the relatively less-screened sector instead of the 
unscreened sector when comparing it to the public non-service sector. 
Psacharopoulos' hypothesis says nothing about the distinction between 
specific and general skills derived from different certificate courses, since under 
the strong screening hypothesis the human capital value (general plus specific 
investment) of education is zero in both sectors. If we assume that the human 
capital value of certification courses is equal, but not zero, across sectors then we 
could say that the differential in returns to high level certification shown in Table 
6.14 supports the weak screening model; ifthat differential were significant. 
However, in a Chow test the calculated F-statistic was approximately 
1.176 and shows that the estimated coefficients in the wage rate functions of the 
distribution and public non-service sectors are significantly different from one 
another only at the 25% significance level (see Appendix for further details). 
Given the small significance of the F-statistic an alternative test of wage rate 
equation separation was used; the Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test; this 
showed that there were no significant interactions between any of the educational 
variables and sector. Thus we must conclude, on the basis of this methodology 
and the two separation tests, that there is no evidence in support of the strong or 
weak screening hypotheses and that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 3. 
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6.5.3 Private vs. Public Sectors 
Table 6.15 shows the results of estimating wage rate equations for male full-time 
workers in the private and public sectors. For the private sector we can see that 
all eleven regional dummy variables have significant negative coefficients, with 
the exception of London residence, showing lower wage rates in comparison to 
the South East for private sector workers. London residents working in the 
private sector have wage rates approximately 13% higher than the remaining areas 
of the South East. In comparison only four of the eleven regional dummy 
variables are significant in determining the wage rates of male workers in the 
public sector of the economy; London residence increases wage rates by 
approximately 12% and South West, Welsh or Northern Ireland residence 
decreases wage rates by approximately 9-11%, in comparison to South East 
residents. This is to be expected if private sector wage rates are determined by 
regional labour market pressures, and the public sector wage rates are determined 
more by the state of the national labour market. The effect of unionisation is also 
lower in the public sector in comparison to the private sector; approximately a 5% 
compared to a 14% increase in wage rates through union or staff association 
membership in the public and private sector respectively. 
The wage-experience profiles allowing for the additional influences upon 
wage rates in the regressions, as represented by the similar coefficients on years in 
the labour force and its square in Table 6.15, have the same shape and vertical 
intercept for both sectors. Having been unemployed in the previous five years has 
more of a negative effect on the determination of wage rates in the public sector 
in comparison to the private sector; approximately a 22% compared to a 14% 
decrease in wage rates through recent unemployment in the public and private 
sector respectively. 
To test Hypothesis 3 we must consider screening by highest qualification 
held and look for differences in the returns to the highest qualification held 
dummy variables between sectors. Under Hypothesis 3 we would expect under 
that returns to education would be higher in the public sector. 
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Table 6.15: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-timers in the Private 
and Public Sectors 
Sector: Private Public 
(N=3353) (N=1303) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
Years in labour Force 0.027 10.174* 0.027 7.412* 
YILF2 -0.495E·3 -10.149* -0.498E-3 -7.237* 
Hieh Qualifications 0.359 10.882* 0.319 8.375* 
Middle Qualifications 0.198 9.635* 0.223 7.423* 
Low _Qualifications 0.119 4.956* 0.124 3.468* 
Married 0.188 7.733* 0.077 2.461* 
Divorced/widowed 0.119 2.803* 0.032 0.575 
Private Education 0.046 1.804** 0.038 1.173 
Recently Unemployed -0.138 -7.230* -0.222 -6.806* 
East Anl!lia -0.113 -2.737* -0.061 -0.965 
East Midlands -0.175 -5.019* 0.375E-2 0.082 
London 0.128 4.174* 0.123 2.897* 
North East -0.135 -3.387* 0.402E-3 0.801E-2 
N. Ireland -0.246 -6.577* -0.090 -2.001* 
North West -0.195 -6.525* -0.053 -1.240 
South -0.098 -2.908* -0.025 -0.603 
South West -0.173 -5.3!5* -0.111 -2.549* 
Wales -0.214 -5.001* -0.091 -1.696** 
West Midlands -0.115 -3.696* -0.053 -1.135 
Yorkshire & Humb. -0.163 -5.224* -0.047 -1.098 
Union Member 0.143 8.466* 0.049 1.922** 
Low Occupation -0.093 -4.545* -0.162 -5.681* 
Hieh Occupation 0.252 11.781* 0.238 8.322* 
African -0.150 -1.674** -0.134 -1.240 
Asian I Chinese -0.314 -4.160* -0.143 -1.402 
Unclassified R.O. -0.016 -0.272 -0.038 -0.613 
1985 -0.587 -18.927* -0.467 -11.532* 
1986 -0.406 -14.990* -0.390 -10.807* 
1987 -0.376 -13.612* -0.338 -9.!43* 
1989 -0.200 -3.747* -0.233 -4.121* 
1990 -0.086 -3.159* -0.064 -1.806* 
Constant 1.251 18.269* 1.328 16.268* 
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.501 
Variance of Estimate 0.196 0.127 
Meanlnw 1.471 1.614 
Notes: • Stgntficant at 5% level or better, •• Stgntficant at I 0% level. 
From Table-6-:-15 we can see that the estimated coefficients on the high 
qualification held dummy variable is lower in the public sector (judged to be the 
screened sector) than in the private sector (judged to be the less screened sector), 
whereas the estimated coefficients on the middle and low qualification dummy 
variables are marginally higher in the public sector compared to the private sector. 
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A Chow Test gtves a calculated F-statistic of 1.573 shows that the 
estimated coefficients in the two wage rate functions of the public and private 
sectors are significantly different from one another at the 5% level (see Appendix 
for further details). However, a Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test indicates 
that the sectora1 differences in wage determination lie in differences in the returns 
to union membership, occupation level, recent unemployment, marital status and 
region, and not in the returns to education. As in Section 6.5.2 we have no 
support, from this methodology and the separation tests, for the strong screening 
hypothesis. 
6.5.4 Low vs. High Competition UK Production Industries 
We can now consider Hypothesis 3 in reference to the UK production industry for 
which concentration level data is available. To give larger sample size the four 
disaggregated production industries (SIC 1-4) have been grouped according to 
competition level into two pooled samples. The results of estimating Mincerian 
wage rate functions for these two samples are shown in Table 6.16; where 'Low' 
and 'High' competition refers to high and low average concentration ratios 
respectively (reported in Table 6.10). Energy & Water Production and Extraction 
& Chemical Production are classed as low competition industries, and Metal 
goods, Engineering and Other Manufacturing as high competition industries. 
From Table 6.16 we can see that male full-time workers earn a higher 
wage in the low-competition industries and that there are marked differences in 
the estimated earnings equations for the low and high competition industries. 
Nine of the eleven regional dummy variables are significant in determining the 
wage rates of full time male workers in the high-competition industries compared 
to only three significant regional dummy variables for the low-competition 
industries. This result supports the view that wage rates in the low competition 
industries are determined more bureaucratically and affected less by regional 
labour market pressures than wage rates in the high competition industries. 
Similarities are apparent in the return to recent unemployment and 
unionisation; recent unemployment decreases wage rates by approximately 14-
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15% and union membership boosts wage rates by approximately I 0-11%. The 
returns to years in the labour force and its square are also comparable between 
industry groups. However, low occupational class reduces wage rates by 
approximately 7% in the low competition industries compared to 12% in the high 
competition industries. High occupational class raises wage rates by 
approximately 21% in the low competition industries compared to 17% in the 
high competition industries. 
From Hypothesis 3 we expect strong screening to be more apparent in low-
competition sectors and under this hypothesis that there are higher returns to the 
highest qualification held in these sectors compared to high-competition sectors. 
However, what is immediately apparent from Table 6.16 is that no such inverse 
relationship exists between competition level and rates of return to educational 
variables. Indeed, the converse appears to be true; that is the more competitive a 
sector the higher the returns to education. All three certification dummies in the 
estimated wage rate function for the high-competition sample have estimated 
coefficients which are statistically significant, compared to only the variables 
representing high and middle level certification for the low-competition sample, 
even though this sample appears to fit the model better than the high-competition 
sample (as shown by adjusted R-squared). The hypothesis that there are higher 
returns to certificates in the low-competition sector is rejected. 
A Chow test gives a calculated F-statistic of approximately 1.248 shows 
that the two wage rate functions of the low- and high-competition sectors are 
significantly different from one another, only at the 25% significance level (see 
Appendix for further details). A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test reveals that 
significant sectoral differences lie in the returns to private education, low level 
qualifications, and the majority of regional dummy variables. 
It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient on the variable 
representing private schooling at junior or secondary level is significant in the 
wage rate function for the low competition sector in comparison to an 
insignificant estimated coefficient in the high competition sector. Although we 
have rejected the hypothesis that more educational screening occurs in the low 
competition sector compared to the high competition sector, the result of differing 
6.30 
returns to private schooling may support the idea of screening by educational 
quality in the low competition sector. 
Table 6.16: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Full-timers in the Low 
Competition Industries SIC 1+2 and High Competition Industries SIC 3+4 
Competition Level: Low High 
(N=442) (N=1292l 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
Years in labour Force 0.023 3.543* 0.023 6.029* 
Y1LF2 -0.363E-3 -2.964* -0.433E-3 -6.036* 
High Qualifications 0.391 5.105* 0.457 9.504* 
Middle Qualifications 0.149 3.133* 0.234 8.606* 
Low Qualifications 0.066 1.115 0.177 5.355* 
Married 0.108 1.920** 0.149 4.314* 
Divorced/widowed 0.069 0.763 0.089 1.572 
Private Education 0.153 2.156* 0.181E-2 0.045 
Recently Unemployed -0.138 -2.639* -0.152 -5.652* 
East Anglia 0.129 1.161* -0.083 -1.420 
East Midlands -0.075 -0.870 -0.154 -3.510* 
London 0.128 1.308 0.107 2.164* 
North East 0.049 0.655 -0.090 -1.464 
N. Ireland -0.085 -0.843 -0.206 -4.224* 
North West 0.129E-3 0.162E-2 -0.168 -4.382* 
South 0.134 1.650** -0.112 -2.075* 
South West 0.087 0.893 -0.156 -3.432* 
Wales -0.233E-2 -0.027 -0.272 -4.689* 
West Midlands -0.139 -1.753** -0.108 -2.801* 
Yorkshire & Humb. 0.061 0.898 -0.116 -2.696* 
Union Member 0.104 2.568* 0.113 4.988* 
Low Occupation -0.067 -1.308 -0.121 -4.065* 
High Occupation 0.206 3.810* 0.170 5.203* 
African -0.036 -0.131 -0.103 -0.775 
Asian I Chinese -0.646 -1.602 -0.!95 -1.954** 
Unclassified RO. -0.208 -1.309 0.026 0.337 
1985Dummy_ -0.512 -7.431* -0.455 -10.622* 
1986Dummy -0.484 -7.936* -0.343 -9.705* 
1987Dummy -0.346 -5.174* -0.306 -8.067* 
1989 Dummy -0.473 -3.042* -0.195 -2.668* 
1990 Dummy -0.187 -2.877* -0.092 -2.580* 
--Constant 1.528 7.943* 1.286 13.652* 
-
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.406 
Variance of Estimate 0.128 0.140 
Mean In w 1.584 1.509 
Notes: SIC I corres_QQ~ds to Energy & Water, SIC 2 corresponds to Extraction & Chem1cals, 
SIC 3 corresponds to Metal Goods, and SIC 4 corresponds to Other Manufacturing. 
• Significant at 5% level or better, •• Significant at I 0% level. 
6.31 
6.6 Actual Results and Hypothesis 5 
Table 6.17 shows the results from estimating Mincerian wage rate functions for 
full-time male employees. The sub-sample of employees from the BSA Survey 
data is split into three groups; columns 2 and 3 show results for those employees 
with 10 or less years of experience in the labour force, columns 4 and 5 show 
results for those with 20 to 30 years, and columns 6 and 7 show results for those 
with 40 to 50 years experience. 
Before considering the results presented in Table 6.17 we must first note 
that the wage rate equation becomes increasingly inaccurate in explaining wage 
rates earned by employees as years in the labour force increases. This can be seen 
from the declining R-squared values and increasing variance of estimate values 
for both worker types as we move from the early- to the late-career groups. 
Earnings functions such as this are traditionally applied to young cohorts, and 
although the equations estimated contain additional explanatory variables, they 
fail to capture all influences upon earnings as age increases. Since the late-career 
group observations are very 'noisy', in the sense that variables not included in the 
wage rate equation begin to exert more and more of an influence on wage rates, 
and the estimated equation becomes increasingly inaccurate in explaining 
variation in wage rates, we must be careful in drawing conclusions based on early-
to late-career comparisons. 
Secondly, we must note that years in the labour force, or age, has been 
used in this Chapter as a proxy variable for tenure. We would expect that there is 
a general positive correlation between tenure and years in the labour force or age. 
However, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that some individuals in each 
career group, as defined by years in the labour force or age, may just be starting 
new occupations. Beyond the first year of experience, those just starting new jobs 
in each tenure category would on average have lower wage rates, ceteris paribus, 
than those properly categorised. Since the proxy would become less inaccurate as 
age increased, because the number of individuals changing jobs is assumed to 
decrease as years in the labour force increases, we would expect that the returns to 
education would become less underestimated (closer to the true value) as tenure 
increased. 
6.32 
From Table 6.17 we can see that the impact upon wage rates of marital 
status, that is the positive effect of being married, increases as years in the labour 
force increases; approximately 6% in the early career stage compared to 
approximately 14% by the mid- and the late-career stage. Being divorced or 
widowed apparently only has a significant positive effect on wage rates for the 
early-career group, increasing wage rates by approximately 26%. 
Regional influences, in comparison to living in the South East, generally 
decline in the size of their effects upon wage rates as years in the labour force 
increases, with eight out of the eleven regional dummies becoming insignificant 
in determining wage rates by the late career stage. 
The effect of union or staff-association membership upon the wage rates 
of male employees is significantly positive and not uniform over the three career-
stage groups; the effect of union membership is to raise wage rates by 
approximately 14% in the early and late career stages, but only by approximately 
8% in the middle career stage. Low occupational class has a significant negative 
impact on wage rates which is approximately uniform over the career stage 
groups. High occupational class gives no premium over jobs classified as middle 
level occupations for those employees at an early stage in their careers, then a 
25% premium in the middle of their careers and 20% in the latter stages of their 
careers. 
The racial origin dummy variables representing African and Asian or 
Chinese racial origin are significant in determining the wage rates of young male 
employees; wage rates are reduced by approximately 27% for African origin and 
approximately 33% for Asian or Chinese origin compared to the wage rates of 
Whites I Europeans in the early-career group. The effect of racial origin is 
insignificant in later career stages, with the exception of Asian or Chinese origin 
in the late career stage reducing wage rates by approximately 23%. 
We assume that the return to education as a human capital investment is 
constant as tenure increases i.e. any further human capital return is from labour 
market experience (general human capital investment) or on-the-job training 
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(specific human capital investments); this is a basic premise in Mincer (1974).6 
Thus, under Psacharopoulos's weak screening hypothesis, we can expect that the 
average wage effect of education decreases as tenure increases, since education's 
informational component does not hold its value (i.e. earning differential 
compared to a person with no formal qualifications) as tenure increases and 
alternative information becomes available to employers. 
Table 6.17: Estimated Wage Rate Equations for Male Employees by Career Stage 
Career Stage: Early Middle Late 
(N=1065) (N=l172) (N=484) 
Variable Name Est. Coef. T- Ratio Est. Coef. T- Ratio Est. Coef. T- Ratio 
YILF 0.158 7.760* 0.074 1.107 0.191 1.0032 
YILF2 -0.876E-2 -5.070* -0.160E-2 -1.197 -0.215E-2 -1.0038 
Yrs. Education 0.079 10.314* 0.046 6.402* 0.079 4.771* 
Married 0.063 2.192* 0.138 2.883* 0.137 1.809** 
Div./widowed 0.255 2.742* -0.986E-2 -0.143 -0.028 -0.288 
Recent Unemp, -0.072 -2.887* -0.190 -5.553* -0.162 -3.316* 
East Anglia -0.116 -1.690* -0.180 -2.905* -0.040 -0.403 
East Midlands -0.112 -2.163* -0.198 -3.501* -0.013 -0.185 
London 0.11 I 2.489* -0.549E-2 -0.105 0.123 1.678** 
North East -0.133 -2.174* -0.066 -1.143 -0.020 -0.260 
N. Ireland -0.327 -6.018* -0.227 -4.387* -0.973E-2 -0.112 
North West -0.185 -4.087* -0.125 -2.636* -0.128 -1.740** 
South -0.174 -3.575* -0.035 -0.694 -0.095 -1.107 
South West -0.161 -3.035* -0.162 -3.262* -0.101 -1.423 
Wales -0.159 -2.441* -0.164 -2.325* -0.251 -2.021* 
West Midlands -0.180 -3.672* -0.149 -3.169* -0.065 -0.805 
Yorks./Hum. -0.124 -2.589* -0.138 -2.852* -0.092 -1.163 
Union Member 0.136 5.506* 0.077 3.158* 0.144 3.715* 
LowOcc. -0.150 -4.780* -0.165 -4.707* -0.173 -3.857* 
High Occ. 0.057 1.579 0.252 7.159* 0.199 3.455* 
African -0.269 -1.995* -0.280 -1.554 -0.091 -0.461 
Asian/Chinese -0.355 -3.460* -0.165 -1.470 -0.228 -1.664** 
Unc. R.O. -0.710E-2 -0.094 0.032 0.410 -0.134 -1.185 
1985 -0.577 -12.555* -0.498 -10.271* -0.360 -4.894* 
1986 -0.500 -12.239* -0.427 -10.321* -0.394 -5.824* 
1987 -0.433 -10.421* -0.364 -8.512* -0.278 -4.076* 
1989 -0.230 -3.299* -0.207 -2.860* -0.291 -2.840* 
1990 -0.085 -2.162* -0.113 -2.909* -0.066 -0.996 
Constant -0.198 -1.190 0.250 0.295 -3.756 -0.887 
Adjusted R2 0.521 0.394 0.346 
Variance of Est. 0.138 0.159 0.164 
Meanlnw 1.315 1.696 1.459 
Notes: • S1grnficant at 5% level, ** S1gruficant at 10% level, Early, Mid- and Late-career refer to 
I 0 or less, 20-30, and 40-50 years in the labour force respectively. 
6 We also therefore assume that the respondent has not returned to formal schooling at any point in 
their working life. 
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From Table 6.17, we can see that the estimated average wage increase for 
each year of education falls from approximately 8% to approximately 5% then 
rises back to approximately 8% over the three career stages. In terms of years of 
education there is little evidence to allow us to reject the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 5.7 There is little support for Psacharopoulos's weak version of the 
screening hypothesis from the results of this methodology; following Tucker 
( 1986) we would not expect sustained or increasing returns to years of education 
as years in the labour force, the proxy for tenure, increases. 
The reported mean log-wages in Table 6.17 are consistent with the 
inverted U-shape of the experience earnings profile in the human capital model, 
and the Life-cycle Income Hypothesis. Having been unemployed in the previous 
five years before the year of response has a significant negative effect on wage 
rates throughout the career stage groups. The negative impact of recent 
unemployment increases in magnitude as age increases; the estimated coefficient 
is approximately minus 7% in the early-career stage, approximately quadrupling 
in magnitude to minus 19% and minus 16% in the mid- and late-career stages. 
From the estimated coefficients on the years in the labour force and years 
in the labour force squared variables in Table 6.17 we can see that only the early-
career stage group has a significant positive returns to years of accumulated 
general labour market experience.8 
The mid-career stage group shows no returns from increasing years in the 
labour force within the bounds of the groupings beyond approximately 20 years. 
The lack of significance of the estimated coefficient on years in the labour force 
suggests that labour market experience of 21-30 years does not, ceteris paribus, 
increase the wage rate above the level that someone with 20 years of experience 
would be paid. Similarly, for the late-career stage it appears that experience of 
7 This result also holds when certification dummies were used instead of years of education, and the 
returns to private education were in all career stage groups were found to be insignificant. 
8 Note that no control is made within the regressions for unemployment incidence which occurred 6 
or more years before the response year, thus the return to years in the labour force may be biased 
downwards by the recent unemployment dummy variable only partially controlling for 
unemployment. 
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41-50 years has no significance return in comparison to the wage rate earned by a 
man with 40 years of experience. 9 
6.7 Actual Results and Hypothesis 6 
Following Psacharopoulos (1979), and Tucker (1986), the strong screening 
hypothesis is supported if the tenure-earnings profiles for degree holders and 
school-leavers do not diverge over time. School-leavers in this Section are 
assumed to be those BSA Survey respondents possessing CSE's, 0-levels or A-
Levels as the highest qualifications held. A divergent tenure-earnings profile is a 
rejection of the strong screening hypothesis because it is indicative of employers 
paying relatively higher wages to the more educated and productive group beyond 
the initial hiring point. 
Table 6.18 shows the estimated wage-rate functions for the two groups in 
Psacharopoulos' (1979) model (see Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2.4); school-leavers 
and degree holders, in the private sector. Again we use years in the labour force 
as a proxy for tenure with the employer, and we can see from Table 6.18 that this 
variable has a significant positive effect on the size of the wage rates of both 
education groups. Note that the size and significance of the estimated coefficient 
on years in the labour force is greater for school-leavers than for university 
graduates, and that the t-ratio associated with the estimated coefficient on the 
square of years in the labour force is not significant for those with degrees, but is 
significant for the school-leavers group. Using this methodology, this result 
would appear to support the strong screening hypothesis in the case of private 
sector employees. 
In the work ofPsacharopoulos (1979), Lee (1980) and Liu & Wong (1982) 
it is assumed that wages in the labour market for private sector employees are 
determined competitively, and that wages in the public sector are determined less 
competitively and are more likely to be based upon educational signals. Under 
9 Using dummy variables to represent each year of experience within the bounds of each career 
grouping confirms the result that the rate of return to years of experience beyond 21 years is 
insignificant; the marginal rate of return to years in the labour force increases then falls to zero as 
years in the labour force approaches 21. 
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this assumption, finding non-divergent wage rate profiles appears to be a strong 
result. 
Table 6.18: Estimated Mincer-type Functions for School-leavers and University 
Graduates who are Private Sector Employees 
Education Level: School Leavers University Graduates 
(N=1023) (N= 249) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years in Labour Force O.Q44 8.785* 0.025 2.875* 
YILF2 -0.817E-3 -8.018* -O.JISE-3 -1.440 
Years of Education 0.033 2.306* 0.041 2.078* 
Married 0.135 3.408* 0.104 1.718** 
Divorced/widowed 0.094 1.078 0.378 2.894* 
Private Education 0.046 0.990 0.018 0.331 
Recently Unemploved -0.068 -2.136* -0.142 -2.406* 
East Anelia -0.169 -2.325* -0.144 -0.931 
East Midlands -0.084 -1.297 -0.350 -2.730* 
London 0.028 0.542 -0.070 -1.047 
North East -0.180 -2.612* -0.227 -1.605 
N. Ireland -0.306 -5.601* -0.220 -1.856** 
North West -0.229 -4.494* -0.266 -2.522* 
South -0.131 -2.295* -0.183 -2.346* 
South West -0.148 -2.596* -0.338 -1.843** 
Wales -0.116 -1.561 -0.470 -2.888* 
West Midlands -0.154 -3.035* -0.087 -1.117 
Yorks. & Humberside -0.149 -2.672* -0.337 -3.894* 
Union Member 0.126 4.320* -0.065 -0.976 
Low Occupation -0.199 -5.535* -0.568 -1.796** 
High Occupation 0.108 2.837* 0.147 2.006* 
1985 -0.549 -10.066* -0.554 -5.553* 
1986 -0.419 -9.091* -0.436 -5.150* 
1987 -0.367 -7.731* -0.389 -4.701* 
1989 -0.146 -3.350* -0.204 -2.947* 
1990 -0.033 -0.702 -0.039 -0.550 
Constant 0.812 3.282* 1.096 2.527* 
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.396 
Variance of Estimate 0.176 0.141 
Meanlnw 1.432 1.981 
Notes: • S1gruficant at 5% level, •• S1gmficant at I 0% level, Graduates regressiOn uses White's 
(1980) correction. 
However, based on the evidence shown in Section 6.5.3, the assumption 
that less screening occurs in the private sector is rejected. Moreover, the strong 
screening hypothesis is actually rejected even if we put the evidence of Section 
6.5.3 aside, since running a Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test reveals that the 
only significant differences between degree holders and school-leavers in this 
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sector lie in the returns to union membership, occupation level and marital status, 
and not in the returns to years of experience. 
Table 6.19: Estimated Mincer-type Functions for School-leavers and University 
Graduates who are Public Sector Employees 
Education Level: School Leavers University Graduates 
(N=330) (N =243) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Years in Labour Force 0.016 1.984* 0.045 4.235* 
YILF2 -0.237E-3 -1.413 -0.780E-3 -3.391* 
Years of Education 0.028 1.284 0.024 1.462 
Married 0.093 1.459 0.055 0.794 
Divorced/widowed 0.120 1.108 0.229 1.526 
Private Education -0.096 -1.281 0.037 0.647 
Recently Unemployed -0.202 -3.311* -0.201 -2.286* 
East Anglia -0.057 -0.461 -0.162 -1.037 
East Midlands -0.010 -0.108 0.018 0.146 
London 0.183 2.135* -0.486E-2 -0.055 
North East -0.479E-2 -0.049 -0.109 -0.709 
N. Ireland -0.135 -1.628 -0.081 -0.882 
North West -0.077 -0.891 -0.063 -0.671 
South -0.423E-3 -0.481E-2 -0.028 -0.328 
South West -0.066 -0.715 -0.139 -1.389 
Wales -0.075 -0.640 -0.011 -0.093 
West Midlands -0.049 -0.520 -0.335 -3.080* 
Yorks. & Humberside -0.095 -1.118 -0.101 -1.053 
Union Member 0.084 1.557 -0.020 -0.364 
Low Occupation -0.135 -2.513* -0.211 -0.125 
Hi~h Occupation 0.219 4.185* 0.230 2.027* 
1985 -0.571 -6.645* -0.591 -6.237* 
1986 -0.456 -6.045* -0.520 -6.617* 
1987 -0.320 -4.219* -0.497 -6.477* 
1989 -0.222 -3.284* -0.241 -2.965* 
1990 -0.145 -1.884** -0.151 -1.887** 
Constant 1.053 2.677* 1.129 3.057* 
Adjusted R2 0.405 0.412 
Variance ofEstimate 0.135 0.117 
Meanlnw 1.530 1.961 
Notes: * S1gruficant at 5% level or better, ** S1gruficant at the I 0% level. 
This analysis is repeated for the public sector, and again the strong version 
of the screening hypothesis is rejected. Table 6.19 shows the estimated wage-rate 
functions for school-leavers and degree holders employed in the public sector. 
Years in the labour force again has a significant and positive coefficient in the 
wage rate equations for both education groups. In this case note that the size and 
significance of the estimated coefficient on years in the labour force is greater for 
university graduates than for school-leavers, and that the /-statistic associated with 
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the estimated coefficient on the square of years in the labour force is not 
significant for the school-leavers group, in comparison to university graduates 
where it is significant at the 5% level. Thus public sector employees with higher 
levels of education earn relatively higher earnings even after their employers have 
had time to observe productivity on the job. 
A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test reveals that there are significant 
differences between school-leavers and degree holders, who are working in the 
public sector, in the estimated returns to years in the labour force and its square. 
This result leads to the rejection of the strong screening hypothesis for public 
sector employees. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this Chapter a number of methodologies were used to test the strong and weak 
versions of screening hypothesis in relation to the BSA Survey data set. The 
results of testing these methodologies generally lend no support to the strong or 
weak version of the screening hypothesis and therefore support human capital 
theory. Assumptions made in previous P-tests were refuted by the results in this 
Chapter. 
The results of testing the weak screening model as interpreted by Katz & 
Ziderman (1980) were found to give no support to this model based on an analysis 
of education levels by occupation level and worker type; however it was found 
that the self-employed tended to be concentrated in certain occupations and that 
this may bias results. 
There is also little support for the screening hypothesis from applying the 
P-test methodology of making sectoral comparisons of mid- to early-career 
earnings ratios and estimated wage rate equations. These methodologies were 
previously used by, amongst others, Psacharopoulos (1979), Cohn et a! (1987) and 
Lee (1980) and the authors generally rejected the strong version of the screening 
hypothesis. 
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Testing the strong and weak versions of the screening hypothesis using the 
methodologies of Tucker ( 1986) gives results rejecting both versions of the 
screening model and supporting the human capital model of the role of education. 
Ziderman's (1990) critique of the first part of the P-test methodology has 
been noted in Section 6.2.7. The sectoral wage rate comparisons which form the 
second part of the P-test methodology in most empirical studies can be criticised 
for the assumption that competitive sectors are less likely to use educational 
screens. The hypothesis is that, although productivity is more important in the 
competitive sectors, it is expected that these sectors will apply alternative means 
of screening and that productivity is more easily measured than in the non-
competitive sectors. For example ability-contingent contracts may be applied to 
applicants in the competitive sector so less reliance is put upon educational 
screening. The assumptions that the public sector uses educational screens more 
than the private sector, and that less-competitive industries uses educational 
screens to a greater extent than more-competitive industries, were rejected using 
the BSA Survey data. 
In conclusion, using the P-test methodologies and noting the critique of 
Ziderman (1990) in relation to the simple earnings ratio tests we can say that there 
appears to be little evidence in this Chapter in support of the strong or weak 
versions of the screening hypothesis, with the exception of the results of observing 
earnings ratios by worker type in Section 6.4.2. The results of this Chapter add to 
the body of evidence which supports the human capital explanation of the 
education-earnings relationship. 
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Appendix 6.1: 
Details of Chow Tests to show the Independence ofSectoral Wage 
Rate Equations 
Table 6.20 shows the details of Chow tests to test whether the Mincerian wage 
rate functions estimated for particular industrial sectors are independent from one 
another i.e. that wage rates in the particular sectors are determined separately. In 
all cases the number of explanatory variables including the constant term was 39, 
with the exception of Public Non-services where the dummy variable representing 
nursing qualifications was omitted. 
Table 6.20: Details of Chow-tests for Independence of Wage Determination 
No. of Calculated 
Sector Observations SSE F- statistic 
Distribution (D) 771 215.16 
Public Non-services (N) 357 36.439 1.176** 
D+NPooled 1128 260.50 
Private (PR) 3353 651.83 
Public (PU) 1303 161.83 1.573* 
PR+ PU Pooled 4656 822.58 
SIC Industries I + 2 442 52.321 
SIC Industries 3 + 4 1292 176.36 1.248** 
SIC 1+2+3+4 Pooled 1734 234.15 
Notes: * stgmficant at the 5% level or better, ** stgrnficant at the 25% level only. 
The level of significance indicates at what level we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients in the two wage-rate functions are the 
same for both sectors in question. For example wage determination is found to be 
separate in the private and public sectors at the 5% level of significance. 
6.41 
Chapter 7 
Testing the Role of Education in the Italian Labour 
Market 
7.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter I test the screening hypothesis in relation to the market for full-
time workers in Italy using 1989 data. This will be done by applying 
methodologies similar to those used in Chapters 5 and 6 to test the screening 
hypothesis in relation to the UK labour market. There has been no attempt to test 
the screening hypothesis in relation to Italy to date; in fact there appears to be a 
general lack of evidence in relation to most of the member states of the European 
Community. 
From Chapter 3 we can see that previous results of testing the role of 
education seem to suggest that the screening hypothesis may apply to some 
countries rather better than other countries. For instance evidence of screening 
was found to exist for the Israel [Ziderman (1992)], Japan [Sakamoto & Chen 
(1992)], Singapore [Liu & Wong (1982)] and Australia [Miller & Volker (1984)], 
but not for the Greece [Lambropoulos (1992)], Malaysia [Lee (1980)], the 
Netherlands [Oosterbeek (1992)], Sweden [Aibrecht (1981)] and Egypt 
[Arabsheibani (1989)]. Mixed results were found for the UK [for example see 
Shah (1985) and Psacharopoulos (1979)] and the USA [for example see Riley 
(1979a) and Layard & Psacharopoulos (1974)]. The extent to which education is 
used as a screen depends on the nature of the educational systems, labour markets 
and cultures in these countries. One cannot generalise the results found for 
Country A to Country B if the two countries have institutional and cultural 
differences in their education systems and labour markets. The main differences 
in the education systems and labour markets in the UK and Italy are highlighted in 
Sections 7.4 to 7.6. 
Section 7.2 presents the methodology used in this Chapter to test the 
screening hypothesis, outlines the earnings function which will be the basis of the 
analysis and gives details of the hypotheses about the role of education to be 
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tested and the expected results from these hypotheses. Section 7.3 discusses the 
data set used [the 1989 wave of the Bank of Italy 'Survey on Consumption by 
Italian Families' (SCIF)]. 
Section 7.4 describes the nature of the Italian educational system. Section 
7.5 investigates the nature of the North-South divide and labour market dualism in 
Italy. Some background to the economic dualism is given, regional variations in 
the mean levels of the SCIF sample variables are presented, and separate regional 
earnings functions are estimated. 
The Rome Treaty (1957), which founded the European Economic 
Community [now known as the European Union (EU)], emphasised the goal of 
improving living standards and working conditions within member states. In the 
first major revision of the Rome Treaty, the Single European Act (1987), the EU 
stated that it aimed to open national markets to competition among member 
states, these markets are not only those for goods and services, but also financial 
and factor markets. The markets for labour in member states have since been the 
subject of a number of EU directives relating to discrimination in the workplace, 
health and safety and labour mobility. 
Despite these directives many critics believed that labour market reform in 
member countries of the EU was lagging behind the reforms occurring in other 
EU markets, and the laissez-faire approach to the labour market should itself be 
revised [see Brown et a! (1996) for further details on the implications of 
liberalising EU labour markets]. However, the labour market did not escape the 
aim of 'convergence' of markets within the EU outlined in the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) and the 'Social Charter' later detailed principles regarding the labour 
market. The UK opted out of the Charter which aimed to make working 
conditions, levels of social security and worker protection uniform across the 
labour markets of the member countries of the EU. 
With this in mind Section 7.6 aims to present some comparisons between 
the labour market for full-time workers in the UK and in Italy in 1989, since 
although EU directives may eventually lead to certain uniformities in the labour 
markets of member countries the role of education in the labour markets of 
member states has been largely over-looked. 
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Section 7.7 tests the screening hypothesis in relation to Italy 1989. Some 
preliminary results from testing the significance of differences in mean values of 
the sample variables between the self-employed and employees are presented. 
Then the actual results of estimating earnings equations are compared to the 
expected results under the hypotheses detailed in Section 7.2. Section 7.8 gives 
some overall conclusions from the analyses in this Chapter. 
7.2 Methodology 
7.2.1 The Earnings Function 
The following Mincer-type earnings equation is estimated for full-time workers in 
Italy 1989; 
where: 
w 
a 
c 
X 
d 
= 
= 
= 
household 'wage rate' calculated from household net disposable 
income, hours and months worked in 1989 (in lOOO's Italian Lira), 
average wage for reference respondent, 
educational certification dummies, 
years of labour market experience, proxied by age, 
vector of regional, marital status and other earner dummy 
variables. 
There is a common problem associated with using age to proxy for years 
of experience are illustrated below [also discussed in Mincer (1974), pp. 83-85]. 
Assuming continuous work experience starting immediately after leaving 
education, we can write: 
(2) A=x+y+b 
where: 
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A = age 
b age at which schooling began, 
y = years of education, 
X = years of!abour market experience. 
The use of age as a proxy for years of experience x in the function leaves 
out an interactive term derived from expanding the quadratic term in the 
following function; 
The coefficient B2 will be an over estimate of the returns to labour market 
experience, since it will include the effect of years of education on wage rates. 
Similarly the coefficient B3 will be an over estimate of the effect of increasing 
experience upon the returns to experience, since; 
(4) (x+ y+b)2 = x+ y 2 + 2xy+ 2bx+2by+b2 
and therefore the estimated coefficient on the quadratic will include the effect of 
increasing years of education upon the returns education and the four other factors 
above. However, Blinder (1975) posits that, although Mincer strictly used years 
in the labour force to measure non-school human capital in his earnings functions, 
when a wage rate function is used we should be less doctrinaire about the 
functional form used an base our decision on empirical basis rather than a 
theoretical one. 
The estimated coefficients on the certification dummy variables will be 
corrected for the effects of years of education by the inclusion of age, and so years 
of education is not entered as a separate independent variable. 
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7.2.2 Hypotheses and Expected Results 
The hypotheses that follow are carried over from Chapters 5 and 6. They are 
constructed to test for differences in the role of education in determining wages 
between groups differing by worker type or education level. Hypotheses 1-4 test 
the weak version of the educational screening hypothesis, and Hypothesis 5 tests 
the strong version of the screening hypothesis based on the methodology of 
Tucker (1986). 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the estimation of wage rate functions for self-
employed workers and employees. As in Chapter 5, it is assumed in a weak 
version of the screening hypothesis that the self-employed have no need to signal 
their ability to employers and therefore only use education as a human capital 
investment. In contrast, employees are assumed to use educational both to 
augment and to signal their ability to would-be employers. In this sense we can 
refer to the self-employed as the 'unscreened' group and employees as the 
'screened' group. 
7.2.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
Following Riley (1979a), we would expect that for education to be an effective 
screening device it should be an accurate signal of worker productivity. The wage 
rate function of the screened group, assumed to be employees, is therefore 
expected to fit the data better than that for the unscreened group, assumed to be 
the self-employed. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Ho: The screened group does not fit the model any more accurately than the 
unscreened group, 
H 1: The screened group does fit the model more accurately than the 
unscreened group. 
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7 .2.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
Under the weak version of the educational screening hypothesis we would expect 
higher returns from education for the screened group, assumed to be employees, 
compared to the unscreened group, assumed to be the self-employed. The self-
employed are assumed to be fully aware of their productive ability and education 
therefore serves no purpose as a screening device for productivity, but may still be 
valuable as a human capital investment. For employees education is assumed to 
be valuable not only for its human capital effects on productivity but also its role 
as a signal in the labour market. The null hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
Ho: Returns to education are not significantly higher for employees relative to 
the self-employed, 
H 1: Returns to education are significantly higher for employees relative to the 
self-employed. 
7 .2.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
Following Psacharopoulos (1979) we assume that the public administration sector 
is characterised by non-competitive wage determination based upon educational 
screening devices, and that the private sector is characterised by more competitive 
wage determination. The SCIF 1989 data does not specifically identify private 
sector workers and so commercial services and the other services sectors are used 
to represent the competitive private sector. 
In sectors, such as the public administration sector, where wage rates are 
difficult to measure and determined bureaucratically we would expect educational 
screening to be in operation. We would therefore expect, under the weak 
screening hypothesis, to find higher returns to educational variables in such 
sectors in comparison to more competitive sectors, such as commercial services. 
The P-test hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
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Ho: Returns to education do not vary significantly between high and low 
competition sectors, 
H 1: Returns to education do vary significantly between high and low 
competition sectors. 
7.2.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
Following Tucker (1986), under the weak screening hypothesis, we would expect 
that as tenure increases the firm is able to gather more information about 
individual ability, and we should therefore expect that the size and the level of 
significance of the estimated rate of return on the certification variables (the 
initial signals of individual ability) should decline as tenure increases. We can 
use age as a proxy for tenure, for the reasons stated in Section 6.6 of Chapter 6. 
Rejection of the following null hypothesis would therefore lend support to the 
weak screening hypothesis: 
Ho: Returns to certificates do not decrease as tenure (proxied by age) 
increases, 
H 1: Returns to certificates decrease as tenure (proxied by age) increases. 
7.2.2.5 Hypothesis 5 
Following Tucker (1986), the strong screening hypothesis is supported if the age-
earnings profiles for university graduates and schoolleavers do not diverge as age 
increases. If the profiles prove to be divergent then this rejects the strong 
screening hypothesis and shows that the higher educated are receive higher 
earnings beyond the initial hiring point because of human capital effects of 
education. 
Rejection of the following null hypothesis would therefore support the 
strong screening hypothesis: 
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Ho: Returns to age (as a proxy for tenure) rise as education level rises, 
H 1: Returns to age (as a proxy for tenure) do not rise as education level rises. 
7.3 The Sample 
. The sample used in this Chapter is derived from the 1989 wave of the 'Survey on 
Consumption by Italian Families' (SCIF) commissioned by the Bank ofltaly. The 
questionnaire is comprised of six main sections which record household 
characteristics, details of income, saving, consumption, wealth and the banking 
behaviour of a national cross-section ofltalian families. 
Using SPSS, from the 1989 data set I have taken a subset of data for 
household heads who were working full-time. I The variables selected were the 
marital, educational and occupational characteristics of the head of the household. 
The response rate regarding individual income of working household 
heads was poor so family net disposable income data is used as a proxy for 
individual income of the head of the household with control made for the number 
of other workers in the household. 2 · 
In a similar fashion to the BSA Survey sample used in previous Chapters, 
control can also be made for regional labour market disparities as geographic 
region is also recorded. The reference categories, unless otherwise stated, are 
such that a in Equation (1) is the average wage of a single male full-time blue-
collar (or, if self-employed, not a professional or entrepreneur) worker living in 
the south, holding a primary school leaving certificate as his highest qualification 
and no other workers contributing to household income. Unfortunately, in 
comparison to the BSA Survey sample used in Chapters 4-6, there is no data 
regarding union status of workers or racial origin, and no useful data on recent 
unemployment incidence. See Appendix 7.1 for a description of the variables 
contained in the SCIF 1989 sample. 
I Note: Female workers are omitted from some sections of this Chapter due to data restrictions. 
The number of female full-time workers in the sample, for which complete records were available, 
was not large enough to allow the separation of data into the various sub-samples needed for the 
comparative methodologies in some of the hypotheses tests. 
2 See Appendix 7.2 on the effects of estimating earnings equations for single worker households 
and the justfication for including multiple worker households in the sample. 
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Section 7.4 outlines the nature of the Italian education system, and Section 
7.5 the nature of the Italian labour market. Section 7.6 presents some 
comparisons between the Italian labour market and the UK labour market. 
Section 7.7 presents the results from testing the screening hypothesis for Italy. 
7.4 The Italian Education System 
The mam labour market problems in Italy in the late 1980's were high 
unemployment rates and low levels of qualifications and education of the labour 
force. To some extent the latter factors may be due to the severe under-funding of 
the education system, the minimum leaving age of 14 and subsequent small 
proportion of students continuing through to university level education 
[Employment Observatory Trends No. 20 (1994)]. Italy, in comparison to the UK, 
has a higher average government expenditure on each primary-school pupil, but a 
lower average government expenditure on each student in higher education [The 
Economist, April22nd 1995, p. 20]. 
In Italy, non-compulsory nursery education is provided for 3-6 year-olds in 
both state and private facilities, and the majority of Italian children will have 
attended such nurseries. School attendance is compulsory for children of the ages 
6 to 14 years. Compulsory primary education starts at the age of 6 and continues 
until children reach the age of 11 year olds. The final year at primary school ends 
with Licenza elemetare examinations, and this primary school certificate admits 
children to middle schooL Middle school education is from 11 to 14 and pupils 
study for the Licenza di scuola media, the Intermediate Certificate. 
In a similar fashion to the UK with regards to GCSE's and 'A' level 
admittance, this intermediate certificate allows access to higher secondary 
schools. Higher secondary schools teach 14-19 year olds and fall into one of five 
categories; grammar schools, art schools, teacher training schools, technical 
institutes and vocational institutes (with more practical courses than technical 
institutes). Graduation from a higher secondary school allows an individual to 
apply to universities or allows a graduate from a vocational institute access to 
intermediate professions. 
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Italian university courses normally last for at least four years and very few 
students receive a student grant from the state. Unlike the UK, Italy has no 
specific student loans system and enrollment fees have to be paid. 
Although exam resits are more common in Italy than the UK [Raban 
(1991) p. 20], figures for 1989 show that approximately 6% of Italians (aged 25-
64 years of age) graduated from university, in comparison to 9% of the population 
in the UK. In comparison, the population proportions with only nursery, primary 
or lower secondary education as the highest education level are 74% for Italy and 
35% for the UK [for more details see OECD (1992) Table Cl]. 
The certification dummies in vector c in Equation ( 1) represent no 
certification, intermediate and high school certification and university degree 
level certification as the highest level of certification held by the SCIF 1989 
respondent, and the omitted reference category is primary school certification 
unless otherwise stated. 
7.5 The Italian Labour Market: Dualism 
7.5.1 Introduction 
Economists tend to view the differences between the labour markets in the North 
and South regions of Italy as being an example of market dualism where two quite 
different economies exist within the same country, rather than simply as a 
regional issue. Foreign occupation until the unification of Italy in 1860 prevented 
the growth of a culture of public service, particularly in the South where the 
public administration and service shortcomings in turn impeded economic 
growth. Italian market dualism has been recognised since unification on the basis 
of major differences in activity rates, unemployment rates, emigration levels and 
per capita regional expenditure. 
Post-war dualism was documented by Lutz (1962) and has been 
substantially modified in nature. Lutzian dualism in Italy was characterised by 
workers in different regions being paid differing wage rates for the same work 
although they possessed the same characteristics (such as education) and potential 
productivity [see Alien et a/ (1974) for more details]. 
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The high paid group tended to be state employees or those protected by 
unions and working in large industries with minimum wage contracts set by a 
process of collective bargaining. In comparison to non-state employees, state 
employees enjoyed higher pay, higher pensions, better sick-pay, more holidays, 
guaranteed job-security and perks which could sometimes be interpreted as 
corruption [see p.126 Alien et a/ (1974)] 
The lower paid group tended to be self-employed persons and hired 
manual workers attached to very small enterprises with small workforces and not 
covered by terms of collective bargaining contracts. 3 Thus the size of enterprise 
was the fundamental basis of Lutzian dualism, and since large industry was 
concentrated in the North-Centre of Italy and the overwhelming majority of 
enterprises in the South were small firms, the dualism evolved into a North-South 
divide. 
In the post-war period union membership in Italy, and therefore power in 
the bargaining process, was relatively low and concentrated in the industrial areas 
of the North. The abundance of smaller employers in the South, who were 
encouraged to grow by the state through preferential credit facilities and tax-
breaks, therefore had little difficulty in employing non-union labour and under-
cutting the minimum wage level set in the Northern areas. Although labour 
mobility within Italy was severely impeded by pre-war Fascist legislation, this led 
to much inter-regional and outward migration to Southern Europe and America in 
the post-war period and severe de-population of Southern Italy. 
Law reforms in the 1960's, the rise of union power and the growth in the 
average size of enterprise workforces diminished the scope for Lutzian dualism. 
The emergence of 'state economic enterprises' through the 1960's and 1970's led to 
a substantial increase in the size of the manufacturing industry in the South, 
relative to the North, both in terms of output and employment. However, the rise 
in the black market for labour in the South, fuelled by the European heroin 
market, the inadequacy of the unemployment benefit system and ineffective 
3 Lutz concentrated on the 'cheap-labour' hiring practices of firms with ten or less workers in his 
treatment oflabour market dualism. 
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regional development policy has maintained the North-South labour market 
dualism in the 1980's. 
There had been some limited progress by the late 1980's in the industrial 
development of the South East of Italy and Eastern Sicily, but where productivity 
improvements had occurred, in the metal and chemical industries, it was mainly 
due to factor substitution i.e. replacing human capital (workers) with new physical 
capital. Indeed, there was a contraction of traditional industries such as steel, 
petrochemicals and shipbuilding, leading to structural problems. The resulting 
unemployment counteracted the improvement in productivity in the South. 
In fact Schachter & Engelbourg (1988) conclude that, although the South 
had tripled its per capita income over the 1950-1988 period and although the 
North-South divide was no longer expanding, the division was in fact greater in 
1988 than when the government initiated its development policies in the 1960's. 
Indeed, the authors describe the 1985 'Three Year Plan for the South' as a 
'symbolic panacea' rather than an effective development policy. 
One problem lies in the nature of the Italian labour market. The 
entrepreneur in the South of Italy is faced with high labour costs relative to labour 
productivity. In 1984 average output per industrial worker in the South was 75% 
that of workers in the North, but labour contracts are generally decided on a 
national basis. This tends to promote the creation of capital-intensive industries 
in which employment is based on the. national rather than the Southern labour 
market, leading to involuntary unemployment in the legal labour market of the 
South [see Schachter & Engelbourg (1988)]. 
In 1989 Italy's main social problem was youth unemployment, particularly 
in the South, and the gap between living standards in the North-Centre and South. 
In the North-Centre area the majority of young people are covered by work-
training contracts but the rate of unemployment in terms of first job seekers is as 
high as 50% in some regions of the South. The national unemployment benefit 
system is such that payments to unemployed youths are very low and the family is 
expected to look after such youths, if they do not find legitimate work or jobs in 
the thriving black market for labour [see Jenkins (1988)]. 
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7.5.2 Differences in Variable Means by Region 
Italy is characterised by extreme differences in unemployment and living 
standards by region, and there is much literature to suggest that the country has 
been a case study of a dual labour market. Table 7.1 shows the differences in the 
mean levels of variables in the two regions from the 1989 SCIF sample of full-
time workers. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics from SCIF 1989 by Region 
Region: North-Centre South 
(N = 1641) (N = 1025) 
Variable Name Mean Standard Mean Standard T-Statistic 
Deviation Deviation 
Family Income 41813 23368 33784 22764 8.769* 
Months worked 11.955 0.536 11.798 1.090 4.298* 
Weekly Hours 40.693 3.937 40.773 4.980 -0.436 
Age 43.300 10.250 43.204 10.337 0.234 
Sex 0.899 0.007 0.935 0.008 -3.206* 
Married 0.831 0.009 0.894 0.010 -4.497* 
Si~~gle 0.102 0.007 0.067 0.008 3.095* 
Divorced I widowed 0.067 0.006 0.039 0.006 3.053* 
No formal Education 0.017 0.003 0.048 0.007 -4.647* 
Primary Certificate 0.222 0.010 0.278 0.014 -3.277* 
Intermediate Cert. 0.338 0.012 0.260 0.014 4.244* 
High School Cert. 0.316 0.011 0.302 0.014 0.760 
Degree 0.107 0.008 0.112 0.010 -0.403 
Blue Collar Occ. 0.336 0.012 0.305 0.014 1.664** 
Clerical Occupation 0.277 0.011 0.309 0.014 -1.773** 
Middle level Occ. 0.091 0.007 0.077 0.008 1.257 
High Level Occ. 0.027 0.004 0.023 0.005 0.638 
Agriculture 0.039 0.005 0.080 0.008 -4.526* 
Construction 0.138 0.009 0.143 0.011 -0.362 
Energy 0.193 0.010 0.139 0.011 3.592* 
Commercial/ Distrib. 0.168 0.009 0.175 0.012 -0.467 
Transport I Commnn. 0.080 0.007 0.084 0.009 -0.367 
Finance 0.029 0.004 0.024 0.005 0.774 
Consultancies 0.032 0.004 0.020 0.004 1.847** 
Public Administration 0.134 0.008 0.180 0.012 -3.221* 
Other Services 0.188 . 0.010 0.154 0.011 2.248* 
Self-employed 0.270 0.011 0.287 0.014 -0.955 
S.E. Professional 0.073 0.006 0.060 0.007 1.297 
S.E. Entrepreneur 0.098 0.007 0.114 0.010 -1.316 
S.E. Other 0.099 0.007 0.113 0.010 -1.150 
Notes: * Stgruficant at the 5% level m a two-tailed test, ** stgruficant at the 10% level, wtth 2664 
degrees of freedom. 
The regions included as the 'South' of Italy, known as the Mezzogiorno, are 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Abruzzi Molise, and the islands of 
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Sardinia and Sicily. The regions included as the 'North-Centre' of Italy are 
Piemonte, Valle d' Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, Toscana, Trentino - Alto Adige, 
Friuli - Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio. This 
follows the methodology ofMeschi (1995). 
From Table 7.1 we can see that there are significant differences in the 
mean values of some of the variables listed between the North-Centre and South 
regions. There are significantly more female household heads in the North-Centre 
region in comparison to the South. Household heads in the South are more likely 
to be married and therefore less likely to be single, divorced or widowed. 
Significantly more workers in the South are likely to have no formal 
qualifications or primary certification as the highest level of qualification held. 
Significantly more workers in the North-Centre hold intermediate certification 
whereas the proportions for high-school and degree level certification do not 
differ significantly by region. Workers in the North-Centre on average work a 
significantly longer year, but not a longer week, in comparison to workers in the 
South. 
There is a significantly higher proportion of blue collar employees or 
similar workers in the North-Centre region, a significantly higher proportion of 
clerical or similar workers in the South, and there is no significant difference in 
the proportions of middle and top management workers between regions. The 
proportion of workers who are self-employed in each region does not differ 
significantly. 
As we would expect, the proportion of workers who are active in the 
agricultural sector of the economy is significantly higher in the South; for 
example the area of Puglia in the late 1980's was responsible for a major 
proportion of Italy's olive and citrus fruit crop. The proportion of workers who 
are active in the energy sector of the economy is significantly higher in the North-
Centre; again this is as expected given the poor utility infrastructure in the South. 
The proportions for commercial, distribution, transport, communications and 
finance sectors do not differ significantly by region. The proportion of workers in 
consultancy and other services jobs is relatively higher in the North-Centre, and 
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the proportion of workers in public administration jobs is relatively higher in the 
South. 
Also as expected there is a highly significant difference between average 
family income between the North-Centre and South of Italy; with families in the 
South receiving on average approximately 80% of the income of families in the 
North-Centre. 
7.5.3 Differences in Estimated Earnings Equations by Region 
Table 7.2 shows the estimated earnings equations for full-time workers in Italy by 
region. From Table 7.2 we can see that there appear to be a number of significant 
differences between the estimated earnings equations for the two regions. Being 
male as opposed to female increases the earnings of full-time workers in the 
North-Centre region of Italy by approximately 9%, whereas there is no such 
differential in the South. Self-employment on the other hand appears to 
uniformly increase earnings in both regions by approximately 20-21%. 
The average rate of return to years of age in the North-Centre region is 
approximately 4% and in the South approximately 3% for each year of age. 
Decreasing marginal returns to age are present in both areas; the decrease in 
returns to age as age increases appears to be larger in the North-Centre indicated 
by the higher estimated coefficient on age-squared. 
The positive effect on earnings of having no certification in comparison to 
primary certification is only significant in the North-Centre region and raises 
earnings by approximately 19%. The estimated earnings effects of intermediate, 
high-school and degree level certification are equivalent in both regions, raising 
earnings by approximately 10%, 28-30% and 51-52% respectively in comparison 
to a worker holding only primary certification. 
The effect of being married is significant in the North-Centre region in the 
determination of earnings and increases earnings by approximately 14%. In 
comparison, marital status in the South has no significant effect on earnings in 
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comparison to a single person. Being divorced or widowed is not significant in 
the determination of earnings in either region. 
Earnings in the North-Centre in the construction, energy, distribution, 
commercial and other services sectors are not significantly different, ceteris 
paribus, from earnings in the agricultural sector. Similarly, earnings in the 
construction, transport, communication, distribution and commercial services 
sectors are not significantly different, ceteris paribus, from earnings in the 
agricultural sector in the South. Wage rates in the transport and communications 
sectors are approximately 14% higher than in agriculture in the North-Centre, 
whilst earnings in the energy and other services sector are approximately 10-11% 
higher than in agriculture in the South. Wage rates in the finance sector are 
approximately 31% higher in the North-Centre and 20% higher in the South than 
in their agricultural sectors. 
The average log-wage converted to lire for each region is 17796 lire per 
hour in the North-Centre region and 14585 lire per hour in the South. A Chow 
test to show that the two estimated earnings equations are separate i.e. that the 
labour market is regionally segmented gives an F-statistic of 4.27 which is 
significant at the 1% level; this implies that some form of labour market dualism 
exists. 
A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test revealed that significant regional 
differences appeared in the effects of marital status, additional workers in the 
household, and the industrial sector in which the SCIF respondent worked (with 
the exception of the variable representing the energy sector). This last result 
implies that workers in the construction, distribution, commercial, transport, 
communications and finance sectors have higher earnings ceteris paribus in the 
North-Centre in comparison to similarly employed workers in the South. Only 
workers in the other services sector earn more, ceteris paribus, in the South than 
in the North-Centre region ofltaly. 
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Table 7.2: Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Full-timers by Region (1989) 
Region: North-Centre South 
(N = 1641) (N = 1025) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T -Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.090 2.217* 0.024 0.349 
Self-employed 0.207 8.932* 0.200 5.996* 
Al!e 0.039 5.573* 0.028 2.885* 
A gel -0.00032 -4.070* -0.00023 -2.075* 
No Certification 0.189 2.585* 0.071 1.087 
Intermediate Certificate 0.101 3.789* 0.097 2.659* 
High School Certificate 0.275 9.808* 0.299 7.916* 
Del!ree 0.512 13.937* 0.519 10.484* 
Married 0.135 3.651* 0.00045 0.008 
Divorced I widowed -0.008 -0.164 -0.091 -1.031 
Construction 0.054 1.010 0.024 0.421 
Enei'I!Y 0.068 1.308 0.108 1.814** 
Distribution/Commercial 0.077 1.461 0.036 0.625 
Transport/Communication 0.137 2.353* 0.063 0.965 
Finance 0.305 4.143* 0.197 2.020* 
Other Services 0.055 1.077 0.096 1.774** 
1 Additional worker 0.390 18.946* 0.523 17.689* 
2 Additional workers 0.658 16.658* 0.819 10.163* 
3 Additional workers 0.864 12.659* 0.992 5.389* 
4 Additional workers 1.101 6.600* 0.361 1.234 
Constant 1.094 6.973* 1.376 6.130* 
AdjustedR2 0.458 0.450 
Variance ofEstimate 0.137 0.166 
Mean lnw 2.879 2.658 
Notes: * Stgruficant at 5% level, ** stgmficant at I 0% level. 
7.5.4 Conclusion 
Comparisons between earnings determination in the North-Centre and South 
regions of Italy, show little variation in the effect of certification upon family 
earnings. The estimated rates of return to intermediate, high-school and degree 
level certification are equivalent in both regions raising earnings by 
approximately 10%, 28-30% and 51-52% respectively in comparison to a worker 
holding only primary certification. There appears to be little regional difference 
in the role of education in the Italian labour market. However, one difference that 
is apparent is the significant positive earnings effect of having no certification in 
comparison to primary certification in the North-Centre region; this result is re-
examined in Appendix 7.2. 
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7.6 Comparisons Between the UK and Italy 
7.6.1 National Comparisons 
It is tempting to compare the estimated rates of return to Italian high school 
certification and degrees with those estimated in Chapters 4-6 for UK 'A' levels 
and degrees. However, such comparisons between the estimated rates of return to 
educational variables in the determination of earnings for the UK and Italy are 
complicated by the differing nature of the educational systems of the two 
countries, and the different formulations of the earnings equation estimated in this 
Chapter as compared to previous Chapters. The problems of different 
formulation lie in the fact that the dependant variable in the BSA Survey data is 
individual wage rate and the dependant variable in the SCIF data is family wage 
rate. 
Similarly, since age (which includes years of education) is used as a proxy 
for labour market experience, we cannot strictly compare the rates of return to age 
and age squared in Italy with years in the labour force and its square in the 
regressions for the UK in previous Chapters.4 
In this section the UK BSA Survey data for 1989 is analysed using a 
similar formulation that has been applied to the Italian SCIF data. The control 
variables for racial origin, unionisation, recent unemployment, certification, and 
occupational class are dropped. Female workers are re-introduced so that we may 
ascertain the differing effect of gender on wages between the countries. To make 
the regional dummy variables more comparable the prosperous North region is 
now the reference category for the Italian regression, since the South East is the 
reference category for the UK. Since the certificate dummy variables are 
dropped, because comparisons are meaningless, the coefficient on years of 
education is an over estimate of the true average rate of return to years of 
education independent of certification effects. Table 7.3 shows the results of 
estimating the earnings equation for full-timers in 1989 for the two countries. 
4 The word 'strictly' is used here since there seems to be some debate in human capital literature as 
to how biased estimated rates of return are when using the age proxy; see Blinder (1975). 
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From Table 7.3 we can see that the effect of gender upon wage 
determination differs significantly between countries; being male in Italy 
increases earnings by approximately 7% compared to 31% in the UK. Self-
employment increases earnings of Italians by approximately I 9%, but reduces 
earnings ofUK workers by approximately 24%. 
Being married or living as married has a significant positive effect upon 
earnings of workers in both countries; the effect is to raise earnings by 
approximately 8% in Italy and 14% in the UK. Being divorced or widowed 
reduces earnings of Italian workers by about 5% and in contrast divorced or 
widowed workers in the UK have 17% higher earnings. 
The rate of return to each year of age is approximately 4% and 6% in Italy 
and the UK respectively. However, the decline in the rate of return to age as age 
increases is more marked in the UK; the coefficient on age-squared being 
approximately double in size for the estimated UK earnings equation in 
comparison to the Italian estimated equation. 
The earnings effect of education (with no control for certification effects) 
IS much higher in the UK; UK workers have an increase in earnings of 
approximately 10% for each year of education compared to 4% for each year of 
education for Italian workers. 
The regional variations m earnings between prosperous and less 
prosperous areas appear to be more pronounced in the UK in comparison to Italy. 
For example earnings in Wales are, ceteris paribus, approximately 27% lower 
than in the South East, whereas earnings in the South of Italy are, ceteris paribus, 
11% lower in comparison to the more prosperous North. One of the reasons why 
this result occurs may be due to differences in the way in which wages are set in 
the two countries. In the UK the system is 'voluntarist' in the sense that the state 
adopts a laissez-faire approach and imposes a minimum amount of labour market 
legislation upon employers. Where workers are unionised in the UK the unions 
would tend to agree to a national norm level of wage rates, but then regional 
market influences are allowed to determine wage rates within the agreed range. 
In contrast, Italy tends to be characterised by the Roman-Germanic system in 
which there are stricter rules for wage determination through union bargaining on 
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a national level with state guarantees of minimum levels of remuneration, 
working conditions and worker unionisation. For example in 1989 the scala 
mobile was still in place in the Italian system; this was an explicit contract which 
ensured that wage levels would be indexed to inflation expectations to protect 
workers' living standards [see Brown et a! ( 1996) for the implications of these 
differences in bargaining structure upon EU labour market convergence]. 
The lack of union membership variable in the SCIF 1989 sample is 
unfortunate as it means that we cannot control for, or compare, differences in the 
effects of unionisation upon the earnings of workers in the two countries. 
However, trade union membership density in the late 1980's was approximately 
comparable in the UK and Italy, being approximately 40-42% of the workforce 
[Gunnigle et a! (1994)]. Although recognition of trade unions by employers was 
also approximately the same in this period in the two countries, the influence of 
UK trade unions within labour market negotiations diminished to a greater extent 
than in Italy in the late 1980's [see Figure 2 in Gunnigle et a! (1994)).5 
The difference in mean log wages between the two countries can be 
attributed to the fact that earnings is measured in the different currencies of each 
country; thousands of Italian Lire and £'s Sterling. To compare the real earnings 
earned by workers in the two countries measured in terms of a common currency, 
purchasing power parity (PPP) figures for 1989 can be used. Purchasing power 
parity represents the rate of exchange between two currencies which would exist 
if they were to be exchanged in direct proportion to the domestic price levels 
prevailing in the two countries. The divergence between PPP and the actual 
exchange rate indicates the differing price level and hence different cost of living 
between the two countries. 
The PPP for Italy in 1989 with reference to the UK is approximately 
2304.54 lire to the pound. The reported mean log-wage rate reported for Italy in 
Table 7.8 converted to lire is approximately 16297.3 lire and using the PPP figure 
this is approximately equivalent to £7.07. The mean log-wage rate reported for 
5 One way of comparing the effects of union coverage between the two countries would be to 
include the regional average level of union coverage as an explanatory variable in the earnings 
equations for the two countries. However, this thesis is primarily concerned with the role of 
education in the labour market and regional dummy variables suffice in controlling for regional 
variations in union coverage. 
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the UK in Table 7.8 when converted to non-logarithmic form is approximately 
£4.28. However, note that the Italian figure is a 'household' wage in the sense that 
approximately 48% of the households in the SCIF sample contain one or more 
additional workers who will contribute to household income. 
Table 7.3: Estimated Earnings Functions for Italian and UK Full-timers (1989) 
Country: Italy UK 
(N =2666) (N = 1666) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient 
Male 0.067 1.916** 0.306 
Self-employed 0.186 10.806* -0.236 
Married 0.079 2.528* 0.142 
Divorced/widowed -0.047 -1.088* 0.174 
A~e 0.036 6.285* 0.056 
A!!e2 -0.00029 -4.519* -0.00064 
Years of Education 0.039 20.719* 0.097 
East An)!lia 
- --
-0.052 
East Midlands -- -- -0.158 
London -- -- 0.075 
North East -- -- -0.150 
Northern Ireland -- -- -0.214 
North West 
- -
-0.158 
Scotland -- -- -0.170 
South West -- -- -0.180 
Wales -- -- -0.266 
West Midlands -- -- -0.117 
Yorks. & Humberside 
-- --
-0.133 
Central -0.056 -2.752* --
South -0.109 -5.468* --
Island -0.143 -5.898* --
1 Additional worker 0.447 26.409* --
2 Additional workers 0.717 19.852* --
3 Additional workers 0.899 13.647* --
4 Additional workers 0.931 6.272* --
Constant 0.892 6.948* -1.438 
AdjustedR2 0.461 0.297 
Variance of estimate 0.152 0.213 
Meanlnw 2.791 1.455 
Notes: • Stgruficant at 5% level or better, •• stgruficant at I 0% level, 
'--' denotes that a variable is not defined for that sub-sample. 
T- Ratio 
12.350* 
-7.134* 
4.220* 
3.303* 
8.225* 
-7.782* 
16.502* 
-0.706 
-2.872* 
1.607* 
-2.688* 
-5.497* 
-3.222* 
-3.304* 
-3.527* 
-3.844* 
-2.415* 
-2.657* 
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
-9.234* 
To allow for the unequal proportions of female workers and additional 
earners in the two samples the following calculated wage rates and incomes are 
for male full-timers who are sole earners in both countries, and using PPP figure 
to convert to Pounds Sterling, gives the following figures: 
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Italy 1989: 
UK 1989: 
Income=£ 12931 
Income=£ 12503 
Hourly Wage-rate = £ 6.25 
Hourly Wage-rate=£ 5.38 
This indicates that individual incomes and wages rates are higher in Italy 
than in the UK for full-time workers and illustrates the sorpasso (overtaking) of 
the UK in terms of gross income per capita. The sorpasso of the UK in terms of 
gross national product occurred in 1986 because of the strength of the lira, the 
rapid expansion of Italian economy over the period 1983-1987, and a re-
assessment ofltaly's national accounts. This confirmed what many observers had 
claimed from looking at increasing living standards in the North-Centre, although 
the South continued to Jag behind [see Jenkins (1988) for further details]. Note 
that real wage growth in Italy was lower in 1989 than in the UK [see Figure 14, p. 
136, World Employment 1995]. 
7.6.2 Regional Comparisons Between the UK and Italy 
Table 7.4 shows the results of estimating earnings equations for the South and 
North-Centre of Italy. Table 7.5 shows the results of estimating earnings 
equations for the North and South of the UK. The regions included as South and 
North-Centre of Italy are the same as in Section 7.5.3. The regions included as 
the 'South' of the UK are the South East, South West, London, East Anglia, and 
the East Midlands. The regions included as the 'North' of the UK are Northern 
Ireland, Wales, Scotland, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, the North 
East and the North West. Such division of the country is justified on the basis of 
regional unemployment levels and Brown et a! ( 1994) provide clear evidence of 
such a North-South divide on the basis of long term unemployment probabilities. 
Industrial dummy variables have been introduced to the estimated earnings 
equations to allow for the fact that the economies of certain geographic areas tend 
to be dominated by specific industries. In each estimated earnings equation the 
reference category for industrial sector is the agricultural sector. 
From Table 7.4 we can see that there are a number of significant 
differences between the estimated earnings equations for the two regions of Italy; 
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these differences are generally equivalent to those described for Table 7.2 in 
Section 7.5.3. Being male as opposed to female increases the earnings of full-
time workers in the North-Centre region of Italy by approximately 9%, whereas 
there is no such differential in the South. Self-employment uniformly increases 
earnings in both regions by approximately 21%. 
Table 7.4 : Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Full-timers by Region using 
Years of Education Variable (1989) 
Region: North-Centre South 
(N = 1641) (N = 1025) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.091 2.236* 0.021 0.310 
Self-employed 0.214 9.198* 0.207 6.165* 
Age 0.039 5.566* 0.026 2.646* 
Age2 -0.00032 -4.046* -0.00019 -1.756** 
Years of Education 0.036 14.334* 0.036 10.809* 
Married 0.125 3.371* -0.011 -0.194 
Divorced I widowed -0.023 -0.471 -0.092 -1.040 
Construction 0.045 0.832 -0.00046 -0.008 
Eneri!Y 0.056 1.059 0.078 1.323 
Distribution/Commercial 0.058 1.104 -0.002 -0.035 
Transport/Communication 0.120 2.043* 0.036 0.553 
Finance 0.291 3.933* 0.177 1.814** 
Other Services 0.053 1.040 0.083 1.531 
I Additional worker 0.391 18.876* 0.532 18.010* 
2 Additional workers 0.661 16.596* 0.827 10.215* 
3 Additional workers 0.865 12.578* 0.971 5.244* 
4 Additional workers 1.088 6.472* 0.415 1.412 
Constant 0.748 4.669* 1.099 4.860* 
AdjustedR2 0.449 0.443 
Variance ofEstimate 0.139 0.168 
Meanlnw 2.879 2.658 
Notes: * S1gmficant at 5% level, ** Sigruficant at 10% level. 
The average rate of return to general human capital, as proxied by years of 
age, in the North-Centre region is approximately 4% and in the South 
approximately 3% per year. Decreasing marginal returns to age are present in 
both areas; the decrease in returns to age as age increases is larger in the North-
Centre. 
Educational effects appear not to differ regionally; the average earnings 
effect of each year of education is approximately equal to 4% in both regions. 
Although this estimated rate of return is biased by the use of age as a proxy for 
general human capital rather than years in the labour force, or tenure, it gives us a 
7.23 
basis for comparison with the UK if we similarly use age as a proxy for general 
human capital in the earnings equation estimates for that country. Note that these 
two estimated earnings equations for Italy do not fit the data quite as well as the 
estimated earnings equations presented in Table 7.2 where certification dummies 
were included instead of the years of education variable; for example the adjusted 
R-squared figure for the previous South earnings equation was 45% and here it is 
approximately 44%. 
Marital status is significant in the determination of earnings in the North-
Centre; increasing earnings by approximately 13%. In the South being married 
has no significant effect on earnings, and being divorced or widowed is not 
significant in the determination of earnings in either region. 
Table 7.5: Estimated Earnings Equations for UK Full-timers by Region (1989) 
Region: South North 
(N = 684) (N = 982) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Male 0.324 7.896* 0.273 8.464* 
Self-employed -0.275 -4.936* -0.197 -4.220* 
Al!:e 0.055 4.921* 0.062 7.372* 
Al!:e2 -0.00065 -4.801* -0.00070 -6.869* 
Years of Education 0.085 9.095* 0.096 11.902* 
Married 0.117 2.080* 0.128 3.122* 
Divorced I widowed 0.177 2.077* 0.120 3.087* 
Construction 0.482 2.592* 0.323 2.657* 
Ene<J!:Y 0.308 1.410 0.527 4.278* 
Distribution/Commercial 0.226 1.218 0.121 1.215 
Transport/Communication 0.388 2.042* 0.197 1.723** 
Finance 0.577 3.115* 0.4ll 3.882* 
Other Services 0.316 1.723** 0.303 3.016* 
Other Manufacturing_ 0.342 1.870** 0.225 2.267* 
Constant -1.594 -5.189* -1.954 -9.207* 
AdjustedR2 0.271 0.320 
Variance of Estimate 0.218 0.200 
Meanlnw 1.557 1.383 
Notes: • S1gruficant at 5% level, •• s1gruficant at 10% level. 
Earnings in all sectors except transport, communication and finance, are 
not significantly different, ceteris paribus, from earnings in the agricultural sector 
in the North-Centre. In the South, earnings in all sectors, except the finance 
sector, are not significantly different from earnings in the agricultural sector in the 
North-Centre. Wage rates in the North-Centre in the transport and 
communications sectors are approximately 12% higher than in agriculture. Wage 
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rates in the finance sector are approximately 29% higher in the North-Centre and 
18% higher in the South than in agriculture respectively. 
From Table 7.5 we can see that there are a number of significant 
differences between the estimated earnings equations for the two regions of the 
UK and between the estimated regional earnings equations for the UK and Italy. 
In the UK, being male as opposed to female increases the earnings of full-
time workers in both regions; by approximately 32% in the South and 27% in the 
North. In Italy the gender effect was insignificant in the under developed 
Southern region ofltaly, and approximately 9% in the North-Centre region. 
In the UK self-employment decreases earnings in both regions; by 
approximately 27% in the South and 20% in the North. The opposite effect was 
estimated for both regions of Italy in that earnings were increased by self-
employment by approximately 21%. This may reflect a difference in government 
policy towards small businesses, and the viability of self-employment, between 
the two countries. 
The positive effects of general human capital upon earnings do not appear 
to vary regionally in the UK; the average rate of return to years of age in both 
regions is approximately 6% per year. Decreasing marginal returns to age are 
present in both regions and the decrease in returns to age as age increases are of 
approximately the same magnitude in both regions. In comparison with Italy it 
appears that general human capital, as proxied by years of age, has a greater 
influence upon the earnings of full time workers in the UK. 
The effect of years of education appears to differ only slightly by region; 
the average earnings effect of each year of education is approximately equal to 
9% in the South and 10% in the North. Thus in comparison with Italy it appears 
that years of education has a greater influence upon the earnings of full time 
workers in the UK. Note that the two estimated equations shown in Table 7.5 do 
not fit the data as well as the estimated equations presented in Chapter 4-6 where 
certification dummies were included alongside the years of education variable; 
the effects of certification on earnings in both countries are being ignored in this 
section because estimated returns would not be comparable. 
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Being married in comparison to single is significant in the determination 
of wage rates in both regions of the UK and increases wage rates by 
approximately 12-13%; this is comparable to the 13% effect on wage rates in the 
North-Centre of Italy. Being divorced or widowed is also significant in the 
determination of wage rates in both regions of the UK, in comparison to Italy 
where it was insignificant in both regions. 
Wage rates in all sectors except the distribution and commercial service 
sector (and the energy sector in the South) are significantly different from wage 
rates in the agricultural sector in both regions of the UK. For example, wage rates 
in the finance sector are, ceteris paribus, approximately 58% higher in the South, 
and 41% higher in the North, compared to wage rates in the agricultural sector. In 
comparison wage rates in the finance sector in Italy are approximately 29% higher 
in the North-Centre and 18% higher in the South than in agriculture respectively. 
The effects of industrial classification of jobs are generally more significant and 
stronger in the UK in comparison to Italy. 
7.6.3 Conclusion 
Comparisons between the UK and Italy showed that the average earnings effect of 
years of education appears to be much higher in the UK; 10% for each year of 
education in the UK compared to 4% for each year of education in Italy. Using 
these two countries as examples of EU member states, this implies that EU labour 
market policies aimed at convergence in wage rates and productivity should also 
address the issue of the efficiency and equity of educational systems in providing 
skills and increased earnings for workers in member states. 
It was also shown that being male rather than female in the UK increases 
the earnings of full-time workers by approximately 32% in the South and 27% in 
the North. In Italy the equivalent gender effect was insignificant in the South, and 
approximately 9% in the North-Centre region. These results reflect the poor 
position of female workers in the market for full time employment in the two 
countries. 
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Self-employment was found to decrease earnings m the UK by 
approximately 27% in the South and 20% in the North. Conversely, in Italy 
earnings were increased by approximately 21% in both regions by self-
employment. These differences may reflect national differences in government 
policy towards small businesses, and the viability of self-employment. 
7.7 Testing the Screening Hypothesis for Italy 
7.7.1 Differences in Variable Means by Worker Type 
Table 7.6 presents the mean values and standard deviations of the variables used 
to analyse wage rate detennination for Italian males in this Chapter. See 
Appendix 7.1 for a description of the variables contained in the SCIF 1989 
sample. 
The sample has been further split by worker type so that we may test for 
significant differences in the mean levels of characteristics between the self-
employed and employees. 
From Table 7.6 we can see that the self-employed in the sample are 
significantly older, possess higher net disposable family incomes, work more 
hours per week and less months per year than employees. The proportion of self-
employed workers in the sample who are single, is significantly higher than the 
proportion of employees. 
The proportion of self-employed workers who have no fonnal 
qualifications or just primary certification is significantly higher than the 
proportion of employees. The proportion of employees who have high school 
certification is significantly higher than the proportion of self-employed workers. 
These two observations accord with the screening hypothesis that the self-
employed are relatively less interested in acquiring education than employees. 
However, note that the proportions in the two groups who have university degrees 
are not significantly different, implying that higher education levels do not differ 
by worker type perhaps due to their human capital value or because self-
employment plans may not come to fruition and students are 'hedging'. 
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Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics for Male Full-time Workers in Italy 1989 
Worker Type: Employees Self-employed 
(N = 1750) (N = 68l) 
Standard Standard 
Variable Name Mean Deviation Mean Deviation T- Ratio 
Familv Income 36701 19473 47193 31615 -11.821* 
Months worked 11.909 0.724 11.851 1.001 1.964* 
Weekly Hours 40.388 3.423 41.842 6.009 -8.795* 
A~e 42.854 9.731 45.255 I 1.385 -4.862* 
Married 0.930 0.006 0.899 0.012 2.552* 
Sinele 0.054 0.005 0.076 0.010 -2.050* 
Divorced/widowed 0.0154 0.003 0.025 0.006 -1.596 
No formal Education 0.023 0.004 0.042 0.008 -2.538* 
Primary Certificate 0.233 0.010 0.302 0.018 -3.521* 
Intermediate Cert. 0.323 0.011 0.297 0.017 1.240 
High School Cert. 0.314 0.011 0.249 0.017 3.157* 
Degree 0.107 0.007 0.110 0.012 -0.214 
Blue collar worker 0.468 0.012 -- -- --
Clerical Worker 0.375 0.012 
-- -- --
Middle level Occ. 0.119 0.008 -- -- --
High level Occupation 0.038 0.005 -- -- --
S.E. Professional 
-- --
0.243 0.016 --
S.E. Entrepreneur 
-- --
0.391 0.019 
--
S.E. Other -- -- 0.366 0.018 --
North West 0.235 0.010 0.204 0.015 1.642** 
North East 0.134 0.008 0.206 0.015 -4.419* 
Central 0.244 0.010 0.179 0.015 3.446* 
South 0.249 0.010 0.264 0.017 -0.765 
Island 0.138 0.008 0.148 0.014 -0.637 
l Additional worker 0.418 0.012 0.406 0.019 0.540 
2 Additional workers 0.053 0.005 0.060 0.009 -0.681 
3 Additional workers 0.014 0.003 0.016 0.005 -0.370 
4 Additional workers 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.003 -1.589 
' '' Notes. • S1gmficant at S Yo level or better,** Slgntficant at the 10% level - denotes that a vanable IS not 
defined for that sub-sample, a significant test-statistic indicates a significant difference between means 
in a two-tailed test with d.f. = 2431. 
A significantly higher proportion of self-employed workers live in the 
North East region of Italy in comparison to the number of employees, and a 
significantly higher proportion of employees live in the North West and central 
regions of Italy in comparison to the number of self-employed workers. 
Proportions are not significantly different in the relatively less prosperous 
Southern and Island regions ofltaly. 
The proportion of male workers who are defined as self-employed in the 
SCIF 1989 sample (28%) is in line with the national average of 30% reported for 
the period 1983-1992; in comparison the proportion of self-employed in the UK 
7.28 
which is approximately 10% for the same period [Employment Observatory 
Trends No. 18 (1994)]. 
7. 7.2 General Regression Results 
Table 7. 7 shows the results of estimating earnings equations for full-timers in 
Italy in 1989 by worker type. From Table 7.7 we can see that age and age-squared 
are both significant in the determination of the earnings of both worker types. An 
additional year of age increases the earnings of employees by approximately 3%, 
and the earnings of a self-employed worker by approximately 5%. The negative 
effect of age-squared is higher for the self-employed implying that, ceteris 
paribus, the age-earnings profiles of the self-employed will be more convex in 
comparison to that of employees i.e. the effect of age upon the earnings declines 
faster for the self-employed as age increases. 6 The average amount earned by the 
self-employed per hour is approximately 19087 Italian Lira compared to 15816 
for employees. 
Being married has a significant positive effect upon the earnings of male 
full-time employees in comparison to the insignificant effect upon the earnings of 
the self-employed. Being divorced or widowed has no significant effect upon the 
earnings of either worker type. 
Occupational class has a positive significant effect on the earnings of 
employees; in comparison to blue-collar workers clerical employees have 
approximately 14% higher earnings, middle-management have approximately 
31% higher earnings, and top management and similar workers have 
approximately 53% higher earnings. Similarly, in comparison to self-employed 
assistants and similar self-employed workers, self-employed professionals have 
approximately 12% higher earnings and self-employed entrepreneurs have 
approximately 10% higher earnings. 
Living in the North West area of Italy appears to have the strongest 
positive effect on earnings in comparison to living in the South; employees' 
6 Other things being equal the self-employed would always earn a higher wage rate than employees 
since the age at which the two profiles cross over is calculated as 142; this is done by equating the 
two quadratic wage equations, in terms of age and age-squared, and solving. 
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earnings are 12% higher and self-employed earnings are 25% higher than in the 
South. In the North East employees' earnings are 8% higher, but the earnings of 
the self-employed are not significantly different form those in the South. Living in 
the central area of Italy increases earnings of employees compared to those living 
in the South by 6%, and again the earnings of the self-employed are not 
significantly affected. Both worker types resident on one of the two Italian 
islands (Sardinia or Sicily) gain no earnings advantage over those workers living 
in South Italy; this confirms the traditional classification of the islands as being 
part of the economically lesser developed South. 
Table 7.7: Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Male Full-timers in 1989 
Worker Type: Employees Self- employed 
(N=l750) (N = 683i_ 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Age 0.030 4.675* 0.047 3.597* 
A2el -0.00027 -3.625* -0.00039 -2.783* 
Married 0.104 2.909* 0.060 0.796 
Divorced/widowed 0.011 0.156 -0.077 -0.555 
No Certification 0.105 1.963* 0.069 0.698 
Intermediate Certificate 0.092 4.100* 0.059 1.156 
Hi2h School Certificate 0.193 7.202* 0.232 4.008* 
Degree 0.331 9.346* 0.457 5.675* 
Clerical Employee 0.136 6.503* 
-- --
Middle level Employee 0.305 10.563* 
-- --
High level Employee 0.532 11.337* 
-- --
Self Emp. Professional 
-- --
0.119 2.033* 
Self Emp. Entrepreneur 
-- --
0.095 2.197* 
North West 0.120 5.280* 0.249 4.390* 
North East 0.077 2.929* 0.085 1.497 
Central 0.064 2.907* 0.079 1.347 
Island -0.032 -1.227 -0.070 -1.141 
1 additional worker 0.466 27.159* 0.368 8.683* 
2 additional workers 0.766 21.139* 0.609 7.263* 
3 additional workers 1.033 15.704* 0.608 4.005* 
4 additional workers 1.152 7.155* 0.664 2.675* 
Constant 1.351 9.820* 1.161 3.909* 
AdjustedR2 0.588 0.316 
Variance of Estimate 0.102 0.238 
Mean In w 2.761 2.949 
Notes: * S1gruficant at 5% level or better, ** Sigruficant at I 0% level, 
'-·' denotes that a variable is not defined for that sub-sample. 
As we would expect the effect of 1-4 additional workers in the household 
is significant for both types of worker. The effect increases from 47 to 115% 
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higher earnings for employees and 37 to 66% higher earnings for the self-
employed, as the number of additional workers in the household increases. 
7.7.3 Hypothesis 1 and Actual Results 
Under Hypothesis 1 if weak screening occurs we would expect the employees 
sub-sample to fit the estimated earnings equation in Table 7. 7 more accurately 
than the self-employed sub-sample. This is indeed the case; approximately 59% 
of the variation in earnings of male full-time employees is explained by the 
regression, compared to an R-squared of 32% for the self-employed sub-sample. 
The variation of the estimate is relatively lower for the employee sub-sample 
again indicating a better fit. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis, giving 
support to the weak screening model. 
7.7.4 Hypothesis 2 and Actual Results 
From Table 7.7, we can see that the estimated earnings effect of having no formal 
certification in comparison to having primary certification is significantly positive 
and approximately equal to 11% for employees, and is not significant for the self-
employed. This implies that the earnings of employees completing the primary 
stage of education but failing to get the intermediate certification, which 
concludes the compulsory stage of education in Italy, are actually lower than 
those employees with no formal certification. 
Intermediate certification is also significant m affecting earnings of 
employees in comparison to the earnings earned by employees with primary 
certificates; intermediate certification increases earnings, ceteris paribus, by 
approximately 9%. No such positive returns are present for the self-employed 
holding no educational certification, or intermediate certification in comparison 
to primary certificates. 
High school certification and university degree level certification has a 
significant positive effect on the earnings of both the self-employed and 
employees in comparison to those with primary certification. Wage rates are 
increased by high school graduation by approximately 19% for employees and 
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23% for the self-employed. Wage rates are increased by university graduation by 
approximately 33% for employees and 46% for the self-employed. The higher 
returns to both these certificates for the self-employed is contrary to the screening 
hypothesis and therefore, although the other two education categories have no 
effect on the wages of the self-employed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
there is little support for the screening hypothesis from these results. 
Following the 'consumer-screening' hypothesis of Lazear (1977), we might 
expect that self-employed professionals would acquire qualifications in order to 
signal the quality of their services to potential clients, thus raising the average 
level of education of the self-employed and upwardly biasing the returns to 
certification in the self-employed sub-sample. However, contrary to Lazear's 
hypothesis, the omission of professionals from the sub-sample of self-employed 
workers in the SCIF sample was found not to effect the estimated returns to the 
certification dummy variables in the earnings function. 
7.7.5 Hypothesis 3 and Actual Results 
Table 7.8 shows the estimated earnings functions for male full-time employees in 
the public administration and commercial plus other services sectors of the Italian 
economy. From Table 7.8 there are three main points of interest. Firstly, the 
returns to general human capital, as proxied by years of age, appear to differ 
significantly between the two sectors. The commercial/other services sector 
displays an estimated average increase in earnings due to each year of age of 
approximately 5% in comparison to 3% in the public administration sector. 
The estimated coefficient on age-squared for male employees in the public 
administration sector is insignificant, whereas the coefficient for 
commercial/other services sector employees is significant, indicating that low 
returns to age persist in public administration jobs but fall in commercial service 
sector jobs in Italy as age increases. This implies that there is apparently a 
diminishing marginal rate of return to age in the commercial/other services sector 
but not in the public administration sector. 
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Table 7.8: Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Male Full-time Employees by 
Sector (1989) 
Sector: Public Administration Commercial/ Other 
(N=335) Services (N = 398) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
A2e 0.030 1.932** 0.050 3.746* 
A2eZ -0.253E-3 -1.429 -0.502E-3 -3.272* 
Married 0.156 2.141* 0.103 1.484 
Divorced/widowed -0.318 -1.854** 0.073 0.367 
Intermediate Certificate 0.156 1.927* 0.842E-2 0.171 
High School Certificate 0.232 2.866* 0.093 1.646 
De2ree 0.420 4.695* 0.171 2.351* 
Clerical Occupation 0.020 0.325 0.183 4.195* 
Middle Level Occ. 0.096 1.262 0.413 7.111* 
High Level Occ. 0.322 3.041* 0.689 7.319* 
North West -0.277E-2 -0.048 0.190 3.597* 
North East -0.054 -0.864 0.151 2.570* 
Central -0.093 -1.718** 0.161 3.442* 
Island -0.041 -0.675 -0.011 -0.206 
l additional worker 0.444 10.509* 0.472 13.177* 
2 additional workers 0.711 5.222* 0.708 9.415* 
3-4 additional workers 1.231 5.837* 0.894 6.572* 
Constant 1.405 4.025* 0.938 3.477* 
AdjustedR2 0.507 0.597 
Variance of Estimate 0.119 0.102 
Meanlnw 2.844 2.764 
Notes: • Stgruficant at 5% level, ** stgruficant at I 0% level. 
The second point of interest is the general lack of significance of 
coefficients on the regional dummy variables in the public administration sector 
and the large and significant coefficients in the commercial/other services sector. 
This means, for example, for male employees working in the commercial/other 
services sector living in the North West increases the amount earned by 
approximately 19% in comparison to those living in the South, whereas there is 
no such regional effect for employees in the public administration sector. This 
may well be due to the fact that public administration wages are negotiated on a 
national basis with no regional market influences, whereas commercial/other 
services wages are more likely to be determined on a regional market level [see 
Alien et a/ (1974) for further details]. 
The third point of interest from Table 7.8 is that we can reject the null in 
Hypothesis 3. The estimated rates of return to intermediate and high-school level 
certification, in comparison to primary certification or no certification, are both 
positive and significant for the public administration estimated earnings equation, 
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but insignificant in the commercial/other services equation. The certificates 
appear to hold no human capital or informational value in the commercial/other 
seiVices sector, whereas in the public administration sector intermediate 
certification gives approximately 16% and high-school certification gives 
approximately 24% higher earnings in comparison to those with primary school 
certificates as the highest obtained. 
However, this result does not continue when we look at degree level 
certification; both groups of employees have their earnings increased significantly 
by holding degree level certificates. Public administration employees holding 
degrees have earnings increased by approximately 42%, and commercial/other 
seiVices sector employees holding degrees have earnings increased by 
approximately 17%. This result lends support to the weak screening hypothesis 
since employees in the less screened sector (commercial and other seiVices) 
appear to benefit less from their education in terms of higher wages than those in 
the more screened sector (public administration). 
A Chow test of the equality of the two sets of estimated coefficients in the 
estimated earnings functions shown in Table 7.8, gives a calculated F-statistic of 
approximately 2.22 which is significant at the 5% level, which indicates that the 
estimated coefficients are significantly different from one another. 
A Gujarati (1970) dummy variable test gives the estimated earnings 
equation for the pooled data shown in Table 7.9. The notation PA*variable 
represents a dummy variable showing that the SCIF respondent is working in the 
public administration sector and is characterised by the variable=!, and where 
such interactive dummy variables are not significant they are omitted from the 
mode1.7 
From Table 7.9 we can see that the apparent sectoral difference in the rate 
of return to years of age is not significant. However, there are significant sectoral 
differences in the effects of educational certification, occupational classification 
and geographic region upon male full-time employees earnings. We cannot 
7 The dummy variable representing public administration sector employment itself was insignificant 
in this pooled regression. 
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accept the null of Hypothesis 3 and therefore conclude that there is some evidence 
in support of the weak screening hypothesis on the basis of this methodology. 
Table 7.9: Estimated Earnings Equation for Pooled Set Including Sector-variable 
Interaction Dummies 
Public Administration, Commercial and 
Other Services (N = 733) 
Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio 
Age 0.038 3.809* 
Age2 -0.354E-3 -3.097* 
Married 0.135 2.692* 
Divorced/widowed -0.155 -1.209 
Intermediate Certificate -0.015 -0.306 
High School Certificate 0.082 1.454 
Degree 0.162 2.214* 
Clerical Occupation 0.178 3.998* 
Middle Level Occupation 0.400 6.715* 
High Level Occupation 0.663 6.880* 
North West 0.176 3.424* 
North East 0.137 2.408* 
Central 0.145 3.227* 
Island -0.024 -0.584 
1 additional worker 0.461 16.827* 
2 additional workers 0.708 10.627* 
3 or 4 additional workers 1.011 8.742* 
PA *Intermediate Cert. 0.256 3.524* 
PA *High School Cert. 0.228 2.913* 
PA*Degree 0.335 3.397* 
PA *Clerical Occupation -0.127 -1.803** 
PA*Middle Occupation -0.263 -2.863* 
PA*Hb~h Occupation -0.298 -2.166* 
PA*North West -0.155 -2.280* 
PA*North East -0.171 -2.256* 
PA*Central -0.216 -3.521* 
Constant 1.154 5.437* 
AdjustedR2 0.557 
Variance of Estimate 0.111 
Meanlnw 2.801 
F - statistic 36.391 
Notes. • Stgmficant at 5% level or better.** stgmficant at 10% level. 
7.7.6 Hypothesis 4 and Actual Results 
Table 7.10 shows the results from estimating earnings equations for the 1750 full-
time male employees in the SCIF sample. The mean age level of employees is 44 
years and so this was chosen to construct the dummy variables representing age-
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variable interaction denoted '44*variable' in Table 7.10; where significant these 
show the effects of being age 44 or above and be characterised by variable= 1. 
Note that age has been used in this Chapter as a proxy variable for tenure 
or general human capital accumulation. We would expect that there is a general 
positive correlation between tenure and years of age. However, as explained in 
Chapter 6, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that some older individuals may 
just be starting new occupations. However, those over the age of 44 are assumed 
to have longer tenure with their present employer and to have built up more 
experience and alternative information (in the form of a work performance 
record) about themselves than those who are younger. 
The interactive effects of marital status, occupation level, living in the 
North East or on an Island, and the having additional workers in the household, in 
conjunction with being aged 44 or over were found to be insignificant in 
determining wages of Italian full-time male employees. However, there appears 
to be significant interaction between no certification, intermediate certification, 
North West residence and Central residence and the dummy variable representing 
age 44 and over. Residence in the North West or Central regions of Italy and 
being aged 44 or over increases earnings by approximately 7-8% in comparison to 
younger employees. 
We assume that the return to education as a human capital investment is 
constant as age increases i.e. any further human capital return is from labour 
market experience (general human capital investment) or work-related training 
(specific human capital investments). Under the strong screening hypothesis, we 
therefore expect that the return to each certificate held (earnings differential 
compared to a person with primary certification) decreases as tenure increases, 
since its informational component does not hold its value as tenure increases and 
alternative information becomes available to employers. 
Having no certification and being aged 44 or over reduces the earnings of 
male employees by approximately 27%. The negative effect of having no 
qualifications at this age level, in the context of the weak version of the screening 
hypothesis, may be due to a combination of effects including the bad signal it 
sends to potential employers, the low level of educational human capital the 
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person holds, and the lack of opportunities for promotion from previous 
employers earlier in life. 
Table 7.10: Estimated Earnings Equations for Full-time Male Employees including 
Age-variable Interaction Dummies 
Employees (N- 1750) 
Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio 
Al(e 0.030 4.555* 
Age2 -0.259E-3 -3.474* 
Married 0.101 2.845* 
Divorced/widowed 0.012 0.174 
No Certification 0.290 3.306* 
Intermediate Certificate 0.140 5.140* 
Hieh School Certificate 0.209 7.755* 
Degree 0.349 9.812* 
Clerical Emplovee 0.137 6.600* 
Middle level Employee 0.300 10.415* 
High level Employee 0.514 10.923* 
North West 0.088 3.158* 
North East 0.076 2.879* 
Central 0.031 1.162 
Island -0.034 -1.315 
1 additional worker 0.468 27.344* 
2 additional workers 0.769 21.224* 
3 additional workers 1.027 15.610* 
4 additional workers 1.139 7.094* 
44*No Certification -0.271 -2.505* 
44*1ntermediate Cert. -0.094 -2.844* 
44*North West 0.076 2.061* 
44*Central 0.067 1.886* 
Constant 1.348 9.602* 
Adjusted R2 0.591 
F - statistic 111.086* 
Variance ofEstimate 0.101 
Meanlnw 2.761 
Notes: • Significant at 5% level, •• Sigruficant at I 0% level. 
Having intermediate certification as the highest educational qualification 
held and being aged 44 or over reduces the earnings of male employees by 
approximately 9%. Using the methodology of Tucker (1986), the observed lack 
of increasing returns to high school and degree level certification, and the 
observed decreasing returns to intermediate certification as age increases over the 
mean level offers some weak evidence in favour of rejecting the null of 
Hypothesis 4. 
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We now move on to Hypothesis 5, another test of the strong hypothesis, 
used by Tucker (1986), which looks at the returns to tenure between education 
groups, for more and possibly clearer evidence of strong screening. 
7.7.7 Hypothesis 5 and Actual Results 
The estimated earnings equations for school-leavers and university graduates 
working full-time in Italy are shown in Table 7.11. Those with Intermediate or 
High school certificates make up the school-leavers sub-sample, while degree 
holders make up the university graduates sub-sample. Occupational classification 
reference category now corresponds to top management and similar jobs. 
Table 7.11: Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Full-time Employees by 
Education (1989) 
Education Level: School - leavers University Graduates 
(N = 1238) (N =209) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T- Ratio Coefficient T- Ratio 
Sex -0.003 -0.060 0.282 2.658* 
Al!:e 0.034 4.322* 0.053 2.459* 
A!!:e2 -0.00032 -3.350* -0.00050 -2.119* 
Married 0.006 0.155 0.099 1.204 
Divorced/widowed -0.102 -1.950** 0.192 1.195 
Blue collar/Clerical Occ. -0.548 -7.409* -0.282 -4.308* 
Middle Level Occupation -0.299 -3.851* -0.204 -2.838* 
North 0.069 2.707* -0.049 -0.825 
Central 0.007 0.249 -0.009 -0.133 
Island -0.011 -0.340 -0.231 -2.811* 
1 Additional worker 0.513 24.535* 0.399 7.261* 
2 Additional workers 0.770 14.513* 0.671 4.193* 
3 Additional workers 1.137 12.040* 
-- --
4 Additional workers 1.297 5.469* -- --
Constant 2.124 11.682* 1.466 3.047* 
AdiustedR2 0.512 0.481 
V ariaoce of Estimate 0.110 0.114 
Mean In w 2.740 3.091 
Notes: * S1gruficaot at 5% level or better, •• sigrnficant at I 0% level, 
'--' denotes that a variable is not defined for that sub-sample. 
We can calculate from the mean log-wage given in Table 7.11 that the 
average wage-rate is 15487 lire per hour for school-leavers and 21999 lire per 
hour for university graduates. The family earnings premium to university 
graduates in comparison to school-leavers is therefore approximately 30%. 
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Following Tucker (1986), Hypothesis 5 suggests that under the strong 
screening hypothesis returns to tenure do not increase as education level 
mcreases. However, we can see from Table 7.11 that the rate of return to age, the 
proxy variable for tenure, does increase between the relative low and high 
education worker sub-samples; representing a 3% and 5% increase in earnings on 
average per year of tenure respectively. This refutes the strong screening 
hypothesis. 
A Chow test of the hypothesis that the two estimated earnings equations 
are significantly different i.e. that the labour markets for the two groups are 
separated gives a calculated F-statistic of 5.51 which is significant at the 1% level. 
7. 7.8 Conclusion 
Using the worker-type comparative methodology to test the role of education in 
the Italian labour market, we find little support for the screening hypothesis. 
Intermediate certification increases earnings, ceteris paribus, by approximately 
9% in comparison to the amount earned by employees with primary certificates. 
No such positive returns are present for the self-employed holding no educational 
certification, or intermediate certification in comparison to primary certificates. 
High school and degree level certification has a significant positive effect 
on the earnings of both worker types in comparison to those with primary 
certification. Earnings are increased by high school and university graduation by 
approximately 19% and 33% for employees, and 23% and 46% for the self-
employed. The higher returns to high school and university level certification for 
the self-employed is contrary to the screening hypothesis and therefore, although 
the other two education categories have no effect on the earnings of the self-
employed, there is little support for the screening hypothesis from these results. 
Using the P-test methodology of Chapter 6 on the SCIF 1989 gives some 
support to the weak, but not the strong, version of the screening hypothesis. The 
estimated rates of return to intermediate and high-school level certification, in 
comparison to primary certification or no certification, are significant and positive 
in the public administration sector, but insignificant in the commercial/other 
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services sector. The certificates appear to hold no human capital or informational 
value in the services sector. 
However, employees m both sectors have their earnmgs increased 
significantly by holding degree level certificates. Holding a degree increases 
earnings by approximately 42% and 17% for public administration and service 
sector employees respectively. This result lends support to the weak screening 
hypothesis since employees in the less screened sector in comparison to those in 
the more screened sector appear to a lower net benefit from their education. 
Using Tucker's (1986) methodology on the SCIF 1989 data provides some 
tentative evidence in favour of the weak screening hypothesis for Italian 
employees. The results show a lack of increasing returns to high school and 
university certificates, and a significant decrease in returns to intermediate 
certification as age increases over the mean level. Tucker ( 1986) also suggests 
that under the strong screening hypothesis returns to tenure do not rise as 
education level increases. However, the rate of return to age, the proxy variable 
for tenure, was found to increase between the relative low and high education 
worker sub-samples, refuting the strong screening hypothesis. 
7.8 Conclusion 
There appears to be little regional difference in the role of education in the Italian 
labour market; comparisons between earnings determination in the North-Centre 
and South, showed little variation in the effect of certification upon earnings. The 
estimated rates of return to intermediate, high-school and degree level 
certification are equivalent in both regions. The only apparent regional difference 
is the positive earnings effect of no certification in comparison to primary 
schooling in the North-Centre region; explained in Appendix 7.2. 
Comparisons between the UK and Italy showed that the average earnings 
effect of years of education appears to be higher in the UK ( 10% higher earnings 
per year compared to 4% in Italy). This implies that EU directives aimed at 
labour market convergence should address the issue of differences in the 
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efficiency and equity of educational systems in providing skills and increased 
earnings for workers in member states. 
It was also shown that being male rather than female in the UK increases 
the wage rate of full-time workers by approximately 30%. In Italy the equivalent 
gender effect was insignificant in the South, and approximately 9% in the North-
Centre region. These results reflect the poor position of female workers in the 
market for full time employment in both member states. Self-employment was 
found to decrease earnings in the UK and increase earnings in Italy. These 
differences may reflect national differences in government policy towards small 
businesses, and the viability of self-employment. 
These results imply that EU labour market policies aimed at convergence 
in wage rates and productivity should also address the issue of the national 
differences in opportunities for female workers and workers who want to be self-
employed. 
Using the worker-type comparative methodology, we find little support for 
the screening hypothesis in Italy. Intermediate certification increases earnings 
significantly in comparison to the amount earned by employees with primary 
certificates. No such returns are found for the self-employed with no educational 
certification, or intermediate certification. 
High school and degree level certification has a significant positive effect 
on the earnings of both worker types in comparison to those with primary 
certification, and there are higher returns from these certificates for the self-
employed. This result leads to a rejection of the screening hypothesis. 
Using the P-test methodology gives some support to the weak version of 
the screening hypothesis. The estimated rates of return to intermediate and high-
school level certification, in comparison to primary certification or no 
certification, are significant and positive in the public administration sector, but 
insignificant in the commercial/other services sector. However, employees in 
both sectors have their earnings increased significantly by holding degree level 
certificates. 
Using the tenure group methodology provides some evidence in support of 
weak screening in Italy. The results show a lack of increasing returns to high 
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school and university certificates, and a significant decrease in returns to 
intermediate certification as age increases over the mean level. The rate of return 
to age, the proxy variable for tenure, was found to increase between the relative 
low and high education worker sub-samples, refuting the strong screening 
hypothesis. 
In summary, although Italy is characterised by a different education and 
labour market structure in comparison to the UK, there again appears to be no 
support for the strong screening hypothesis, tentative support for the weak 
screening hypothesis and strong support for the human capital model of 
education. 
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Appendix 7.1: 
Summary of Variables derived from Bank ofltaly Survey on 
Consumption by Italian Families 1989 
Table 7.12: Description of Variables Derived from Bank of Italy SCIF 1989 
Variable Name Description 
Age Respondent's age in years 
Married 0 ~ Respondent is not married, I - married or living as married 
Single 0 - not single, I - single 
Divorced/widowed 0 ~ not divorced or widowed, I ~ divorced or widowed 
No formal Education 0 - other education, I - respondent has no formal education 
Primary Certificate 0 ~ other education, I ~ primary school certificate 
Intermediate Cert. 0 - other education, I - intermediate school certificate 
High School Cert. 0 - other education, I - high school diploma 
(equivalent to UK 'A' levels) 
Degree 0 - other education, I - university graduate 
(equivalent to UK degree) 
Months worked Months worked by respondent in 1989 
Weekly Hours Average hours worked per week in 1989 
Blue Collar 0 - other occupational class 
I ~blue collar worker, apprentice, domestic or similar job 
Clerical 0 - other occupational class 
I ~ employed in a clerical, teaching or similar job 
Middle Level 0 ~ other occupational class 
Occupation I ~ employed in a middle management iob or with similar status 
High Level Occupation 0 ~ other occupational class 
I ~employed as a company director, president, top management, 
magistrate/judge, lecturer or job with similar status. 
S.E. Professional 0 ~ other occupational class 
I ~respondent is a self-employed professional 
S.E. Entrepreneur 0 - other occupational class 
I ~ respondent is a self-employed entrepreneur 
S.E. Other 0 - other occupational class 
I ~ respondent is a self-employed in another occupation (includes 
those working as self-employed assistants within companies) 
North West 0 ~Living in the North West 
I ~ Living elsewhere 
Areas included as North West Italy are: 
Piemonte, Valle d' Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, Toscana 
North East 0 ~Living in the North East 
I ~ Living elsewhere 
Areas included as North East Italy are: 
Trentino- Alto Adige Friuli- Venezia Giulia Emilia Romagna 
Central 0 ~ Living in Central Region 
I ~ Living elsewhere 
Areas included as Central are: 
Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise 
South 0 ~Living in Southern Italy 
I ~ Living elsewhere 
Areas included as South are: Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria 
Island 0 ~ Living in Sicily or Sardinia, I - Living elsewhere 
Family Income Family net disposable income in 1989 (Italian Lire) 
n additional worker(s) The respondent's household contains 11 other person( s) who 
contribute to household income by full or part-time work. 
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Appendix 7.2: 
The Influence of Additional Workers in the SCIF Respondent's 
Household 
The results of estimating earnings functions for those SCIF respondents who have 
no additional workers living in their houses and contributing to the family income 
figure for 1989 are shown in Table 7.13. In comparison to Table 7.7 we can see 
that, in general, the estimated coefficients on age, age squared and the education 
variables (the variables we are most concerned with in this thesis) are not 
significantly affected in terms of magnitude and significance by the exclusion of 
those household heads who live in multiple worker households. 
Table 7.13: Estimated Earnings Equations for Italian Male Full-timers with 
no Other Workers in Household in 1989 by Worker Type 
Worker Type: Employees Self- employed 
(N = 897) (N = 350) 
Estimated Estimated 
Variable Name Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
Age 0.029 3.099* 0.051 2.764* 
Agez 
-0.259E-3 -2.380* -0.435E-3 -2.197* 
Married 0.141 3.284* 0.096 1.091 
Divorced/widowed 0.012 0.152 -0.079 -0.489 
No Certification 0.076 0.989 0.018 0.125 
Intermediate Certification 0.072 2.217* 0.017 0.231 
Hieh School Certificate 0.199 5.045* 0.212 2.529* 
Degree 0.349 6.234* 0.443 3.596* 
Clerical Employee 0.106 3.414* 
-- --
Middle level Employee 0.307 7.056* 
-- --
High Level Employee 0.560 8.161* 
-- --
Self Emp. Professional 
-- --
0.162 1.943** 
Self Emp. Entrepreneur 
-- --
0.106 1.656** 
North West 0.180 5.049* 0.331 4.050* 
North East 0.149 3.599* 0.139 1.668** 
Central 0.114 3.548* 0.183 1.903** 
Island -0.012 -0.363 -0.056 -0.071 
Constant 1.327 6.844" 1.005 2.416* 
Adjusted R' 0.334 0.190 
Variance of Estimate 0.117 0.263 
Mean In w 2.466 2.706 
Notes:* Stgruficant at 5% level or better, •• at 10% level,'--' denotes where a vanable ts not 
defined for that sub-sample. 
The only major change is that no certification in comparison to primary 
certification no longer has a significant positive effect on the earnings of male 
employees. In Section 7.7.2, it appeared intuitively incorrect in the context of 
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both the screening and human capital models to expect that no certification would 
have a positive earnings effect in comparison to a higher level of education 
(primary education), and this can now be attributed to the effect of additional 
workers in the household subsidising the earnings of unqualified household heads. 
The decision to increase sample size and include dummy variables 
representing additional workers, following the argument that we should use all the 
available data to avoid incidental truncation problems, is made on the basis that 
the earnings equation, as shown in Table 7.13, is relatively robust. 
The second argument is concerned with degrees of freedom; in a number 
of the regional and sectoral analyses the number of observations exhibiting 
positive dummy variable values for certain variables would have been seriously 
depleted if multiple worker households were omitted. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The aim of this Thesis was to investigate the role which education played in the 
formation of full-time wage rates for workers in the UK over the period 1985-
1991 and workers in Italy in 1989. The positive correlation between education 
and earnings in these two countries is not disputed, but what has been tested is the 
process in which higher levels of education generally lead to higher levels of 
earnings. The traditional model of the earnings-education relationship, human 
capital_theory, posits that individuals invest in education to improve their 
productivity and therefore future income since firms are assumed to pay wages 
equal to individual productivity. The alternative model of the earnings-education 
relationship, the screening hypothesis, posits that education serves as an indicator 
of the general productive ability of an individual which may not be influenced by 
that education. In the 'strong' version of the screening hypothesis the education 
which is used as a signal does not improve productivity, whereas in the 'weak' 
version of the screening hypothesis the education does have a positive effect on 
productivity. 
In Chapter 2 the theoretical foundations of the screening hypothesis were 
reviewed. The overalJ conclusion from Chapter 2 was that the efficiency of 
screening equilibria in the labour market depends upon the assumptions made 
about the production process, the number of types of labour, the nature of 
signalJing costs and the ability of firms to use alternative screening devices and 
. compete in wage setting. It was also posited that screening theory does not 
contradict later theories of wage determination; rather it acts as complementary 
model for labour markets characterised by asymmetric information. 
Chapter 3 presented a survey of the previous empirical studies of the 
screening hypothesis. The overall conclusion from th'ese studies was that there is 
-little evidence in support of the strong screening hypothesis, some support for the 
weak screening hypothesis and overwhelming support for human capital theory. 
However, since tests tended to be put into the context of the human capital versus 
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screening debate, it was found that there were few tests of the weak version of the 
screening hypothesis and tests of the role of credentials as screening devices. A 
lack of empirical evidence was also apparent for most EU member states, 
including the UK and, moreover, Italy. 
In Chapter 4 traditional human capital functions were estimated for male 
and female full-timers who responded to the BSA Survey 1985-1991. The 
average percentage effect upon wage rates from each year of education was 
estimated as approximately 5-6% with the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables controlling for union membership, recent unemployment, marital status, 
occupation, racial origin and geographical region. This figure is significantly 
lower than the estimated rate of return from the simple Mincerian function which 
was approximately 11%, and the rates of return estimated for previous UK 
studies; 10% [from Psacharopoulos & Layard (1979)] and 16% [from Harmon & 
Walker (1995)]. 
The inclusion of the additional explanatory variables reduced the 
superiority of the quartic Murphy & Welch (1990) function over the Mincerian 
function in explaining the variation in wage rates. Estimation of the 
Psacharopoulos & Layard ( 1979) function gave results showing significant 
interaction between years in the labour force and years of education. However, 
significant shifts in the marginal rate of return to years of education (MRE) were 
found in the three human capital models. 
The shifts in the MRE were found to occur in years which would normally 
involve educational certification, and it was proposed that controlling for highest 
certification level in the wage rate functions could control for the MRE variations. 
Estimates of wage rate functions including dummy variables representing the 
highest certificate held, instead of years of education as a measure of education 
level, were found to explain the variation in wage rates more accurately because 
they allowed for the effect of years of schooling plus certificates upon wage rates. 
The object of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 was to test the possible screening role that 
education may have had in the determination of full-time wage rates in the UK 
over the sample period. 
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In Chapter 5 separate wage rate functions were estimated for self-
employed workers and employees in the BSA Survey sample. Significant 
differences were found between these sub-samples in the effects on wage rates of 
years of education, highest certification levels and private education. 
The estimated average rate of return to years of education was higher for 
employees in comparison to the self-employed. All the certificate dummy 
variables were found to significantly increase wage rates of employees, whereas 
only degree level, trade and business, apprenticeships and 0-level certification 
were found to significantly effect the wage rates earned by the self-employed. 
The effect of private schooling was positive and significant for employees but not 
for the self-employed. These results can be taken as evidence in support of the 
weak but not the strong screening hypothesis in relation to the market for male 
full-time workers in the UK, since under the strong screening hypothesis we 
would expect no significant education effects for the self-employed .. 
Unqualified and qualified employees were found to have significantly 
different estimated wage rate functions, and years of education were found to 
have no influence on the wage rates of unqualified workers. This may be because 
certificates rather than yea~ of education act as a screening device and that years 
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of education do not improve productivity. Alternatively, it may be that increased 
years of education have such a strong negative signalling effect upon the wage 
rates of the unqualified, since they are not accompanied by increased certification, 
that it outweighs any positive effect from improved productivity. 
The negative effect of recent unemployment was found not to differ 
significantly between worker types, and the hypothesis that recent unemployment 
incidence had a screening role was rejected. The effect of years in the labour 
force was found to be significantly different between work types. This may be 
due to the wage-tenure structure inherent in employee pay schemes, but also may 
be due to experience having a screening role in the labour market. No evidence 
was found of a bias in the estimated rate of return to education by including 
professional workers in the regressions, and so unlike previous studies, 
professionals were not omitted from the sub-samples used to test the screening 
hypothesis. 
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In Chapter 6 a number of alternative methodologies were used to test the 
strong and weak versions of screening hypothesis in relation to the BSA Survey 
data. The results of testing Katz & Ziderman's (1980) weak screening rri6del were 
found to give no support to this model based on an analysis of education levels by 
occupation level and worker type. However, the self-employed tend to be 
concentrated in certain occupations in the BSA Survey data and this may bias 
results. 
The P-test methodology of making sectoral comparisons of mid- to early-
career earnings ratios and wage rate functions was applied to the BSA Survey 
data. The methodologies of Tucker (I 986) were also used. Using these 
methodologies, we can say that there generally appears to be little evidence in 
Chapter 6 in support of either version of the screening hypothesis, but that there is 
support for the human capital theory. 
Combining the results of Chapters 4-6 we reach the overall conclusion that 
there is little evidence in support of the existence of strong screening in the UK, 
but that there is some support for the weak screening hypothesis and human 
capital theory. I would tend towards the view expressed by Dolton (1985) in 
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relation to the role of education in the UK, in that there is reasonable evidence to 
support a model which incorporates both the signalling and human capital roles of 
education, but no evidence to support the strong version of the screening 
hypothesis. 
Chapter 7 tested the role of education in the Italian labour market. 
Comparisons between earnings determination in the North-Centre and South of 
Italy, showed that there was little variation in the effect of education upon 
earnings, even though the two areas have different levels of economic 
development. Comparisons between the UK and Italy in 1989 showed that the 
average rate of return to years of education was approximately twice as high in 
the UK compared to Italy. It was also shown that the effects of gender and worker 
type are significantly different in the two countries. This implies that EU labour 
market policies aimed at convergence in wage rates and productivity should also 
address the issue of the differences in opportunities for female workers, the self-
employed and the efficiency and equity of educational systems in providing skills 
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and increased earnings for workers in member states. However, we must note that 
the earnings equations· of the two countries differed in the dependant and 
independent variables included, and so these results are at best approximate 
representations of the true differentials between these two EU member states. 
Chapter 7 applied the worker type comparative methodology from Chapter 
5 and sectoral, education and tenure grouping, methodologies of Chapter 6 to data 
for Italy 1989. The higher returns to high school and university level certification 
estimated for the self-employed in comparison to employees is contrary to the 
screening hypothesis and therefore, although the other two education categories 
were shown to have no effect on the earnings of the self-employed, there is little 
support for the idea that education has a signalling role in the Italian labour 
market from these results. 
Applying the P-test methodology of Chapter 6 to the Italian data gave 
some support to the weak, but not the strong, version of the screening hypothesis. 
Intermediate and high-school level certification appeared to hold no human 
capital or informational value in the services sector. However, degree level 
certification increased earnings by approximately 42% and 17% for public 
administration and service sector employees respectively. This result lends 
support to the weak screening hypothesis since there appeared to be a lower 
average rate of return to higher education in the less screened sector in 
comparison to the more screened sector. Using Tucker's (1986) methodologies on 
the Italian data provided some evidence in favour of the. weak screening 
hypothesis, but refuted the strong screening hypothesis. 
As with the UK data, there is some evidence to support a model which 
incorporates both the signalling and human capital roles of education in the Italian 
labour market, but no evidence to support the strong screening hypothesis. 
If weak screening exists in the labour markets of the UK and Italy, as is 
suggested by the results of this Thesis, there are important policy implications. 
The weak screening model gives the result that workers are paid wages equal to 
their marginal productivity, which is equivalent to the human capital model; in 
this case self-funding policy is not justified if all courses are improving national 
productivity (and acting as signals). 
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However, some educational courses in the two countries may be acting 
mainly as screening devices and have little effect on individual and therefore 
national productivity, whereas other courses may be acting mainly as ways of 
improving individual and national productivity, and other courses have equal 
roles. Because of this the introduction of self-funding for higher education (and 
indeed post-compulsory education of all types) may distort both the distribution of 
income and the growth of national output. 
If self-funding has blanket coverage then some individuals may abstain 
from investing in those courses which do impart useful skills (and also act as job 
market signals). In the case of weak screening the required policy would appear 
to be to impose self-funding only on those courses that act mainly as job market 
signals of a priori information, to impose joint funding (i.e. central and self-
finance schemes) for those courses which both improve and signal productivity 
equally, and to centrally fund those courses which are solely or mainly human 
capital in nature, from national resources. 
As previously mentioned there is no control variable or proxy variable for 
individual productive ability throughout the analyses contained within this thesis, 
this was due to data limitations; no such variables were available in the BSA 
sample or SCIF sample. Therefore, the first caveat to be applied to the results 
contained in this thesis is to note that an implicit assumption is being made; the 
individuals in the two groups used in each comparative methodology are on 
average assumed to have insignificantly different levels of ability. For example, if 
the employee subsample used in Chapter 5 have a higher average level of 
productive ability than the self-employed then this may be one reason why they 
earn more, rather than the differential being due to returns to their higher levels of 
education. 
Taubman (1976a,b) found that not controlling for genetics and family 
background in such regressions may cause a over-estimation of coefficients of up 
to two thirds. However, Griliches ( 1977) showed that the assumed positive 
omitted-ability bias in estimation of earnings coefficients in earnings regressions 
may actually be insignificant or reversed. 
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Indeed, Weiss (1995) contends that in screening models firms cannot 
directly observe the productivity enhancing attributes of a worker that are 
commonly omitted from earnings regressions. Firms use education as an indirect 
estimator of the unobserved ability. The estimated coefficient on education is 
fully capturing the effects of the firms' estimation process and would not be 
affected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that the firm cannot 
directly observe. Indeed, due to similar data limitations as experienced in this 
thesis, a majority of the articles reviewed in Chapter 3 use simple Mincerian 
earnings functions to estimate the education-earnings relationship and have no 
control for individual demographic, regional or ability related variables. 
The second caveat applies to the P-tests and is simply a re-statement of 
Ziderman's (1990) critique detailed in Section 6.2.7. Ziderman (1990) posits that 
the methodology of identifying whether educational effects are eroded with age is 
based upon an incorrect interpretation of the screening model. In the P-test 
literature the model tested is one in which firms pay irrationally higher starting 
salaries to the more educated workers in the absence of alternative information. 
The distinction drawn between the weak and strong hypotheses is based upon 
whether firms continue to pay irrational wages after the worker has been 
monitored on the job. 
This theoretical framework is in conflict with the previous theoretical 
literature in which firms will only continue to use education as a screen if it can 
be used to correctly predict the productivity of workers at the point of hiring. 
Ziderman (1990) suggests that the erosion of returns to educational variables with 
age is an effect of older applicants rather than existing workers with higher 
tenure. He suggests that the observed erosion of returns with age is due to the 
accumulation of information from labour force participation which can be used as 
an alternative screen for productive ability. 
A further limitation of this thesis is that it does not follow those 
methodologies which appear to be best designed for the analyses of the role of 
education; due to the lack of useful detail within both the BSA Survey and SCIF 
data sets. This author would suggest that three methodologies stand out as 
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candidates for future research when suitable data becomes available; both because 
of their lucid analyses and their lack of application by previous economists. 
These methodologies are as follows: Oosterbeek & Groot's (1994) 
methodology of the decomposition of actual years of schooling into effective, 
repeated, skipped, inefficient routing and dropout years. Wiles (1974) proposed 
methodology of comparing the earnings of workers in occupations related to their 
educational qualifications to those of other workers with the same qualifications, 
but who are working in areas not directly related to their education. A 
modification of Albrecht's (1981) methodology of analysing the hiring process of 
the employer using a probit model to test the screening hypothesis. 
In Albrecht' s analysis in which applicants are characterised by their 
education and the amount of information the hiring firm has about them, the firm 
is assumed to depend more heavily on education as a signal when screening 
applicants about which it has no alternative information, and the dependant 
variable is zero or one depending on whether the applicant is hired. I would 
suggest that the dependant should be zero or one depending on whether the 
applicant is asked for an interview i.e. if the applicant passes through the initial 
educational screening process, since much 'noise' is introduced by variations in 
interview performance and additional information arising from the interview. 
Garen (1984) and Harmon & Walker (1995) tackle the endogeniety of 
schooling using two-stage selection models. Schooling is treated as a choice 
variable and selectivity corrected rates of return are estimated. The findings 
suggest that is important to control for selectivity and support the comparative 
advantage hypothesis of Willis & Rosen (1979). This methodology was not 
incorporated into the analyses in this thesis and in future research I hope to clarify 
the issue of educational choice between worker types using such a model. 
Further research in this field should apply to different models as well as 
different methdologies. The intuitively appealing credentialist theory appears to 
have seldom been analysed empirically. In Thurow's (1975) job-queue model 
workers improve their education simply to maintain their relative position in the 
queue for jobs; a heirachy in which those at the front of the queue have the 
opportunity to gain jobs which have higher salaries than those that could be 
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gained in a position further down the queue. Similar analyses can be found in the 
field of psychology; for example see Berg (1971) and Do re (1976). Such 
credentialist models, where qualifications and union, staff association or 
professional group membership is an uncompetitve and non-productive barrier to 
entry in the labour market, need to be thoroughly tested in an economic 
framework. 
Second is the case alluded to in Section 2.5.3 and above, where in a weak 
screening environment there may be qualifications that have different strengths as 
signals and productivity enhancers. Following evidence of weak screening, future 
research should focus on the extent to which specific courses of centrally funded 
higher and non-compulsory education are job market signals and the extent to 
which they improve worker productivity; to allow better management and 
targetting of educational funding. 
A third area that requires further research is the extent to which on-the-job 
training or day release courses, which may be funded by the firm (in the case of 
firm-specific skills) or indirectly by the worker (in the case of general skills), 
could replace higher education as a more efficient provider of human capital in 
some industries, and negate the necessity for other, possibly less efficient, 
screening processes. 
Finally, in an international context, the differing roles of qualifications in 
the different domestic markets of member states of the EU (i.e. which 
qualifications are mainly used as screening devices, and which ones are 
considered mainly as productivity augmenting in a weak screening environment) 
implies that there may be discriminatory behaviour patterns inherent in hiring and 
wage setting processes that EU directives have not yet addressed. Further 
research is necessary to understand and evaluate the role of education in the EU 
labour market as a whole. 
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